quick question
Locked
1234
1234
 
|
Steve,
My understanding of the meaning of "strong" emergence is "inexplicable emergence". Is there another meaning? N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > [Original Message] > From: Steve Smith <[hidden email]> > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 6/11/2009 9:38:52 AM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] quick question > > Ted Carmichael wrote: > > I think the difficulty of the "triangle as emergence" problem is > > trying to imagine an situation where the "agents" (individual edges of > > a triangle) combine and re-combine in different configurations. But > > if they do, and if the environment selects structures based on > > strength, then I can see that the triangle (or pyramid, in 3 > > dimensions) is a "basin of attraction" that would emerge from this > > environment. > > > > In my mind, homogeneity is important ... although I prefer the phrase > > "self-similar," as the agents don't have to be completely the same ... > > they just have to be close to each other in their attributes that > > relate to the emergent property. > > > > It's a good thought experiment, though. Thanks. > I suspect this is where Buckminster Fullerenes come from. I don't know > the lore... but my guess is that somehow the carbon atoms they are > formed from are somehow under such wicked stresses that the only > "structures" that form are those whose integral strength exceeds that of > the forces they are under. > > This seems to be on the "lower" edge of emergence. Like the scale of > gravel in a streambed matching a size profile based on the conditions? > > I think that tensegrity structures have collective rather than emergent > properties, but again, this might qualify for being at the "lower" > boundary of emergence. > > Frankly I admit that it is hard for me to think of "emergence" without > activity. To the extent that a tensegrity structure is (conventionally) > designed and built, and its collective properties do not "show up" until > it is complete (or subunits are complete) seems to be an indication that > what we are seeing is *not* emergence. Somehow I think incrementality > is as important as serendipity. > > Going back to the Bucky Balls, I'm not sure, but I don't think that > there are any "incomplete" forms that have any of the interesting > properties of the complete form. Bucky Tubes, perhaps... which leads > me full-circle back to crystal growth. > > I believe Crystal Growth shows more emergence.... incremental change > which by itself does not show qualitatively new properties but once > above some threshold, DOES. > > I believe *all* of the discussion (Triangles, Fullerenes, Crystals) are > examples of *weak emergence*. I'd never really thought about whether > there were "degrees of emergence" within the loose categories of "weak" > vs "strong". Triangles vs Geodesic Domes are (perhaps) a good example. > > - Steve > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
|
|
On Thu, Jun 11, 2009 at 07:01:38PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> Steve, > > My understanding of the meaning of "strong" emergence is "inexplicable > emergence". > > Is there another meaning? > > N Bedau defines it as emergence with downward causation. For example, we would say that consciousness is strongly emergent if we felt that we could consciously influence the activities of our neurons, rather than simply our consciousness simply being the result of neuronal activity. I'm not sure this notion has any use in discussions other than consciousness, and even there the notion of epiphenomenalism would say that it is void concept. Cheers -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email] Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
|
|
In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Oh dear. I have to read bedau again.
Gawd what a muddle. Back to you in a few days. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > [Original Message] > From: russell standish <[hidden email]> > To: <[hidden email]>; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 6/12/2009 3:17:44 PM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] quick question > > On Thu, Jun 11, 2009 at 07:01:38PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > > Steve, > > > > My understanding of the meaning of "strong" emergence is "inexplicable > > emergence". > > > > Is there another meaning? > > > > N > > Bedau defines it as emergence with downward causation. For example, we > that consciousness is strongly emergent if we felt that we could > consciously influence the activities of our neurons, rather than > simply our consciousness simply being the result of neuronal activity. > > I'm not sure this notion has any use in discussions other than > consciousness, and even there the notion of epiphenomenalism would say > that it is void concept. > > Cheers > > -- > > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Mathematics > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email] > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
|
|
In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Ted,
Reading the collection on emergence that got this started seemed to make clear to me that the world of people who think in terms of agents (sensu Carmichaeli) and people for whom thinking of a triangle member as an agent would just not happen is a fundamental chasm in thinking about emergence. In a sense, what I am trying to do is build a bridge across that chasm, since I have people with whom I like to think who live on both sides.
Thanks for you comments,
Nick Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
|
|
In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Russell,
So, is it Bedau and Philllips you have at hand? I am hoping to get some of my colleagues in Santa Fe to read that with me next fall. If that is the source you are using, I also had Bedau's contribution to this volume in mind when I made the comment below. I am going to key in some short passages below so we can go over them together. He writes that [strong] emergent properties are supervenient properties with irreducible causal powers"...some of which are "macro-to-micro" effects[,] termed "downward causation". Supervenience means, as i understand it, that while each member of some enumerable list of microstates is sufficient for the occurence of the emergent macrostate, no one of those states is necessary for its occurence. So in practice one can have many different micro states that can bring about the macrostate, but no change in the macrostate without some change in a microstate. Downward causation means, as I understand it, that some macrostates are sufficient for some microstates. This brings about the loopiness that some of the authors in the book regard as inspired and others regard as vicious. [Some will argue that if a microstate is sufficient for A macrostate and that macrostate is sufficient for a microstate then the macrostate drops out of the equasion and we need simply point out that the first microstate is sufficient for the second. } Bedau then writes: "Such [macro] causal powers cannot be explained in terms of the aggregationof the micro-level potentialities; they are primtive or "brute" natural powers that arise inexplilcably withthe existence of certain macro-level entitites." Which led to my comment that they are, by definition, inexplicable. Bedau goes on to write, "All the evidence today suggests that strong emergence is scientifically irrelevant." and goes on to argue that no essentially examples exist. In othere words, strong emergence is possible, it just has never been observed. This seems a very strange resolution of the argument, since it seems to define emergence in terms of our inablity to explain something, rather than in terms of some measurable property of the thing itself. This seems very close to the "surprise" argument that Bedau rejects in the early pages of the same article. More on this tomorrow, I hope. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > [Original Message] > From: russell standish <[hidden email]> > To: <[hidden email]>; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 6/12/2009 3:17:44 PM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] quick question > > On Thu, Jun 11, 2009 at 07:01:38PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > > Steve, > > > > My understanding of the meaning of "strong" emergence is "inexplicable > > emergence". > > > > Is there another meaning? > > > > N > > Bedau defines it as emergence with downward causation. For example, we > that consciousness is strongly emergent if we felt that we could > consciously influence the activities of our neurons, rather than > simply our consciousness simply being the result of neuronal activity. > > I'm not sure this notion has any use in discussions other than > consciousness, and even there the notion of epiphenomenalism would say > that it is void concept. > > Cheers > > -- > > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Mathematics > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email] > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
|
|
Hi Nick,
See below. -- Russ On Thu, Jun 11, 2009 at 9:48 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote: Russell,
The necessary and sufficient part isn't part of the definition of "supervenient." The definition is simply your last clause: no change in the macrostate without some change in a microstate. Â
I understand downward causation to refer to a new causal power. An example might be dark energy. It causes changes in the universe even though there are no micro explanations for it. If it operates only at cosmological scales (and not just because it is weak at other scales, but it simply doesn't exist at other scales) then it exhibits downward causation. Another example is vitalism, were it true. It would say that there are new causal powers at the biological level that simply come into existence at that level and are not explicable in terms of lower level forces. Â
His argument is really a rejection of vitalism. No one wants to be a defender of vitalism, which is the rejected poster boy of downward causation. I've never seen anyone talk about dark energy in this context. It might be a more respectable candidate for downward causation. But it's not likely -- in my opinion. It's conceivable that dark energy is a new force of nature and that it's different from the other known forces -- gravity, electromagnetic, strong, and weak.But even if that were the case, if it could be shown to exist at all scales -- or perhaps like time and gravity -- to be simply a part of the structure of the universe, it wouldn't qualify as downward causation. Downward causation requires that the new force pop into existence when and only when some macro condition holds but not as a consequence of the micro conditions that make it up. Â More on this tomorrow, I hope. ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
|
|
Now that I've written the previous post, I noticed the addressee on yours, and it occurred to me that you probably weren't talking to me. Oh well. I think it's a useful post whether you want my opinion or not.
-- Russ Abbott _____________________________________________ Professor, Computer Science California State University, Los Angeles o Check out my blog at http://bluecatblog.wordpress.com/ On Thu, Jun 11, 2009 at 11:33 PM, Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote: Hi Nick, ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
|
|
In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Dear Russells, Abbot and Standish,
Sorry to mix up my Russell's; I am so excited that you are both interested in this that I am falling all over myself. You are both very kind and forebearing.
Abbot:
I don't know how I came up with "Phillips"; Humphreys indeed!
You write:
RA-->"The necessary and sufficient part isn't part of the definition of "supervenient." The definition is simply your last clause: no change in the macrostate without some change in a microstate. "<--RA
Ok, so help me walk through this. Doesn't "no change in the macrostate without some change in a microstate" mean that "a change in a microstate is necessary for a change in a macrostate. (I realize that is NOT what I said; this thing keeps necker-cubing for me).
And can you help me understand why Bedau uses the soft language "dependent on" rather than language like "caused" or "determined by". I realize that causality is a cess-pit, but is "dependence" any better? If we are not talking about micro events being necessary and/or sufficient conditions for macro events, what ARE we talking about?
You also write:
RA-->"Downward causation requires that the new force pop into existence when and only when some macro condition holds but not as a consequence of the micro conditions that make it up."<--RA
The above statement seems to me to be internally contradictory. My understanding about what it means for something to be "a consequence of something else" is very close to my understanding of what it means to be "made up" by something.
Standish:
You write:
RS-->""Bedau defines it as emergence with downward causation. For example, we would say
that consciousness is strongly emergent if we felt that we could
consciously influence the activities of our neurons, rather than
simply our consciousness simply being the result of neuronal activity.
I'm not sure this notion has any use in discussions other than
consciousness, and even there the notion of epiphenomenalism would say
that it is void concept."<--RS
OK. We all seem to agree that strong emergence is a reach. But once we have given up on strong emergence, do we need supervenience for anything? I cannot shake the intuition that the whole reason for "supervenience" is to defend consciousness against determinism, and this has always seemed to me a religious, as opposed to a scientific, project.
Thanks for your help and patience,
Have you both read the Kim and the Wimsatt articles in the same volume?
Nick
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
|
|
In reply to this post by Russell Standish
Exactly, I think it is a useless and void concept if one defines it in
this way. It makes sense the other way round: the stronger the emergence, the weaker the causal dependence. Yet although we agree there is no mysterious downward causation, we can without doubt consciously influence the activities and movements of our body. If there is no downward causation, who is causing these activities? What do you think? * Wrong question, the actor is not a single entity ? * Self-consciousness does not trigger actions, it impedes actions (Hamlet's to be or not to be comes to mind) ? * We are not the actor of our own story, just the witness of it? -J. ----- Original Message ----- From: "russell standish" <[hidden email]> To: <[hidden email]>; "The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group" <[hidden email]> Sent: Friday, June 12, 2009 3:17 AM Subject: Re: [FRIAM] quick question > On Thu, Jun 11, 2009 at 07:01:38PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote: >> Steve, >> >> My understanding of the meaning of "strong" emergence is "inexplicable >> emergence". >> >> Is there another meaning? >> >> N > > Bedau defines it as emergence with downward causation. For example, we > would say > that consciousness is strongly emergent if we felt that we could > consciously influence the activities of our neurons, rather than > simply our consciousness simply being the result of neuronal activity. > > I'm not sure this notion has any use in discussions other than > consciousness, and even there the notion of epiphenomenalism would say > that it is void concept. > > Cheers > > -- > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Mathematics > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email] > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
|
|
In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
See below.
-- Russ On Fri, Jun 12, 2009 at 1:23 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:
Yes, I don't see why it doesn't mean the same thing. Also, although this is really nit-picky, people talk about properties rather than states. The Standord Encyclopeia of Philosohy has a good article on supervenience. Â
It's been too long since I read Bedeau to be able to comment on that. Â
That's probably why people don't like the idea of downward causation. But what about vitalism? Doesn't that fit the description? Â
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
|
|
In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
On Fri, Jun 12, 2009 at 02:23:03PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> > RS-->""Bedau defines it as emergence with downward causation. For example, we would say > that consciousness is strongly emergent if we felt that we could > consciously influence the activities of our neurons, rather than > simply our consciousness simply being the result of neuronal activity. > > I'm not sure this notion has any use in discussions other than > consciousness, and even there the notion of epiphenomenalism would say > that it is void concept."<--RS > > OK. We all seem to agree that strong emergence is a reach. Actually, I'm not as dismissive of it as Bedau is. In particular, I see that application of the anthropic principle in a multiverse causes the sort of "strange loop" that Hofstadter talks about, and this is characteristic of downward causation. Nevertheless, I do concede this is rather airy-fairy speculation, so I don't insist. > But once we have given up on strong emergence, do we need supervenience for anything? I cannot shake the intuition that the whole reason for "supervenience" is to defend consciousness against determinism, and this has always seemed to me a religious, as opposed to a scientific, project. Supervenience is just a denial of the soul, AFAICT. And yes, it is important, in the sense that without it, the anthropic principle cannot work in a multiverse, and we would suffer the Occam collapse (which we clearly don't). If you've read my book, I talk about this stuff there. > > Thanks for your help and patience, > > Have you both read the Kim and the Wimsatt articles in the same volume? > No - I don't have the volume. Sorry. > Nick > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > Clark University ([hidden email]) > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Russ Abbott > To: [hidden email];The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > Cc: Russell Standish > Sent: 6/12/2009 12:33:26 AM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] quick question > > > Hi Nick, > > See below. > > -- Russ > > > > On Thu, Jun 11, 2009 at 9:48 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote: > > Russell, > > So, is it Bedau and Philllips you have at hand? I am hoping to get some of > my colleagues in Santa Fe to read that with me next fall. > > It's Bedau and Humphreys. > > > > If that is the source you are using, I also had Bedau's contribution to > this volume in mind when I made the comment below. > > I am going to key in some short passages below so we can go over them > together. > > He writes that [strong] emergent properties are supervenient properties > with irreducible causal powers"...some of which are "macro-to-micro" > effects[,] termed "downward causation". > > Supervenience means, as i understand it, that while each member of some > enumerable list of microstates is sufficient for the occurence of the > emergent macrostate, no one of those states is necessary for its occurence. > So in practice one can have many different micro states that can bring > about the macrostate, but no change in the macrostate without some change > in a microstate. > > The necessary and sufficient part isn't part of the definition of "supervenient." The definition is simply your last clause: no change in the macrostate without some change in a microstate. > > > > Downward causation means, as I understand it, that some macrostates are > sufficient for some microstates. This brings about the loopiness that some > of the authors in the book regard as inspired and others regard as vicious. > [Some will argue that if a microstate is sufficient for A macrostate and > that macrostate is sufficient for a microstate then the macrostate drops > out of the equasion and we need simply point out that the first microstate > is sufficient for the second. } > > Bedau then writes: "Such [macro] causal powers cannot be explained in > terms of the aggregationof the micro-level potentialities; they are > primtive or "brute" natural powers that arise inexplilcably withthe > existence of certain macro-level entitites." > > Which led to my comment that they are, by definition, inexplicable. > > I understand downward causation to refer to a new causal power. An example might be dark energy. It causes changes in the universe even though there are no micro explanations for it. If it operates only at cosmological scales (and not just because it is weak at other scales, but it simply doesn't exist at other scales) then it exhibits downward causation. Another example is vitalism, were it true. It would say that there are new causal powers at the biological level that simply come into existence at that level and are not explicable in terms of lower level forces. > > > Bedau goes on to write, "All the evidence today suggests that strong > emergence is scientifically irrelevant." and goes on to argue that no > essentially examples exist. In othere words, strong emergence is possible, > it just has never been observed. This seems a very strange resolution of > the argument, since it seems to define emergence in terms of our inablity > to explain something, rather than in terms of some measurable property of > the thing itself. This seems very close to the "surprise" argument that > Bedau rejects in the early pages of the same article. > > > His argument is really a rejection of vitalism. No one wants to be a defender of vitalism, which is the rejected poster boy of downward causation. > > I've never seen anyone talk about dark energy in this context. It might be a more respectable candidate for downward causation. But it's not likely -- in my opinion. It's conceivable that dark energy is a new force of nature and that it's different from the other known forces -- gravity, electromagnetic, strong, and weak.But even if that were the case, if it could be shown to exist at all scales -- or perhaps like time and gravity -- to be simply a part of the structure of the universe, it wouldn't qualify as downward causation. Downward causation requires that the new force pop into existence when and only when some macro condition holds but not as a consequence of the micro conditions that make it up. > > > > More on this tomorrow, I hope. > > Nick > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > Clark University ([hidden email]) > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > > > [Original Message] > > From: russell standish <[hidden email]> > > To: <[hidden email]>; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity > Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > > Date: 6/12/2009 3:17:44 PM > > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] quick question > > > > On Thu, Jun 11, 2009 at 07:01:38PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > > > Steve, > > > > > > My understanding of the meaning of "strong" emergence is "inexplicable > > > emergence". > > > > > > Is there another meaning? > > > > > > N > > > > Bedau defines it as emergence with downward causation. For example, we > would say > > that consciousness is strongly emergent if we felt that we could > > consciously influence the activities of our neurons, rather than > > simply our consciousness simply being the result of neuronal activity. > > > > I'm not sure this notion has any use in discussions other than > > consciousness, and even there the notion of epiphenomenalism would say > > that it is void concept. > > > > Cheers > > > > -- > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > > Mathematics > > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email] > > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email] Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
|
|
In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Russes,
I assume we agree that vitalism is crap!
right?
N
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
|
|
In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Russell
AFAICT.? My first thought was that it was an insurance company whose mascott is a duck. I think you dont mean that. I think of the anthropic principle about the same way I think of the "planetary" principle. It is true that the planets we see today are those that have been selected for orbits that have not yet either spun out or fallen in. Yet, I am hard pressed to think of the present arrangement of the planets as a cultmination of anything. The culmination, if there is one, comes when the sun explodes and we all return to the fire from which we came. But I probably mispeak. To be honest, the anthropic principle is the sort of idea that makes me uneasy, so I have probably have always shielded myself from it and never looked at it straight. As SS would say: I am not a wise man. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > [Original Message] > From: russell standish <[hidden email]> > To: <[hidden email]>; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 6/13/2009 5:50:45 PM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] quick question > > On Fri, Jun 12, 2009 at 02:23:03PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > > > > RS-->""Bedau defines it as emergence with downward causation. For example, we would say > > that consciousness is strongly emergent if we felt that we could > > consciously influence the activities of our neurons, rather than > > simply our consciousness simply being the result of neuronal activity. > > > > I'm not sure this notion has any use in discussions other than > > consciousness, and even there the notion of epiphenomenalism would say > > that it is void concept."<--RS > > > > OK. We all seem to agree that strong emergence is a reach. > > Actually, I'm not as dismissive of it as Bedau is. In particular, I > see that application of the anthropic principle in a multiverse causes > the sort of "strange loop" that Hofstadter talks about, and this is > characteristic of downward causation. Nevertheless, I do concede this > is rather airy-fairy speculation, so I don't insist. > > > But once we have given up on strong emergence, do we need supervenience "supervenience" is to defend consciousness against determinism, and this has always seemed to me a religious, as opposed to a scientific, project. > > Supervenience is just a denial of the soul, AFAICT. And yes, it is > important, in the sense that without it, the anthropic principle > cannot work in a multiverse, and we would suffer the Occam collapse > (which we clearly don't). If you've read my book, I talk about this > stuff there. > > > > > Thanks for your help and patience, > > > > Have you both read the Kim and the Wimsatt articles in the same volume? > > > > No - I don't have the volume. Sorry. > > > Nick > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > > Clark University ([hidden email]) > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > > > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: Russ Abbott > > To: [hidden email];The Friday Morning Applied Complexity > > Cc: Russell Standish > > Sent: 6/12/2009 12:33:26 AM > > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] quick question > > > > > > Hi Nick, > > > > See below. > > > > -- Russ > > > > > > > > On Thu, Jun 11, 2009 at 9:48 PM, Nicholas Thompson > > > > Russell, > > > > So, is it Bedau and Philllips you have at hand? I am hoping to get some of > > my colleagues in Santa Fe to read that with me next fall. > > > > It's Bedau and Humphreys. > > > > > > > > If that is the source you are using, I also had Bedau's contribution to > > this volume in mind when I made the comment below. > > > > I am going to key in some short passages below so we can go over them > > together. > > > > He writes that [strong] emergent properties are supervenient properties > > with irreducible causal powers"...some of which are "macro-to-micro" > > effects[,] termed "downward causation". > > > > Supervenience means, as i understand it, that while each member of some > > enumerable list of microstates is sufficient for the occurence of the > > emergent macrostate, no one of those states is necessary for its > > So in practice one can have many different micro states that can bring > > about the macrostate, but no change in the macrostate without some change > > in a microstate. > > > > The necessary and sufficient part isn't part of the definition of "supervenient." The definition is simply your last clause: no change in the macrostate without some change in a microstate. > > > > > > > > Downward causation means, as I understand it, that some macrostates are > > sufficient for some microstates. This brings about the loopiness that some > > of the authors in the book regard as inspired and others regard as vicious. > > [Some will argue that if a microstate is sufficient for A macrostate and > > that macrostate is sufficient for a microstate then the macrostate drops > > out of the equasion and we need simply point out that the first microstate > > is sufficient for the second. } > > > > Bedau then writes: "Such [macro] causal powers cannot be explained in > > terms of the aggregationof the micro-level potentialities; they are > > primtive or "brute" natural powers that arise inexplilcably withthe > > existence of certain macro-level entitites." > > > > Which led to my comment that they are, by definition, inexplicable. > > > > I understand downward causation to refer to a new causal power. An there are no micro explanations for it. If it operates only at cosmological scales (and not just because it is weak at other scales, but it simply doesn't exist at other scales) then it exhibits downward causation. Another example is vitalism, were it true. It would say that there are new causal powers at the biological level that simply come into existence at that level and are not explicable in terms of lower level forces. > > > > > > Bedau goes on to write, "All the evidence today suggests that strong > > emergence is scientifically irrelevant." and goes on to argue that no > > essentially examples exist. In othere words, strong emergence is possible, > > it just has never been observed. This seems a very strange resolution of > > the argument, since it seems to define emergence in terms of our inablity > > to explain something, rather than in terms of some measurable property of > > the thing itself. This seems very close to the "surprise" argument that > > Bedau rejects in the early pages of the same article. > > > > > > His argument is really a rejection of vitalism. No one wants to be a defender of vitalism, which is the rejected poster boy of downward causation. > > > > I've never seen anyone talk about dark energy in this context. It might be a more respectable candidate for downward causation. But it's not likely -- in my opinion. It's conceivable that dark energy is a new force of nature and that it's different from the other known forces -- gravity, electromagnetic, strong, and weak.But even if that were the case, if it could be shown to exist at all scales -- or perhaps like time and gravity -- to be simply a part of the structure of the universe, it wouldn't qualify as downward causation. Downward causation requires that the new force pop into existence when and only when some macro condition holds but not as a consequence of the micro conditions that make it up. > > > > > > > > More on this tomorrow, I hope. > > > > Nick > > > > > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > > Clark University ([hidden email]) > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > > > > > > > > [Original Message] > > > From: russell standish <[hidden email]> > > > To: <[hidden email]>; The Friday Morning Applied > > Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > > > Date: 6/12/2009 3:17:44 PM > > > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] quick question > > > > > > On Thu, Jun 11, 2009 at 07:01:38PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > > > > Steve, > > > > > > > > My understanding of the meaning of "strong" emergence is "inexplicable > > > > emergence". > > > > > > > > Is there another meaning? > > > > > > > > N > > > > > > Bedau defines it as emergence with downward causation. For example, we > > would say > > > that consciousness is strongly emergent if we felt that we could > > > consciously influence the activities of our neurons, rather than > > > simply our consciousness simply being the result of neuronal activity. > > > > > > I'm not sure this notion has any use in discussions other than > > > consciousness, and even there the notion of epiphenomenalism would say > > > that it is void concept. > > > > > > Cheers > > > > > > -- > > > > > > > > > > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > > > Mathematics > > > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email] > > > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > > > ============================================================ > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > ============================================================ > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > -- > > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Mathematics > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email] > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
|
|
In reply to this post by Jochen Fromm-4
Jochen,
What follows is a behaviorist snit, and I apologize in advance for it. Why does the defence of consciousness always come in this form: "Yet although we agree there is no mysterious downward causation, we can without doubt consciously influence the activities and movements of our body" It is NOT without doubt. I doubt it. So there is at LEAST ONE doubt. I doubt that I am conscious and that my consciousness affects my acts. Surely after 5 hundred years there is SOMETHING to be said beyond Decartes meditations. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > [Original Message] > From: Jochen Fromm <[hidden email]> > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 6/12/2009 6:25:26 PM > Subject: [FRIAM] The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question') > > Exactly, I think it is a useless and void concept if one defines it in > this way. It makes sense the other way round: the stronger the > emergence, the weaker the causal dependence. > > Yet although we agree there is no mysterious downward causation, > we can without doubt consciously influence the activities and movements > of our body. If there is no downward causation, who is causing these > activities? What do you think? > > * Wrong question, the actor is not a single entity ? > * Self-consciousness does not trigger actions, it impedes actions > (Hamlet's to be or not to be comes to mind) ? > * We are not the actor of our own story, just the witness of it? > > -J. > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "russell standish" <[hidden email]> > To: <[hidden email]>; "The Friday Morning Applied Complexity > Coffee Group" <[hidden email]> > Sent: Friday, June 12, 2009 3:17 AM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] quick question > > > > On Thu, Jun 11, 2009 at 07:01:38PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > >> Steve, > >> > >> My understanding of the meaning of "strong" emergence is "inexplicable > >> emergence". > >> > >> Is there another meaning? > >> > >> N > > > > Bedau defines it as emergence with downward causation. For example, we > > would say > > that consciousness is strongly emergent if we felt that we could > > consciously influence the activities of our neurons, rather than > > simply our consciousness simply being the result of neuronal activity. > > > > I'm not sure this notion has any use in discussions other than > > consciousness, and even there the notion of epiphenomenalism would say > > that it is void concept. > > > > Cheers > > > > -- > > > > > > Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > > Mathematics > > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email] > > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > ============================================================ > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
|
|
In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
As far as I can tell, Russ meant AFAICT to mean "as far as I can tell."
But yeah, I also thought of the duck first. Â Same thing happened when someone once tried to tell me what a millard is.
-Ted On Sat, Jun 13, 2009 at 12:42 AM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote: Russell ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
|
|
In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
The question was why do many of us have the
belief that they can move their body in a certain direction if they want to do it voluntarily or consciously? The belief must be based on a perception of a process or interaction. If downward causation is like self-consciousness an illusion, then what kind of stimuli or causal chain preceeds a conscious action? I think the answer is maybe a complex interaction of several causal chains and circuits: * There is causal chain from the outer world to the brain and back (including the internal stimuli-response or perception-action loop) * There is a causal chain inside the body from the primary sensoric and motoric regions of the brain to the corresponding body parts * There is a causal chain inside the mind from the high-level level goals and abstract intentions to the low-level actions and concrete behavior patterns Now a mental thought occurred, a physical activity of the body happened, and afterwards we witness it. Has the mental thought triggered the physical action? The causal chain which preceeds a conscious action goes roughly like this - The mind formulates a intention and selects a goal, according to the current beliefs and desires (for example "i want to reach a certain region") - The body is in a certain state and environment - The mind perceives the current situation - The mind triggers a certain action suitable for the the current situation and the current goal - The body is in a new state Here conscious action is possible through modulation of the causal chain from the outer world to the brain and back, which is described usually as a perceive -reason-action or belief-desire-intention loop. The illusion of downcard causation seems to arise through a fundamental attribution error and an interaction of several causal chains. There is also book named "The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism" by Karl Popper and John C. Eccles which discusses a similar topic. -J. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Nicholas Thompson" <[hidden email]> To: <[hidden email]> Sent: Saturday, June 13, 2009 6:45 AM Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question') > Jochen, > > What follows is a behaviorist snit, and I apologize in advance for it. > > Why does the defence of consciousness always come in this form: > > "Yet although we agree there is no mysterious downward causation, > we can without doubt consciously influence the activities and movements > of our body" > > It is NOT without doubt. I doubt it. So there is at LEAST ONE doubt. I > doubt that I am conscious and that my consciousness affects my acts. > > Surely after 5 hundred years there is SOMETHING to be said beyond Decartes > meditations. > > Nick > > Nicholas S. Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > Clark University ([hidden email]) > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
|
|
Jochen and Nick-
I don't have any answers on this one, but I do have a couple of observations. 1) I don't understand what Nick means when he says : I doubt that I am conscious and that my consciousness affects my acts.I sympathize with the feeling, but I don't understand. In particular who the "I" is who is doing the doubting and whether "doubting" is a conscious act or not. 2) I appreciate Jochen's attempts to reduce the mystery of conscious action into it's (perhaps) more tractable components, but somehow I feel like you are cutting the head off of a Hydra in the process. As a young child (<10 yrs) I would lie in the grass staring at the clouds on lazy summer days until I felt compelled to get up and do something else. At that point, the habit of laying and contemplating would be deep enough that I would find myself in an interesting "loop" of "deciding to get up, but not doing it. I would (deliberately) think very hard about getting up yet would never quite find the connection between the decision and the action. I would deliberately search for the connection between the conscious thought "I shall get up now"with the action "getting up" and the very introspection would prevent the connection best I could tell. It would get so "bad" that eventually I would have to play a mental trick on myself and quit thinking about getting up. At that point, I would simply "get up" and the loop would be broken. This anecdote might explain why I am sympathetic with both Nick and Jochen, yet am significantly unsatisfied with either discussion. Carry on! - Steve ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
|
|
Oh Yeh... those of you who know me personally must know that this is the only way I ever make a Deliverable too! > I would deliberately search for the connection between the conscious > thought "I shall get up now"with the action "getting up" and the very > introspection would prevent the connection best I could tell. It would > get so "bad" that eventually I would have to play a mental trick on > myself and quit thinking about getting up. ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
|
|
In reply to this post by Jochen Fromm-4
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
Steve writes:
1) I don't understand what Nick means when he says :
I doubt that I am conscious and that my consciousness affects my acts.I sympathize with the feeling, but I don't understand. In particular who the "I" is who is doing the doubting and whether "doubting" is a conscious act or not. Nick replies: this is what it is to be trapped in a language game. If you dont play the game nobody understands you, and if you do play the game, everybody accuses you of being a hypocrite.
As I said to Jochen, I grant to myself all the powers I grant to any creature. If you can see me, I can see me. If you can see me doubting, then I can see me doubting. Everything a third person can do, I do. Doubting is a conscious act if the behavior of the doubter implies awareness of the doubting.
Like all behaviorists, I believe that first person perception is just third person perception directed towards the self.
N
============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question')
|
|
In reply to this post by Jochen Fromm-4
Dear Jochen,
What I am about to say will seem crazy and I certainly don't expect to convince you. At max, I might get you to try out the world from this rather strange point of view, and see why somebody might explore it. My basic position is that consciousness is an illusion. I am not talking "user-illusion" here or even epiphenomenalism. What I am saying is much stronger and more obnoxious than either of those positions. The best metaphor I can think of is "the sun rising." We all talk as if the sun rises, but it doesn't, or at best, the statement, "the sun rises", relates only in a vague way to the actual state of affairs. Our belief that the sun rises get's its force not from the facts but from the enormous authority of language, and other social arrangements. Consciousness is a huge language game, which we violate on pain of being called crazy. So what do I have to offer instead? Well, nothing, actually. I confess to being as caught in the illusion as anybody else. All I can say is that the way we talk about consciousness verges seems not to make a lot of sense, much of the time. For instance, not only do we talk as if the conscious-actor can act on his body, or through his body, on the world; we also talk as if the conscious-actor can act on his own mind, e.g., "make it up" like a rumpled bed. In these intra-mental transactions, who is the agent and who the receiver of the action? Only in talking about consciousness do we allow the agent to act upon itself in such a profligate way. An other oddity is our curious ambivalence concerning third-person point of view. There are four billion people in the world, right? When you and I speak of any of those people, we take a third-person point of view. Early in the conversation, we will make a decision, depending on our metaphysics, concerning whether another person's consciousness is something we have access to, or not. Some will take the position that we never REALLY can know what is in another person's mind. We could, of course, ask the agent, but the agent need not tell us the truth. So we are stuck because [scientific] knowledge of another's mind is beyond our reach. For such people, a scientific conversation concerning the true thoughts, feelings, intentions, etc., of another person is not possible. But what of people who don't hold to the primacy of the first person view. With such people we can have a conversation about the true intentions of another person, confident that we can get to the truth of the matter. Was OJ Simpson a murderer? Don't ASK him; look at the evidence. Our legal system is based on the notion that the intentions of an agent are something that a jury of peers can assess. In such circumstances, we are convinced that we can invade the so called privacy of the mind. But even people who grant their own powers to see the true intentions of others, still grant themselves primacy in the determination of their own behavior. To that extent, we indulge ourselves in a dualism in which we hold one theory that works for ourselves and another theory that works for the other 4 billion people on earth. And it is the personal theory that holds the most sway when called upon to talk about the relationship between the "brain and consciousness." Ok, so having confessed to all of that, please allow me to comment on your letter below. I will use CAPS, because it is a quick way to distinguish my text from yours. Owen will accuse me of SHOUTING, which I promise I am not. I am speaking in a teensy weensy voice. All the best, Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > [Original Message] > From: Jochen Fromm <[hidden email]> > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 6/14/2009 9:50:27 AM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question') > > The question was why do many of us have the > belief that they can move their body in a certain > direction if they want to do it voluntarily or > consciously? The belief must be based on a perception > of a process or interaction. If downward causation > is like self-consciousness an illusion, then what > kind of stimuli or causal chain preceeds a conscious > action? THE BEST I CAN OFFER IS A PROCEDURE FOR ANSWERING THAT QUESTION, WHICH IS TO FIGURE OUT HOW ONE WOULD GO ABOUT ANSWERING IT IN THE THIRD PERSON CASE. I GRANT TO MYSELF ALL THE POWERS OF PERCEPTION THAT I GRANT TO ANY OTHER HUMAN BEING, AND NO MORE. SO, I AM PRESENT EVERYWHERE I GO, AND I SEE MYSELF DO STUFF (ALTHOUGH MY POINT OF VIEW ON MY OWN ACTIONS IS UNIQUE). MY INTENTIONS ARE A KIND OF STANDING IN RELATION TO THE WORLD AND MY CONSCIOUSNESS IS A KIND OF STANDING IN RELATION TO MY INTENTIONS. ALL OF THIS IS AS EVIDENT TO OTHERS AS IT IS TO MYSELF, ASSUMING THAT THEY HAVE BEEN AROUND ME AS MUCH AS I HAVE. WHAT FOLLOWS IS METAPHYSICS OR ONTOLOGY OR BOTH. I HAVE NEVER KNOWN THE DIFFERENCE. WHAT IS WRITTEN HERE REMINDS ME OF DESCRIPTION'S OF THE LEVELS OF PURGATORY IN MILTON. SURE, IT BEARS SOME VAGUE RELATION TO THE WORLD AS WE KNOW IT -- OTHERWISE THE PASSAGES WOULD BE UNINTELLIGIBLE -- BUT DESCRIBING THE WORLD AS WE FIND IT IS NOT THE PRIMARY IMPULSE OF THIS WRITING. THE PRIMARY IMPULSE, AS IN MILTON, IS TO DESCRIBE THE WORLD THAT LIES BEHIND OUR SENSES ... THE WORLD AS IT REALLY IS. THE AUTHORITY OF SUCH CLAIMS LIES NOT IN IS DESCRIPTIVE POWER BUT IN ITS COALESCENCE WITH ALL THE OTHER THINGS WE THINK WE KNOW, AND THOSE COME NOT FROM THE SENSES BUT FROM LANGUAGE AND SOCIETY. > > I think the answer is maybe a complex interaction > of several causal chains and circuits: THE DECISION TO USE THE CURCUIT AND THE CHAIN METAPHORS IS AN IMPORTANT ONE AND NOT ONE THAT IS WARRANTED BY THE ANALOG PARALLEL PROCESSING SYSTEM THE BRAIN SEEMS TO BE. > > * There is causal chain from the outer world > to the brain and back (including the internal > stimuli-response or perception-action loop) > > * There is a causal chain inside the body > from the primary sensoric and motoric regions > of the brain to the corresponding body parts > > * There is a causal chain inside the mind from > the high-level level goals and abstract > intentions to the low-level actions and > concrete behavior patterns NOTE HOW THE NOTION OF CAUSAL CHAIN IS METAMORPHOSING HERE. HOW DOES A GOAL CAUSE? WE ARE FUSING BRAIN-TALK WITH LOGICAL ANAYSIS TALK. IT MAKES A KIND OF SENSE TO DO SO, BUT SO DOES ALL METAPHYSICS, AND METAPHYSICS DOES NOT TELL US MUCH ABOUT HOW THINGS ARE IN EXPERIENCE. . > > Now a mental thought occurred, a physical activity > of the body happened, and afterwards we witness > it. Has the mental thought triggered the physical > action? The causal chain which preceeds a conscious > action goes roughly like this > > WHAT FOLLOWS IS INDEED WHAT OUR LANGUAGE PRESUPPOSES, IN THE SAME WAY THAT EQUIVALENT CONVERSATIONS ABOUT DEVELOPMENT PRESUPPOSED. BUT, AS WE ARE DISCOVERING WITH DEVELOPMENT, THE BODY DOES NOT BEHAVE LOGICALLY AND IT CERTAINLY DOES NOT BEHAVE EFFICIENTLY. WASTE IS THE HALL MARK OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL SYSTEM, BUILDING UP ONLY TO TEAR DOWN ARE REBUILD. The mind formulates a intention and selects a goal, > according to the current beliefs and desires > (for example "i want to reach a certain region") > > - The body is in a certain state and environment > > - The mind perceives the current situation > > - The mind triggers a certain action suitable for the > the current situation and the current goal NO, I DISAGREE. THIS IS NOT WHAT THE MIND DOES, IN ANY CASE. THIS IS WHAT YOU DO, AND IF I WATCH YOU CLOSELY, I CAN SEE YOU DODING IT. > > - The body is in a new state > > Here conscious action is possible through modulation > of the causal chain from the outer world to the brain > and back, which is described usually as a perceive > -reason-action or belief-desire-intention loop. > The illusion of downcard causation seems to arise > through a fundamental attribution error and > an interaction of several causal chains. > > There is also book named "The Self and Its Brain: > An Argument for Interactionism" by Karl Popper and > John C. Eccles which discusses a similar topic. J. THANKS FOR THIS EXCHANGE. I APOLOGIZE FOR THE CAPS AGAIN. OWEN WILL NOT FORGIVE ME, BUT I THINK YOU WILL. NOW i WILL RETURN TO ORDINARY TEXT. Take care. If you every were so idle and demented as to want to read something I have written on the subject, you might try: http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/id36.html Nick > > -J. > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Nicholas Thompson" <[hidden email]> > To: <[hidden email]> > Sent: Saturday, June 13, 2009 6:45 AM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The ghost in the machine (was 'quick question') > > > > Jochen, > > > > What follows is a behaviorist snit, and I apologize in advance for it. > > > > Why does the defence of consciousness always come in this form: > > > > "Yet although we agree there is no mysterious downward causation, > > we can without doubt consciously influence the activities and movements > > of our body" > > > > It is NOT without doubt. I doubt it. So there is at LEAST ONE doubt. I > > doubt that I am conscious and that my consciousness affects my acts. > > > > Surely after 5 hundred years there is SOMETHING to be said beyond > > meditations. > > > > Nick > > > > Nicholas S. Thompson > > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, > > Clark University ([hidden email]) > > http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ > > > > > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
«
Return to Friam
|
1 view|%1 views
| Free forum by Nabble | Edit this page |