Re: comm. (was Re: FW: Re:Emergence Seminar--BritishEmergence)
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Re: comm. (was Re: FW: Re:Emergence Seminar--BritishEmergence)
 
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Marcus,
Hmmm! This communication is a case in point. You hear me to say something like .... forgive the hyperbole ... I have to know whether Marcus's father flogged him with wet noodles before I can understand what he means by his views on writing in forums and listservs. But that is not what I meant to say. I meant to say that language is always ambiguous and that you have to build a big picture of what is being said out of the little words that are offered you. Before you responded to my message, you built a model of my mind. I would say you built the wrong model, although (at the risk of drawing Russ back to this argument) we might bring evidence to bear and argue that point. In short, we held different models of my mind, and it led to a misunderstanding. If one tries to be aware of the different models that might be built on the same words, it helps to make a conversation more fruitful, I believe. If one has read some history of thinking on the subject, one has more potential models available to apply to any utterance. One is more likely to understand what the speaker meant. I thought the comment on the New Criticism was interesting, but I am not sure it's relevant here. Literature is not designed to inform in the same way that I assume [hmmmm!] postings to this list are designed to inform. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > [Original Message] > From: Marcus G. Daniels <[hidden email]> > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 9/15/2009 3:40:14 PM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] comm. (was Re: FW: Re:Emergence Seminar--BritishEmergence) > > Nicholas Thompson wrote: > > I was puzzled, when you wrote ... > > > > "It could be to communicate, but it could > > also be to entertain or to manipulate. If a reader thinks they are > > modeling a writer's *mind* (holy crap, the arrogance..), it's likely > > they are just going down the road the writer so competently put out for > > them." > > > > What sort of a "mind" did you have in mind? There are those of us out > > that think that mind is just an individuals longstanding pattern of > > response and sensitiivity. So when you read what I write, you have to try > > and gather, from the short sample that I give you, what the over all > > pattern is. So it may be arrogance, but isnt it also a necessity? Arent > > you constantly building models of the minds of the people around you? > > > I may or may not be. Why would you assume that it is effective for me, > in order to better understand your arguments, to model YOU? Just the > opposite could be true. It could be better for me to filter out the > noise (a highly parameterized model of someone's personality) to get to > the signal (the point or its absence). > > Down with straw men, > > Marcus > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: comm. (was Re: FW: Re:Emergence Seminar--BritishEmergence)
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Don't worry. It's not an argument I want to be drawn into.
-- RussA On Tue, Sep 15, 2009 at 9:24 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote: Marcus, ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: comm. (was Re: FW: Re:Emergence Seminar--BritishEmergence)
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> Before you responded to my message, you built a model of my mind. I built a model of your utterance from immediate context. In my view, it would not be useful for me to attempt to model your mind, as that includes, among other things, your life memory, emotions, logical and non-logical executive processes. Such a model would be very complex, ill-informed by data available and comprehensible to me, and less effective than asking for clarification on Emergence or communication or whatever. > If one tries to be aware of the different models that might be built on the > same words, it helps to make a conversation more fruitful, I believe. Is a fruitful conversation one that leads to more conversation, or to a conclusion? Marcus -- "What can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence." Ludwig Wittgenstein ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: comm. (was Re: FW: Re:Emergence Seminar--BritishEmergence)
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
On Sep 15, 2009, at 9:24 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
That's an intriguing issue actually and docks nicely with Marcus's question below. What is different about scientific discourse? Is it intent? Context? The larger point is that people have done a lot of thinking about this kind of stuff already and if nothing else the post-structuralists have made early critical approaches appear hopelessly naive. I can't help but see some striking parallels between New Criticism and the general scientific materialist world view. Granted, a lot of post-structuralism is self-referential, brain-dead and nihilistic, but some of it quite brilliant and I think ultimately indispensable to any efforts at communicating our understanding and (yes) appreciation of complex systems and knowing the limits of doing so.
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: comm. (was Re: FW: Re:Emergence Seminar--BritishEmergence)
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Miles Parker wrote:
> What is different about scientific discourse? Is it intent? Context? > Scientific writing aims to facilitate the reader in understanding how to reproduce a result. It must be subject neutral. Why should pre-publication discourse be different? For example, peer review is not supposed to be different. I could see why some interdisciplinary collaborative discourse would be different, as it would involve education (e.g. each colleague could model the other to have an idea of what they probably understand and what they probably don't). But the inputs and outputs to those models would come down to utterances in a domain or set of domains of science, and so there again the direct approach (correct what was said), ought to be fine. Marcus ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: comm. (was Re: FW: Re:Emergence Seminar--BritishEmergence)
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Thus spake Marcus G. Daniels circa 09/16/2009 06:49 AM:
> Miles Parker wrote: >> What is different about scientific discourse? Is it intent? Context? >> > Scientific writing aims to facilitate the reader in understanding how to > reproduce a result. It must be subject neutral. "Must" is too strong. Here's an (obviously contrived) example. Let's say a document says something like: "Next, add 500 mL of gel to a BIBBLEGONK, agitate for 30 seconds, and sluice into 5 250 mL petri dishes." How do we determine what a BIBBLEGONK is? Can we do it in an entirely subject neutral way? True, we can infer many of the properties of a BIBBLEGONK from the usage, here. It must be able to be agitated and we have to be able to sluice from it either with something built into it or with an attachment. But a better way would be to find out precisely what it is, which involves thinking at least enough about the subject to do an internet search or to ask someone local who might know something about these experiments, the equipment required, and the people who conduct them. I.e. it's not entirely subject neutral. This sort of thing happens all the time when one lab reproduces the experiments of another lab, especially when the experiments are spatially or temporally distant. In that sense, I posit that easily reproducible scientific discourse is most definitely NOT subject neutral. Ideally, you'd want to record _everything_ about not just the non-subject elements of the experiment, but about the people executing the experiment and the conditions under which they executed it. 99.999...% of that data would be unnecessary. But in the situation where reproduction proves elusive, it can be mined for salient differences that will help the new lab reproduce the result. Again, as long as the simpler model is adequate for the use, you use it. If it's not, you extend it. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: comm. (was Re: FW: Re:Emergence Seminar--BritishEmergence)
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glen e. p. ropella wrote:
>> Scientific writing aims to facilitate the reader in understanding how to >> reproduce a result. It must be subject neutral. >> > > "Must" is too strong. Here's an (obviously contrived) example. Let's > say a document says something like: "Next, add 500 mL of gel to a > BIBBLEGONK, agitate for 30 seconds, and sluice into 5 250 mL petri dishes." > > How do we determine what a BIBBLEGONK is? Can we do it in an entirely > subject neutral way? there isn't, then it is probably well understood in the field what it means, and in that sense it remains subject neutral; the reader is expected to have certain training or background. That's different then them building a generous model of what the writer is trying to say. I don't want to argue the point as to whether the academic literature does an appropriate of making ideas accessible to outsiders. I find I read a lot of stuff where the idea being conveyed ends up being pretty simple, but I have to wade through piles of jargon to get that simple point. The whole first half of Science with its condensed versions of the papers I often find harder to read than the articles themselves. Marcus ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: comm. (was Re: FW: Re:Emergence Seminar--BritishEmergence)
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In reply to this post by glen e. p. ropella-2
What's the big deal about the bibblegonk, that part I
figured out -
looked it up on ebay and got some at a discount... But then I tried desperately
to agitate the mixture, and couldn't find anything to say that it truly found
insulting! Again, this conversation about "modeling minds" is weirdly high-end. Even the most trivial understanding of the words in context (e.g., "agitate") requires something of a model of the writer. Eric On Wed, Sep 16, 2009 10:41 AM, "glen e. p. ropella" <[hidden email]> wrote: Eric CharlesThus spake Marcus G. Daniels circa 09/16/2009 06:49 AM: > Miles Parker wrote: > What is different about scientific discourse? Is it intent? Context? > > Scientific writing aims to facilitate the reader in understanding how to > reproduce a result. It must be subject neutral. "Must" is too strong. Here's an (obviously contrived) example. Let's say a document says something like: "Next, add 500 mL of gel to a BIBBLEGONK, agitate for 30 seconds, and sluice into 5 250 mL petri dishes." How do we determine what a BIBBLEGONK is? Can we do it in an entirely subject neutral way? True, we can infer many of the properties of a BIBBLEGONK from the usage, here. It must be able to be agitated and we have to be able to sluice from it either with something built into it or with an attachment. But a better way would be to find out precisely what it is, which involves thinking at least enough about the subject to do an internet search or to ask someone local who might know something about these experiments, the equipment required, and the people who conduct them. I.e. it's not entirely subject neutral. This sort of thing happens all the time when one lab reproduces the experiments of another lab, especially when the experiments are spatially or temporally distant. In that sense, I posit that easily reproducible scientific discourse is most definitely NOT subject neutral. Ideally, you'd want to record _everything_ about not just the non-subject elements of the experiment, but about the people executing the experiment and the conditions under which they executed it. 99.999...% of that data would be unnecessary. But in the situation where reproduction proves elusive, it can be mined for salient differences that will help the new lab reproduce the result. Again, as long as the simpler model is adequate for the use, you use it. If it's not, you extend it. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org Professional Student and Assistant Professor of Psychology Penn State University Altoona, PA 16601 ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: comm. (was Re: FW: Re:Emergence Seminar--BritishEmergence)
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Thus spake ERIC P. CHARLES circa 09/16/2009 08:35 AM:
> Again, this conversation about "modeling minds" is weirdly high-end. > Even the most trivial understanding of the words in context (e.g., > "agitate") requires something of a model of the writer. Well, Marcus' point is well taken to the extent that if you don't need the extended model of the writer, then a model based purely on the text (including some sort of interpretation of the vernacular meanings of all the words in it) is a) more practical, b) more trustable, c) conservative, etc. The key part is that, especially in science, one is supposed to be building transpersonal knowledge... things that are true for multiple people, not just a single person. So, by sticking with the vernacular meanings as opposed to the specific personal meanings, private to the writer, you help ensure that transitive aspect of the knowledge. Hence, modeling the writer's _mind_ is, from this perspective, not only unnecessary, but a Bad Thing(tm) in general. Only sloppy, irresponsible people (would) use these extended models. At least that's my take on his argument. And I agree with my interpretation of his argument, except in cases where the usage _requires_ an extended model of the writer. E.g. where a text cannot be understood without the extended (speculative) context. In those cases, I say go ahead and extend the model despite your ignorance, but be vigilant in the caveats that the uncertainty in the extended model is unbounded and your model is totally invalid ("invalid" in simulation jargon or "unsound" in logic/philosophy jargon). -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: comm. (was Re: FW: Re:Emergence Seminar--BritishEmergence)
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glen e. p. ropella wrote:
> I say go ahead and extend the model despite your ignorance, but be > vigilant in the caveats that the uncertainty in the extended model is > unbounded and your model is totally invalid ("invalid" in simulation > jargon or "unsound" in logic/philosophy jargon). > I'm not denying that this kind of social modeling goes on or that it isn't useful sometimes. But it's risky to even *talk* about this class of models -- that's why there are legal guards against prejudicial evidence and many religions consider bearing false witness a sin. If the symbols of a model aren't anywhere close to grounded, almost any proposition could be true or false. It could be that some things are more or less likely, but figuring that out soon becomes a huge computational/cognitive load. Marcus ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: comm. (was Re: FW: Re:Emergence Seminar--BritishEmergence)
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In reply to this post by glen e. p. ropella-2
I would put it more strongly and say that it is "entirely not subject neutral". I think if we look honestly there is not a single thing that we can drill into that has ultimate reality. I'm not being cute, or deep, or nihilistic, ;) but I really don't think that this is simply a matter of reducing to the absurd either. Or if it is, then we are showing that the very act of reduction is itself absurd. Once we begin with that kind of understanding of the profound limitations of conceptual knowledge then we can begin to do real science. (I am thinking quite seriously about writing a book that catalogs material and concepts simply as an exercise in loosing our affection for seeing things as "really real".) On Sep 16, 2009, at 7:41 AM, glen e. p. ropella wrote: > Thus spake Marcus G. Daniels circa 09/16/2009 06:49 AM: >> Miles Parker wrote: >>> What is different about scientific discourse? Is it intent? Context? >>> >> Scientific writing aims to facilitate the reader in understanding >> how to >> reproduce a result. It must be subject neutral. > > I.e. it's not entirely subject neutral. ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by Marcus G. Daniels
Thus spake Marcus G. Daniels circa 09-09-16 10:39 AM:
> If the symbols of a model > aren't anywhere close to grounded, almost any proposition could be true > or false. It could be that some things are more or less likely, but > figuring that out soon becomes a huge computational/cognitive load. Well, the symbols in such a model _are_ grounded to the person constructing and using the model. So, as a thinking tool, there's no danger at all. The danger comes in when that person makes the mistake of believing that what they think is somehow real. Besides, we can say the exact same thing about models grounded to the vernacular. Just because a bunch of people use the same terms in, seemingly, the same way does NOT imply that those terms are any more grounded than the private terms inside one person's mind. In fact, because those terms are aggregate abstractions, they are _less_ well-grounded than personal terms (because grounding comes from having fingers, toes, tongues, eyes, etc.). The danger of misunderstanding and confusion is much higher when using the vernacular because it's more tempting to think that, because you speak the way others do, you're all somehow _right_ about whatever you're talking about. It's easier to be tricked into thinking a falsehood is true if _lots_ of people share in the falsehood ... another typical trait of organized religion. Using your own private models and forcing yourself to continually map your lexicon to others' is a great way of ensuring you don't fall into the trap of "consensus reality" and justificationism. Really, it's 6 to one 1/2 a dozen to the other. Both are untrustworthy and that's why the success of science is based on _behavior_ not words. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: comm. (was Re: FW: Re:Emergence Seminar--BritishEmergence)
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In reply to this post by Miles Parker
Miles Parker wrote:
> > I think if we look honestly there is not a single thing that we can > drill into that has ultimate reality. But there are a lot of things that can be controlled very effectively and with predictable failure rates. > I'm not being [...] nihilistic Are they arresting people for that now? Let me know.. :-) Marcus ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by glen e. p. ropella-2
glen e. p. ropella wrote:
> Well, the symbols in such a model _are_ grounded to the person > constructing and using the model. So, as a thinking tool, there's no > danger at all. The danger comes in when that person makes the mistake > of believing that what they think is somehow real. > It's real enough if it works (predicts) and facilitates whatever personal or social goals. If it doesn't work, it's not a great tool. ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by Marcus G. Daniels
Thus spake Marcus G. Daniels circa 09-09-16 11:22 AM:
> Miles Parker wrote: >> >> I think if we look honestly there is not a single thing that we can >> drill into that has ultimate reality. >> > But there are a lot of things that can be controlled very effectively > and with predictable failure rates. But the question is How are they controlled? I think the answer is with multiple models, by parallax. A single model is never valid (sound), as Miles points out. Multiple models are required for validity and, hence, control and prediction. I'd go even further to claim that the more complex the system, the more models required to effectively model it. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: comm. (was Re: FW: Re:Emergence Seminar--BritishEmergence)
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In reply to this post by Marcus G. Daniels
On Sep 16, 2009, at 11:22 AM, Marcus G. Daniels wrote: > Miles Parker wrote: >> >> I think if we look honestly there is not a single thing that we can >> drill into that has ultimate reality. > But there are a lot of things that can be controlled very > effectively and with predictable failure rates. Good. I was expecting we were on the same page on that one, but given the discussion at Swarmfest I'm not sure how many people -- including "scientists" who should know better -- still believe in such. Still... prediction is a funny word. Because you know, you can only predict what has already happened. And control is only effective until it isn't. Which as a consequence of that, always happens at the worst possible time. ;) >> I'm not being [...] nihilistic > Are they arresting people for that now? Let me know.. :-) You'll be the um... first to know. ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by glen e. p. ropella-2
On Sep 16, 2009, at 12:11 PM, glen e. p. ropella wrote:
I would heartily agree -- and as the name of this group is "Applied Complexity" -- that that is sound practical advice. Curious if you are also arguing that *in general*, say validity(M1) > validity(M2) where M1 and M2 are sets of models and M1@ > M2@, or M1 ⊃ M2? I think but am not sure that I am interpreting your parallax argument correctly. Do you mean that literally, or as a kind of heuristic? Does it assume a known or knowable state-space? ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Faith and Science (was comm.)
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In reply to this post by Miles Parker
Miles: "I think if we look honestly there is not a single thing that we can drill into that has ultimate reality."-- It's funny, I have the general notion that "scientists" shouldn't know better. I don't mean that based on their intelligence, but I think it is much easier for scientists to go about doing the stuff they do, and they do it better, if they think they are REALLY doing it. Albeit, it may be fun to predict where a cannon ball is going to land, or what the orbit of the planets will be, but if people didn't think they were finding out something "real" about "gravity" I doubt the activity would have been as engaging. For an example in a science that seems less useful to me: It always amazes me that social and personality psychologists can go around thinking that the things they study are "real"... extroversion, emotional intelligence, in-group preference, etc.... Yet, I also have the feeling that if they for one moment thought as I did, that they were (at best) just playing a strange prediction game, the whole enterprise would suddenly grind to a halt. Ah, the time and money that would be saved. Of course, the social and personality psychologists would likely say the same thing about my work, reinforcing my point: I to go about my work just fine, at least in part, because (barring the occasional metaphysical spaz) I go about my day to day business with the firm belief that I am REALLY studying things. When people on this list talk about emergence, complexity, intrinsic organization, rule governed behavior, consciousness, software usability, threshold phenomenon, keyboard preferences, etc., don't most of them think they are talking about something real? Eric ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: comm. (was Re: FW: Re:Emergence Seminar--BritishEmergence)
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In reply to this post by Miles Parker
Isn't that the postmodernist position?
Frank -----Original Message----- From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Miles Parker Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2009 12:04 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Subject: Re: [FRIAM] comm. (was Re: FW: Re:Emergence Seminar--BritishEmergence) I would put it more strongly and say that it is "entirely not subject neutral". I think if we look honestly there is not a single thing that we can drill into that has ultimate reality. I'm not being cute, or deep, or nihilistic, ;) but I really don't think that this is simply a matter of reducing to the absurd either. Or if it is, then we are showing that the very act of reduction is itself absurd. Once we begin with that kind of understanding of the profound limitations of conceptual knowledge then we can begin to do real science. (I am thinking quite seriously about writing a book that catalogs material and concepts simply as an exercise in loosing our affection for seeing things as "really real".) On Sep 16, 2009, at 7:41 AM, glen e. p. ropella wrote: > Thus spake Marcus G. Daniels circa 09/16/2009 06:49 AM: >> Miles Parker wrote: >>> What is different about scientific discourse? Is it intent? Context? >>> >> Scientific writing aims to facilitate the reader in understanding >> how to >> reproduce a result. It must be subject neutral. > > I.e. it's not entirely subject neutral. ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by Miles Parker
Thus spake Miles Parker circa 09-09-16 12:49 PM:
> I would heartily agree -- and as the name of this group is "Applied > Complexity" -- that that is sound practical advice. Curious if you are > also arguing that *in general*, say > > validity(M1) > validity(M2) > > where M1 and M2 are sets of models and M1@ > M2@, or M1 ⊃ M2? I'm not sure what that last symbol is (⊃); but I do NOT assert that any set of models that's larger than any other set of models is more valid merely because it's larger. Rather, I assert that more models are required to represent a complex system than a simple system. And adding another (valid) model to a set of (valid) models of a system increases the accuracy of the set. It's important that each model be validated against some aspect (use case) of the system, of course. Adding an invalid model would probably -- but not necessarily -- decrease the validity of the whole set. Also, it's necessary for the models to be validated against different aspects of the system. I.e. just adding another model that validates against an identical aspect as another model already in the set probably won't increase the validity of the whole set (by much anyway). > I think but am not sure that I am interpreting your parallax argument > correctly. Do you mean that literally, or as a kind of heuristic? Does > it assume a known or knowable state-space? I mean it literally. It does not assume a known or knowable _mechanism_. It does assume known or knowable phenomena (which is a fancy way of saying that we have to have concrete _measurement_ operators we apply to the model and the system for validation). Much of this is spelled out in excruciating detail in our newest paper: http://www.springerlink.com/content/v6q24gw11l037351/ Sorry for the plug.... I didn't intend for the conversation to go this way. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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