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Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
 
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so, what does one behaviorist say to another after sex?
It was good for you, how was it for me? :-) tom On Jun 14, 2009, at 11:19 AM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
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Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
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s/behaviorist/FRIAMer/g
s/sex/a FRIAM list discussion/g :-o On Sun, Jun 14, 2009 at 12:16 PM, Tom Carter <[hidden email]> wrote:
-- Doug Roberts [hidden email] [hidden email] 505-455-7333 - Office 505-670-8195 - Cell ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
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In reply to this post by Jochen Fromm-4
<BASE
href="file://C:\Users\Rikus\Documents\My Stationery\">
I'm reminded of Daniel Dennett's "Consciousness Explained" whenever the
subject of consciousness and the elusive "I" comes up. I've read it more
than ten years ago, so the detail has largely faded and I'm
unsure how well the book has aged. At the time, I thought it was
an excellent read and my impression is that the avalanche of cognitive
neuroscience results, coming in thick and fast, mostly supports the central idea
-- i.e. "I" is an illusion born from the automatic assembly of a coherent,
after-the-fact, serialised account of a inherently parallel process with
multiple foci.
If Dennett's model is accurate, one should not be too
surprised at results like the following, which shows that simple decisions
can be detected and decoded on fMRI *10 seconds* before the subject consciously
experiences making a decision:
http://tinyurl.com/lcym4m -- Abstract. Full text requires subscription. http://tinyurl.com/l7go77 -- But the
web features wild redundancy.
http://tinyurl.com/kn3mmo --
Just-discovered video lecture by one of the authors. Haven't watched it
myself yet.
And some vaguely related material:
http://tinyurl.com/374x4k Apologies for jumping into this conversation from nowhere. I've
been lurking on the list for more than two years, I think, and am frequently
tempted to contribute. Time pressure, precognitive plagiarism of my
thoughts, and knowing that politeness demands (well, encourages) an extra moment
spent on a short bio has kept me from contributing beyond the odd chirp
here and there. Since I've come this far:
I live and work in Cape Town (South Africa) where I'm one half of a modest
two-man software development venture. My background is in electronic
engineering with postgraduate specialisation in pattern recognition and software
engineering. Sadly, I've allowed my career to stray from the
intellectually rewarding content that tends to pass through this list
(but mean to fix that). I've been deeply interested in
machine intelligence since high school, which led to an interest in psychology,
neuroscience, biological systems, social systems, complex systems and ultimately
left me interested in life, the universe and everything.
This list manages to reach an itch I rarely get
to scratch otherwise. Thanks for that.
Regards,
Rikus Combrinck ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Your paper "Intentionality is the Mark of the Vital"
seems to fit better. It argues that it is unnecessary to reconcile the mental with the material if we consider the mental as intentional, and gives the example A did D because A desired (wanted, believed..) [x] For example I can move my arm because I want it. I want it means I have the intention to it. It is the intention which causes a kind of downward causation to low-level behaviors (from the prefrontal cortex to the premotor areas and the primary motor cortex). As the article says, intentional explanations may be the best way to describe the elusive nature of "mental" operations in a biological system. -J. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Nicholas Thompson" <[hidden email]> To: <[hidden email]> Sent: Sunday, June 14, 2009 7:24 PM Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question') > Take care. If you every were so idle and demented as to want to read > something I have written on the subject, you might try: > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/id36.html > > Nick > ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
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In reply to this post by Jochen Fromm-4
<BASE href="file://C:\Users\Rikus\Documents\My Stationery\">
Rikus,
Great to hear from you. This discussion needs new blood, and you are kind to shed it.
Time for me to read Dennett again. he always annoys me because I suspect him of have some cake and eating it, too. Wants to be a radical thinker but wants to be loved, or something.
But one should regularly reread the authors one finds annoying.
N.
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
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In reply to this post by Jochen Fromm-4
Jochen,
You put me in a terrible conflict. On the one hand, you are one of three people who has ever read that paper, so I want to thank you .... in fact, I want to bound into your lap like a large St. Bernard puppy and lick your face ... so filled with gratitude am I . For most of us, academic writing is a lonely trade. On the other hand, I dont' THINK the paper says that. Now, on my understanding of mind, you are at least as good a judge of my intentions as I am, and so I feel a rush of uncertainty as I say, "I never intended to be ... never have been?... a causal mentalist. On my account, mind states describe behavior, they dont explain it and they certainly dont cause it. I will reread the paper and see what I said. But whatever the outcome of my rereading, thank you so very much for your reading. All the best, Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > [Original Message] > From: Jochen Fromm <[hidden email]> > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 6/14/2009 6:56:41 PM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question') > > Your paper "Intentionality is the Mark of the Vital" > seems to fit better. It argues that it is unnecessary to > reconcile the mental with the material if we consider the > mental as intentional, and gives the example > > A did D because A desired (wanted, believed..) [x] > > For example I can move my arm because I want it. > I want it means I have the intention to it. It is the > intention which causes a kind of downward causation > to low-level behaviors (from the prefrontal cortex to > the premotor areas and the primary motor cortex). > As the article says, intentional explanations may be > the best way to describe the elusive nature of > "mental" operations in a biological system. > > -J. > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Nicholas Thompson" <[hidden email]> > To: <[hidden email]> > Sent: Sunday, June 14, 2009 7:24 PM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question') > > > > Take care. If you every were so idle and demented as to want to read > > something I have written on the subject, you might try: > > > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/id36.html > > > > Nick > > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Nick, I'm not sure if I am correctly representing your position about the third-person point of view, but I would agree that if we want to construct a scientific theory of consciousness, it must be based on a third person approach. But it seems possible that there are some facts about 'the world as it really is' that are not now accessible to science. If this is so, the impressions we receive from the first-person point of view may offer us the best insights we can get, given the current state of scientific knowledge. So why must we rigorously ignore such impressions? I agree with your point that our language about consciousness is not very consistent. Trying to use precise language about our minds may be as difficult as creating a scientific theory of our 'inner lives'. Maybe when discussing this area, we can only use language metaphorically and hope that the person we are communicating with can make sense of it. What about your statements that 'consciousness is an illusion' or a 'huge language game' . Are these metaphors or precise statements? --John ________________________________________ From: [hidden email] [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Nicholas Thompson [[hidden email]] Sent: Sunday, June 14, 2009 1:24 PM To: [hidden email] Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question') Dear Jochen, What I am about to say will seem crazy and I certainly don't expect to convince you. At max, I might get you to try out the world from this rather strange point of view, and see why somebody might explore it. My basic position is that consciousness is an illusion. I am not talking "user-illusion" here or even epiphenomenalism. What I am saying is much stronger and more obnoxious than either of those positions. The best metaphor I can think of is "the sun rising." We all talk as if the sun rises, but it doesn't, or at best, the statement, "the sun rises", relates only in a vague way to the actual state of affairs. Our belief that the sun rises get's its force not from the facts but from the enormous authority of language, and other social arrangements. Consciousness is a huge language game, which we violate on pain of being called crazy. So what do I have to offer instead? Well, nothing, actually. I confess to being as caught in the illusion as anybody else. All I can say is that the way we talk about consciousness verges seems not to make a lot of sense, much of the time. For instance, not only do we talk as if the conscious-actor can act on his body, or through his body, on the world; we also talk as if the conscious-actor can act on his own mind, e.g., "make it up" like a rumpled bed. In these intra-mental transactions, who is the agent and who the receiver of the action? Only in talking about consciousness do we allow the agent to act upon itself in such a profligate way. An other oddity is our curious ambivalence concerning third-person point of view. There are four billion people in the world, right? When you and I speak of any of those people, we take a third-person point of view. Early in the conversation, we will make a decision, depending on our metaphysics, concerning whether another person's consciousness is something we have access to, or not. Some will take the position that we never REALLY can know what is in another person's mind. We could, of course, ask the agent, but the agent need not tell us the truth. So we are stuck because [scientific] knowledge of another's mind is beyond our reach. For such people, a scientific conversation concerning the true thoughts, feelings, intentions, etc., of another person is not possible. But what of people who don't hold to the primacy of the first person view. With such people we can have a conversation about the true intentions of another person, confident that we can get to the truth of the matter. Was OJ Simpson a murderer? Don't ASK him; look at the evidence. Our legal system is based on the notion that the intentions of an agent are something that a jury of peers can assess. In such circumstances, we are convinced that we can invade the so called privacy of the mind. But even people who grant their own powers to see the true intentions of others, still grant themselves primacy in the determination of their own behavior. To that extent, we indulge ourselves in a dualism in which we hold one theory that works for ourselves and another theory that works for the other 4 billion people on earth. And it is the personal theory that holds the most sway when called upon to talk about the relationship between the "brain and consciousness." Ok, so having confessed to all of that, please allow me to comment on your letter below. I will use CAPS, because it is a quick way to distinguish my text from yours. Owen will accuse me of SHOUTING, which I promise I am not. I am speaking in a teensy weensy voice. All the best, Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > [Original Message] > From: Jochen Fromm <[hidden email]> > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 6/14/2009 9:50:27 AM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question') > > The question was why do many of us have the > belief that they can move their body in a certain > direction if they want to do it voluntarily or > consciously? The belief must be based on a perception > of a process or interaction. If downward causation > is like self-consciousness an illusion, then what > kind of stimuli or causal chain preceeds a conscious > action? THE BEST I CAN OFFER IS A PROCEDURE FOR ANSWERING THAT QUESTION, WHICH IS TO FIGURE OUT HOW ONE WOULD GO ABOUT ANSWERING IT IN THE THIRD PERSON CASE. I GRANT TO MYSELF ALL THE POWERS OF PERCEPTION THAT I GRANT TO ANY OTHER HUMAN BEING, AND NO MORE. SO, I AM PRESENT EVERYWHERE I GO, AND I SEE MYSELF DO STUFF (ALTHOUGH MY POINT OF VIEW ON MY OWN ACTIONS IS UNIQUE). MY INTENTIONS ARE A KIND OF STANDING IN RELATION TO THE WORLD AND MY CONSCIOUSNESS IS A KIND OF STANDING IN RELATION TO MY INTENTIONS. ALL OF THIS IS AS EVIDENT TO OTHERS AS IT IS TO MYSELF, ASSUMING THAT THEY HAVE BEEN AROUND ME AS MUCH AS I HAVE. WHAT FOLLOWS IS METAPHYSICS OR ONTOLOGY OR BOTH. I HAVE NEVER KNOWN THE DIFFERENCE. WHAT IS WRITTEN HERE REMINDS ME OF DESCRIPTION'S OF THE LEVELS OF PURGATORY IN MILTON. SURE, IT BEARS SOME VAGUE RELATION TO THE WORLD AS WE KNOW IT -- OTHERWISE THE PASSAGES WOULD BE UNINTELLIGIBLE -- BUT DESCRIBING THE WORLD AS WE FIND IT IS NOT THE PRIMARY IMPULSE OF THIS WRITING. THE PRIMARY IMPULSE, AS IN MILTON, IS TO DESCRIBE THE WORLD THAT LIES BEHIND OUR SENSES ... THE WORLD AS IT REALLY IS. THE AUTHORITY OF SUCH CLAIMS LIES NOT IN IS DESCRIPTIVE POWER BUT IN ITS COALESCENCE WITH ALL THE OTHER THINGS WE THINK WE KNOW, AND THOSE COME NOT FROM THE SENSES BUT FROM LANGUAGE AND SOCIETY. > > I think the answer is maybe a complex interaction > of several causal chains and circuits: THE DECISION TO USE THE CURCUIT AND THE CHAIN METAPHORS IS AN IMPORTANT ONE AND NOT ONE THAT IS WARRANTED BY THE ANALOG PARALLEL PROCESSING SYSTEM THE BRAIN SEEMS TO BE. > > * There is causal chain from the outer world > to the brain and back (including the internal > stimuli-response or perception-action loop) > > * There is a causal chain inside the body > from the primary sensoric and motoric regions > of the brain to the corresponding body parts > > * There is a causal chain inside the mind from > the high-level level goals and abstract > intentions to the low-level actions and > concrete behavior patterns NOTE HOW THE NOTION OF CAUSAL CHAIN IS METAMORPHOSING HERE. HOW DOES A GOAL CAUSE? WE ARE FUSING BRAIN-TALK WITH LOGICAL ANAYSIS TALK. IT MAKES A KIND OF SENSE TO DO SO, BUT SO DOES ALL METAPHYSICS, AND METAPHYSICS DOES NOT TELL US MUCH ABOUT HOW THINGS ARE IN EXPERIENCE. . > > Now a mental thought occurred, a physical activity > of the body happened, and afterwards we witness > it. Has the mental thought triggered the physical > action? The causal chain which preceeds a conscious > action goes roughly like this > > WHAT FOLLOWS IS INDEED WHAT OUR LANGUAGE PRESUPPOSES, IN THE SAME WAY THAT EQUIVALENT CONVERSATIONS ABOUT DEVELOPMENT PRESUPPOSED. BUT, AS WE ARE DISCOVERING WITH DEVELOPMENT, THE BODY DOES NOT BEHAVE LOGICALLY AND IT CERTAINLY DOES NOT BEHAVE EFFICIENTLY. WASTE IS THE HALL MARK OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL SYSTEM, BUILDING UP ONLY TO TEAR DOWN ARE REBUILD. The mind formulates a intention and selects a goal, > according to the current beliefs and desires > (for example "i want to reach a certain region") > > - The body is in a certain state and environment > > - The mind perceives the current situation > > - The mind triggers a certain action suitable for the > the current situation and the current goal NO, I DISAGREE. THIS IS NOT WHAT THE MIND DOES, IN ANY CASE. THIS IS WHAT YOU DO, AND IF I WATCH YOU CLOSELY, I CAN SEE YOU DODING IT. > > - The body is in a new state > > Here conscious action is possible through modulation > of the causal chain from the outer world to the brain > and back, which is described usually as a perceive > -reason-action or belief-desire-intention loop. > The illusion of downcard causation seems to arise > through a fundamental attribution error and > an interaction of several causal chains. > > There is also book named "The Self and Its Brain: > An Argument for Interactionism" by Karl Popper and > John C. Eccles which discusses a similar topic. J. THANKS FOR THIS EXCHANGE. I APOLOGIZE FOR THE CAPS AGAIN. OWEN WILL NOT FORGIVE ME, BUT I THINK YOU WILL. NOW i WILL RETURN TO ORDINARY TEXT. Take care. If you every were so idle and demented as to want to read something I have written on the subject, you might try: http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/id36.html Nick > > -J. > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Nicholas Thompson" <[hidden email]> > To: <[hidden email]> > Sent: Saturday, June 13, 2009 6:45 AM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question') > > > > Jochen, > > > > What follows is a behaviorist snit, and I apologize in advance for it. > > > > Why does the defence of consciousness always come in this form: > > > > "Yet although we agree there is no mysterious downward causation, > > we can without doubt consciously influence the activities and movements > > of our body" > > > > It is NOT without doubt. I doubt it. So there is at LEAST ONE doubt. I > > doubt that I am conscious and that my consciousness affects my acts. > > > > Surely after 5 hundred years there is SOMETHING to be said beyond > > meditations. > > > > Nick > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > > Clark University ([hidden email]) > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
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In reply to this post by Jochen Fromm-4
John,
John, All good questions. I dont think I make a distinction between precise statements and metaphors. I think I think it's metaphors all the way down I also I think I think there is no such thing as a first person perspective ... not really. Specting.... seeing the world from a position ... is what every creature does. One of the events that I can spect, is a creature specting its world, and one of the creatures that I can spect, in this way , is myself. Not my inner processes or my mind, but me, an actor in the world. Like all observers, I am situated, and since I am the only person who is around me all the time, I am situated in a particularly unique way with respect to myself. My situation may sight me or blind me, depending on the kind of information that is required to make an accurate prediction about what I will do. Those are my best answers. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > [Original Message] > From: John Kennison <[hidden email]> > To: [hidden email] <[hidden email]>; The FridayMorning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 6/14/2009 9:35:12 PM > Subject: RE: [FRIAM] The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question') > > > > Nick, > > I'm not sure if I am correctly representing your position about the third-person point of view, but I would agree that if we want to construct a scientific theory of consciousness, it must be based on a third person approach. But it seems possible that there are some facts about 'the world as it really is' that are not now accessible to science. If this is so, the impressions we receive from the first-person point of view may offer us the best insights we can get, given the current state of scientific knowledge. So why must we rigorously ignore such impressions? > > I agree with your point that our language about consciousness is not very consistent. Trying to use precise language about our minds may be as difficult as creating a scientific theory of our 'inner lives'. Maybe when discussing this area, we can only use language metaphorically and hope that the person we are communicating with can make sense of it. What about your statements that 'consciousness is an illusion' or a 'huge language game' . Are these metaphors or precise statements? > > --John > ________________________________________ > From: [hidden email] [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Nicholas Thompson [[hidden email]] > Sent: Sunday, June 14, 2009 1:24 PM > To: [hidden email] > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question') > > Dear Jochen, > > What I am about to say will seem crazy and I certainly don't expect to > convince you. At max, I might get you to try out the world from this > rather strange point of view, and see why somebody might explore it. > > My basic position is that consciousness is an illusion. I am not talking > "user-illusion" here or even epiphenomenalism. What I am saying is much > stronger and more obnoxious than either of those positions. The best > metaphor I can think of is "the sun rising." We all talk as if the sun > rises, but it doesn't, or at best, the statement, "the sun rises", relates > only in a vague way to the actual state of affairs. Our belief that the > sun rises get's its force not from the facts but from the enormous > authority of language, and other social arrangements. Consciousness is a > huge language game, which we violate on pain of being called crazy. > > So what do I have to offer instead? Well, nothing, actually. I confess > being as caught in the illusion as anybody else. All I can say is that > the way we talk about consciousness verges seems not to make a lot of > sense, much of the time. > > For instance, not only do we talk as if the conscious-actor can act on his > body, or through his body, on the world; we also talk as if the > conscious-actor can act on his own mind, e.g., "make it up" like a > rumpled bed. In these intra-mental transactions, who is the agent and who > the receiver of the action? Only in talking about consciousness do we > allow the agent to act upon itself in such a profligate way. > > An other oddity is our curious ambivalence concerning third-person point > of view. There are four billion people in the world, right? When you and > I speak of any of those people, we take a third-person point of view. > Early in the conversation, we will make a decision, depending on our > metaphysics, concerning whether another person's consciousness is > we have access to, or not. Some will take the position that we never > REALLY can know what is in another person's mind. We could, of course, ask > the agent, but the agent need not tell us the truth. So we are stuck > because [scientific] knowledge of another's mind is beyond our reach. For > such people, a scientific conversation concerning the true thoughts, > feelings, intentions, etc., of another person is not possible. > > But what of people who don't hold to the primacy of the first person view. > With such people we can have a conversation about the true intentions of > another person, confident that we can get to the truth of the matter. Was > OJ Simpson a murderer? Don't ASK him; look at the evidence. Our legal > system is based on the notion that the intentions of an agent are > that a jury of peers can assess. In such circumstances, we are convinced > that we can invade the so called privacy of the mind. > > But even people who grant their own powers to see the true intentions of > others, still grant themselves primacy in the determination of their own > behavior. To that extent, we indulge ourselves in a dualism in which we > hold one theory that works for ourselves and another theory that works for > the other 4 billion people on earth. And it is the personal theory that > holds the most sway when called upon to talk about the relationship between > the "brain and consciousness." > > Ok, so having confessed to all of that, please allow me to comment on your > letter below. I will use CAPS, because it is a quick way to distinguish my > text from yours. Owen will accuse me of SHOUTING, which I promise I am > not. I am speaking in a teensy weensy voice. > > All the best, > > Nick > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > Clark University ([hidden email]) > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > > > [Original Message] > > From: Jochen Fromm <[hidden email]> > > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > > Date: 6/14/2009 9:50:27 AM > > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question') > > > > The question was why do many of us have the > > belief that they can move their body in a certain > > direction if they want to do it voluntarily or > > consciously? The belief must be based on a perception > > of a process or interaction. If downward causation > > is like self-consciousness an illusion, then what > > kind of stimuli or causal chain preceeds a conscious > > action? > > THE BEST I CAN OFFER IS A PROCEDURE FOR ANSWERING THAT QUESTION, WHICH IS > TO FIGURE OUT HOW ONE WOULD GO ABOUT ANSWERING IT IN THE THIRD PERSON > I GRANT TO MYSELF ALL THE POWERS OF PERCEPTION THAT I GRANT TO ANY OTHER > HUMAN BEING, AND NO MORE. SO, I AM PRESENT EVERYWHERE I GO, AND I SEE > MYSELF DO STUFF (ALTHOUGH MY POINT OF VIEW ON MY OWN ACTIONS IS UNIQUE). > MY INTENTIONS ARE A KIND OF STANDING IN RELATION TO THE WORLD AND MY > CONSCIOUSNESS IS A KIND OF STANDING IN RELATION TO MY INTENTIONS. ALL OF > THIS IS AS EVIDENT TO OTHERS AS IT IS TO MYSELF, ASSUMING THAT THEY HAVE > BEEN AROUND ME AS MUCH AS I HAVE. > > WHAT FOLLOWS IS METAPHYSICS OR ONTOLOGY OR BOTH. I HAVE NEVER KNOWN THE > DIFFERENCE. WHAT IS WRITTEN HERE REMINDS ME OF DESCRIPTION'S OF THE > OF PURGATORY IN MILTON. SURE, IT BEARS SOME VAGUE RELATION TO THE WORLD AS > WE KNOW IT -- OTHERWISE THE PASSAGES WOULD BE UNINTELLIGIBLE -- BUT > DESCRIBING THE WORLD AS WE FIND IT IS NOT THE PRIMARY IMPULSE OF THIS > WRITING. THE PRIMARY IMPULSE, AS IN MILTON, IS TO DESCRIBE THE WORLD THAT > LIES BEHIND OUR SENSES ... THE WORLD AS IT REALLY IS. THE AUTHORITY OF > SUCH CLAIMS LIES NOT IN IS DESCRIPTIVE POWER BUT IN ITS COALESCENCE WITH > ALL THE OTHER THINGS WE THINK WE KNOW, AND THOSE COME NOT FROM THE SENSES > BUT FROM LANGUAGE AND SOCIETY. > > > > > I think the answer is maybe a complex interaction > > of several causal chains and circuits: > > THE DECISION TO USE THE CURCUIT AND THE CHAIN METAPHORS IS AN IMPORTANT > AND NOT ONE THAT IS WARRANTED BY THE ANALOG PARALLEL PROCESSING SYSTEM THE > BRAIN SEEMS TO BE. > > > > * There is causal chain from the outer world > > to the brain and back (including the internal > > stimuli-response or perception-action loop) > > > > * There is a causal chain inside the body > > from the primary sensoric and motoric regions > > of the brain to the corresponding body parts > > > > * There is a causal chain inside the mind from > > the high-level level goals and abstract > > intentions to the low-level actions and > > concrete behavior patterns > > NOTE HOW THE NOTION OF CAUSAL CHAIN IS METAMORPHOSING HERE. HOW DOES A > GOAL CAUSE? WE ARE FUSING BRAIN-TALK WITH LOGICAL ANAYSIS TALK. IT MAKES > A KIND OF SENSE TO DO SO, BUT SO DOES ALL METAPHYSICS, AND METAPHYSICS > NOT TELL US MUCH ABOUT HOW THINGS ARE IN EXPERIENCE. . > > > > Now a mental thought occurred, a physical activity > > of the body happened, and afterwards we witness > > it. Has the mental thought triggered the physical > > action? The causal chain which preceeds a conscious > > action goes roughly like this > > > > WHAT FOLLOWS IS INDEED WHAT OUR LANGUAGE PRESUPPOSES, IN THE SAME WAY > THAT EQUIVALENT CONVERSATIONS ABOUT DEVELOPMENT PRESUPPOSED. BUT, AS WE > ARE DISCOVERING WITH DEVELOPMENT, THE BODY DOES NOT BEHAVE LOGICALLY AND > CERTAINLY DOES NOT BEHAVE EFFICIENTLY. WASTE IS THE HALL MARK OF THE > DEVELOPMENTAL SYSTEM, BUILDING UP ONLY TO TEAR DOWN ARE REBUILD. > > The mind formulates a intention and selects a goal, > > according to the current beliefs and desires > > (for example "i want to reach a certain region") > > > > - The body is in a certain state and environment > > > > - The mind perceives the current situation > > > > - The mind triggers a certain action suitable for the > > the current situation and the current goal > > NO, I DISAGREE. THIS IS NOT WHAT THE MIND DOES, IN ANY CASE. THIS IS > YOU DO, AND IF I WATCH YOU CLOSELY, I CAN SEE YOU DODING IT. > > > > - The body is in a new state > > > > Here conscious action is possible through modulation > > of the causal chain from the outer world to the brain > > and back, which is described usually as a perceive > > -reason-action or belief-desire-intention loop. > > The illusion of downcard causation seems to arise > > through a fundamental attribution error and > > an interaction of several causal chains. > > > > There is also book named "The Self and Its Brain: > > An Argument for Interactionism" by Karl Popper and > > John C. Eccles which discusses a similar topic. > > J. THANKS FOR THIS EXCHANGE. I APOLOGIZE FOR THE CAPS AGAIN. OWEN WILL > NOT FORGIVE ME, BUT I THINK YOU WILL. NOW i WILL RETURN TO ORDINARY TEXT. > > Take care. If you every were so idle and demented as to want to read > something I have written on the subject, you might try: > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/id36.html > > Nick > > > > > -J. > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: "Nicholas Thompson" <[hidden email]> > > To: <[hidden email]> > > Sent: Saturday, June 13, 2009 6:45 AM > > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question') > > > > > > > Jochen, > > > > > > What follows is a behaviorist snit, and I apologize in advance for it. > > > > > > Why does the defence of consciousness always come in this form: > > > > > > "Yet although we agree there is no mysterious downward causation, > > > we can without doubt consciously influence the activities and > > > of our body" > > > > > > It is NOT without doubt. I doubt it. So there is at LEAST ONE doubt. I > > > doubt that I am conscious and that my consciousness affects my acts. > > > > > > Surely after 5 hundred years there is SOMETHING to be said beyond > Decartes > > > meditations. > > > > > > Nick > > > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > > > Clark University ([hidden email]) > > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > ============================================================ > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
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Hi Nick,
I don't think I understand your position. Are you talking about subjective experience? It seems to me that the essence of the "problem of consciousness," what Chalmers calls "the hard problem," is subjective experience, i.e., the first person perspective. We all have it. (Or do you deny that you have it?) But we have no idea how to explain it or to understand what it is or how it comes about. That seems to me to be the heart of the problem. Are you focusing on that issue (and if so what is your position) or on something else? -- Russ On Sun, Jun 14, 2009 at 10:32 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote: John, ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
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In reply to this post by Jochen Fromm-4
Russ,
I think my position is that I dont "have" it. Like every creature .... every machine, for that matter ... I interact with the world from a point of view. If you were sitting accross my kitchen table from me now we would see the coffee cup in the middle of the table from different sides and would have different information about it. That is the only "subjective" experience I have, and I dont really "have" it. Rather I do it.
Nick
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
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In reply to this post by Russ Abbott
It's
one thing to say (and I agree) that we have no idea how any of us can
experience any one else's subjective experience. (Perhaps we will be
able go do it at some point, but we can't now.)
It's another thing for someone to say that they don't have subjective experience. It's hard even to imagine what that means. If one doesn't have subjective experience (as, in my opinion, computers don't) it's not clear what such a being would mean by denying having subjective experience--since they don't know what it means. It's also hard for me to believe Nick (or Hans) when they say that they don't have it. I don't know how far down it goes, but most (at least) higher level biological organisms seem to have subjective experience. Furthermore, I'd say that subjective experience is all that we have. All any of us has is his/her own subjective experience. That's where we live--in our subjective experience. There's no way to avoid it -- even if one meditates. (It's still subjective experience that one is experiencing in that state too; it's just not conceptualization.) So for a human being to deny having subjecctive experience simply doesn't make sense to me since I can't believe that any human being doesn't have it. -- Russ Abbott _____________________________________________ Professor, Computer Science California State University, Los Angeles o Check out my blog at http://bluecatblog.wordpress.com/ On Mon, Jun 15, 2009 at 9:30 AM, Frank Wimberly <[hidden email]> wrote:
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Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Nick, I am puzzled about all statements being metaphors. To me one feature about metaphors is that we must tolerate inconsistencies. For example, I can say (metaphorically) that my friend is a political tiger; that all tigers have long tails but my friend does not have a long tail. If I weren't using metaphors the last two statements would contradict the first. So it would be very difficult to conclude that a specimen is not a tiger, when speaking metaphorically. But you claim that I, for example, suffer from an illusion of being conscious. I presume this means that you have concluded that I believe I am conscious but that I am not conscious. From what perspective do you draw these conclusions? What do you observe from that perspective that leads you to those conclusions? Particularly that I am not conscious, seeing that you would have difficulty even concluding that my friend is not a tiger. --John ________________________________________ From: Nicholas Thompson [[hidden email]] Sent: Monday, June 15, 2009 1:32 AM To: John Kennison; [hidden email] Subject: RE: [FRIAM] The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question') John, John, All good questions. I dont think I make a distinction between precise statements and metaphors. I think I think it's metaphors all the way down I also I think I think there is no such thing as a first person perspective ... not really. Specting.... seeing the world from a position ... is what every creature does. One of the events that I can spect, is a creature specting its world, and one of the creatures that I can spect, in this way , is myself. Not my inner processes or my mind, but me, an actor in the world. Like all observers, I am situated, and since I am the only person who is around me all the time, I am situated in a particularly unique way with respect to myself. My situation may sight me or blind me, depending on the kind of information that is required to make an accurate prediction about what I will do. Those are my best answers. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > [Original Message] > From: John Kennison <[hidden email]> > To: [hidden email] <[hidden email]>; The FridayMorning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 6/14/2009 9:35:12 PM > Subject: RE: [FRIAM] The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question') > > > > Nick, > > I'm not sure if I am correctly representing your position about the third-person point of view, but I would agree that if we want to construct a scientific theory of consciousness, it must be based on a third person approach. But it seems possible that there are some facts about 'the world as it really is' that are not now accessible to science. If this is so, the impressions we receive from the first-person point of view may offer us the best insights we can get, given the current state of scientific knowledge. So why must we rigorously ignore such impressions? > > I agree with your point that our language about consciousness is not very consistent. Trying to use precise language about our minds may be as difficult as creating a scientific theory of our 'inner lives'. Maybe when discussing this area, we can only use language metaphorically and hope that the person we are communicating with can make sense of it. What about your statements that 'consciousness is an illusion' or a 'huge language game' . Are these metaphors or precise statements? > > --John > ________________________________________ > From: [hidden email] [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Nicholas Thompson [[hidden email]] > Sent: Sunday, June 14, 2009 1:24 PM > To: [hidden email] > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question') > > Dear Jochen, > > What I am about to say will seem crazy and I certainly don't expect to > convince you. At max, I might get you to try out the world from this > rather strange point of view, and see why somebody might explore it. > > My basic position is that consciousness is an illusion. I am not talking > "user-illusion" here or even epiphenomenalism. What I am saying is much > stronger and more obnoxious than either of those positions. The best > metaphor I can think of is "the sun rising." We all talk as if the sun > rises, but it doesn't, or at best, the statement, "the sun rises", relates > only in a vague way to the actual state of affairs. Our belief that the > sun rises get's its force not from the facts but from the enormous > authority of language, and other social arrangements. Consciousness is a > huge language game, which we violate on pain of being called crazy. > > So what do I have to offer instead? Well, nothing, actually. I confess > being as caught in the illusion as anybody else. All I can say is that > the way we talk about consciousness verges seems not to make a lot of > sense, much of the time. > > For instance, not only do we talk as if the conscious-actor can act on his > body, or through his body, on the world; we also talk as if the > conscious-actor can act on his own mind, e.g., "make it up" like a > rumpled bed. In these intra-mental transactions, who is the agent and who > the receiver of the action? Only in talking about consciousness do we > allow the agent to act upon itself in such a profligate way. > > An other oddity is our curious ambivalence concerning third-person point > of view. There are four billion people in the world, right? When you and > I speak of any of those people, we take a third-person point of view. > Early in the conversation, we will make a decision, depending on our > metaphysics, concerning whether another person's consciousness is > we have access to, or not. Some will take the position that we never > REALLY can know what is in another person's mind. We could, of course, ask > the agent, but the agent need not tell us the truth. So we are stuck > because [scientific] knowledge of another's mind is beyond our reach. For > such people, a scientific conversation concerning the true thoughts, > feelings, intentions, etc., of another person is not possible. > > But what of people who don't hold to the primacy of the first person view. > With such people we can have a conversation about the true intentions of > another person, confident that we can get to the truth of the matter. Was > OJ Simpson a murderer? Don't ASK him; look at the evidence. Our legal > system is based on the notion that the intentions of an agent are > that a jury of peers can assess. In such circumstances, we are convinced > that we can invade the so called privacy of the mind. > > But even people who grant their own powers to see the true intentions of > others, still grant themselves primacy in the determination of their own > behavior. To that extent, we indulge ourselves in a dualism in which we > hold one theory that works for ourselves and another theory that works for > the other 4 billion people on earth. And it is the personal theory that > holds the most sway when called upon to talk about the relationship between > the "brain and consciousness." > > Ok, so having confessed to all of that, please allow me to comment on your > letter below. I will use CAPS, because it is a quick way to distinguish my > text from yours. Owen will accuse me of SHOUTING, which I promise I am > not. I am speaking in a teensy weensy voice. > > All the best, > > Nick > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > Clark University ([hidden email]) > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > > > [Original Message] > > From: Jochen Fromm <[hidden email]> > > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > > Date: 6/14/2009 9:50:27 AM > > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question') > > > > The question was why do many of us have the > > belief that they can move their body in a certain > > direction if they want to do it voluntarily or > > consciously? The belief must be based on a perception > > of a process or interaction. If downward causation > > is like self-consciousness an illusion, then what > > kind of stimuli or causal chain preceeds a conscious > > action? > > THE BEST I CAN OFFER IS A PROCEDURE FOR ANSWERING THAT QUESTION, WHICH IS > TO FIGURE OUT HOW ONE WOULD GO ABOUT ANSWERING IT IN THE THIRD PERSON > I GRANT TO MYSELF ALL THE POWERS OF PERCEPTION THAT I GRANT TO ANY OTHER > HUMAN BEING, AND NO MORE. SO, I AM PRESENT EVERYWHERE I GO, AND I SEE > MYSELF DO STUFF (ALTHOUGH MY POINT OF VIEW ON MY OWN ACTIONS IS UNIQUE). > MY INTENTIONS ARE A KIND OF STANDING IN RELATION TO THE WORLD AND MY > CONSCIOUSNESS IS A KIND OF STANDING IN RELATION TO MY INTENTIONS. ALL OF > THIS IS AS EVIDENT TO OTHERS AS IT IS TO MYSELF, ASSUMING THAT THEY HAVE > BEEN AROUND ME AS MUCH AS I HAVE. > > WHAT FOLLOWS IS METAPHYSICS OR ONTOLOGY OR BOTH. I HAVE NEVER KNOWN THE > DIFFERENCE. WHAT IS WRITTEN HERE REMINDS ME OF DESCRIPTION'S OF THE > OF PURGATORY IN MILTON. SURE, IT BEARS SOME VAGUE RELATION TO THE WORLD AS > WE KNOW IT -- OTHERWISE THE PASSAGES WOULD BE UNINTELLIGIBLE -- BUT > DESCRIBING THE WORLD AS WE FIND IT IS NOT THE PRIMARY IMPULSE OF THIS > WRITING. THE PRIMARY IMPULSE, AS IN MILTON, IS TO DESCRIBE THE WORLD THAT > LIES BEHIND OUR SENSES ... THE WORLD AS IT REALLY IS. THE AUTHORITY OF > SUCH CLAIMS LIES NOT IN IS DESCRIPTIVE POWER BUT IN ITS COALESCENCE WITH > ALL THE OTHER THINGS WE THINK WE KNOW, AND THOSE COME NOT FROM THE SENSES > BUT FROM LANGUAGE AND SOCIETY. > > > > > I think the answer is maybe a complex interaction > > of several causal chains and circuits: > > THE DECISION TO USE THE CURCUIT AND THE CHAIN METAPHORS IS AN IMPORTANT > AND NOT ONE THAT IS WARRANTED BY THE ANALOG PARALLEL PROCESSING SYSTEM THE > BRAIN SEEMS TO BE. > > > > * There is causal chain from the outer world > > to the brain and back (including the internal > > stimuli-response or perception-action loop) > > > > * There is a causal chain inside the body > > from the primary sensoric and motoric regions > > of the brain to the corresponding body parts > > > > * There is a causal chain inside the mind from > > the high-level level goals and abstract > > intentions to the low-level actions and > > concrete behavior patterns > > NOTE HOW THE NOTION OF CAUSAL CHAIN IS METAMORPHOSING HERE. HOW DOES A > GOAL CAUSE? WE ARE FUSING BRAIN-TALK WITH LOGICAL ANAYSIS TALK. IT MAKES > A KIND OF SENSE TO DO SO, BUT SO DOES ALL METAPHYSICS, AND METAPHYSICS > NOT TELL US MUCH ABOUT HOW THINGS ARE IN EXPERIENCE. . > > > > Now a mental thought occurred, a physical activity > > of the body happened, and afterwards we witness > > it. Has the mental thought triggered the physical > > action? The causal chain which preceeds a conscious > > action goes roughly like this > > > > WHAT FOLLOWS IS INDEED WHAT OUR LANGUAGE PRESUPPOSES, IN THE SAME WAY > THAT EQUIVALENT CONVERSATIONS ABOUT DEVELOPMENT PRESUPPOSED. BUT, AS WE > ARE DISCOVERING WITH DEVELOPMENT, THE BODY DOES NOT BEHAVE LOGICALLY AND > CERTAINLY DOES NOT BEHAVE EFFICIENTLY. WASTE IS THE HALL MARK OF THE > DEVELOPMENTAL SYSTEM, BUILDING UP ONLY TO TEAR DOWN ARE REBUILD. > > The mind formulates a intention and selects a goal, > > according to the current beliefs and desires > > (for example "i want to reach a certain region") > > > > - The body is in a certain state and environment > > > > - The mind perceives the current situation > > > > - The mind triggers a certain action suitable for the > > the current situation and the current goal > > NO, I DISAGREE. THIS IS NOT WHAT THE MIND DOES, IN ANY CASE. THIS IS > YOU DO, AND IF I WATCH YOU CLOSELY, I CAN SEE YOU DODING IT. > > > > - The body is in a new state > > > > Here conscious action is possible through modulation > > of the causal chain from the outer world to the brain > > and back, which is described usually as a perceive > > -reason-action or belief-desire-intention loop. > > The illusion of downcard causation seems to arise > > through a fundamental attribution error and > > an interaction of several causal chains. > > > > There is also book named "The Self and Its Brain: > > An Argument for Interactionism" by Karl Popper and > > John C. Eccles which discusses a similar topic. > > J. THANKS FOR THIS EXCHANGE. I APOLOGIZE FOR THE CAPS AGAIN. OWEN WILL > NOT FORGIVE ME, BUT I THINK YOU WILL. NOW i WILL RETURN TO ORDINARY TEXT. > > Take care. If you every were so idle and demented as to want to read > something I have written on the subject, you might try: > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/id36.html > > Nick > > > > > -J. > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: "Nicholas Thompson" <[hidden email]> > > To: <[hidden email]> > > Sent: Saturday, June 13, 2009 6:45 AM > > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question') > > > > > > > Jochen, > > > > > > What follows is a behaviorist snit, and I apologize in advance for it. > > > > > > Why does the defence of consciousness always come in this form: > > > > > > "Yet although we agree there is no mysterious downward causation, > > > we can without doubt consciously influence the activities and > > > of our body" > > > > > > It is NOT without doubt. I doubt it. So there is at LEAST ONE doubt. I > > > doubt that I am conscious and that my consciousness affects my acts. > > > > > > Surely after 5 hundred years there is SOMETHING to be said beyond > Decartes > > > meditations. > > > > > > Nick > > > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > > > Clark University ([hidden email]) > > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > ============================================================ > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
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In reply to this post by Douglas Roberts-2
I recognize the language but not the dialect. This could be TRIX, EX, ED, VI or VIM but I get the meaning (and so do you) Which reminds me of another (bad) joke/pun/rhyme. Roses are Red Violets are Blue I'm Schizophrenic and so am I! - Steve s/behaviorist/FRIAMer/g ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
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Steve,
Perl regex, actually. As are most of my puns. Perls... --Doug On Mon, Jun 15, 2009 at 1:59 PM, Steve Smith <[hidden email]> wrote:
-- Doug Roberts [hidden email] [hidden email] 505-455-7333 - Office 505-670-8195 - Cell ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
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Doug-
> ve, > > Perl regex, actually. As are most of my puns. > > Perls... Ah yes. Perls before Swine. I should have recognized the Latin^H^H^H^H^HRegex (aka regular expression) roots in all of the languages mentioned. And I should have recognized the dialect. - Sneeze ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
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On Mon, Jun 15, 2009 at 2:20 PM, Steve Smith <[hidden email]> wrote: Doug- And that, sir, is why I am the Special Swine Flu Correspondent to the Santa Fe Reporter! Swine Flu Intelligence ReportPosted by: Maassive In: News
(Feel free to go hog wild...) ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
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Nick -
Now that Doug has established that Swine Flu has Intelligence (is it Collective?) I am left wondering if it (Swine Flu) has a First-Person Experience? I am so taken with your (Nick's) suggestion that 1st-Person Experience of Consciousness is really an epiphenomenon of 3rd-Person Observation that I am now trying to relate it to my recent readings of the Trialogs of Terrence McKenna, Ralph Abraham, and Rupert Sheldrake. I have always had a hard time swallowing both Sheldrake and McKenna for somewhat different reasons, but for better or worse, I find that your 1st/3rd-person duality makes their schlock (or is it?) more palatable. This is not a criticism of your observations/suggestions, but rather a report from my own reaction to it. One of the biggest problems *I* have with the "the universe is all one big slap-happy consciousness and the you that thinks it is you is just one little tiny facet of it" is the ever-present *I* that *I* experience! But somehow this is harder to hold onto after your description of how 1st Person Experience might very well be an illusion of 3rd person observation. It seems as if this 3rd/1st Duality supports collective consciousness in some way or another? I have never (wanted to?) viewed Collective (un)Consciousness as a literal understanding. This takes me to another (quite eloquent) statement you made earlier. "It's metaphors all the way down!" As an acolyte of the reverend George Lakoff in the Church of Metaphor, I will have to go see what he and Rafael Nunez have to imply about that in their "Where Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being". It's a great allusion to "Turtles all the way down!" but my own theories of layered metaphor complexes (or complex layered metaphors, depending on when you ask) depends on metaphor grounding out in experiences (ala Nunez & Lakoff and embodied mind). I am willing to accept (perhaps) that there is some sort of bootstrapping process where metaphors are first built upon primary experience and then elaborated by inserting other metaphorical maps between the original metaphorical source and the experiential target, and repeatedly abstracted until the original experiences are lost to the fogs of time or the influence of other's. Damn fine material for avoiding deadlines. Thank gentlemen, one and all! - Steve ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
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In reply to this post by Jochen Fromm-4
thanks Steve for these comments.
Since your message is in html, I will allow myself colors in my response.
please see below.
Nick
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
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Nick,
In one of the previous messages, you said, "I don't know about you, but I experience a world." Experiencing a world is a mark of subjective experience. Robots don't experience; they have sensors that measure things and report those measures, from which the robot may draw conclusions. There is a difference. I don't understand how you can deny that difference. After all, what do you mean by "experience the world" other than subjective experience? Is this just a matter of terminological bickering? If you are willing to say that you experience the world, then by my understanding of "experience" you have subjective experience. -- Russ Abbott _____________________________________________ Professor, Computer Science California State University, Los Angeles Cell phone: 310-621-3805 o Check out my blog at http://bluecatblog.wordpress.com/ ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
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In reply to this post by Jochen Fromm-4
Russ,
I don't think I am bickering or splitting hairs; but then, people who are, never do.
To put yourself in my frame of mind on these issues, start by saying what you can say about what others "see". I see that my cat sees the mouse in the corner of the room.
Anything I can say of the cat, I can say of myself.; anything I cannot say of the cat, I cannot say of myself.... well, except for the fur part.
If all experience is subjective, then we probably don't need the extra word, do we? I don't deny that I, or the cat, or even the robot, experience (when all three obey the rules of "experiencing"). I just don't see what is gained by adding the word "subjective" except a very confusing and inconsistent metaphysics.
Nick
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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