Re: comm. (was Re: FW: Re:Emergence Seminar--BritishEmergence)
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I'll see your Synchronicity and raise you a double helping of
Confirmation Bias.
I don't know... adding discussions of the meaning of "synchronicity" to "complexity" and "emergence" would add some exotic spice to the otherwise "meat and potatoes" of Philosophy. Or if not Synchonicity at least something that alliterates with it like "Stigmergy". It is interesting that Pauli corresponded with Jung (I have the collection of that correspondence in book form) throughout most of their careers on this and related topics. He seemed to (want to?) take Jung and Synchronicity seriously.... Aside from the personal friendship they struck up, it might have something to do with the various paradoxes of subatomic physics including quantum effects that he was wrestling with. Pauli and colleagues coined the the term "the Pauli Effect" to describe (tongue-in-cheek I am sure) the coincidence that experiments were prone to fail in his presence. It is a nice corollary to many of our own experiences with demos that only work when there is no (important) audience. I am no expert on Synchronicity but it has always struck me that there are a plethora of alternate mechanisms for meaningful relation besides direct, simple, causality but are nevertheless rooted in a causal universe. They are generally described as "correlation" and there are many recognized mechanisms that make sense in a "causal" world but are not directly, causally connected. Parallel evolution and emergence seem to be two obvious ones. Purveyors of Newage and Mysticism often imply (or state directly and vehemently) that meaningful connections that are not (directly) causally linked is proof by counter-example that causality is an illusion or not real or at least not the only way things work. I'm enough of a "wishful thinker" to not discount possible extra-causal connections, but I also believe that such phenomena as our own coveted "emergence" and the ever-popular "parallel evolution" (which are based in causality) explain *most* and could explain *all* of the phenomena described by Synchronicity and *not* dismissable simply as Confirmation Bias. Sorry Doug, I just couldn't help myself... Coincidence or Synchronicity? You decide. - Steve Nah. Let's go with philosophy. Again. ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by Russ Abbott
Thus spake Russ Abbott circa 09-09-22 12:23 PM:
> Would you tell me why that is important. Biology isn't physics. Is the > fact that you don't consider it physics a criticism of biology? Are you > saying biology should be physics? I'm missing the point. Wow. OK. Physics has one language for its hypothetical mechanisms and biology uses a totally different language. That's what I'm saying. > So what are you suggesting be done? Or am I still missing your point? You are totally missing my point. Economics is expressed in a language that is different from the language we use to express physics. The language of biology is also different from that of physics. I'm not suggesting anything be done. I'm defining complexity in response to Miles' conjecture that SoPS may be more complex than physical systems and in response to Jochen's suggestion that part of the reason for the apparent complexity of SoPS lies in the informality of the languages used to describe them. Here's a recap: Miles: Let SoPS be more complex than physical systems. Miles: .: Adequate explanation of SoPS requires more models than that of physical systems. Miles: .: More effort is required to explain SoPS than physical systems. Jochen: Perhaps SoPS are no more complex than physical systems, it's just that they haven't arrived at formalisms for them, yet. Me: SoPS are NOT necessarily more complex than physical systems, not (solely) due to informality, but because complexity is a result of circular causality and lexical mismatch. That's it. That's the end of it. That's all there is to it. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by Douglas Roberts-2
Thus spake Douglas Roberts circa 09-09-22 12:27 PM:
> Nah. Let's go with philosophy. Again. Hm. Which is worse? Yahoos who have a tendency to wax philosophical or yahoos who continually, insistently, repeat the same vapid objection to philosophy over and over and over despite the lack of effect? What's the definition of "insanity" again? [grin] -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by Steve Smith
Steve Smith wrote:
> I'm enough of a "wishful thinker" to not discount possible > extra-causal connections, but I also believe that such phenomena as > our own coveted "emergence" and the ever-popular "parallel evolution" > (which are based in causality) explain *most* and could explain *all* > of the phenomena described by Synchronicity and *not* dismissable > simply as Confirmation Bias > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confirmation_bias>. Did Pauli mean parallel evolution (grouping by meaning, where meaning is not subjective), or did he actually buy into the idea of the collective unconscious influencing how things unfold in nature? Marcus ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by glen e. p. ropella-2
Good question!
Let's see what my random philosophy generator has to say about this: It is plain that we have not simply lost an infinite horizon of approximations for phenomenology; we retain it, however, by a freely actualizable return to experiences. Ah, yes: fine stuff. ;-} --Doug On Tue, Sep 22, 2009 at 2:28 PM, glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]> wrote: Thus spake Douglas Roberts circa 09-09-22 12:27 PM: -- Doug Roberts [hidden email] [hidden email] 505-455-7333 - Office 505-670-8195 - Cell ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by glen e. p. ropella-2
On Tue, Sep 22, 2009 at 1:04 PM, glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]> wrote:
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In reply to this post by Marcus G. Daniels
Marcus G. Daniels wrote:
> Steve Smith wrote: >> I'm enough of a "wishful thinker" to not discount possible >> extra-causal connections, but I also believe that such phenomena as >> our own coveted "emergence" and the ever-popular "parallel evolution" >> (which are based in causality) explain *most* and could explain *all* >> of the phenomena described by Synchronicity and *not* dismissable >> simply as Confirmation Bias >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confirmation_bias>. > Did Pauli mean parallel evolution (grouping by meaning, where meaning > is not subjective) mean the phenomena of "solutions" evolving with similar structure when faced with the same "problem"... such as fins on fish and flippers on water-mammals, or the multiple times that eyes (lensed photosensitive tissue directly connected to the neural system) have evolved independently. What they have in common is the underlying building blocks, the problem to solve (i.e. swimming or seeing) and similar constraints (i.e. viscosity of water, strength of muscle and bone, frequency spectra available, etc.) > or did he actually buy into the idea of the collective unconscious > influencing how things unfold in nature? You mean Morphogenesis and Morphic Resonance ala Rupert Sheldrake? I don't believe so... though that is another motley crue I am fascinated by. It may be morbid fascination, but fascination nonetheless. They naturally draw the interest of the Mystics as well. My interest in all of this is to find a middle way... not dismissing it completely out of hand, yet not swallowing it hook, line and sinker. I'm not sure how much middle ground that leaves... but it is still of interest to me. Even after reading a lot of their correspondence, I'm not clear on why Pauli was not more critical of the general area. He was clearly interested/fascinated and seemed to hold his balance in this same middle ground that I seek. - Steve ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by Russ Abbott
Sorry. Pressed "Send" by mistake.
On Tue, Sep 22, 2009 at 1:04 PM, glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]> wrote: OK. I don't understand what you mean by either circular causality or lexical mismatch.
Can you provide concrete examples of each. -- Russ A ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by Douglas Roberts-2
Douglas Roberts wrote:
Good question!Holy shiite Doug! You are our Reluctant Oracle after all! I think you've hit upon the fundamental answer to all of our questions, philosphical (synchronicity vs emergence and epistimology vs cosmology), technological (what is the bestest language for OO or ABM development), psychological (variations on homunculus talk), mathematical (is solving Goldbach's conjecture fundamentally more important than Fermat's last theorem?), and practical (is it too late for coffee yet too early for beer? And in what Time Zone?) All of these FRIAM discussions do seem to be about infinite horizons and somebody always demands that we return to experiences. Amazing... Synchronicity *and* Morphic Resonance all rolled into one! ;-} Steve
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In reply to this post by Russ Abbott
Doug -
Can you feed these into your Random Philosophy Generator Lexicon? We need it to become more specific to the discussions of this list. circular causality lexical mismatch - Steve Sorry. Pressed "Send" by mistake. ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by Steve Smith
Yeah, I know. I'm that good.
;-o On Tue, Sep 22, 2009 at 2:58 PM, Steve Smith <[hidden email]> wrote:
-- Doug Roberts [hidden email] [hidden email] 505-455-7333 - Office 505-670-8195 - Cell ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by Russ Abbott
Thus spake Russ Abbott circa 09-09-22 01:52 PM:
> OK. I don't understand what you mean by either *circular causality* or *lexical > mismatch*. Whew! OK. By "circular causality", I mean that a thing is caused by another thing that is caused by itself. Abstractly, let E1, E2, and E3 be events such that E1 causes E2, and E3 causes E3, and E3 causes E1. Of course, you may object that an event can only occur once in the time stream and so E3, having occurred after E2 cannot cause E1. But there are cases for it: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Retrocausality#Current_topics A more acceptable conception of it comes in the form of non-well-founded sets and impredicative definitions where an object is _defined_ in terms of a quantification over the whole set to which that object belongs, or more simply, a set can be a member of itself. More flaky conceptions of it are autopoiesis and Rosen's closure to efficient cause. A more practical conception of it is co-evolution. By "lexical mismatch", I mean that two languages are different (at least) in terms of their vocabulary. So, a formal system with a set of symbols {x,y,z} is lexically distinct from a formal system with a set of symbols {x,y,p}. It should be clear that sentences formed in the former may not have an equivalent in the latter. Lexical mismatch is the simplest form. There can also be differences in grammar and/or axioms, which would lead to a linguistic mismatch, which may also contribute to complexity. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by Douglas Roberts-2
Thus spake Douglas Roberts circa 09-09-22 01:36 PM:
> *It is plain that we have not simply lost an infinite horizon of > approximations for phenomenology; we retain it, however, by a freely > actualizable return to experiences. * I _finally_ understand your domain name "parrot-farm.net"! ;-) -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by glen e. p. ropella-2
Let's do one at a time.
Circular causality: Why do you say that retrocausality is a source of complexity? It's certainly a weird notion if it exists, but what does it have to do with complexity? How about flocking, a nice simple example of what is called a complex system. I see no retrocausality here. Would you suggest a concrete example of a complex system whose complexity (not just quantum weirdness) has to do with retrocausality. Lexical mismatch: Why is that a cause of complexity? Just becasue the langauge of say, group theory and calculus are lexically mismatched, what does that have to do with the complexity of anything? If on the other hand you are saying that, for example, the language of economics and the language of particle physics are lexically mismatched, I would agree. That, in fact, is part of my paper on reductionism, namely that terms for phenomena involving "higher level" entities don't exist at "lower levels." The examples of evolution in biology and Gresham's law in economics are lexically mismatched with the language of particle physics. So it sounds like you are agreeing with me. But in your original note you specifically said you were disagreeing with me. -- Russ A On Tue, Sep 22, 2009 at 2:13 PM, glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]> wrote: Thus spake Russ Abbott circa 09-09-22 01:52 PM: ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by glen e. p. ropella-2
Very nice summary. One thing I've noticed in most of the modeling
I've done is that Game Theory matches social interactions best, while Physics (constraints, physics, ...) matches physical interactions best. Examples: Crowd dynamics is fairly easily done with a blend of simple games (tit-for-tat, frustration, and so on) while modeling water traffic on the Venice canals works best with GIS (constraints on a graph, mass of the boats, etc). So at least part of the difference between SoPS and Physical modeling is in the formal domain that matches it best. -- Owen On Sep 22, 2009, at 2:04 PM, glen e. p. ropella wrote: > Thus spake Russ Abbott circa 09-09-22 12:23 PM: >> Would you tell me why that is important. Biology isn't physics. Is >> the >> fact that you don't consider it physics a criticism of biology? >> Are you >> saying biology should be physics? I'm missing the point. > > Wow. OK. Physics has one language for its hypothetical mechanisms > and > biology uses a totally different language. That's what I'm saying. > >> So what are you suggesting be done? Or am I still missing your point? > > You are totally missing my point. Economics is expressed in a > language > that is different from the language we use to express physics. The > language of biology is also different from that of physics. > > I'm not suggesting anything be done. I'm defining complexity in > response to Miles' conjecture that SoPS may be more complex than > physical systems and in response to Jochen's suggestion that part of > the > reason for the apparent complexity of SoPS lies in the informality of > the languages used to describe them. > > Here's a recap: > > Miles: Let SoPS be more complex than physical systems. > > Miles: .: Adequate explanation of SoPS requires more models than > that of > physical systems. > > Miles: .: More effort is required to explain SoPS than physical > systems. > > Jochen: Perhaps SoPS are no more complex than physical systems, it's > just that they haven't arrived at formalisms for them, yet. > > Me: SoPS are NOT necessarily more complex than physical systems, not > (solely) due to informality, but because complexity is a result of > circular causality and lexical mismatch. > > That's it. That's the end of it. That's all there is to it. > > -- > glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by Russ Abbott
Thus spake Russ Abbott circa 09-09-22 03:12 PM:
> *Circular causality:* Why do you say that retrocausality is a source of > complexity? It's certainly a weird notion if it exists, but what does it > have to do with complexity? How about flocking, a nice simple example of > what is called a complex system. I see no retrocausality here. Would you > suggest a concrete example of a complex system whose complexity (not just > quantum weirdness) has to do with retrocausality. You asked for examples of "circular causality". Retrocausality is an example of "circular causality". In my opinion flocking behavior is not (ontologically) complex. Another example of circular causality is co-evolution, where species adapt to compensate for each others' adaptations. > *Lexical mismatch:* Why is that a cause of complexity? Just becasue the > langauge of say, group theory and calculus are lexically mismatched, what > does that have to do with the complexity of anything? If on the other hand > you are saying that, for example, the language of economics and the language > of particle physics are lexically mismatched, I would agree. That, in fact, > is part of my paper on reductionism, namely that terms for phenomena > involving "higher level" entities don't exist at "lower levels." The > examples of evolution in biology and Gresham's law in economics are > lexically mismatched with the language of particle physics. So it sounds > like you are agreeing with me. But in your original note you specifically > said you were disagreeing with me. Right. I disagree with your reliance on _level_. The mismatched languages (and complexity) don't require the concept of _level_. I've explained this to you both here and privately. I'm running out of ways to say the same thing. I also disagree with your assumption that everything is reducible. And I also speculate that circular causality is necessary, which you do not. So, I disagree with you in those 3 ways. What does lexical mismatch have to do with complexity? Well, I've explained that, too. But I'll try again. a) lexical mismatch is necessary but not sufficient for the generation of ontological complexity. Circular causality is also required. b) lexical mismatch results in ontological complexity when one part of the system applies an operator, formulated in a language that is different from that in which the mechanism is formulated. The part of the system that is applying the operator uses the inaccurate/abstracted results of the operator as part of its mechanism (as when a bunny rabbit misinterprets the behavior of a wolf). Hence, both languages participate in the construction of the system as a whole. Complexity means "plaited", consisting of interwoven parts. The two languages (constructing the system) are the interwoven parts. If you only use a _single_ language and all elements in the system can be reduced to that single language, then it is a simple (not complex) system. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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On Tue, Sep 22, 2009 at 03:51:08PM -0700, glen e. p. ropella wrote:
> > What does lexical mismatch have to do with complexity? Well, I've > explained that, too. But I'll try again. a) lexical mismatch is > necessary but not sufficient for the generation of ontological > complexity. Circular causality is also required. b) lexical mismatch > results in ontological complexity when one part of the system applies an > operator, formulated in a language that is different from that in which > the mechanism is formulated. > > The part of the system that is applying the operator uses the > inaccurate/abstracted results of the operator as part of its mechanism > (as when a bunny rabbit misinterprets the behavior of a wolf). Hence, > both languages participate in the construction of the system as a whole. > > Complexity means "plaited", consisting of interwoven parts. The two > languages (constructing the system) are the interwoven parts. If you > only use a _single_ language and all elements in the system can be > reduced to that single language, then it is a simple (not complex) system. > I still don't follow why circular causality is required, although it is an interesting class of systems. So long as the two languages are lexically mismatched, that suffices, as there are behaviours (eg flocking) inexpressible in the reduced language. Cheers -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email] Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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Thus spake russell standish circa 09-09-22 05:06 PM:
> I still don't follow why circular causality is required, although it > is an interesting class of systems. So long as > the two languages are lexically mismatched, that suffices, as there > are behaviours (eg flocking) inexpressible in the reduced language. Well, remember that this is all speculation on my part. I could easily be wrong about all this. However, the reason I think circular causality is necessary is because if the construction is built up from a single, consistent language, then all one need do is show that the other language is isomorphic to the first (or find a new language where that's the case) and any apparent "complexity" is proven illusory. However, if the system is constructed with mismatched languages, in the first place, then it's no simple task to find a 3rd language that is isomorphic to the composition of the languages from which the system is constructed. I.e. for "strong" or "real" complexity, we need something that is _constructed_ with mismatched languages, not merely constructed with a single coherent one and operated on by another. And the only way to construct a system with mismatched languages is to embed one (different, mismatched) language inside another ... i.e. for one part of the system to use the results of an (inaccurate) operator as part of its mechanism. All this boils down to is that circular systems are not reducible beyond the elements of the circle. And if the circle is expressed in a single, consistent language, then the circle can be formulated nicely and isn't complex, which is why we need the language mismatch. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by glen e. p. ropella-2
On Tue, Sep 22, 2009 at 3:51 PM, glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]> wrote:
Thus spake Russ Abbott circa 09-09-22 03:12 PM: Are you saying that retrocausality (if it even exists) is necessary for complexity or that retrocausality (if it even exists) is sufficient for complexity? In my opinion flocking behavior is not (ontologically) complex. Then your notion of complexity differs from how the word is generally used in the field of complex systems. Flocking is one of the prototypical examples of a complex system. It is a (macro) phenomenon produced by the interaction of (micro) individuals. If you are going to dismiss that then what's the point of this discussion? Another example of circular causality is co-evolution, where species Then virtually everything qualifies as circular causality. Is there anything in the world that is not to one extent or another affected by what it does? To take one of the oldest examples of this sort of thing, by your definition a thermostat and the heating/cooling device it controls would be a complex system. I don't think that comports with the usual notion of complex system. What is not complex under this definition? Right. I disagree with your reliance on _level_. The mismatched Then please stop saying the same thing. I'm running out of ways to say that when I use the term "level" I'm not referring to a stratified structure. (I used the terms "micro" and "macro" above. Is that any better?) As you may know, one of my favorite examples is a gecko, which uses quantum phenomena to adhere to vertical surfaces. I've used the term "higher level" for geckos even though their phenomenology is directly dependent on "lowest level" phenomena. So instead of level perhaps the term "composed entity" would work better. Substitute "composed entity" for "higher level entity" and "component out of which a composed entity is composed" for "lower level entity" and lets stop getting distracted by this non-issue.
Can you give me an example of something that is non-reducible? Let's exclude quantum weirdness since no one really understand that. Besides, if there are physical primitives, then they are not reducible. Give me your example of a macro non-reducible phenomenon.
I've pointed out that you are apparently agreeing with me about what you call lexical mismatch. As I've said a number of times, the laws of economics and evolution cannot be expressed using the language of fundamental physics. Do you mean something different than that? If not you are agreeing with me. If you do mean something different from that, what is it? (And please give a concrete example instead of talking about generic "operators." Give an example of the operators you are thinking of.) ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by glen e. p. ropella-2
On Sep 22, 2009, at 1:04 PM, glen e. p. ropella wrote:
Yes, you're challenging my warrant and pretty persuasivly. (But I think there are some scale issues that could be relevant.) ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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