For those rare few of you that are INTENSELY interested by the recent discussion on self consciousness, here is a paper on the subject which asserts that every organism must have a point of view.
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/id14.html If anybody survives this one, there is a later one that establishes that such a point of view must include itself as a part. Nothing if not Escherian. (Escherian Coli, some would say.) Nick Nicholas Thompson nickthompson at earthlink.net http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: /pipermail/friam_redfish.com/attachments/20060625/25f20a56/attachment.html |
It seems a little like an argument where the two sides are squaring
off with different terminological bases. For me, "intentional" is an emergent concept. Something has intention if modeling something as having a mind with intentions gives a better model than modeling without. Most complex animals are better modeled that way. Simpler animals (eg ants) can often be modelled as mindless automata, and so could be described as intentionless. Of course there will be no obvious line of demarcation. One can model a thermostat as having a mind - its just that its not that good a model. So this means I more or less agree with you. However, the other camp are probably interested in the mind in the "what is it like to be" sense. Just because we model a creature as having a mind, doesn't mean there is anything it is like to be that creature. It need not be conscious. It definitely need not be self-aware (which is a more objectively measureable property). I argue that it is necessary to be self-aware to be conscious, but this email is too short to repeat the argument here. It is in my upcoming book "Theory of Nothing" though, if I've whetted anyone's appetite. Cheers On Sun, Jun 25, 2006 at 09:20:04PM -0400, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > For those rare few of you that are INTENSELY interested by the recent discussion on self consciousness, here is a paper on the subject which asserts that every organism must have a point of view. > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/id14.html > > If anybody survives this one, there is a later one that establishes that such a point of view must include itself as a part. > > Nothing if not Escherian. (Escherian Coli, some would say.) > > Nick > > > Nicholas Thompson > nickthompson at earthlink.net > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type "application/pgp-signature". Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics 0425 253119 (") UNSW SYDNEY 2052 R.Standish at unsw.edu.au Australia http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
I have finally read the article "Intentionality is the mark of the vital". It contains interesting remarks about the mind/body problem, about the relationship between mental and material "substance", and nice illustrations (for example about lions and gnus). Well written. If "intentionality is the mark of the vital", are artificial agents with intentions the first step towards vital, living systems ? Agents are of course used in artificial life, but in the context of the article the question seems to gain new importance. -J. ________________________________ From: Nicholas Thompson Sent: Monday, June 26, 2006 3:20 AM To: friam at redfish.com Subject: [FRIAM] self-consciousness For those rare few of you that are INTENSELY interested by the recent discussion on self consciousness, here is a paper on the subject which asserts that every organism must have a point of view. http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/id14.html |
On the suggestion I went back to Nick & Pat's paper, but don't find the
departure from a normal sifting of categories (philosophical conversation) that science broke from ages ago, and that Nick's own sharp questions about things with homing trajectories represents. I'm a designer, among other things, and while I understand the need to stretch the meanings of common words to raise new issues, I think 'design' and 'intentionality' can't be done by systems that don't make 'images'. You might stretch it to say that natural systems and their behaviors ARE images of their environments (though that's not what we mean when we refer to the mental state the word refers to), but I don't think it's right to say natural systems or their behaviors HAVE images, or designs on, their environments. That just seems to take us back to teleology. If 'intentionality' is to be read into complex systems that probably don't have vast reflective worlds of projected imagery seated in a central control structure, I think it'll disagree with the natural meaning of the word and be confusing. We grope for how to describe how things without brains can act as a whole, but I vote we not use 'intentionality'. To say that non-cognitive systems don't 'have designs on' other things isn't to say that the 'designs of nature' aren't real. They seem to be the main source of human 'invention'. Maybe the disconnect, that nature has design, but doesn't do design, is telling though. I think it's one of the most widespread errors of thought, that we use the same words for things in nature and in our minds, and don't distinguish... To think the world is in your mind does give you a peculiarly enthralling feeling of power, no doubt, but as a lifestyle it actually leaves you quite powerless. Phil Henshaw ????.?? ? `?.???? ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 680 Ft. Washington Ave NY NY 10040 tel: 212-795-4844 e-mail: pfh at synapse9.com explorations: www.synapse9.com > -----Original Message----- > From: friam-bounces at redfish.com > [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] On Behalf Of Jochen Fromm > Sent: Friday, July 14, 2006 3:42 AM > To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' > Subject: [FRIAM] Intentionality - the mark of the vital > > > > I have finally read the article "Intentionality is > the mark of the vital". It contains interesting > remarks about the mind/body problem, about the > relationship between mental and material "substance", > and nice illustrations (for example about lions and gnus). > Well written. > > If "intentionality is the mark of the vital", > are artificial agents with intentions the first > step towards vital, living systems ? Agents are > of course used in artificial life, but in the > context of the article the question seems to > gain new importance. > > -J. > ________________________________ > > From: Nicholas Thompson > Sent: Monday, June 26, 2006 3:20 AM > To: friam at redfish.com > Subject: [FRIAM] self-consciousness > > For those rare few of you that are INTENSELY interested by > the recent discussion on self consciousness, here is a paper > on the subject which asserts that every organism must have a > point of view. > ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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