question for pragmatists and Piercians among us

[Prof David West]

Politically charged question to follow. Unlike my usual wont, I am not trying to be provocative. I pick a difficult example for my question in the hope that it will generate enough heat to produce light with the hope that the light will illuminate clarity.

Pierce said:

"Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."

The Donald is our object.

1- Can we enumerate the "effects with conceivably practical bearings" we expect our object to have?
2- Must the enumeration include both "positive" and "negative" effects?
  2a- does the answer to #2 depend on the definition of "our?" If 'our' is defined inclusively the answer to #2 would seem to be yes, but if 'our' is exclusive or restricted to only those with pro or anti perspectives/convictions, maybe not.
3- Must the effects we conceive have some threshold measure of a quality we might call 'truthiness', 'likelihood', 'believe-ability', reality'? [T becoming a dictator is a conceivable effect, but, I for one, see no possibility of that effectuating.]
4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object?
5- If we have myriad enumerations does that mean "we" cannot possess a conception of the object, merely multiple conceptions of caricatures of the object?

I'm working on a paper with an epistemological focus and that brought me to Pierce and prompted the above questions.

Another question for the evolutionists who are also pragmatists: why pragmatism over "naturalized epistemology?"

davew

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[Marcus G. Daniels]

<   2a- does the answer to #2 depend on the definition of "our?" If 'our' is defined inclusively the answer to #2 would seem to be yes, but if 'our' is exclusive or restricted to only those with pro or anti perspectives/convictions, maybe not. >

Long-term harm to the Republican party could be one good outcome.

Marcus
 

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[thompnickson2]

David,

 

I immediately got snarled up in writing you a long, turgid response, so figured I better write you a short one first, lest I never respond at all.  See larding below.

 

n

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/D

 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 8:48 AM
To: [hidden email]
Subject: [FRIAM] question for pragmatists and Piercians among us

 

Politically charged question to follow. Unlike my usual wont, I am not trying to be provocative. I pick a difficult example for my question in the hope that it will generate enough heat to produce light with the hope that the light will illuminate clarity.

 

Pierce said:

 

"Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."

 

The Donald is our object

[NST===>] It might be argued that the whole project is ill-founded because “the Donald” is an individual, and therefore, by definition, not a general.  Abduction is to generals.  I think this is a cheap response, because, while The Donald is not a general in the same way “cat” is a general, it is still a lower level general.  “Is it true that The Donald is over 6’ tall” is a reasonable question to ask in the same way that “how many angels….pin?” is not a reasonable question to ask. So, then, by definition, The Donald is a real 

 

 

1- Can we enumerate the "effects with conceivably practical bearings" we expect our object to have?[NST===>]  Eric might help us here, but basically, I have to agree with you the Maxim is faulty at this point.  It seems to me a monstrous category error.  Objects are just not the sorts of things that have effects.  Events have effects.  Actions have effects.  Thanks reminding me of this problem.  I always supply words when I read the maxim, such as effects… of conceiving of the object in the way we do, as opposed to some other way. The effects under consideration are the expectations that would arise from conceiving of the object way.  So, if we conceive of DT as  a liar, then many effects follow from that conception, and those effects are the meaning of the conception, and it has no other meaning. 

2- Must the enumeration include both "positive" and "negative" effects?

  2a- does the answer to #2 depend on the definition of "our?" If 'our' is defined inclusively the answer to #2 would seem to be yes, but if 'our' is exclusive or restricted to only those with pro or anti perspectives/convictions, maybe not.[NST===>]  

[NST===>] well, we have to remember that the Maxim is a thesis about meaning, and so I think the maxim can be applied relatively—i.e., If [to me] a unicorn is a white horse with a narwhale horn in the middle of his forehead, then that is [to me] the meaning of unicorn. 

3- Must the effects we conceive have some threshold measure of a quality we might call 'truthiness', 'likelihood', 'believe-ability', reality'? [T becoming a dictator.][NST===>]  The question is not about the meaning of “trump”; as a proper name, “Trump” has no meaning in that sense.  The question is about the assignment of trump to the general, “dictator”, and so concerns the meaning of that general.  If we were to test by observation the proposition that Trump is a dictator,  what tests would we employ.  These tests, according to the maxim, are the meaning of the attribution. 

 is a conceivable effect, but, I for one, see no possibility of that effectuating [NST===>] I don’t think so.  What “unicorn” means to me has no implications for the existence of unicorns. 

4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object?

[NST===>] I don’t think so.  Increasing the number of people who think that “unicorn” means “a horse with a narwhale horn on his forehead” has no implications for the existence or non existence of unicorns.

 

5- If we have myriad enumerations does that mean "we" cannot possess a conception of the object, merely multiple conceptions of caricatures of the object?

 

I'm working on a paper with an epistemological focus and that brought me to Pierce and prompted the above questions.

Another question for the evolutionists who are also pragmatists: why pragmatism over "naturalized epistemology?"

[NST===>] I am not sure what a naturalized epistemology is.  Evolutionary epistemology is the known that all knowledge arises through selection mechanisms.  People will say, for instance, that both a bird’s wing and a jumbo jet’s constitute knowledge about flight.  Well, I suppose. 

 

davew

 

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[Frank Wimberly-2]

To me "unicorn" means an imaginary horse with a sharp horn made of precious material growing from it's forehead.

On Wed, Feb 19, 2020, 5:36 PM <[hidden email]> wrote:

David,

 

I immediately got snarled up in writing you a long, turgid response, so figured I better write you a short one first, lest I never respond at all.  See larding below.

 

n

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/D

 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 8:48 AM
To: [hidden email]
Subject: [FRIAM] question for pragmatists and Piercians among us

 

Politically charged question to follow. Unlike my usual wont, I am not trying to be provocative. I pick a difficult example for my question in the hope that it will generate enough heat to produce light with the hope that the light will illuminate clarity.

 

Pierce said:

 

"Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."

 

The Donald is our object

[NST===>] It might be argued that the whole project is ill-founded because “the Donald” is an individual, and therefore, by definition, not a general.  Abduction is to generals.  I think this is a cheap response, because, while The Donald is not a general in the same way “cat” is a general, it is still a lower level general.  “Is it true that The Donald is over 6’ tall” is a reasonable question to ask in the same way that “how many angels….pin?” is not a reasonable question to ask. So, then, by definition, The Donald is a real 

 

 

1- Can we enumerate the "effects with conceivably practical bearings" we expect our object to have?[NST===>]  Eric might help us here, but basically, I have to agree with you the Maxim is faulty at this point.  It seems to me a monstrous category error.  Objects are just not the sorts of things that have effects.  Events have effects.  Actions have effects.  Thanks reminding me of this problem.  I always supply words when I read the maxim, such as effects… of conceiving of the object in the way we do, as opposed to some other way. The effects under consideration are the expectations that would arise from conceiving of the object way.  So, if we conceive of DT as  a liar, then many effects follow from that conception, and those effects are the meaning of the conception, and it has no other meaning. 

2- Must the enumeration include both "positive" and "negative" effects?

  2a- does the answer to #2 depend on the definition of "our?" If 'our' is defined inclusively the answer to #2 would seem to be yes, but if 'our' is exclusive or restricted to only those with pro or anti perspectives/convictions, maybe not.[NST===>]  

[NST===>] well, we have to remember that the Maxim is a thesis about meaning, and so I think the maxim can be applied relatively—i.e., If [to me] a unicorn is a white horse with a narwhale horn in the middle of his forehead, then that is [to me] the meaning of unicorn. 

3- Must the effects we conceive have some threshold measure of a quality we might call 'truthiness', 'likelihood', 'believe-ability', reality'? [T becoming a dictator.][NST===>]  The question is not about the meaning of “trump”; as a proper name, “Trump” has no meaning in that sense.  The question is about the assignment of trump to the general, “dictator”, and so concerns the meaning of that general.  If we were to test by observation the proposition that Trump is a dictator,  what tests would we employ.  These tests, according to the maxim, are the meaning of the attribution. 

 is a conceivable effect, but, I for one, see no possibility of that effectuating [NST===>] I don’t think so.  What “unicorn” means to me has no implications for the existence of unicorns. 

4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object?

[NST===>] I don’t think so.  Increasing the number of people who think that “unicorn” means “a horse with a narwhale horn on his forehead” has no implications for the existence or non existence of unicorns.

 

5- If we have myriad enumerations does that mean "we" cannot possess a conception of the object, merely multiple conceptions of caricatures of the object?

 

I'm working on a paper with an epistemological focus and that brought me to Pierce and prompted the above questions.

Another question for the evolutionists who are also pragmatists: why pragmatism over "naturalized epistemology?"

[NST===>] I am not sure what a naturalized epistemology is.  Evolutionary epistemology is the known that all knowledge arises through selection mechanisms.  People will say, for instance, that both a bird’s wing and a jumbo jet’s constitute knowledge about flight.  Well, I suppose. 

 

davew

 

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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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[Marcus G. Daniels]

Nick writes:

 

< It might be argued that the whole project is ill-founded because “the Donald” is an individual, and therefore, by definition, not a general.  Abduction is to generals.  >

 

Change it to the collective crazy known as Trumpism, then.

 

From: Friam <[hidden email]> on behalf of "[hidden email]" <[hidden email]>
Reply-To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Date: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 at 4:36 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] question for pragmatists and Piercians among us

 

David,

 

I immediately got snarled up in writing you a long, turgid response, so figured I better write you a short one first, lest I never respond at all.  See larding below.

 

n

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/D

 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 8:48 AM
To: [hidden email]
Subject: [FRIAM] question for pragmatists and Piercians among us

 

Politically charged question to follow. Unlike my usual wont, I am not trying to be provocative. I pick a difficult example for my question in the hope that it will generate enough heat to produce light with the hope that the light will illuminate clarity.

 

Pierce said:

 

"Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."

 

The Donald is our object

[NST===>] It might be argued that the whole project is ill-founded because “the Donald” is an individual, and therefore, by definition, not a general.  Abduction is to generals.  I think this is a cheap response, because, while The Donald is not a general in the same way “cat” is a general, it is still a lower level general.  “Is it true that The Donald is over 6’ tall” is a reasonable question to ask in the same way that “how many angels….pin?” is not a reasonable question to ask. So, then, by definition, The Donald is a real 

 

 

1- Can we enumerate the "effects with conceivably practical bearings" we expect our object to have?[NST===>]  Eric might help us here, but basically, I have to agree with you the Maxim is faulty at this point.  It seems to me a monstrous category error.  Objects are just not the sorts of things that have effects.  Events have effects.  Actions have effects.  Thanks reminding me of this problem.  I always supply words when I read the maxim, such as effects… of conceiving of the object in the way we do, as opposed to some other way. The effects under consideration are the expectations that would arise from conceiving of the object way.  So, if we conceive of DT as  a liar, then many effects follow from that conception, and those effects are the meaning of the conception, and it has no other meaning. 

2- Must the enumeration include both "positive" and "negative" effects?

  2a- does the answer to #2 depend on the definition of "our?" If 'our' is defined inclusively the answer to #2 would seem to be yes, but if 'our' is exclusive or restricted to only those with pro or anti perspectives/convictions, maybe not.[NST===>]  

[NST===>] well, we have to remember that the Maxim is a thesis about meaning, and so I think the maxim can be applied relatively—i.e., If [to me] a unicorn is a white horse with a narwhale horn in the middle of his forehead, then that is [to me] the meaning of unicorn. 

3- Must the effects we conceive have some threshold measure of a quality we might call 'truthiness', 'likelihood', 'believe-ability', reality'? [T becoming a dictator.][NST===>]  The question is not about the meaning of “trump”; as a proper name, “Trump” has no meaning in that sense.  The question is about the assignment of trump to the general, “dictator”, and so concerns the meaning of that general.  If we were to test by observation the proposition that Trump is a dictator,  what tests would we employ.  These tests, according to the maxim, are the meaning of the attribution. 

 is a conceivable effect, but, I for one, see no possibility of that effectuating [NST===>] I don’t think so.  What “unicorn” means to me has no implications for the existence of unicorns. 

4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object?

[NST===>] I don’t think so.  Increasing the number of people who think that “unicorn” means “a horse with a narwhale horn on his forehead” has no implications for the existence or non existence of unicorns.

 

5- If we have myriad enumerations does that mean "we" cannot possess a conception of the object, merely multiple conceptions of caricatures of the object?

 

I'm working on a paper with an epistemological focus and that brought me to Pierce and prompted the above questions.

Another question for the evolutionists who are also pragmatists: why pragmatism over "naturalized epistemology?"

[NST===>] I am not sure what a naturalized epistemology is.  Evolutionary epistemology is the known that all knowledge arises through selection mechanisms.  People will say, for instance, that both a bird’s wing and a jumbo jet’s constitute knowledge about flight.  Well, I suppose. 

 

davew

 

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[Prof David West]

Nick,

Thanks for the response. I think you answered my questions but, because your answers seem to confirm a conclusion I came to prior to the answers, I need to check if I have it correct.

The key issue, for me is in question 4 and your answer ...

4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object?

[NST===>] I don’t think so.  Increasing the number of people who think that “unicorn” means “a horse with a narwhale horn on his forehead” has no implications for the existence or non existence of unicorns.

 ... which is the reason that I asked the followup question about naturalized epistemology (NE).

NE comes from W.V.O. Quine and advocates replacing traditional approaches for understanding knowledge with empirically grounded approaches ala the natural sciences — how knowledge actually forms and is used in the World. A subset would be about what knowledge must an agent form and hold in order to survive; which sounds related to evolutionary epistemology.

The epistemology of Pierce and traditional philosophers of knowledge is deemed, like mathematics, to be divorced from common sense understandings of meaning and truth. I.e. Pierce's system (logic?) can tell us whether or not we have a truthful conception of an object, but nothing further. It cannot tell us that Donald "is," let alone that he is an "x."

Alas, I seems I must abandon the hope that Pierce can offer assistance in my quest to understand what knowledge is, means for obtaining it, and how we know if we have it.

davew

On Thu, Feb 20, 2020, at 1:35 AM, [hidden email] wrote:

David,

 

I immediately got snarled up in writing you a long, turgid response, so figured I better write you a short one first, lest I never respond at all.  See larding below.

 

n

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/D

 

 

-----Original Message-----

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Prof David West

Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 8:48 AM

To: [hidden email]

Subject: [FRIAM] question for pragmatists and Piercians among us

 

Politically charged question to follow. Unlike my usual wont, I am not trying to be provocative. I pick a difficult example for my question in the hope that it will generate enough heat to produce light with the hope that the light will illuminate clarity.

 

Pierce said:

 

"Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."

 

The Donald is our object

[NST===>] It might be argued that the whole project is ill-founded because “the Donald” is an individual, and therefore, by definition, not a general.  Abduction is to generals.  I think this is a cheap response, because, while The Donald is not a general in the same way “cat” is a general, it is still a lower level general.  “Is it true that The Donald is over 6’ tall” is a reasonable question to ask in the same way that “how many angels….pin?” is not a reasonable question to ask. So, then, by definition, The Donald is a real 

 

 

1- Can we enumerate the "effects with conceivably practical bearings" we expect our object to have?[NST===>]  Eric might help us here, but basically, I have to agree with you the Maxim is faulty at this point.  It seems to me a monstrous category error.  Objects are just not the sorts of things that have effects.  Events have effects.  Actions have effects.  Thanks reminding me of this problem.  I always supply words when I read the maxim, such as effects… of conceiving of the object in the way we do, as opposed to some other way. The effects under consideration are the expectations that would arise from conceiving of the object way.  So, if we conceive of DT as  a liar, then many effects follow from that conception, and those effects are the meaning of the conception, and it has no other meaning. 

2- Must the enumeration include both "positive" and "negative" effects?

  2a- does the answer to #2 depend on the definition of "our?" If 'our' is defined inclusively the answer to #2 would seem to be yes, but if 'our' is exclusive or restricted to only those with pro or anti perspectives/convictions, maybe not.[NST===>]  

[NST===>] well, we have to remember that the Maxim is a thesis about meaning, and so I think the maxim can be applied relatively—i.e., If [to me] a unicorn is a white horse with a narwhale horn in the middle of his forehead, then that is [to me] the meaning of unicorn. 

3- Must the effects we conceive have some threshold measure of a quality we might call 'truthiness', 'likelihood', 'believe-ability', reality'? [T becoming a dictator.][NST===>]  The question is not about the meaning of “trump”; as a proper name, “Trump” has no meaning in that sense.  The question is about the assignment of trump to the general, “dictator”, and so concerns the meaning of that general.  If we were to test by observation the proposition that Trump is a dictator,  what tests would we employ.  These tests, according to the maxim, are the meaning of the attribution. 

 is a conceivable effect, but, I for one, see no possibility of that effectuating [NST===>] I don’t think so.  What “unicorn” means to me has no implications for the existence of unicorns. 

4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object?

[NST===>] I don’t think so.  Increasing the number of people who think that “unicorn” means “a horse with a narwhale horn on his forehead” has no implications for the existence or non existence of unicorns.

 

5- If we have myriad enumerations does that mean "we" cannot possess a conception of the object, merely multiple conceptions of caricatures of the object?

 

I'm working on a paper with an epistemological focus and that brought me to Pierce and prompted the above questions.

Another question for the evolutionists who are also pragmatists: why pragmatism over "naturalized epistemology?"

[NST===>] I am not sure what a naturalized epistemology is.  Evolutionary epistemology is the known that all knowledge arises through selection mechanisms.  People will say, for instance, that both a bird’s wing and a jumbo jet’s constitute knowledge about flight.  Well, I suppose. 

 

davew

 

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[gepr]

If I read this post with a little empathy, it seems very provocative, indeed. Good job.

You start by striking a posture of checking your "in your own words" with Nick's. But you end with the suggestion that Pierce's work has nothing to offer in understanding what knowledge is, etc. And you obviously understand that Nick believes Pierce DOES offer at least some assistance in that effort.

If you were in a physical fight, this would be a *feint*, where you pretend to check your own words against Nick with your right hand. But then quickly punch him in the kidney with your left.

An authentic attempt to steel-man why Nick might believe Pierce can contribute to your effort might consist of identifying, for example, how establishing the truth of one's (or many's) conception of an object (which you admit Pierce helps with) might *indirectly* contribute to understanding the existence of those target objects. Personally, it's not clear to me that Pierce's words, themselves, help much in that regard. But his intellectual descendants' words *do* help, John Woods for me. But maybe others for you.

On 2/20/20 12:54 AM, Prof David West wrote:

> Thanks for the response. I think you answered my questions but, because your answers seem to confirm a conclusion I came to prior to the answers, I need to check if I have it correct.
>
> The key issue, for me is in question 4 and your answer ...
>
>> 4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object?
>>
>> */[NST===>] I don’t think so.  Increasing the number of people who think that “unicorn” means “a horse with a narwhale horn on his forehead” has no implications for the existence or non existence of unicorns./*
>>
>
>  ... which is the reason that I asked the followup question about naturalized epistemology (NE).
>
> NE comes from W.V.O. Quine and advocates replacing traditional approaches for understanding knowledge with empirically grounded approaches ala the natural sciences — how knowledge actually forms and is used in the World. A subset would be about what knowledge must an agent form and hold in order to survive; which sounds related to evolutionary epistemology.
>
> The epistemology of Pierce and traditional philosophers of knowledge is deemed, like mathematics, to be divorced from common sense understandings of meaning and truth. I.e. Pierce's system (logic?) can tell us whether or not we have a truthful conception of an object, but nothing further. It cannot tell us that Donald "is," let alone that he is an "x."
>
> Alas, I seems I must abandon the hope that Pierce can offer assistance in my quest to understand what knowledge is, means for obtaining it, and how we know if we have it.

--
☣ uǝlƃ

============================================================
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[Prof David West]

Hi Glen,

Your analysis is excellent but the post is missing what is actually an important bit of information re: my quest that Nick would likely recall but is not in the post. I am interested in whether or not various approaches to epistemology are applicable to "knowledge" obtained from mystical and/or hallucinogenic experiences.

This makes my "feint" a little less of one and my conclusion that Pierce probably offers little of assistance less of a provocation.

I used to think that Pierce had a bit of the mystic in his work, but increasingly doubt it.

davew


On Thu, Feb 20, 2020, at 4:21 PM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote:

> If I read this post with a little empathy, it seems very provocative,
> indeed. Good job.
>
> You start by striking a posture of checking your "in your own words"
> with Nick's. But you end with the suggestion that Pierce's work has
> nothing to offer in understanding what knowledge is, etc. And you
> obviously understand that Nick believes Pierce DOES offer at least some
> assistance in that effort.
>
> If you were in a physical fight, this would be a *feint*, where you
> pretend to check your own words against Nick with your right hand. But
> then quickly punch him in the kidney with your left.
>
> An authentic attempt to steel-man why Nick might believe Pierce can
> contribute to your effort might consist of identifying, for example,
> how establishing the truth of one's (or many's) conception of an object
> (which you admit Pierce helps with) might *indirectly* contribute to
> understanding the existence of those target objects. Personally, it's
> not clear to me that Pierce's words, themselves, help much in that
> regard. But his intellectual descendants' words *do* help, John Woods
> for me. But maybe others for you.
>
> On 2/20/20 12:54 AM, Prof David West wrote:
> > Thanks for the response. I think you answered my questions but, because your answers seem to confirm a conclusion I came to prior to the answers, I need to check if I have it correct.
> >
> > The key issue, for me is in question 4 and your answer ...
> >
> >> 4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object?
> >>
> >> */[NST===>] I don’t think so.  Increasing the number of people who think that “unicorn” means “a horse with a narwhale horn on his forehead” has no implications for the existence or non existence of unicorns./*
> >>
> >
> >  ... which is the reason that I asked the followup question about naturalized epistemology (NE).
> >
> > NE comes from W.V.O. Quine and advocates replacing traditional approaches for understanding knowledge with empirically grounded approaches ala the natural sciences — how knowledge actually forms and is used in the World. A subset would be about what knowledge must an agent form and hold in order to survive; which sounds related to evolutionary epistemology.
> >
> > The epistemology of Pierce and traditional philosophers of knowledge is deemed, like mathematics, to be divorced from common sense understandings of meaning and truth. I.e. Pierce's system (logic?) can tell us whether or not we have a truthful conception of an object, but nothing further. It cannot tell us that Donald "is," let alone that he is an "x."
> >
> > Alas, I seems I must abandon the hope that Pierce can offer assistance in my quest to understand what knowledge is, means for obtaining it, and how we know if we have it.
>
> --
> ☣ uǝlƃ
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>

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[Frank Wimberly-2]

Peirce

On Thu, Feb 20, 2020, 8:59 AM Prof David West <[hidden email]> wrote:

Hi Glen,

Your analysis is excellent but the post is missing what is actually an important bit of information re: my quest that Nick would likely recall but is not in the post. I am interested in whether or not various approaches to epistemology are applicable to "knowledge" obtained from mystical and/or hallucinogenic experiences.

This makes my "feint" a little less of one and my conclusion that Pierce probably offers little of assistance less of a provocation.

I used to think that Pierce had a bit of the mystic in his work, but increasingly doubt it.

davew


On Thu, Feb 20, 2020, at 4:21 PM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote:
> If I read this post with a little empathy, it seems very provocative,
> indeed. Good job.
>
> You start by striking a posture of checking your "in your own words"
> with Nick's. But you end with the suggestion that Pierce's work has
> nothing to offer in understanding what knowledge is, etc. And you
> obviously understand that Nick believes Pierce DOES offer at least some
> assistance in that effort.
>
> If you were in a physical fight, this would be a *feint*, where you
> pretend to check your own words against Nick with your right hand. But
> then quickly punch him in the kidney with your left.
>
> An authentic attempt to steel-man why Nick might believe Pierce can
> contribute to your effort might consist of identifying, for example,
> how establishing the truth of one's (or many's) conception of an object
> (which you admit Pierce helps with) might *indirectly* contribute to
> understanding the existence of those target objects. Personally, it's
> not clear to me that Pierce's words, themselves, help much in that
> regard. But his intellectual descendants' words *do* help, John Woods
> for me. But maybe others for you.
>
> On 2/20/20 12:54 AM, Prof David West wrote:
> > Thanks for the response. I think you answered my questions but, because your answers seem to confirm a conclusion I came to prior to the answers, I need to check if I have it correct.
> >
> > The key issue, for me is in question 4 and your answer ...
> >
> >> 4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object?
> >>
> >> */[NST===>] I don’t think so.  Increasing the number of people who think that “unicorn” means “a horse with a narwhale horn on his forehead” has no implications for the existence or non existence of unicorns./*
> >>
> >
> >  ... which is the reason that I asked the followup question about naturalized epistemology (NE).
> >
> > NE comes from W.V.O. Quine and advocates replacing traditional approaches for understanding knowledge with empirically grounded approaches ala the natural sciences — how knowledge actually forms and is used in the World. A subset would be about what knowledge must an agent form and hold in order to survive; which sounds related to evolutionary epistemology.
> >
> > The epistemology of Pierce and traditional philosophers of knowledge is deemed, like mathematics, to be divorced from common sense understandings of meaning and truth. I.e. Pierce's system (logic?) can tell us whether or not we have a truthful conception of an object, but nothing further. It cannot tell us that Donald "is," let alone that he is an "x."
> >
> > Alas, I seems I must abandon the hope that Pierce can offer assistance in my quest to understand what knowledge is, means for obtaining it, and how we know if we have it.
>
> --
> ☣ uǝlƃ
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>

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FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
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[gepr]

Interesting. My guess is that we could fold Peirce (thanks Frank -- I'm the victim, here! 8^) into a particular *kind* of mystical tradition. I'm no scholar. But it seems to me that mystics come in 2 flavors, those who believe cause (a derivative of existence) is merely occult versus those who believe cause is unknowable. Peirce would land in the former camp, I think.

If we posit the existence of immortal people (I've longed for "intellectual vampires" to accompany the philosophers' favorite "intellectual zombies"), I suspect Peirce might agree that a specific type of vampire would be able to track ontology with their conceptions -- and, more importantly, the methods by which they track the world. But I'd need to know more about why y'all distinguish, so disjointly, evolutionary epistemology versus the long-term stabilization of collective conceptions.

Entheogens are of the manipulationist conception of cause. They not only provide access to truth, but *intervene* in the world so as to change the truth. ... if they didn't do that, the name "entheogen" wouldn't apply. So we could argue that evolutionary epistemology might provide for an "open-ended" world ... one where few, if any, properties/attributes are forever-stable. But the long-term stabilization of a conception relies on there being properties upon which the conceptions *can* stabilize.

To me, the very *talking about* of this sort of thing has helped us, no matter which way the question resolves. So, Peirce has *already* helped us. To ignore that seems a bit flippant.


On 2/20/20 7:58 AM, Prof David West wrote:
> Your analysis is excellent but the post is missing what is actually an important bit of information re: my quest that Nick would likely recall but is not in the post. I am interested in whether or not various approaches to epistemology are applicable to "knowledge" obtained from mystical and/or hallucinogenic experiences.
>
> This makes my "feint" a little less of one and my conclusion that Pierce probably offers little of assistance less of a provocation.
>
> I used to think that Pierce had a bit of the mystic in his work, but increasingly doubt it.

--
☣ uǝlƃ

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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

[thompnickson2]

Dave,

 

I confess I did not see the “ecstatic” context of your question:  Is here any place in pragmatism for knowledge gained in “special” states of consciousness.  I think The Goose that Laid the Golden Egg is a fable about consciousness.  Conscioiusness, as we experience it in everday life, IS the golden egg, and it does’t get more golden when we eff with it.  Perhaps I should rethink that.  Hmmm.  Opiods exist in the nervous system to tell the organism when it has done something right.  But why go to all that trouble of doing something right when we can drink the poppy juice and have the pleasure of doing something right without the bother?  Here, I guess I have bought some of the premises of evolutionary epistemology.  If it feels good, it must have BEEN good, for the average person, in the deep history of the population of which I am a member.  But given that all control systems work on cues, the fact that it feels good is insufficient evidence that it is, even to a card carrying evolutionary epistemologist. 

 

If you smash an alarm clock with a sledge hammer, it will ring.  Does that tell you anything about time?  Kill the goose and all you get is goose-guts. 

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

 

 

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2020 1:55 AM
To: [hidden email]
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] question for pragmatists and Piercians among us

 

Nick,

 

Thanks for the response. I think you answered my questions but, because your answers seem to confirm a conclusion I came to prior to the answers, I need to check if I have it correct.

 

The key issue, for me is in question 4 and your answer ...

 

4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object?

[NST===>] I don’t think so.  Increasing the number of people who think that “unicorn” means “a horse with a narwhale horn on his forehead” has no implications for the existence or non existence of unicorns.

 

 ... which is the reason that I asked the followup question about naturalized epistemology (NE).

 

NE comes from W.V.O. Quine and advocates replacing traditional approaches for understanding knowledge with empirically grounded approaches ala the natural sciences — how knowledge actually forms and is used in the World. A subset would be about what knowledge must an agent form and hold in order to survive; which sounds related to evolutionary epistemology.

 

The epistemology of Pierce and traditional philosophers of knowledge is deemed, like mathematics, to be divorced from common sense understandings of meaning and truth. I.e. Pierce's system (logic?) can tell us whether or not we have a truthful conception of an object, but nothing further. It cannot tell us that Donald "is," let alone that he is an "x."

 

Alas, I seems I must abandon the hope that Pierce can offer assistance in my quest to understand what knowledge is, means for obtaining it, and how we know if we have it.

 

davew

 

 

 

On Thu, Feb 20, 2020, at 1:35 AM, [hidden email] wrote:

David,

 

I immediately got snarled up in writing you a long, turgid response, so figured I better write you a short one first, lest I never respond at all.  See larding below.

 

n

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/D

 

 

 

-----Original Message-----

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Prof David West

Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 8:48 AM

To: [hidden email]

Subject: [FRIAM] question for pragmatists and Piercians among us

 

Politically charged question to follow. Unlike my usual wont, I am not trying to be provocative. I pick a difficult example for my question in the hope that it will generate enough heat to produce light with the hope that the light will illuminate clarity.

 

Pierce said:

 

"Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."

 

The Donald is our object

[NST===>] It might be argued that the whole project is ill-founded because “the Donald” is an individual, and therefore, by definition, not a general.  Abduction is to generals.  I think this is a cheap response, because, while The Donald is not a general in the same way “cat” is a general, it is still a lower level general.  “Is it true that The Donald is over 6’ tall” is a reasonable question to ask in the same way that “how many angels….pin?” is not a reasonable question to ask. So, then, by definition, The Donald is a real 

 

 

1- Can we enumerate the "effects with conceivably practical bearings" we expect our object to have?[NST===>]  Eric might help us here, but basically, I have to agree with you the Maxim is faulty at this point.  It seems to me a monstrous category error.  Objects are just not the sorts of things that have effects.  Events have effects.  Actions have effects.  Thanks reminding me of this problem.  I always supply words when I read the maxim, such as effects… of conceiving of the object in the way we do, as opposed to some other way. The effects under consideration are the expectations that would arise from conceiving of the object way.  So, if we conceive of DT as  a liar, then many effects follow from that conception, and those effects are the meaning of the conception, and it has no other meaning. 

2- Must the enumeration include both "positive" and "negative" effects?

  2a- does the answer to #2 depend on the definition of "our?" If 'our' is defined inclusively the answer to #2 would seem to be yes, but if 'our' is exclusive or restricted to only those with pro or anti perspectives/convictions, maybe not.[NST===>]  

[NST===>] well, we have to remember that the Maxim is a thesis about meaning, and so I think the maxim can be applied relatively—i.e., If [to me] a unicorn is a white horse with a narwhale horn in the middle of his forehead, then that is [to me] the meaning of unicorn. 

3- Must the effects we conceive have some threshold measure of a quality we might call 'truthiness', 'likelihood', 'believe-ability', reality'? [T becoming a dictator.][NST===>]  The question is not about the meaning of “trump”; as a proper name, “Trump” has no meaning in that sense.  The question is about the assignment of trump to the general, “dictator”, and so concerns the meaning of that general.  If we were to test by observation the proposition that Trump is a dictator,  what tests would we employ.  These tests, according to the maxim, are the meaning of the attribution. 

 is a conceivable effect, but, I for one, see no possibility of that effectuating [NST===>] I don’t think so.  What “unicorn” means to me has no implications for the existence of unicorns. 

4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object?

[NST===>] I don’t think so.  Increasing the number of people who think that “unicorn” means “a horse with a narwhale horn on his forehead” has no implications for the existence or non existence of unicorns.

 

5- If we have myriad enumerations does that mean "we" cannot possess a conception of the object, merely multiple conceptions of caricatures of the object?

 

I'm working on a paper with an epistemological focus and that brought me to Pierce and prompted the above questions.

Another question for the evolutionists who are also pragmatists: why pragmatism over "naturalized epistemology?"

[NST===>] I am not sure what a naturalized epistemology is.  Evolutionary epistemology is the known that all knowledge arises through selection mechanisms.  People will say, for instance, that both a bird’s wing and a jumbo jet’s constitute knowledge about flight.  Well, I suppose. 

 

davew

 

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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College

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[thompnickson2]

Hi, Dave,

 

See Larding below:

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

 

 

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2020 1:55 AM
To: [hidden email]
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] question for pragmatists and Piercians among us

 

Nick,

 

Thanks for the response. I think you answered my questions but, because your answers seem to confirm a conclusion I came to prior to the answers, I need to check if I have it correct.

 

The key issue, for me is in question 4 and your answer ...

 

4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object?

[NST===>] I don’t think so.  Increasing the number of people who think that “unicorn” means “a horse with a narwhale horn on his forehead” has no implications for the existence or non existence of unicorns.

 

 ... which is the reason that I asked the followup question about naturalized epistemology (NE).

 

NE comes from W.V.O. Quine and advocates replacing traditional approaches for understanding knowledge with empirically grounded approaches ala the natural sciences — how knowledge actually forms and is used in the World. A subset would be about what knowledge must an agent form and hold in order to survive; which sounds related to evolutionary epistemology.

 

The epistemology of Pierce and traditional philosophers of knowledge is deemed, like mathematics, to be divorced from common sense understandings of meaning and truth. I.e. Pierce's system (logic?) can tell us whether or not we have a truthful conception of an object, but nothing further. It cannot tell us that Donald "is," let alone that he is an "x."

[NST===>] Ok, you’ve got my head spinning here.  I think you have it exactly backwards.  Leaving the Donald out of it for a moment, because I think he confuses us, I think discriminating the LIKELY truth of an assertion of fact is EXACTLY what pragmatism is about.  Mathematical statements, by themselves, are neither true nor false but meaningless.  Just a matter, as Peirce would say, of what language you chose to speak.  And yes, in a broad sense Peirce is engaged in a vague form of evolutionary epistemology since he vaguely attributes the predictive power of habit formation to natural selection. 

 

If you asked me, a purported pragmatist, where knowledge comes from and what knowledge is ‘about’, I would say that knowledge comes from past experience and it is about future experience.  This includes historical knowledge.  If I am told that Indians camp, fished, and hunted on a low hill at the bend of the river near the Mosquito Infested Bog (hereafrer, MIB), then that information MEANS, among many other things, that I should be able to find some nice arrowheads down there. 

 

Alas, I seems I must abandon the hope that Pierce can offer assistance in my quest to understand what knowledge is, means for obtaining it, and how we know if we have it.

[NST===>] I didn’t see the kidney punch (until Glen pointed it out); all I knew, before that, was that my lower back was sore.  I agree with Glen that if ever crocodile tears were shed, you shed them when you wrote the word “alas”.

 

N

 

davew

 

 

 

On Thu, Feb 20, 2020, at 1:35 AM, [hidden email] wrote:

David,

 

I immediately got snarled up in writing you a long, turgid response, so figured I better write you a short one first, lest I never respond at all.  See larding below.

 

n

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/D

 

 

 

-----Original Message-----

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Prof David West

Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 8:48 AM

To: [hidden email]

Subject: [FRIAM] question for pragmatists and Piercians among us

 

Politically charged question to follow. Unlike my usual wont, I am not trying to be provocative. I pick a difficult example for my question in the hope that it will generate enough heat to produce light with the hope that the light will illuminate clarity.

 

Pierce said:

 

"Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."

 

The Donald is our object

[NST===>] It might be argued that the whole project is ill-founded because “the Donald” is an individual, and therefore, by definition, not a general.  Abduction is to generals.  I think this is a cheap response, because, while The Donald is not a general in the same way “cat” is a general, it is still a lower level general.  “Is it true that The Donald is over 6’ tall” is a reasonable question to ask in the same way that “how many angels….pin?” is not a reasonable question to ask. So, then, by definition, The Donald is a real 

 

 

1- Can we enumerate the "effects with conceivably practical bearings" we expect our object to have?[NST===>]  Eric might help us here, but basically, I have to agree with you the Maxim is faulty at this point.  It seems to me a monstrous category error.  Objects are just not the sorts of things that have effects.  Events have effects.  Actions have effects.  Thanks reminding me of this problem.  I always supply words when I read the maxim, such as effects… of conceiving of the object in the way we do, as opposed to some other way. The effects under consideration are the expectations that would arise from conceiving of the object way.  So, if we conceive of DT as  a liar, then many effects follow from that conception, and those effects are the meaning of the conception, and it has no other meaning. 

2- Must the enumeration include both "positive" and "negative" effects?

  2a- does the answer to #2 depend on the definition of "our?" If 'our' is defined inclusively the answer to #2 would seem to be yes, but if 'our' is exclusive or restricted to only those with pro or anti perspectives/convictions, maybe not.[NST===>]  

[NST===>] well, we have to remember that the Maxim is a thesis about meaning, and so I think the maxim can be applied relatively—i.e., If [to me] a unicorn is a white horse with a narwhale horn in the middle of his forehead, then that is [to me] the meaning of unicorn. 

3- Must the effects we conceive have some threshold measure of a quality we might call 'truthiness', 'likelihood', 'believe-ability', reality'? [T becoming a dictator.][NST===>]  The question is not about the meaning of “trump”; as a proper name, “Trump” has no meaning in that sense.  The question is about the assignment of trump to the general, “dictator”, and so concerns the meaning of that general.  If we were to test by observation the proposition that Trump is a dictator,  what tests would we employ.  These tests, according to the maxim, are the meaning of the attribution. 

 is a conceivable effect, but, I for one, see no possibility of that effectuating [NST===>] I don’t think so.  What “unicorn” means to me has no implications for the existence of unicorns. 

4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object?

[NST===>] I don’t think so.  Increasing the number of people who think that “unicorn” means “a horse with a narwhale horn on his forehead” has no implications for the existence or non existence of unicorns.

 

5- If we have myriad enumerations does that mean "we" cannot possess a conception of the object, merely multiple conceptions of caricatures of the object?

 

I'm working on a paper with an epistemological focus and that brought me to Pierce and prompted the above questions.

Another question for the evolutionists who are also pragmatists: why pragmatism over "naturalized epistemology?"

[NST===>] I am not sure what a naturalized epistemology is.  Evolutionary epistemology is the known that all knowledge arises through selection mechanisms.  People will say, for instance, that both a bird’s wing and a jumbo jet’s constitute knowledge about flight.  Well, I suppose. 

 

davew

 

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[Eric Charles-2]

Well, gosh, now Nick has me all confused... 

Dave, when you say that Peirce can't help with "knowledge", are you invoking some continental-philosophy notion of "definitively-correct, fully-justified true belief"? Or are you instead talking about whatever people are talking about when they claim to know things (or feel like they know things)? Peirce can, I think, help with the latter. He can't help with the former, because he doesn't think it exists. In Peirce-land there is no denying that we are messy systems engaged in messy activities, including in regards to our cognitions. 

On Thu, Feb 20, 2020 at 3:08 PM <[hidden email]> wrote:

Hi, Dave,

 

See Larding below:

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

 

 

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2020 1:55 AM
To: [hidden email]
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] question for pragmatists and Piercians among us

 

Nick,

 

Thanks for the response. I think you answered my questions but, because your answers seem to confirm a conclusion I came to prior to the answers, I need to check if I have it correct.

 

The key issue, for me is in question 4 and your answer ...

 

4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object?

[NST===>] I don’t think so.  Increasing the number of people who think that “unicorn” means “a horse with a narwhale horn on his forehead” has no implications for the existence or non existence of unicorns.

 

 ... which is the reason that I asked the followup question about naturalized epistemology (NE).

 

NE comes from W.V.O. Quine and advocates replacing traditional approaches for understanding knowledge with empirically grounded approaches ala the natural sciences — how knowledge actually forms and is used in the World. A subset would be about what knowledge must an agent form and hold in order to survive; which sounds related to evolutionary epistemology.

 

The epistemology of Pierce and traditional philosophers of knowledge is deemed, like mathematics, to be divorced from common sense understandings of meaning and truth. I.e. Pierce's system (logic?) can tell us whether or not we have a truthful conception of an object, but nothing further. It cannot tell us that Donald "is," let alone that he is an "x."

[NST===>] Ok, you’ve got my head spinning here.  I think you have it exactly backwards.  Leaving the Donald out of it for a moment, because I think he confuses us, I think discriminating the LIKELY truth of an assertion of fact is EXACTLY what pragmatism is about.  Mathematical statements, by themselves, are neither true nor false but meaningless.  Just a matter, as Peirce would say, of what language you chose to speak.  And yes, in a broad sense Peirce is engaged in a vague form of evolutionary epistemology since he vaguely attributes the predictive power of habit formation to natural selection. 

 

If you asked me, a purported pragmatist, where knowledge comes from and what knowledge is ‘about’, I would say that knowledge comes from past experience and it is about future experience.  This includes historical knowledge.  If I am told that Indians camp, fished, and hunted on a low hill at the bend of the river near the Mosquito Infested Bog (hereafrer, MIB), then that information MEANS, among many other things, that I should be able to find some nice arrowheads down there. 

 

Alas, I seems I must abandon the hope that Pierce can offer assistance in my quest to understand what knowledge is, means for obtaining it, and how we know if we have it.

[NST===>] I didn’t see the kidney punch (until Glen pointed it out); all I knew, before that, was that my lower back was sore.  I agree with Glen that if ever crocodile tears were shed, you shed them when you wrote the word “alas”.

 

N

 

davew

 

 

 

On Thu, Feb 20, 2020, at 1:35 AM, [hidden email] wrote:

David,

 

I immediately got snarled up in writing you a long, turgid response, so figured I better write you a short one first, lest I never respond at all.  See larding below.

 

n

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/D

 

 

 

-----Original Message-----

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Prof David West

Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 8:48 AM

To: [hidden email]

Subject: [FRIAM] question for pragmatists and Piercians among us

 

Politically charged question to follow. Unlike my usual wont, I am not trying to be provocative. I pick a difficult example for my question in the hope that it will generate enough heat to produce light with the hope that the light will illuminate clarity.

 

Pierce said:

 

"Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."

 

The Donald is our object

[NST===>] It might be argued that the whole project is ill-founded because “the Donald” is an individual, and therefore, by definition, not a general.  Abduction is to generals.  I think this is a cheap response, because, while The Donald is not a general in the same way “cat” is a general, it is still a lower level general.  “Is it true that The Donald is over 6’ tall” is a reasonable question to ask in the same way that “how many angels….pin?” is not a reasonable question to ask. So, then, by definition, The Donald is a real 

 

 

1- Can we enumerate the "effects with conceivably practical bearings" we expect our object to have?[NST===>]  Eric might help us here, but basically, I have to agree with you the Maxim is faulty at this point.  It seems to me a monstrous category error.  Objects are just not the sorts of things that have effects.  Events have effects.  Actions have effects.  Thanks reminding me of this problem.  I always supply words when I read the maxim, such as effects… of conceiving of the object in the way we do, as opposed to some other way. The effects under consideration are the expectations that would arise from conceiving of the object way.  So, if we conceive of DT as  a liar, then many effects follow from that conception, and those effects are the meaning of the conception, and it has no other meaning. 

2- Must the enumeration include both "positive" and "negative" effects?

  2a- does the answer to #2 depend on the definition of "our?" If 'our' is defined inclusively the answer to #2 would seem to be yes, but if 'our' is exclusive or restricted to only those with pro or anti perspectives/convictions, maybe not.[NST===>]  

[NST===>] well, we have to remember that the Maxim is a thesis about meaning, and so I think the maxim can be applied relatively—i.e., If [to me] a unicorn is a white horse with a narwhale horn in the middle of his forehead, then that is [to me] the meaning of unicorn. 

3- Must the effects we conceive have some threshold measure of a quality we might call 'truthiness', 'likelihood', 'believe-ability', reality'? [T becoming a dictator.][NST===>]  The question is not about the meaning of “trump”; as a proper name, “Trump” has no meaning in that sense.  The question is about the assignment of trump to the general, “dictator”, and so concerns the meaning of that general.  If we were to test by observation the proposition that Trump is a dictator,  what tests would we employ.  These tests, according to the maxim, are the meaning of the attribution. 

 is a conceivable effect, but, I for one, see no possibility of that effectuating [NST===>] I don’t think so.  What “unicorn” means to me has no implications for the existence of unicorns. 

4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object?

[NST===>] I don’t think so.  Increasing the number of people who think that “unicorn” means “a horse with a narwhale horn on his forehead” has no implications for the existence or non existence of unicorns.

 

5- If we have myriad enumerations does that mean "we" cannot possess a conception of the object, merely multiple conceptions of caricatures of the object?

 

I'm working on a paper with an epistemological focus and that brought me to Pierce and prompted the above questions.

Another question for the evolutionists who are also pragmatists: why pragmatism over "naturalized epistemology?"

[NST===>] I am not sure what a naturalized epistemology is.  Evolutionary epistemology is the known that all knowledge arises through selection mechanisms.  People will say, for instance, that both a bird’s wing and a jumbo jet’s constitute knowledge about flight.  Well, I suppose. 

 

davew

 

============================================================

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============================================================

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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College

to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com

archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/

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============================================================
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
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============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

[thompnickson2]

Oh gawd.  How did I confuse YOU!

n

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

 

 

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Eric Charles
Sent: Friday, February 21, 2020 4:37 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] question for pragmatists and Piercians among us

 

Well, gosh, now Nick has me all confused... 

 

Dave, when you say that Peirce can't help with "knowledge", are you invoking some continental-philosophy notion of "definitively-correct, fully-justified true belief"? Or are you instead talking about whatever people are talking about when they claim to know things (or feel like they know things)? Peirce can, I think, help with the latter. He can't help with the former, because he doesn't think it exists. In Peirce-land there is no denying that we are messy systems engaged in messy activities, including in regards to our cognitions. 

-----------

Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist

American University - Adjunct Instructor

 

 

On Thu, Feb 20, 2020 at 3:08 PM <[hidden email]> wrote:

Hi, Dave,

 

See Larding below:

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

 

 

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2020 1:55 AM
To: [hidden email]
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] question for pragmatists and Piercians among us

 

Nick,

 

Thanks for the response. I think you answered my questions but, because your answers seem to confirm a conclusion I came to prior to the answers, I need to check if I have it correct.

 

The key issue, for me is in question 4 and your answer ...

 

4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object?

[NST===>] I don’t think so.  Increasing the number of people who think that “unicorn” means “a horse with a narwhale horn on his forehead” has no implications for the existence or non existence of unicorns.

 

 ... which is the reason that I asked the followup question about naturalized epistemology (NE).

 

NE comes from W.V.O. Quine and advocates replacing traditional approaches for understanding knowledge with empirically grounded approaches ala the natural sciences — how knowledge actually forms and is used in the World. A subset would be about what knowledge must an agent form and hold in order to survive; which sounds related to evolutionary epistemology.

 

The epistemology of Pierce and traditional philosophers of knowledge is deemed, like mathematics, to be divorced from common sense understandings of meaning and truth. I.e. Pierce's system (logic?) can tell us whether or not we have a truthful conception of an object, but nothing further. It cannot tell us that Donald "is," let alone that he is an "x."

[NST===>] Ok, you’ve got my head spinning here.  I think you have it exactly backwards.  Leaving the Donald out of it for a moment, because I think he confuses us, I think discriminating the LIKELY truth of an assertion of fact is EXACTLY what pragmatism is about.  Mathematical statements, by themselves, are neither true nor false but meaningless.  Just a matter, as Peirce would say, of what language you chose to speak.  And yes, in a broad sense Peirce is engaged in a vague form of evolutionary epistemology since he vaguely attributes the predictive power of habit formation to natural selection. 

 

If you asked me, a purported pragmatist, where knowledge comes from and what knowledge is ‘about’, I would say that knowledge comes from past experience and it is about future experience.  This includes historical knowledge.  If I am told that Indians camp, fished, and hunted on a low hill at the bend of the river near the Mosquito Infested Bog (hereafrer, MIB), then that information MEANS, among many other things, that I should be able to find some nice arrowheads down there. 

 

Alas, I seems I must abandon the hope that Pierce can offer assistance in my quest to understand what knowledge is, means for obtaining it, and how we know if we have it.

[NST===>] I didn’t see the kidney punch (until Glen pointed it out); all I knew, before that, was that my lower back was sore.  I agree with Glen that if ever crocodile tears were shed, you shed them when you wrote the word “alas”.

 

N

 

davew

 

 

 

On Thu, Feb 20, 2020, at 1:35 AM, [hidden email] wrote:

David,

 

I immediately got snarled up in writing you a long, turgid response, so figured I better write you a short one first, lest I never respond at all.  See larding below.

 

n

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/D

 

 

 

-----Original Message-----

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Prof David West

Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 8:48 AM

To: [hidden email]

Subject: [FRIAM] question for pragmatists and Piercians among us

 

Politically charged question to follow. Unlike my usual wont, I am not trying to be provocative. I pick a difficult example for my question in the hope that it will generate enough heat to produce light with the hope that the light will illuminate clarity.

 

Pierce said:

 

"Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."

 

The Donald is our object

[NST===>] It might be argued that the whole project is ill-founded because “the Donald” is an individual, and therefore, by definition, not a general.  Abduction is to generals.  I think this is a cheap response, because, while The Donald is not a general in the same way “cat” is a general, it is still a lower level general.  “Is it true that The Donald is over 6’ tall” is a reasonable question to ask in the same way that “how many angels….pin?” is not a reasonable question to ask. So, then, by definition, The Donald is a real 

 

 

1- Can we enumerate the "effects with conceivably practical bearings" we expect our object to have?[NST===>]  Eric might help us here, but basically, I have to agree with you the Maxim is faulty at this point.  It seems to me a monstrous category error.  Objects are just not the sorts of things that have effects.  Events have effects.  Actions have effects.  Thanks reminding me of this problem.  I always supply words when I read the maxim, such as effects… of conceiving of the object in the way we do, as opposed to some other way. The effects under consideration are the expectations that would arise from conceiving of the object way.  So, if we conceive of DT as  a liar, then many effects follow from that conception, and those effects are the meaning of the conception, and it has no other meaning. 

2- Must the enumeration include both "positive" and "negative" effects?

  2a- does the answer to #2 depend on the definition of "our?" If 'our' is defined inclusively the answer to #2 would seem to be yes, but if 'our' is exclusive or restricted to only those with pro or anti perspectives/convictions, maybe not.[NST===>]  

[NST===>] well, we have to remember that the Maxim is a thesis about meaning, and so I think the maxim can be applied relatively—i.e., If [to me] a unicorn is a white horse with a narwhale horn in the middle of his forehead, then that is [to me] the meaning of unicorn. 

3- Must the effects we conceive have some threshold measure of a quality we might call 'truthiness', 'likelihood', 'believe-ability', reality'? [T becoming a dictator.][NST===>]  The question is not about the meaning of “trump”; as a proper name, “Trump” has no meaning in that sense.  The question is about the assignment of trump to the general, “dictator”, and so concerns the meaning of that general.  If we were to test by observation the proposition that Trump is a dictator,  what tests would we employ.  These tests, according to the maxim, are the meaning of the attribution. 

 is a conceivable effect, but, I for one, see no possibility of that effectuating [NST===>] I don’t think so.  What “unicorn” means to me has no implications for the existence of unicorns. 

4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object?

[NST===>] I don’t think so.  Increasing the number of people who think that “unicorn” means “a horse with a narwhale horn on his forehead” has no implications for the existence or non existence of unicorns.

 

5- If we have myriad enumerations does that mean "we" cannot possess a conception of the object, merely multiple conceptions of caricatures of the object?

 

I'm working on a paper with an epistemological focus and that brought me to Pierce and prompted the above questions.

Another question for the evolutionists who are also pragmatists: why pragmatism over "naturalized epistemology?"

[NST===>] I am not sure what a naturalized epistemology is.  Evolutionary epistemology is the known that all knowledge arises through selection mechanisms.  People will say, for instance, that both a bird’s wing and a jumbo jet’s constitute knowledge about flight.  Well, I suppose. 

 

davew

 

============================================================

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv

Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com

archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/

FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

============================================================

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv

Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College

to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com

archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/

FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

 

 

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove