politics and cliques

[glen ep ropella]

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I have an ongoing cognitive conflict w.r.t. the principles I infer from
complexity theory and my ethical indoctrination/rearing.  Perhaps some
of you wise ones can throw some words at the conflict to help me sort it
out.

The primary principle I've inferred from complexity theory (such as it
is) is:  the extent versus the objectives of control structures should
show something like an inverse power law to maintain a balance between
diversity and efficacy.  (It's not my intention to start an argument
about whether complexity theory really implies this... So, if you
criticize that part of this e-mail, I'll just remove the reference to
complexity theory and such removal won't damage the point.)

The primary ethical rule I've been taught to hold is that all people are
equivalent but never equal and that the extent of the equivalence
depends on the chosen equivalence class.

I'm currently living through a transition in my political views.  I used
to be a hardcore libertarian and believed, fundamentally, that non-local
government is incapable of governing many variables.  I'm not saying
that there are particular variables they can or can't regulate.  I'm
saying there's a limit to the total _number_ of variables, whatever they
are, that a massive, global structure like the feds can handle.  For
example, the federal government here in the states can govern some
number of variables (say 10 million) but cannot govern as many as can be
governed by decentralized, local government.

But, the implications of the limitation are that humans in one part of
our country may be horribly abused, oppressed, ignored because the
federal government has chosen to concentrate its energies on a set of
variables unrelated to that particular local abuse or oppression.  And
my ethical upbringing makes me think that our nation-wide government
ought to govern all the variables according to some universally
applicable human standards, regardless of how many variables that comes
to.  For example, I tend to believe that nobody in the US should starve.
 In the past, I would have argued against the centralized control over
food distribution.  I would have said that it's good for a small segment
of the population to enjoy steak and champagne while the large segments
have to stick to McDonald's and Schlitz Malt Liquor.  But, as I get
older, my resolve has started to crumble.  This is made especially acute
when I see blatantly unethical behavior on the part of the rich white
guys who run our government.

Of course, my libertarian mind makes the statement that all of us are
just exploiting the resources available to us.  And that makes me want
to cheer on the Karl Rove's of the world!  Congrats!  You win!  Guys
like that are a healthy example of the rich diversity of control
structures we facilitate in our society, evidence that the inverse power
law remains.

But then my upbringing tells me that Karl Rove is just a slimy perverted
opportunist who needs regulation by the populace.

The problem with that upbringing is that the more of these regulations
we make more universal (increase the extent of a control structure), the
less agile we'll be when the environment changes (e.g. climate change
forcing evacuation of coastal cities or the collapse of the dollar in
the wake of a financial attack by China... or whatever).  Hence, the
more we _allow_ diverse individuals (including slimy perverts) their
diversity, the more agile we'll be as a collective when the sh*t hits
the fan.

For example, look at all the people who are _completely_ dependent on
the federal government for their well-being: FDA, Army Corps of
Engineers, FEMA, high-risk mortgage bail-outs for low-income home
owners, FDIC insured banks, well-maintained highway infrastructure, etc.

Any thoughts on how to reconcile these two contradictory principles
(high diversity versus universal human properties) are welcome.
Luckily, as Lovecraft once said:  "The most merciful thing in the world,
I think, is the inability of the human mind to correlate all its
contents."  So, even if they remain contradictory, I can retain (and be
hypocritical about) both of them.  But, given the recent conversation
about networks and cliques, I figured I'd throw this out and see what
came back. [grin]

- --
glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com
I have an existential map. It has 'You are here' written all over it. --
Steven Wright
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[Marcus G. Daniels]

Glen E. P. Ropella wrote:
> The problem with that upbringing is that the more of these regulations
> we make more universal (increase the extent of a control structure), the
> less agile we'll be when the environment changes (e.g. climate change
> forcing evacuation of coastal cities or the collapse of the dollar in
> the wake of a financial attack by China... or whatever).  Hence, the
> more we _allow_ diverse individuals (including slimy perverts) their
> diversity, the more agile we'll be as a collective when the sh*t hits
> the fan.
>  
Sorry, no matter how you want to look at it the libertarian is going to
lose..
--
People demand freedom of speech as a compensation for the freedom of
thought which they seldom use.
-Soren Kierkegaard

[glen ep ropella]

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Marcus G. Daniels wrote:
> Sorry, no matter how you want to look at it the libertarian is going to
> lose..

I have no idea what you're implying, here.  If your intention was to be
pithy, then you failed and the result is a simple non sequitur.

- --
glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com
I have the heart of a child. I keep it in a jar on my shelf. -- Robert Bloch
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[Phil Henshaw-2]

Glen,

Gee, I don't know if it helps with your philosophy, but I think you're
making a common mistake with the inverse square relation.  It's an
indicator of complex system organization, not a design principle.  'A'
implies 'B' but 'B' in no way implies 'A'.   It's like a thermometer, if
a thermometer reads 98.6 it's likely you've found a human but heating
something up to 98.6 and trying to talk to it is nutty.   The inverse
square metric is a time saving empirical tool for helping to locate and
investigate complex systems.   You have to look into the system to find
what makes it organized, though.  

The network science people seem to have a better way of using it than
the other mainstream science disciplines interested in the subject I
think.   They're looking at complex systems from the inside out (though
maybe not having quite realized that networks are artifacts of the
complex systems they are embedded in).  Their identification of the
elaboration and refinement of network connections during network
development as the origin of the inverse square metric and 'scale-free'
distribution of internal connectedness of natural networks is very
helpful.  There should logically be some kind of connection with the
thinking of people taking an outside in approach to complexity, but I
have not been able to figure out what it is.

As far as the limits of control, don't all complex systems have
significantly independent design and behavior?   It seems to me that the
first thing anything with independent design and behavior requires is
basic respect, otherwise you make large mistakes with it, right?   We so
often forget that finding the easy ways for independent things to get
along is a great design strategy.   Nature seems to like it quite a lot
for evolutionary survival too!

phil

>
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>
>
> I have an ongoing cognitive conflict w.r.t. the principles I
> infer from complexity theory and my ethical
> indoctrination/rearing.  Perhaps some of you wise ones can
> throw some words at the conflict to help me sort it out.
>
> The primary principle I've inferred from complexity theory (such as it
> is) is:  the extent versus the objectives of control
> structures should show something like an inverse power law to
> maintain a balance between diversity and efficacy.  (It's not
> my intention to start an argument about whether complexity
> theory really implies this... So, if you criticize that part
> of this e-mail, I'll just remove the reference to complexity
> theory and such removal won't damage the point.)
>
> The primary ethical rule I've been taught to hold is that all
> people are equivalent but never equal and that the extent of
> the equivalence depends on the chosen equivalence class.
>
> I'm currently living through a transition in my political
> views.  I used to be a hardcore libertarian and believed,
> fundamentally, that non-local government is incapable of
> governing many variables.  I'm not saying that there are
> particular variables they can or can't regulate.  I'm saying
> there's a limit to the total _number_ of variables, whatever
> they are, that a massive, global structure like the feds can
> handle.  For example, the federal government here in the
> states can govern some number of variables (say 10 million)
> but cannot govern as many as can be governed by
> decentralized, local government.
>
> But, the implications of the limitation are that humans in
> one part of our country may be horribly abused, oppressed,
> ignored because the federal government has chosen to
> concentrate its energies on a set of variables unrelated to
> that particular local abuse or oppression.  And my ethical
> upbringing makes me think that our nation-wide government
> ought to govern all the variables according to some
> universally applicable human standards, regardless of how
> many variables that comes to.  For example, I tend to believe
> that nobody in the US should starve.  In the past, I would
> have argued against the centralized control over food
> distribution.  I would have said that it's good for a small
> segment of the population to enjoy steak and champagne while
> the large segments have to stick to McDonald's and Schlitz
> Malt Liquor.  But, as I get older, my resolve has started to
> crumble.  This is made especially acute when I see blatantly
> unethical behavior on the part of the rich white guys who run
> our government.
>
> Of course, my libertarian mind makes the statement that all
> of us are just exploiting the resources available to us.  And
> that makes me want to cheer on the Karl Rove's of the world!  
> Congrats!  You win!  Guys like that are a healthy example of
> the rich diversity of control structures we facilitate in our
> society, evidence that the inverse power law remains.
>
> But then my upbringing tells me that Karl Rove is just a
> slimy perverted opportunist who needs regulation by the populace.
>
> The problem with that upbringing is that the more of these
> regulations we make more universal (increase the extent of a
> control structure), the less agile we'll be when the
> environment changes (e.g. climate change forcing evacuation
> of coastal cities or the collapse of the dollar in the wake
> of a financial attack by China... or whatever).  Hence, the
> more we _allow_ diverse individuals (including slimy
> perverts) their diversity, the more agile we'll be as a
> collective when the sh*t hits the fan.
>
> For example, look at all the people who are _completely_
> dependent on the federal government for their well-being:
> FDA, Army Corps of Engineers, FEMA, high-risk mortgage
> bail-outs for low-income home owners, FDIC insured banks,
> well-maintained highway infrastructure, etc.
>
> Any thoughts on how to reconcile these two contradictory
> principles (high diversity versus universal human properties)
> are welcome. Luckily, as Lovecraft once said:  "The most
> merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability of the
> human mind to correlate all its contents."  So, even if they
> remain contradictory, I can retain (and be hypocritical
> about) both of them.  But, given the recent conversation
> about networks and cliques, I figured I'd throw this out and
> see what came back. [grin]
>
> - --
> glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com
> I have an existential map. It has 'You are here' written all
> over it. -- Steven Wright -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>
>

[Günther Greindl]

Dear Glen, Dear List,

> I have an ongoing cognitive conflict w.r.t. the principles I infer from
> complexity theory and my ethical indoctrination/rearing.  

In this case, objectivity should prevail: as you say, the one is
_inferred_ and the other is result of indoctrination. ;-)

> The primary principle I've inferred from complexity theory (such as it
> is) is:  the extent versus the objectives of control structures should
> show something like an inverse power law to maintain a balance between
> diversity and efficacy.


> The primary ethical rule I've been taught to hold is that all people are
> equivalent but never equal and that the extent of the equivalence
> depends on the chosen equivalence class.

What do mean exactly by this? Does it correspond to:

1a) People should have the same duties and rights before the law if they
belong to the same class.
(I'm not sure I understand you correctly here?)

2) People are different by genetics and socialisation and therefor have
different abilities/skills/opportunities/weaknesses.

> I'm currently living through a transition in my political views.  I used
> to be a hardcore libertarian and believed, fundamentally, that non-local
> government is incapable of governing many variables.  I'm not saying
> that there are particular variables they can or can't regulate.  I'm
> saying there's a limit to the total _number_ of variables, whatever they
> are, that a massive, global structure like the feds can handle.  For
> example, the federal government here in the states can govern some
> number of variables (say 10 million) but cannot govern as many as can be
> governed by decentralized, local government.

Hmm -especially with compututational assistance how should this apply (a
limit on the number?) - I think it's rather a problem of knowledge: the
non-local government does not _know_ about local problems, and this is a
matter of principle because knowledge is not easily transferred (only
information is, which is a different thing).

So locality ensures that the people who know about the problems are
doing things about the problem.

On the other hand, the non-local/local distinction _is_ important, I
think, for the _type_ of variables. There are problems which need
concerted efforts -> central control. This is domain specific.

> But, the implications of the limitation are that humans in one part of
> our country may be horribly abused, oppressed, ignored because the
> federal government has chosen to concentrate its energies on a set of
> variables unrelated to that particular local abuse or oppression.  And
> my ethical upbringing makes me think that our nation-wide government
> ought to govern all the variables according to some universally
> applicable human standards, regardless of how many variables that comes
> to.

In the EU we have the principle of subsidiarity for the level at which
control should be exerted (this is an ideal, not always found in the
real control structures). The principal says that it should be analyzed
at which level of oranization a problem is best addressed, and that
level should then take care of it. There is no general rule: on has to
look at the problems as they arrive (one can classify known problems
beforehand of course).


  For example, I tend to believe that nobody in the US should starve.
>  In the past, I would have argued against the centralized control over
> food distribution.  I would have said that it's good for a small segment
> of the population to enjoy steak and champagne while the large segments
> have to stick to McDonald's and Schlitz Malt Liquor.  But, as I get
> older, my resolve has started to crumble.  This is made especially acute
> when I see blatantly unethical behavior on the part of the rich white
> guys who run our government.

I think we should not mix up the control/diversity question with that of
social justice.

> Of course, my libertarian mind makes the statement that all of us are
> just exploiting the resources available to us.  And that makes me want
> to cheer on the Karl Rove's of the world!  Congrats!  You win!  Guys
> like that are a healthy example of the rich diversity of control
> structures we facilitate in our society, evidence that the inverse power
> law remains.

I think the libertarian needn't be classic egoistic homo oeconomicus.
The libertarian can resent central control but still acknowledge that it
is important for certain problems so that his freedom is preserved in th
e long run. Being rational does not mean being short-sighted :-)

> The problem with that upbringing is that the more of these regulations
> we make more universal (increase the extent of a control structure), the
> less agile we'll be when the environment changes (e.g. climate change
> forcing evacuation of coastal cities or the collapse of the dollar in
> the wake of a financial attack by China... or whatever).  Hence, the
> more we _allow_ diverse individuals (including slimy perverts) their
> diversity, the more agile we'll be as a collective when the sh*t hits
> the fan.

Striking the balance is all the difficulty, of course - but I think that
is what it's about - not going into one extreme or the other, but
teetering on that edge (of chaos SCNR ;-)).

> Any thoughts on how to reconcile these two contradictory principles
> (high diversity versus universal human properties) are welcome.
> Luckily, as Lovecraft once said:  "The most merciful thing in the world,
> I think, is the inability of the human mind to correlate all its
> contents."

Hehe, Lovecraft has his moments indeed :-) One of my favourites is (not
related to here) - "Do not call up what ye cannot put down" (The Case of
  Charles Dexter Ward, his best story IMHO)

> So, even if they remain contradictory, I can retain (and be
> hypocritical about) both of them.  But, given the recent conversation
> about networks and cliques, I figured I'd throw this out and see what
> came back. [grin]

As I said, I think they need not be contradictory -rather complementary
- but before I say more I would like to know if I have understood you
correctly so far.

All the best,
G?nther

--
G?nther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
guenther.greindl at univie.ac.at
http://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/

Blog: http://dao.complexitystudies.org/
Site: http://www.complexitystudies.org

[glen ep ropella]

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G?nther Greindl wrote:
> In this case, objectivity should prevail: as you say, the one is
> _inferred_ and the other is result of indoctrination. ;-)

That's an excellent point!  However, since the heart of the
contradiction lies in non-local vs. local control structures, I don't
think objectivity _can_ prevail.  Child rearing is one of the most
powerful forms of very local control.  Indoctrination by a local
community (church, neighborhood, family, department colleagues, etc.) is
a very important form of control.

If we all (even newly born babies) were objective and able to think
rationally about their world, can you imagine the onslaught of
homogeneity we would see?  It seems like we'd immediately snap into a
gravity well of conservatism governed by "rationality".  Perhaps the
indoctrination and irrational, knee-jerk impulses add a necessary "heat
bath" to society.  And that heat bath might allow the collective to find
better global optima by sacrificing individuals to wacky extrema.

Let's just say the earth is populated by indoctrinated, myopic
individuals and a single individual begins to think rationally.  (This
is just a reformulation of the argument against Utopia where everyone is
altruistic except for one or a few exploiters.)  In such a case, it's
very nice to be the rational guy.  But, it is not necessarily in the
rational guy's best interests to recruit more rational people!

>> The primary ethical rule I've been taught to hold is that all people are
>> equivalent but never equal and that the extent of the equivalence
>> depends on the chosen equivalence class.
>
> What do mean exactly by this? Does it correspond to:
>
> 1a) People should have the same duties and rights before the law if they
> belong to the same class.
> (I'm not sure I understand you correctly here?)
>
> 2) People are different by genetics and socialisation and therefor have
> different abilities/skills/opportunities/weaknesses.

I mean (2).  That we are all idiosyncratic; but we are so flexible and
can combine efforts in so many different combinations that extremely
different sets of people can be functionally equivalent... it all
depends on the function.  Basically, this is just an informal statement
that the map between generators and phenomena is non-isomorphic.  It's
not 1-1 or onto.  There are many ways to generate the same phenomenon
and there are many phenomenon that can result from the same generators.

Hence, it is ultimately disrespectful to say to a particular person
(with particular phenotype) that they are incapable or less capable of
achieving some goal.  This applies to variations skin color, variations
in upbringing, degree of wealth, formal or informal training, or even
psychological "disorders".  Anyone who makes claims (even those driven
by statistics but with little clarity of causality) that one
sub-group/clique is less capable of achieving some particular outcome
makes those claims in an unjustified way.

That is the ethical indoctrination I received as a kid.  It conflicts
with my inference from complexity that there _must_ be a few control
systems that homogenize people and restrict them to particular (low,
high, medium, whatever) achievement levels.  E.g. even in a room full of
hard-working geniuses, not everyone can be a Newton or an Einstein.
Some few of the geniuses will get lucky and see great success.  The rest
will disappear in apparent mediocrity, despite their genius.

> In the EU we have the principle of subsidiarity for the level at which
> control should be exerted (this is an ideal, not always found in the
> real control structures). The principal says that it should be analyzed
> at which level of oranization a problem is best addressed, and that
> level should then take care of it. There is no general rule: on has to
> look at the problems as they arrive (one can classify known problems
> beforehand of course).

Interesting.  When you say "one has to look ...", I presume the "one"
you're talking about is a committee of some kind?  Or is it really an
individual who determines these things?

> I think we should not mix up the control/diversity question with that of
> social justice.

But that's where the contradiction occurs!  I _like_ trying to apply the
principles I infer from my technical work onto problems I find in my
social interactions.  It's a form of falsification for those principles.
 And, of course, since FRIAM is supposed to be about "applied
complexity", I figured this particular contradiction would be a natural
consideration for this list.

Given that, I'd be interested in hearing why you think the two questions
shouldn't be conflated?

> I think the libertarian needn't be classic egoistic homo oeconomicus.
> The libertarian can resent central control but still acknowledge that it
> is important for certain problems so that his freedom is preserved in th
> e long run. Being rational does not mean being short-sighted :-)

Yes.  I agree.  In fact, that's the entire reasoning behind
libertarianism.  Without a belief that some form of Hobbesian 3rd party,
the libertarian turns into an anarchist.  (By which I mean "anarchist"
in the naive sense... not the crypto-communist sophisticated form of
it.)  Libertarianism advocates _for_ some non-local control structures,
just not as many as other -isms advocate.  In many ways, libertarianism
is an admission of the inverse power law between the extent of control
structures and the number of objectives for any single control structure.

A very extensive controller like the federal government should (can)
only have a very few objectives.  The huge diversity of small, local
control structures (like raising your children to brush their teeth
twice a day versus once a day) are maximally efficient at controlling
the huge diversity of other objectives.

> Striking the balance is all the difficulty, of course - but I think that
> is what it's about - not going into one extreme or the other, but
> teetering on that edge (of chaos SCNR ;-)).

Yes.  But, the question comes down to which few objectives should the
large control structures take on?  E.g. should abortion laws be handled
by the states in the US or the feds?  What about euthanasia?
"Universal" health care?  Taxes?  Defense?  Production infrastructure
(like rails and roads)?  Etc.  The number of objectives is _huge_.  And
I think the federal government is too non-local to handle that many
objectives competently.

How do we know that our policies are "striking a balance"?  It seems to
me that complexity theory could help us answer questions like this.  I
don't like that hungry children exist; but, does complexity theory tell
us that at least some children _must_ go hungry?

> Hehe, Lovecraft has his moments indeed :-) One of my favourites is (not
> related to here) - "Do not call up what ye cannot put down" (The Case of
>   Charles Dexter Ward, his best story IMHO)

Excellent quote!  Thanks.  I haven't read that story.

> As I said, I think they need not be contradictory -rather complementary
> - but before I say more I would like to know if I have understood you
> correctly so far.

I can see how they might be complementary.  But, I can only see it in
the sense of a _dualism_.  It is difficult for me to consider both sides
at the same time.  The sides being a) the ethical consideration of
things like abject poverty, epidemic diseases, starvation, etc. and b)
the objective necessity that, with a population-based search method,
some individuals are destined for extrema, often very unpleasant
extrema.  And it is especially difficult to simultaneously consider both
sides when the members of the population who are destined for horrible
extrema like AIDS or starvation are innocents who didn't have any chance
to _choose_ their extreme destiny.

- --
glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com
Power never takes a back step - only in the face of more power. -- Malcolm X

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[glen ep ropella]

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Phil Henshaw wrote:
> Gee, I don't know if it helps with your philosophy, but I think you're
> making a common mistake with the inverse square relation.  It's an
> indicator of complex system organization, not a design principle.  'A'
> implies 'B' but 'B' in no way implies 'A'.   It's like a thermometer, if
> a thermometer reads 98.6 it's likely you've found a human but heating
> something up to 98.6 and trying to talk to it is nutty.   The inverse
> square metric is a time saving empirical tool for helping to locate and
> investigate complex systems.   You have to look into the system to find
> what makes it organized, though.

Hmmm.  I don't think I'm making the mistake you're citing.  But, it's
plenty likely.  I make all sorts of mistakes all the time.  [grin]  To
be clear, let me paraphrase what you're saying:

By saying the inverse power law is a result/indicator rather than a
design principle, you're saying that the generators of these results
could be multifarious and not determined.  I.e. just because a system
turns out to require things extreme behavior and circumstances doesn't
mean the organization of the system is the only organization that could
possibly achieve its objectives.

You're saying that another system may be organized differently, achieve
the same objectives, and not exhibit the same extrema.

Is that right or did I misunderstand you?

> The network science people seem to have a better way of using it than
> the other mainstream science disciplines interested in the subject I
> think.   They're looking at complex systems from the inside out (though
> maybe not having quite realized that networks are artifacts of the
> complex systems they are embedded in).  Their identification of the
> elaboration and refinement of network connections during network
> development as the origin of the inverse square metric and 'scale-free'
> distribution of internal connectedness of natural networks is very
> helpful.  There should logically be some kind of connection with the
> thinking of people taking an outside in approach to complexity, but I
> have not been able to figure out what it is.

I don't quite buy this.  But, my criticism of it takes us on a tangent.
 I'll state my criticism anyway and if you choose to pursue the tangent,
then so be it. [grin]

I don't believe there is a fundamental difference between constructivism
and formalism.  I.e. one cannot study a system from the inside out
without also studying it from the outside in, and vice versa.  When one
uses a phrase like "studying complex systems from the inside out", the
phrase merely _emphasizes_ one part of the studying.  Objectively, all
studies involve an iterative approach that cycles between inside and
outside studies.  This seems to be true of everything from riding a
bicycle to cosmology.

> As far as the limits of control, don't all complex systems have
> significantly independent design and behavior?   It seems to me that the
> first thing anything with independent design and behavior requires is
> basic respect, otherwise you make large mistakes with it, right?   We so
> often forget that finding the easy ways for independent things to get
> along is a great design strategy.   Nature seems to like it quite a lot
> for evolutionary survival too!

It's not clear to me what you're saying, here.  But, I don't really
believe in "design".  Design is a cognitive fiction we use to
rationalize/justify our behavior.  The causes of the phenomena generated
by a complex system are... occult, occluded, at least to some extent.  I
think that's why we call these systems "complex".  And its for these
reasons that simulation is such a necessary and powerful tool in the
study of these systems.  We can't readily find "laws" that compress the
description of the system.  For less complex systems, we can infer these
laws.

Ultimately, however, even when we can (seem to) achieve some descriptive
compression, the causes of the behavior are still occult.  But we gain
some confidence through temporal and spatial extrapolation (we repeat
experiments through time and check to be sure the results are the same
and we have different people in different locations repeat the
experiments to see if the results are the same).  Through such indirect
"validation", we come to trust that our compressed description is
_correct_ or true.  But, ultimately, the causes are still occult.  There
is always the chance of a black swan.

So, "don't all complex systems have significantly independent design and
behavior"?  For the above reasons, my answer is _no_ because "design" is
a figment of our imagination.  A better answer would be that the
question is ill-formed and unanswerable.  Complex systems are not
_designed_ at all.  They grow and evolve through the propagation of
happenstance.

- --
glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com
A random group of homeless people under a bridge would be far more
intellectually sound and principled than anything I've encountered at
the university so far. -- Ward Churchill

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[Robert J. Cordingley]

Glen,

It seems the world has had for a long time, and still has, oppression,
poverty and poor education of segments of its population.  Perhaps we
can say that the developed world has managed to lower their own deprived
segment size while the un(der)developed hasn't made so much progress.  
(Do you remember the TADtalk visualization on poverty?)   It is
considered by many, including you and me, that having deprived segments
of the world's population is unethical because of the ethical standards
we hold, have learned (and have been indoctrinated in, if you will).

It remains ethical to work towards the reduction and elimination of
these deprived segments - it's a big job.  The argument is over how.  I
don't believe complexity science or studies and simulations of Complex
Adaptive Systems (CAS) are yet sufficiently mature to help very far in
this endeavor, but I'm not an expert in the field. It just seems that
way from the perspective of an observer.

That complexity studies indicate emergent behavior that is otherwise
hard to predict and matches small systems (ie < 10^6 agents) behavior is
*very* interesting and justifies further work.  I don't think it
separates cause and effect which is the primary reason for not using
such studies for predictive purposes.  And there is no evidence yet of
successful studies or simulations that model social change, e.g. the
French or Russian Revolutions.  (Please correct me if this is wrong).  
So it seems that the problems of society (including trying to figure out
what is the 'best' form of government) are not yet subject to relief
from CAS studies.  Many would not want one small class of experts to be
responsible for this task anyway.

Going back to your original ethical dilemma, if one agrees with what is
ethical and one's political position doesn't then one will
change/adjust/modify one's political position to maintain one's internal
integrity.  Labels and technicalities in definitions may be part of the
problem:

I am a democrat because I believe everyone should have a say in government,
I am an environmentalist because we should take care of our biosphere so
it remains habitable for us,
I am a monarchist because I don't want to disband the Royal Family,
I am libertarian because I don't want a Big Brother government,
I am conservative because I think we shouldn't waste our resources,
I am a republican in the sense I don't want to dismantle the US federal
system and its three branches of government,
I am a capitalist because I believe in free-markets,
I am socialist because I believe everyone deserves basic health care,
education, justice,
I am a moderate because I believe we deserve a system of justice that
can reign in man's excesses.
etc

If complexity science turns out to be a powerful technology it may take
it's place along side fire, nuclear power and genetic engineering.  All
are amoral.  It's how we use them for our benefit that will exercise our
morals (ethics).

Robert C

Glen E. P. Ropella wrote:

> The sides being a) the ethical consideration of
> things like abject poverty, epidemic diseases, starvation, etc. and b)
> the objective necessity that, with a population-based search method,
> some individuals are destined for extrema, often very unpleasant
> extrema.  And it is especially difficult to simultaneously consider both
> sides when the members of the population who are destined for horrible
> extrema like AIDS or starvation are innocents who didn't have any chance
> to _choose_ their extreme destiny.
>
> - --
> glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com
> Power never takes a back step - only in the face of more power. -- Malcolm X
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>
>  

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[Phil Henshaw-2]

Glen,

> Phil Henshaw wrote:
> > Gee, I don't know if it helps with your philosophy, but I
> think you're
> > making a common mistake with the inverse square relation.  It's an
> > indicator of complex system organization, not a design
> principle.  'A'
> > implies 'B' but 'B' in no way implies 'A'.   It's like a
> thermometer, if
> > a thermometer reads 98.6 it's likely you've found a human
> but heating
> > something up to 98.6 and trying to talk to it is nutty.  
> The inverse
> > square metric is a time saving empirical tool for helping
> to locate and
> > investigate complex systems.   You have to look into the
> system to find
> > what makes it organized, though.
>
> Hmmm.  I don't think I'm making the mistake you're citing.  
> But, it's plenty likely.  I make all sorts of mistakes all
> the time.  [grin]  To be clear, let me paraphrase what you're saying:
>
> By saying the inverse power law is a result/indicator rather
> than a design principle, you're saying that the generators of
> these results could be multifarious and not determined.  I.e.
> just because a system turns out to require things extreme
> behavior and circumstances doesn't mean the organization of
> the system is the only organization that could possibly
> achieve its objectives.

I may not be speaking directly to your actual phrase, describing what
you've gathered from complexity theory: "the extent versus the
objectives of control structures should show something like an inverse
power law to maintain a balance between diversity and efficacy." I read
that as meaning that you'd design an inverse square relation into your
control systems.  I don't know what actual kind of controls you may be
thinking of, or how you'd measure their diversity or efficacy, of
course.

The 'generators' of the inverse square measure are the
self-organizations of the particular complex system you then try to
understand.   If you design a procedure by which self-organization
develops it's quite likely it would behave like natural self-organized
systems and be structurally different every time, and still have metrics
like the inverse square distributions of their parts which are similar.

That there might also be various different kinds of solution to a given
objective is a separate issue to me.

 
> You're saying that another system may be organized
> differently, achieve the same objectives, and not exhibit the
> same extrema.
>
> Is that right or did I misunderstand you?

I'm not quite sure it addresses your question, but I'm was saying the
process by which complex systems evolve does not follow an inverse
square pattern or series of steps.   The measure is generally only found
in systems after they have been built by other means.

> > The network science people seem to have a better way of
> using it than
> > the other mainstream science disciplines interested in the subject I
> > think.   They're looking at complex systems from the inside
> out (though
> > maybe not having quite realized that networks are artifacts of the
> > complex systems they are embedded in).  Their identification of the
> > elaboration and refinement of network connections during network
> > development as the origin of the inverse square metric and
> > 'scale-free' distribution of internal connectedness of natural
> > networks is very helpful.  There should logically be some kind of
> > connection with the thinking of people taking an outside in
> approach
> > to complexity, but I have not been able to figure out what it is.
>
> I don't quite buy this.  But, my criticism of it takes us on
> a tangent.  I'll state my criticism anyway and if you choose
> to pursue the tangent, then so be it. [grin]
>
> I don't believe there is a fundamental difference between
> constructivism and formalism.  I.e. one cannot study a system
> from the inside out without also studying it from the outside
> in, and vice versa.  When one uses a phrase like "studying
> complex systems from the inside out", the phrase merely
> _emphasizes_ one part of the studying.  Objectively, all
> studies involve an iterative approach that cycles between
> inside and outside studies.  This seems to be true of
> everything from riding a bicycle to cosmology.

Well, it's not half well enough studied, but inside and outside
perspectives of organization in systems are so very different it takes
special care to keep them straight it seems to me.  I'm not even sure if
one can discuss a system as having an inside (network cell of relations)
since I haven't heard the 'news' in the journals yet and it seems to
require a radical exception to the traditional view of determinism.
Isn't the traditional view that all causation comes from the outside
still the most widespread?  

One of the differences between the two perspectives is the huge
difference inside and outside views is in the information content of
your observations.   If your view of the world is based on an insider's
perspective of some self-organized 'hive' of activity, say a religious
or social movement, it may be extremely hard to make sense of an
outsider's view of exactly the same thing.  The insider's view is of all
the internalized connections, and the outsider's view of essentially all
the loose ends.  Getting them to connect can be very difficult.

> > As far as the limits of control, don't all complex systems have
> > significantly independent design and behavior?   It seems
> to me that the
> > first thing anything with independent design and behavior
> requires is
> > basic respect, otherwise you make large mistakes with it,
> right?   We so
> > often forget that finding the easy ways for independent
> things to get
> > along is a great design strategy.   Nature seems to like it
> quite a lot
> > for evolutionary survival too!
>
> It's not clear to me what you're saying, here.  But, I don't
> really believe in "design".  Design is a cognitive fiction we
> use to rationalize/justify our behavior.  The causes of the
> phenomena generated by a complex system are... occult,
> occluded, at least to some extent.  I think that's why we
> call these systems "complex".  And its for these reasons that
> simulation is such a necessary and powerful tool in the study
> of these systems.  We can't readily find "laws" that compress
> the description of the system.  For less complex systems, we
> can infer these laws.

In studying natural systems it's apparent that lots of intricate
'design' develops without any 'design'.  I was using first sense above,
that complex systems may develop all kinds of organization and activity
that were neither preconceived nor predetermined.  Whether you can find
useful 'laws' to describe complex systems I think is like other real
scientific questions, more dependence on whether you ask the right
questions.  

I was looking for years for some clear evidence that the economic
systems all act as a single complex system, behaving as a whole.  The
fact that the embodied  energy of economic value (btu/$GDP) is
asymptotically approaching around 8000btu/$ in all the economies of the
world seems to say it's all one system in a highly useful way.   The
self-organization of the economies gives us a conversion and equivalence
between a physical measure and what humans value.  I expect these things
are lying all over the place, but we're just beginning to recognize
them.  

>
> Ultimately, however, even when we can (seem to) achieve some
> descriptive compression, the causes of the behavior are still
> occult.  But we gain some confidence through temporal and
> spatial extrapolation (we repeat experiments through time and
> check to be sure the results are the same and we have
> different people in different locations repeat the
> experiments to see if the results are the same).  Through
> such indirect "validation", we come to trust that our
> compressed description is _correct_ or true.  But,
> ultimately, the causes are still occult.  There is always the
> chance of a black swan.

I think it's more productive, when you're well beaten, to accept that
systems with complex internal network designs we tend not to even see
are beyond our understanding.  There's still good sense to making models
of things, and developing ways of determining if the models behave like
what it imitates.  

One of the interesting subjects that came up at the SASO conference is
that no one in the information network control systems field seems to
know how to do that for self-organizing and self-adapting software
controls... except random experiment.  That may lead to 'gaining some
confidence', as you say, but it's not the same as the narrowly defined
uncertainties of the deterministic controls of the past.

>
> So, "don't all complex systems have significantly independent
> design and behavior"?  For the above reasons, my answer is
> _no_ because "design" is a figment of our imagination.  A
> better answer would be that the question is ill-formed and
> unanswerable.  Complex systems are not _designed_ at all.  
> They grow and evolve through the propagation of happenstance.

Well, that's kind of abstract.   It's a simpler issue when talking about
real things.   Any ecology or social group, etc., will have different
networks emerge within them as they develop and so they will respond
differently too.   That's all I mean by independent design and behavior.

When I speak of 'designing' complex systems, as I do for architectural
and planning projects, it's more about setting up a system learning
process.  Discovering how to make links between previously disconnected
parts of communities takes an effort at exploratory learning about the
disconnected parts of your community.   Once you then design ways to
link them the end product is their own creative interactions which the
planners would never think of.  

Instead of 'propagation of happenstance' I'd use 'development of
opportunity'.  The latter covers both truly random events and the
exploratory path-finding processes also prominent in self-organization.

Phil

>
> - --
> glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com
> A random group of homeless people under a bridge would be far
> more intellectually sound and principled than anything I've
> encountered at the university so far. -- Ward Churchill
>
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>

[Alfredo Covaleda]

Hi,

Many years ago when I was working on my undergraduate thesis in the
jungle of Amazonas in Colombia, I knew a North American Anthropologist
whom had been working there for a long time studying the way how an
indigenous culture disappeared. I horrified with it and thought It was
inmoral. Older members of the team of researchers where I was working
told me that she was making science and that a scientific must be
neutral. I think it's totally false. A scientific has an emotional and
political charge, deep inside feels himself like a demiurge and for
these reasons can't be completely impartial. What is science for?
Science have a social function, must help us to understand and resolve
problems but of course is an instruments of politics because finally we
are in a world of gangs.

I have an hypothesis: biotechnology, robotics, informatics, smart
software and internationalization of economy will increase poverty in
the underdeveloped world. I'm not a scientific but suppose I am,  I take
data and develop a sophisticated model. Maybe, be sure,  I'll conclude
that my hypothesis is true and I'll say for first time something
brilliant like "Poverty is a emergent process"...  wow, what a
conclusion!!!.  If a guy which dream is to be high executive of the
World Bank, IMF or WTO takes data and develops a sophisticated model
will conclude that my hypothesis is false and will say "Richness is an
emergent process". Maybe neither of us will be telling lies, of course
I'll be right but I'll pray for his conclusion to be right because at
the end he will be a high executive and will have the last word.

Alfredo CV


Robert Cordingley wrote:

> Glen,
>
> It seems the world has had for a long time, and still has, oppression,
> poverty and poor education of segments of its population.  Perhaps we
> can say that the developed world has managed to lower their own
> deprived segment size while the un(der)developed hasn't made so much
> progress.  (Do you remember the TADtalk visualization on poverty?)  
> It is considered by many, including you and me, that having deprived
> segments of the world's population is unethical because of the ethical
> standards we hold, have learned (and have been indoctrinated in, if
> you will).
>
> It remains ethical to work towards the reduction and elimination of
> these deprived segments - it's a big job.  The argument is over how.  
> I don't believe complexity science or studies and simulations of
> Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) are yet sufficiently mature to help
> very far in this endeavor, but I'm not an expert in the field. It just
> seems that way from the perspective of an observer.
>
> That complexity studies indicate emergent behavior that is otherwise
> hard to predict and matches small systems (ie < 10^6 agents) behavior
> is *very* interesting and justifies further work.  I don't think it
> separates cause and effect which is the primary reason for not using
> such studies for predictive purposes.  And there is no evidence yet of
> successful studies or simulations that model social change, e.g. the
> French or Russian Revolutions.  (Please correct me if this is wrong).  
> So it seems that the problems of society (including trying to figure
> out what is the 'best' form of government) are not yet subject to
> relief from CAS studies.  Many would not want one small class of
> experts to be responsible for this task anyway.
>
> Going back to your original ethical dilemma, if one agrees with what
> is ethical and one's political position doesn't then one will
> change/adjust/modify one's political position to maintain one's
> internal integrity.  Labels and technicalities in definitions may be
> part of the problem:
>
> I am a democrat because I believe everyone should have a say in
> government,
> I am an environmentalist because we should take care of our biosphere
> so it remains habitable for us,
> I am a monarchist because I don't want to disband the Royal Family,
> I am libertarian because I don't want a Big Brother government,
> I am conservative because I think we shouldn't waste our resources,
> I am a republican in the sense I don't want to dismantle the US
> federal system and its three branches of government,
> I am a capitalist because I believe in free-markets,
> I am socialist because I believe everyone deserves basic health care,
> education, justice,
> I am a moderate because I believe we deserve a system of justice that
> can reign in man's excesses.
> etc
>
> If complexity science turns out to be a powerful technology it may
> take it's place along side fire, nuclear power and genetic
> engineering.  All are amoral.  It's how we use them for our benefit
> that will exercise our morals (ethics).
>
> Robert C
>
> Glen E. P. Ropella wrote:
>
>>The sides being a) the ethical consideration of
>>things like abject poverty, epidemic diseases, starvation, etc. and b)
>>the objective necessity that, with a population-based search method,
>>some individuals are destined for extrema, often very unpleasant
>>extrema.  And it is especially difficult to simultaneously consider both
>>sides when the members of the population who are destined for horrible
>>extrema like AIDS or starvation are innocents who didn't have any chance
>>to _choose_ their extreme destiny.
>>
>>- --
>>glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com
>>Power never takes a back step - only in the face of more power. -- Malcolm X
>>
>>============================================================
>>FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>>Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>>lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>>
>>  
>>
>------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>============================================================
>FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>

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[Mikhail Gorelkin]

I have an hypothesis: biotechnology, robotics, informatics, smart software and internationalization of economy will increase poverty in the underdeveloped world.

I think: 1) it can be proved as the theorem of general systems theory & cybernetics; and 2) it's a part of the fight for the

future --Mikhail

  ----- Original Message -----
  From: Alfredo CV
  To: robert at cirrillian.com ; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
  Sent: Monday, September 03, 2007 12:48 PM
  Subject: Re: [FRIAM] politics and cliques


  Hi,

  Many years ago when I was working on my undergraduate thesis in the jungle of Amazonas in Colombia, I knew a North American Anthropologist whom had been working there for a long time studying the way how an indigenous culture disappeared. I horrified with it and thought It was inmoral. Older members of the team of researchers where I was working told me that she was making science and that a scientific must be neutral. I think it's totally false. A scientific has an emotional and political charge, deep inside feels himself like a demiurge and for these reasons can't be completely impartial. What is science for? Science have a social function, must help us to understand and resolve problems but of course is an instruments of politics because finally we are in a world of gangs.

  I have an hypothesis: biotechnology, robotics, informatics, smart software and internationalization of economy will increase poverty in the underdeveloped world. I'm not a scientific but suppose I am,  I take data and develop a sophisticated model. Maybe, be sure,  I'll conclude that my hypothesis is true and I'll say for first time something brilliant like "Poverty is a emergent process"...  wow, what a conclusion!!!.  If a guy which dream is to be high executive of the World Bank, IMF or WTO takes data and develops a sophisticated model will conclude that my hypothesis is false and will say "Richness is an emergent process". Maybe neither of us will be telling lies, of course I'll be right but I'll pray for his conclusion to be right because at the end he will be a high executive and will have the last word.

  Alfredo CV


  Robert Cordingley wrote:
    Glen,

    It seems the world has had for a long time, and still has, oppression, poverty and poor education of segments of its population.  Perhaps we can say that the developed world has managed to lower their own deprived segment size while the un(der)developed hasn't made so much progress.  (Do you remember the TADtalk visualization on poverty?)   It is considered by many, including you and me, that having deprived segments of the world's population is unethical because of the ethical standards we hold, have learned (and have been indoctrinated in, if you will).

    It remains ethical to work towards the reduction and elimination of these deprived segments - it's a big job.  The argument is over how.  I don't believe complexity science or studies and simulations of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) are yet sufficiently mature to help very far in this endeavor, but I'm not an expert in the field. It just seems that way from the perspective of an observer.

    That complexity studies indicate emergent behavior that is otherwise hard to predict and matches small systems (ie < 10^6 agents) behavior is *very* interesting and justifies further work.  I don't think it separates cause and effect which is the primary reason for not using such studies for predictive purposes.  And there is no evidence yet of successful studies or simulations that model social change, e.g. the French or Russian Revolutions.  (Please correct me if this is wrong).  So it seems that the problems of society (including trying to figure out what is the 'best' form of government) are not yet subject to relief from CAS studies.  Many would not want one small class of experts to be responsible for this task anyway.

    Going back to your original ethical dilemma, if one agrees with what is ethical and one's political position doesn't then one will change/adjust/modify one's political position to maintain one's internal integrity.  Labels and technicalities in definitions may be part of the problem:

    I am a democrat because I believe everyone should have a say in government,
    I am an environmentalist because we should take care of our biosphere so it remains habitable for us,
    I am a monarchist because I don't want to disband the Royal Family,
    I am libertarian because I don't want a Big Brother government,
    I am conservative because I think we shouldn't waste our resources,
    I am a republican in the sense I don't want to dismantle the US federal system and its three branches of government,
    I am a capitalist because I believe in free-markets,
    I am socialist because I believe everyone deserves basic health care, education, justice,
    I am a moderate because I believe we deserve a system of justice that can reign in man's excesses.
    etc

    If complexity science turns out to be a powerful technology it may take it's place along side fire, nuclear power and genetic engineering.  All are amoral.  It's how we use them for our benefit that will exercise our morals (ethics).

    Robert C

    Glen E. P. Ropella wrote:
The sides being a) the ethical consideration of
things like abject poverty, epidemic diseases, starvation, etc. and b)
the objective necessity that, with a population-based search method,
some individuals are destined for extrema, often very unpleasant
extrema.  And it is especially difficult to simultaneously consider both
sides when the members of the population who are destined for horrible
extrema like AIDS or starvation are innocents who didn't have any chance
to _choose_ their extreme destiny.

- --
glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com
Power never takes a back step - only in the face of more power. -- Malcolm X

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org



------------------------------------------------------------------------------


  ============================================================
  FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
  Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
  lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
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[glen ep ropella]

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1


You bring up two very important points:

1) a strong hypo-thesis (somewhat but not completely justified) that it
_is_ ethical to attempt to reduce "deprived" segments and

2) ethical justification for various labels (democrat, monarchist, etc.).

You also brought up the point that the techniques of complexity studies
are, yet, too immature to really bring them to bear on the problem.  I
don't regard this as an important point because tools must be _used_ to
become mature.  So, it doesn't matter how immature the techniques are,
they must be used on the problems we have at hand.  And the corollary
point about them not separating out cause/effect and re: prediction are
premature conclusions in my opinion.  So, I'll leave these points alone
for now.

A solution to my dilemma might involve _rejecting_ the ethical premise
that the deprived segments should not be so deprived.  E.g. some
children _must_ starve in order for life to effectively do whatever it's
doing.  That is a completely reasonable solution (and one taken by many
of us lucky ones whose selves, friends, family, tribe, etc. have their
basic needs taken care of).

Because that is a completely reasonable solution, we have to not only
question _how_ alternative solutions (maintain the ethical premise)
obtain; but we also have to question the entire process of
_justification_.  Can the ethical premise be more completely justified?

This same question comes into your second important point.  When I call
myself a "monarchist" and that "theorem" is somehow justified via some
form of rhetoric, we not only have to question the conclusions derived
from the premise.  We also have to question the rhetorical justification
of the premise, itself.  Am I really a "monarchist", regardless of what
I call myself?  Does the rhetoric: "because I don't want to disband the
Royal Family" deductively lead to the label "monarchist"?  Etc.

This relates fundamentally to the question of whether things like
inverse power laws between particular measures can be effectively
applied to social and/or ethical problems.  It relates because of the
following.

The results of complexity studies are telling us (in my opinion)
_nothing_ about actual (ontological) reality.  These results merely tell
us how we as ignorant individuals _learn_ about actuality.  They are at
their core a psychological bridge between reductionism and holism.

The dilemma, as I formulated it, relates two unjustified measures: the
extent of a control structure and the number of objectives any control
structure can competently achieve.  I believe the epistemological
results of complexity theory can help either:

a) justify the two measures, or
b) demonstrate how one or both of the measures are unjustified.

It's also possible that either measure is justified but falsified
(a.k.a. valid but unsound in logic-speak or verified but invalid in
M&S-speak).  We can't currently falsify the measures and their
relationship because we haven't done the science (though I believe it's
relatively easy to formulate a falsifiable hypothesis).  And whether or
not the science is _worth_ pursuing depends on the justification.

So, the questions become:

Q1) Do non-local control structures exist that regulate many variables?

Q2) Can particular variables (e.g. hunger) be factored completely out of
the system so that no animal/plant experiences extreme changes in those
variables?

These are _justification_ questions, not falsification questions.
Hence, they are perfectly suited for the toy-world models currently
being built by social scientists and mathematicians.  Once the
justification is well-stated; falsification questions can be competently
posed.

Robert Cordingley wrote:

> It seems the world has had for a long time, and still has, oppression,
> poverty and poor education of segments of its population.  Perhaps we
> can say that the developed world has managed to lower their own deprived
> segment size while the un(der)developed hasn't made so much progress.
> (Do you remember the TADtalk visualization on poverty?)   It is
> considered by many, including you and me, that having deprived segments
> of the world's population is unethical because of the ethical standards
> we hold, have learned (and have been indoctrinated in, if you will).
>
> It remains ethical to work towards the reduction and elimination of
> these deprived segments - it's a big job.  The argument is over how.  I
> don't believe complexity science or studies and simulations of Complex
> Adaptive Systems (CAS) are yet sufficiently mature to help very far in
> this endeavor, but I'm not an expert in the field. It just seems that
> way from the perspective of an observer.
>
> That complexity studies indicate emergent behavior that is otherwise
> hard to predict and matches small systems (ie < 10^6 agents) behavior is
> *very* interesting and justifies further work.  I don't think it
> separates cause and effect which is the primary reason for not using
> such studies for predictive purposes.  And there is no evidence yet of
> successful studies or simulations that model social change, e.g. the
> French or Russian Revolutions.  (Please correct me if this is wrong).
> So it seems that the problems of society (including trying to figure out
> what is the 'best' form of government) are not yet subject to relief
> from CAS studies.  Many would not want one small class of experts to be
> responsible for this task anyway.
>
> Going back to your original ethical dilemma, if one agrees with what is
> ethical and one's political position doesn't then one will
> change/adjust/modify one's political position to maintain one's internal
> integrity.  Labels and technicalities in definitions may be part of the
> problem:
>
> I am a democrat because I believe everyone should have a say in government,
> I am an environmentalist because we should take care of our biosphere so
> it remains habitable for us,
> I am a monarchist because I don't want to disband the Royal Family,
> I am libertarian because I don't want a Big Brother government,
> I am conservative because I think we shouldn't waste our resources,
> I am a republican in the sense I don't want to dismantle the US federal
> system and its three branches of government,
> I am a capitalist because I believe in free-markets,
> I am socialist because I believe everyone deserves basic health care,
> education, justice,
> I am a moderate because I believe we deserve a system of justice that
> can reign in man's excesses.
> etc
>
> If complexity science turns out to be a powerful technology it may take
> it's place along side fire, nuclear power and genetic engineering.  All
> are amoral.  It's how we use them for our benefit that will exercise our
> morals (ethics).

- --
glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com
There is a tragic flaw in our precious Constitution, and I don't know
what can be done to fix it. This is it: Only nut cases want to be
president. -- Kurt Vonnegut

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[Robert J. Cordingley]

re: important point 1.  It is easier for me to see/say that it is
_unethical_ to _not_ lend some assistance to deprived segments in order
to improve their lot.  Reduce the segment to one deprived human being
that you pass in the street.  There are may variables in the encounter:
one's schedule, feeling of well-being, attire of the unfortunate being
and the urge to extend a helping hand.  Where does that come from if not
from one's ethical background.

re: important point 2  It wasn't my point to say the labels were
ethically justified but to point out that labels e.g. one being
"libertarian", were not clear cut definitions.  One can hold x political
view in some issues and y on others when pedants might object to say
that x and y were incompatible.  There may be no ethical dilemma for one
to believe in x and y, though other's may debate it.

Your 'reasonable' solution might suit a callous person.  We have to
guard against trends towards 'final solutions'.

I thought the "extent of a control structure" and "the number of
objectives" were two attributes of government that your studies, or at
least your thinking, had connected as related through an inverse power
law.  Neither needs justifying.  I'm probably missing the point or not
familiar with your definition of 'justified'.

re: Q1) "Do non-local control structures exist that regulate many
variables?" - I have no idea,  but suggest that getting some agreement
on the definition of the terms of the question may take some time even
if it's possible.

re: Q2) Can particular variables (e.g. hunger) be factored completely
out of the system so that no animal/plant experiences extreme changes in
those
variables? - I'd vote for working towards improvement in the social
variables knowing that absolute success may be beyond us - but wait,
what about small-pox, or death by dinosaur?  When you say 'variable' do
you mean 'vector'?  But then there are 8 meanings of "vector" in Wiktionary.

So much epistemology, so little time...

Robert C


Glen E. P. Ropella wrote:

> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
>
> You bring up two very important points:
>
> 1) a strong hypo-thesis (somewhat but not completely justified) that it
> _is_ ethical to attempt to reduce "deprived" segments and
>
> 2) ethical justification for various labels (democrat, monarchist, etc.).
>
> You also brought up the point that the techniques of complexity studies
> are, yet, too immature to really bring them to bear on the problem.  I
> don't regard this as an important point because tools must be _used_ to
> become mature.  So, it doesn't matter how immature the techniques are,
> they must be used on the problems we have at hand.  And the corollary
> point about them not separating out cause/effect and re: prediction are
> premature conclusions in my opinion.  So, I'll leave these points alone
> for now.
>
> A solution to my dilemma might involve _rejecting_ the ethical premise
> that the deprived segments should not be so deprived.  E.g. some
> children _must_ starve in order for life to effectively do whatever it's
> doing.  That is a completely reasonable solution (and one taken by many
> of us lucky ones whose selves, friends, family, tribe, etc. have their
> basic needs taken care of).
>
> Because that is a completely reasonable solution, we have to not only
> question _how_ alternative solutions (maintain the ethical premise)
> obtain; but we also have to question the entire process of
> _justification_.  Can the ethical premise be more completely justified?
>
> This same question comes into your second important point.  When I call
> myself a "monarchist" and that "theorem" is somehow justified via some
> form of rhetoric, we not only have to question the conclusions derived
> from the premise.  We also have to question the rhetorical justification
> of the premise, itself.  Am I really a "monarchist", regardless of what
> I call myself?  Does the rhetoric: "because I don't want to disband the
> Royal Family" deductively lead to the label "monarchist"?  Etc.
>
> This relates fundamentally to the question of whether things like
> inverse power laws between particular measures can be effectively
> applied to social and/or ethical problems.  It relates because of the
> following.
>
> The results of complexity studies are telling us (in my opinion)
> _nothing_ about actual (ontological) reality.  These results merely tell
> us how we as ignorant individuals _learn_ about actuality.  They are at
> their core a psychological bridge between reductionism and holism.
>
> The dilemma, as I formulated it, relates two unjustified measures: the
> extent of a control structure and the number of objectives any control
> structure can competently achieve.  I believe the epistemological
> results of complexity theory can help either:
>
> a) justify the two measures, or
> b) demonstrate how one or both of the measures are unjustified.
>
> It's also possible that either measure is justified but falsified
> (a.k.a. valid but unsound in logic-speak or verified but invalid in
> M&S-speak).  We can't currently falsify the measures and their
> relationship because we haven't done the science (though I believe it's
> relatively easy to formulate a falsifiable hypothesis).  And whether or
> not the science is _worth_ pursuing depends on the justification.
>
> So, the questions become:
>
> Q1) Do non-local control structures exist that regulate many variables?
>
> Q2) Can particular variables (e.g. hunger) be factored completely out of
> the system so that no animal/plant experiences extreme changes in those
> variables?
>
> These are _justification_ questions, not falsification questions.
> Hence, they are perfectly suited for the toy-world models currently
> being built by social scientists and mathematicians.  Once the
> justification is well-stated; falsification questions can be competently
> posed.
>
> Robert Cordingley wrote:
>  
>> It seems the world has had for a long time, and still has, oppression,
>> poverty and poor education of segments of its population.  Perhaps we
>> can say that the developed world has managed to lower their own deprived
>> segment size while the un(der)developed hasn't made so much progress.
>> (Do you remember the TADtalk visualization on poverty?)   It is
>> considered by many, including you and me, that having deprived segments
>> of the world's population is unethical because of the ethical standards
>> we hold, have learned (and have been indoctrinated in, if you will).
>>
>> It remains ethical to work towards the reduction and elimination of
>> these deprived segments - it's a big job.  The argument is over how.  I
>> don't believe complexity science or studies and simulations of Complex
>> Adaptive Systems (CAS) are yet sufficiently mature to help very far in
>> this endeavor, but I'm not an expert in the field. It just seems that
>> way from the perspective of an observer.
>>
>> That complexity studies indicate emergent behavior that is otherwise
>> hard to predict and matches small systems (ie < 10^6 agents) behavior is
>> *very* interesting and justifies further work.  I don't think it
>> separates cause and effect which is the primary reason for not using
>> such studies for predictive purposes.  And there is no evidence yet of
>> successful studies or simulations that model social change, e.g. the
>> French or Russian Revolutions.  (Please correct me if this is wrong).
>> So it seems that the problems of society (including trying to figure out
>> what is the 'best' form of government) are not yet subject to relief
>> from CAS studies.  Many would not want one small class of experts to be
>> responsible for this task anyway.
>>
>> Going back to your original ethical dilemma, if one agrees with what is
>> ethical and one's political position doesn't then one will
>> change/adjust/modify one's political position to maintain one's internal
>> integrity.  Labels and technicalities in definitions may be part of the
>> problem:
>>
>> I am a democrat because I believe everyone should have a say in government,
>> I am an environmentalist because we should take care of our biosphere so
>> it remains habitable for us,
>> I am a monarchist because I don't want to disband the Royal Family,
>> I am libertarian because I don't want a Big Brother government,
>> I am conservative because I think we shouldn't waste our resources,
>> I am a republican in the sense I don't want to dismantle the US federal
>> system and its three branches of government,
>> I am a capitalist because I believe in free-markets,
>> I am socialist because I believe everyone deserves basic health care,
>> education, justice,
>> I am a moderate because I believe we deserve a system of justice that
>> can reign in man's excesses.
>> etc
>>
>> If complexity science turns out to be a powerful technology it may take
>> it's place along side fire, nuclear power and genetic engineering.  All
>> are amoral.  It's how we use them for our benefit that will exercise our
>> morals (ethics).
>>    
>
>
> - --
> glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com
> There is a tragic flaw in our precious Constitution, and I don't know
> what can be done to fix it. This is it: Only nut cases want to be
> president. -- Kurt Vonnegut
>
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> Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux)
> Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org
>
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> 1bFC1hz8fvBJr8cypjkfUGE=
> =5ozy
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>
>
>  

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[Phil Henshaw-2]

Glen,
You make a remarkably cogent argument, up until you frame the dilemma entirely in terms of control.  Natural systems orchestrate things leaving most things working independently and 'out of control'.  We should have some better reason than frustration for ignoring that rather effective 'collaborative' approach, shouldn't we?
Phil

Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBerry

-----Original Message-----
From: "Glen E. P. Ropella" <[hidden email]>

Date: Tue, 04 Sep 2007 11:53:02
To:The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam at redfish.com>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] politics and cliques


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1


You bring up two very important points:

1) a strong hypo-thesis (somewhat but not completely justified) that it
_is_ ethical to attempt to reduce "deprived" segments and

2) ethical justification for various labels (democrat, monarchist, etc.).

You also brought up the point that the techniques of complexity studies
are, yet, too immature to really bring them to bear on the problem.  I
don't regard this as an important point because tools must be _used_ to
become mature.  So, it doesn't matter how immature the techniques are,
they must be used on the problems we have at hand.  And the corollary
point about them not separating out cause/effect and re: prediction are
premature conclusions in my opinion.  So, I'll leave these points alone
for now.

A solution to my dilemma might involve _rejecting_ the ethical premise
that the deprived segments should not be so deprived.  E.g. some
children _must_ starve in order for life to effectively do whatever it's
doing.  That is a completely reasonable solution (and one taken by many
of us lucky ones whose selves, friends, family, tribe, etc. have their
basic needs taken care of).

Because that is a completely reasonable solution, we have to not only
question _how_ alternative solutions (maintain the ethical premise)
obtain; but we also have to question the entire process of
_justification_.  Can the ethical premise be more completely justified?

This same question comes into your second important point.  When I call
myself a "monarchist" and that "theorem" is somehow justified via some
form of rhetoric, we not only have to question the conclusions derived
from the premise.  We also have to question the rhetorical justification
of the premise, itself.  Am I really a "monarchist", regardless of what
I call myself?  Does the rhetoric: "because I don't want to disband the
Royal Family" deductively lead to the label "monarchist"?  Etc.

This relates fundamentally to the question of whether things like
inverse power laws between particular measures can be effectively
applied to social and/or ethical problems.  It relates because of the
following.

The results of complexity studies are telling us (in my opinion)
_nothing_ about actual (ontological) reality.  These results merely tell
us how we as ignorant individuals _learn_ about actuality.  They are at
their core a psychological bridge between reductionism and holism.

The dilemma, as I formulated it, relates two unjustified measures: the
extent of a control structure and the number of objectives any control
structure can competently achieve.  I believe the epistemological
results of complexity theory can help either:

a) justify the two measures, or
b) demonstrate how one or both of the measures are unjustified.

It's also possible that either measure is justified but falsified
(a.k.a. valid but unsound in logic-speak or verified but invalid in
M&S-speak).  We can't currently falsify the measures and their
relationship because we haven't done the science (though I believe it's
relatively easy to formulate a falsifiable hypothesis).  And whether or
not the science is _worth_ pursuing depends on the justification.

So, the questions become:

Q1) Do non-local control structures exist that regulate many variables?

Q2) Can particular variables (e.g. hunger) be factored completely out of
the system so that no animal/plant experiences extreme changes in those
variables?

These are _justification_ questions, not falsification questions.
Hence, they are perfectly suited for the toy-world models currently
being built by social scientists and mathematicians.  Once the
justification is well-stated; falsification questions can be competently
posed.

Robert Cordingley wrote:

> It seems the world has had for a long time, and still has, oppression,
> poverty and poor education of segments of its population.  Perhaps we
> can say that the developed world has managed to lower their own deprived
> segment size while the un(der)developed hasn't made so much progress.
> (Do you remember the TADtalk visualization on poverty?)   It is
> considered by many, including you and me, that having deprived segments
> of the world's population is unethical because of the ethical standards
> we hold, have learned (and have been indoctrinated in, if you will).
>
> It remains ethical to work towards the reduction and elimination of
> these deprived segments - it's a big job.  The argument is over how.  I
> don't believe complexity science or studies and simulations of Complex
> Adaptive Systems (CAS) are yet sufficiently mature to help very far in
> this endeavor, but I'm not an expert in the field. It just seems that
> way from the perspective of an observer.
>
> That complexity studies indicate emergent behavior that is otherwise
> hard to predict and matches small systems (ie < 10^6 agents) behavior is
> *very* interesting and justifies further work.  I don't think it
> separates cause and effect which is the primary reason for not using
> such studies for predictive purposes.  And there is no evidence yet of
> successful studies or simulations that model social change, e.g. the
> French or Russian Revolutions.  (Please correct me if this is wrong).
> So it seems that the problems of society (including trying to figure out
> what is the 'best' form of government) are not yet subject to relief
> from CAS studies.  Many would not want one small class of experts to be
> responsible for this task anyway.
>
> Going back to your original ethical dilemma, if one agrees with what is
> ethical and one's political position doesn't then one will
> change/adjust/modify one's political position to maintain one's internal
> integrity.  Labels and technicalities in definitions may be part of the
> problem:
>
> I am a democrat because I believe everyone should have a say in government,
> I am an environmentalist because we should take care of our biosphere so
> it remains habitable for us,
> I am a monarchist because I don't want to disband the Royal Family,
> I am libertarian because I don't want a Big Brother government,
> I am conservative because I think we shouldn't waste our resources,
> I am a republican in the sense I don't want to dismantle the US federal
> system and its three branches of government,
> I am a capitalist because I believe in free-markets,
> I am socialist because I believe everyone deserves basic health care,
> education, justice,
> I am a moderate because I believe we deserve a system of justice that
> can reign in man's excesses.
> etc
>
> If complexity science turns out to be a powerful technology it may take
> it's place along side fire, nuclear power and genetic engineering.  All
> are amoral.  It's how we use them for our benefit that will exercise our
> morals (ethics).

- --
glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com
There is a tragic flaw in our precious Constitution, and I don't know
what can be done to fix it. This is it: Only nut cases want to be
president. -- Kurt Vonnegut

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============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

[glen ep ropella]

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Phil Henshaw wrote:
> I may not be speaking directly to your actual phrase, describing what
>  you've gathered from complexity theory: "the extent versus the
> objectives of control structures should show something like an
> inverse power law to maintain a balance between diversity and
> efficacy." I read that as meaning that you'd design an inverse square
> relation into your control systems.  I don't know what actual kind of
> controls you may be thinking of, or how you'd measure their diversity
> or efficacy, of course.

The actual controls I'm talking about are simple positive and negative
reinforcement of behavior.  For example, if someone breaks a law, we try
to apply negative reinforcement through punishment.  If someone does a
good job, we try to apply positive reinforcement through compensation.
But, I think the principle would also hold in engineering control systems.

When I say that a graph of extent versus number of objectives _shows_ an
inverse power law, I am not saying that I would design an inverse square
law into a control system.  I don't know why you insist on replacing
"power" with "square".  And I don't know how one would mistake "design"
for "show".  I simply mean that if you measured the panoply of existing
control structures using two measures: extent of the control structure
in space and time and number of objectives for that control structure,
you would see an inverse power relationship between the two measures.
I.e. the larger the extent of the control structure, the fewer its
objectives.  The smaller the extent, the higher its number of
objectives.  I have no idea if the power of the relation would turn out
to be 2 or not.

> Well, it's not half well enough studied, but inside and outside
> perspectives of organization in systems are so very different it
> takes special care to keep them straight it seems to me.  I'm not
> even sure if one can discuss a system as having an inside (network
> cell of relations) since I haven't heard the 'news' in the journals
> yet and it seems to require a radical exception to the traditional
> view of determinism. Isn't the traditional view that all causation
> comes from the outside still the most widespread?

I don't know what the general view of causation is.  But, the general
categories for observation from the inside versus the outside are:
constructivism versus formalism.  When one observes a system
objectively, from the outside, it seems the tendency is to formalize
everything (a.k.a. remove the semantic grounding of the tokens that
represent constituents of the system).  When one observes a system
subjectively, from the inside, it seems the tendency is to retain the
semantics and construct explanations directly from the constituents of
the system.

My point was that, ultimately, there's no fundamental difference between
the two because even a subjective account of a phenomenon will involve
objectively defined sub-elements and an objective account of a
phenomenon will involve subjectively interpreted sub-elements.

The difference is one of _method_ not of substance.

> One of the differences between the two perspectives is the huge
> difference inside and outside views is in the information content of
> your observations.   If your view of the world is based on an
> insider's perspective of some self-organized 'hive' of activity, say
> a religious or social movement, it may be extremely hard to make
> sense of an outsider's view of exactly the same thing.  The insider's
> view is of all the internalized connections, and the outsider's view
> of essentially all the loose ends.  Getting them to connect can be
> very difficult.

But, as eluded to above, the reasons for this is that the inside view
retains the semantics and the outside view tries to reduce the relations
to pure syntax.  Pure syntax is best for prediction but piss-poor for
heuristic value.  Pure semantics is best for understanding but near
useless for prediction.

- --
glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com
Whenever we depart from voluntary cooperation and try to do good by
using force, the bad moral value of force triumphs over good intentions.
- -- Milton Friedman

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[glen ep ropella]

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Your use of English confuses me at some points; but, I think I've gotten
your gist.  I agree that a scientist is not (indeed _cannot_) be neutral
or amoral.  Scientists are humans first and foremost.  And humans cannot
be neutral.  They are indocrinated throughout their life and learn
things IN context.  ("Neutrality", to some extent, implies a large
percentage of invariants through context changes.)  So, it is false to
claim that a scientist should be neutral.

However, it is not false to claim that science (in contrast to the
humans who engage in it) can be mostly neutral.  It can't be completely
neutral because every product of science assumes some sub-set of all the
other products of science.  But, it can at least be somewhat spatially
and temporally context independent.  In fact, that's part of the
definition of science, that it contain invariants through time and space.

The point you bring up about individuals (or sub-groups) and their
posited models is a good one.  But, a model is NOT scientific if it is
only posited, held, or tested once (by one individual or one execution).
 A model can only be scientific if it's been posited, held, and/or
tested by multiple people, in multiple contexts, and executed multiple
times.  Science is a social phenomenon, external to any single
individual and (hopefully) external to any single sub-group.

The interesting part of science, to me, lies in applying its results.
And in that sense, science definitely has a social role to play.  In
fact, there's little point in engaging in science if all you want is to
understand the universe, by yourself in your closet.  You can understand
the universe in purely metaphysical or metaphorical terms if you like.
The point of science is to collectively pursue not just understanding
but meaning and engineering.

Alfredo CV wrote:

> Many years ago when I was working on my undergraduate thesis in the
> jungle of Amazonas in Colombia, I knew a North American Anthropologist
> whom had been working there for a long time studying the way how an
> indigenous culture disappeared. I horrified with it and thought It was
> inmoral. Older members of the team of researchers where I was working
> told me that she was making science and that a scientific must be
> neutral. I think it's totally false. A scientific has an emotional and
> political charge, deep inside feels himself like a demiurge and for
> these reasons can't be completely impartial. What is science for?
> Science have a social function, must help us to understand and resolve
> problems but of course is an instruments of politics because finally we
> are in a world of gangs.
>
> I have an hypothesis: biotechnology, robotics, informatics, smart
> software and internationalization of economy will increase poverty in
> the underdeveloped world. I'm not a scientific but suppose I am,  I take
> data and develop a sophisticated model. Maybe, be sure,  I'll conclude
> that my hypothesis is true and I'll say for first time something
> brilliant like "Poverty is a emergent process"...  wow, what a
> conclusion!!!.  If a guy which dream is to be high executive of the
> World Bank, IMF or WTO takes data and develops a sophisticated model
> will conclude that my hypothesis is false and will say "Richness is an
> emergent process". Maybe neither of us will be telling lies, of course
> I'll be right but I'll pray for his conclusion to be right because at
> the end he will be a high executive and will have the last word.

- --
glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com
The poet, the artist, the sleuth - whoever sharpens our perception tends
to be antisocial... he cannot go along with currents and trends. --
Alfred North Whitehead

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[glen ep ropella]

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Robert Cordingley wrote:
> re: important point 1.  It is easier for me to see/say that it is
> _unethical_ to _not_ lend some assistance to deprived segments in order
> to improve their lot.  Reduce the segment to one deprived human being
> that you pass in the street.  There are may variables in the encounter:
> one's schedule, feeling of well-being, attire of the unfortunate being
> and the urge to extend a helping hand.  Where does that come from if not
> from one's ethical background.

Exactly!  For problems with many variables, _local_ controls are
adequate (or even common).  An example of a local control would be an
individual's ability to regulate how much "spare change" they hand to a
transient based on the measurements they take in context.

An example of a non-local control would be, e.g., banning all transients
from the city of Santa Cruz.

In the first case, the individual gets to handle it all, including how
much money (resources) is doled out, whether the subject is a
"transient", the attire of the subject, how much spare change is
available in the individual's pocket or in the subject's can, etc.

In the second case, some generic definition of "transient" must be
found, some definition of "ban" must be found, some definition of "Santa
Cruz" must be found.  And these definitions would provide umbrellas for
many finer-grained variables.

> Where does that come from if not from one's ethical background.

This is where the trick lies.  Ethical indocrination is sub-group
dependent.  Let's say I was reared in New York where it is ethically
acceptable to ignore transients.  Then there are zero problems when I
translate to Santa Cruz and ignore transients there (except for the
aggressive ones, of course ;-).  But, if I were reared in Santa Cruz,
where it used to be considered "good" to help homeless people, and I
translated to New York, I'd soon be broke from handing out all my cash!

This is handled in a non-local way, however.  In Santa Cruz and New
York, the collective gets together and hammers out policy that somehow
embodies the generalized individual ethics of many of the people.  But
when an individual translates from one context to the other, the
non-local control structure changes (the individual's ethics don't... or
not as fast, anyway).  And the result is dissonance between the
individual ethic (local control) and the non-local control structure.

Hence, how much money I give to a beggar does NOT merely come from my
ethical background; but, it also comes from whatever non-local control
structure in which I sit.  In places where the homeless are partially
taken care of through government sponsored programs, I may choose not to
give anything to a transient even though my ethical background would
suggest otherwise.

> re: important point 2  It wasn't my point to say the labels were
> ethically justified but to point out that labels e.g. one being
> "libertarian", were not clear cut definitions.  One can hold x political
> view in some issues and y on others when pedants might object to say
> that x and y were incompatible.  There may be no ethical dilemma for one
> to believe in x and y, though other's may debate it.

Right.  I did not intend to suggest that you were providing ethical
justifications for any given label.  But, your list of causal relations
between the label and some context points out that justification is
important.  Not necessarily "ethical justification"... plain old rhetoric.

If the justification for a label is not accepted by others, then the
justification is _questionable_.  This covers your point that the labels
are not clear cut.  But it also includes situations where the definition
is fine but the grammar that leads from one statement to another can be
called into question.

Sorry for my poor choice of words before.

> I thought the "extent of a control structure" and "the number of
> objectives" were two attributes of government that your studies, or at
> least your thinking, had connected as related through an inverse power
> law.  Neither needs justifying.  I'm probably missing the point or not
> familiar with your definition of 'justified'.

It's mostly just my _thinking_, not my studies.  I don't work in
sociology, politics, or any of that.  But both measures need
justification.  A measure of the extent of a control structure could be
manipulated to give any sort of answer.  So, a concrete measure of
extent needs justifying.  For example, is it enough to define "extent"
in terms of space and time?  Can a politician in DC actually write,
enforce, or judge actions based on laws governing people in Washington
state?  Is a law written in 1878 (Posse Comitatus) applicable in 2006?
Or is it also necessary to consider some sort of cultural extent as well
as spatial and temporal extent?

Such rhetoric is "justification".  And both measures (extent and number
of objectives) require such justification.

> re: Q1) "Do non-local control structures exist that regulate many
> variables?" - I have no idea,  but suggest that getting some agreement
> on the definition of the terms of the question may take some time even
> if it's possible.

Well, as usual, we won't get agreement first then experiment later.
It's normally the case that some yahoo just settles on concrete meanings
of the terms and does the experiment.  If they're a scientist, they tend
to also write down their definitions and methods.  After several such
experiments have been executed and argued about, agreement starts to
settle in.

> re: Q2) Can particular variables (e.g. hunger) be factored completely
> out of the system so that no animal/plant experiences extreme changes in
> those
> variables? - I'd vote for working towards improvement in the social
> variables knowing that absolute success may be beyond us - but wait,
> what about small-pox, or death by dinosaur?  When you say 'variable' do
> you mean 'vector'?  But then there are 8 meanings of "vector" in Wiktionary.

Yes, we could easily rid the world of Poverty and Hunger (note the
capital letters) by ridding the world of humans!  (Analogous to the
"death by dinosaur".)  When I say "variable" I don't tend to mean
"vector".  But, a "vector" can be a variable and vice versa.  For
example, "poverty" might be a variable and it (as currently understood)
has several components.  Hence the modern concept of poverty (or
"poverty level") is a vector in a pseudo-mathematical sense.

But you can understand my language (if not a path to concreteness ;-) by
thinking of variables as scalars.  They imply not only a quantification
but also a common medium (a space or hyper-space) in which they are
embedded.  Otherwise, it would be silly to relate them.

In the case of something like small-pox, my ethical background tells me
that we ought to prevent any further outbreak or transmission of
small-pox over the entire globe.  And such a non-local control would not
violate an IPL between extent and number of objectives.

But, my common sense tells me that there's a cost to such prevention.
And that cost is not necessarily all in money.  For example, what if we
only have the resources to feasibly control, say, 10 diseases in this
global way?  This leads me to consider the pros and cons of small-pox.
Of course, were I to make serious attempts to justify (or even hunt for)
the good side of the sporadic small-pox epidemic, I would (rightfully)
be vilified.  So, one can never _seriously_ consider the pros and cons
of it.  And therein lies the dilemma.

- --
glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com
We think in generalities, but we live in detail. -- Alfred North Whitehead

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[Phil Henshaw-2]

Glen,

> Phil Henshaw wrote:
> > I may not be speaking directly to your actual phrase,
> describing what  
> > you've gathered from complexity theory: "the extent versus the
> > objectives of control structures should show something like
> an inverse
> > power law to maintain a balance between diversity and efficacy." I
> > read that as meaning that you'd design an inverse square
> relation into
> > your control systems.  I don't know what actual kind of
> controls you
> > may be thinking of, or how you'd measure their diversity or
> efficacy,
> > of course.
>
> The actual controls I'm talking about are simple positive and
> negative reinforcement of behavior.  For example, if someone
> breaks a law, we try to apply negative reinforcement through
> punishment.  If someone does a good job, we try to apply
> positive reinforcement through compensation. But, I think the
> principle would also hold in engineering control systems.

OK, pushes and pulls, in directions chosen by a 'controller'.  Does that
include looking at the subjects of control to see how they find it
easiest and hardest to respond?   In other words is the thing you call
'control' just as easily a complex system learning process?

> When I say that a graph of extent versus number of objectives
> _shows_ an inverse power law, I am not saying that I would
> design an inverse square law into a control system.  I don't
> know why you insist on replacing "power" with "square".  And
> I don't know how one would mistake "design" for "show".  I
> simply mean that if you measured the panoply of existing
> control structures using two measures: extent of the control
> structure in space and time and number of objectives for that
> control structure, you would see an inverse power
> relationship between the two measures. I.e. the larger the
> extent of the control structure, the fewer its objectives.  
> The smaller the extent, the higher its number of objectives.  
> I have no idea if the power of the relation would turn out to
> be 2 or not.

I guess bending my mind to directly think about the distributed 'process
ecologies' of complex systems, leaves me to make occasional odd errors
in math...   No, I do mean to be talking about Pareto distributions and
the inverse power law family or relationships.  I also should not
dismiss the usefulness of designing a control strategy to fit the
statistically probable shape of the problem you're dealing with.
Whether statistics ignore individual characteristics or not they still
do save a lot of time!   I suppose there are lots of good examples of
exceptions to my notion that designing systems to follow inverse power
laws is an error.

>
> > Well, it's not half well enough studied, but inside and outside
> > perspectives of organization in systems are so very different it
> > takes special care to keep them straight it seems to me.  I'm not
> > even sure if one can discuss a system as having an inside (network
> > cell of relations) since I haven't heard the 'news' in the journals
> > yet and it seems to require a radical exception to the traditional
> > view of determinism. Isn't the traditional view that all causation
> > comes from the outside still the most widespread?
>
> I don't know what the general view of causation is.  But, the
> general categories for observation from the inside versus the
> outside are: constructivism versus formalism.  When one
> observes a system objectively, from the outside, it seems the
> tendency is to formalize everything (a.k.a. remove the
> semantic grounding of the tokens that represent constituents
> of the system).  When one observes a system subjectively,
> from the inside, it seems the tendency is to retain the
> semantics and construct explanations directly from the
> constituents of the system.
>
> My point was that, ultimately, there's no fundamental
> difference between the two because even a subjective account
> of a phenomenon will involve objectively defined sub-elements
> and an objective account of a phenomenon will involve
> subjectively interpreted sub-elements.

I think my point would be that outside perspectives are highly naturally
subjective in a hidden way, causing there to be a big difference between
inside and outside views.  Your premise seems to be that your observer
is all seeing.  For a real outside observer of any independent cell of
relationships, the relationships are not participated in and the
existence of the system they are part of is thus completely invisible.
It's only when the observer steps inside the system, getting into the
loop, that they suddenly become aware of the whole other world of
relationships it represents.   We see this over and over, that systems
develop in secret from us and then our awareness of them bursts into our
attention.  I think that's a direct effect of systems developing as
truly independent cells of relationships.

>
> The difference is one of _method_ not of substance.
>
> > One of the differences between the two perspectives is the huge
> > difference inside and outside views is in the information
> content of
> > your observations.   If your view of the world is based on an
> > insider's perspective of some self-organized 'hive' of activity, say
> > a religious or social movement, it may be extremely hard to make
> > sense of an outsider's view of exactly the same thing.  The
> insider's
> > view is of all the internalized connections, and the outsider's view
> > of essentially all the loose ends.  Getting them to connect can be
> > very difficult.
>
> But, as eluded to above, the reasons for this is that the
> inside view retains the semantics and the outside view tries
> to reduce the relations to pure syntax.  Pure syntax is best
> for prediction but piss-poor for heuristic value.  Pure
> semantics is best for understanding but near useless for prediction.

Wouldn't it be nice to have a heuristics machine to convert pure syntax
in to meaningful gobbely gook for any particular inside view...!  

I'm not sure how, but this might connect with the structural dilemma
that nature's design is deceptive because we all think the world we see
is the one that's there, and we all see different ones, partly because
of the inverse power law distributions of network connections as I was
describing to Bill.

Phil

>
> - --
> glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com 
> Whenever we depart from voluntary cooperation and try to do
> good by using force, the bad moral value of force triumphs
> over good intentions.
> - -- Milton Friedman
>
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> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>
>

[glen ep ropella]

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Phil Henshaw wrote:
> OK, pushes and pulls, in directions chosen by a 'controller'.  Does that
> include looking at the subjects of control to see how they find it
> easiest and hardest to respond?   In other words is the thing you call
> 'control' just as easily a complex system learning process?

Yes.  In fact, I tend to believe in the "law" of requisite variety and
would say that a controller for a complex system must, itself, be
complex at least in the sense that it contains a complex model of the
regulated system.

But, it's important to state that the complexity of the control system
can be high and need _not_ be a function of the complexity of the system
it controls.

Since I'm putting forth an unjustified thesis (a.k.a. hypothesis), I'm
not really making detailed claims about the control systems being
measured.  I'm merely trying to justify taking the data in the first
place.  And part of the justification for taking the data can be toy
models arguing for/against the hypothesis.  Just to keep it straight,
the hypothesis is that there's an IPL between the extent and number of
variables controlled by any given control system.

And just to reiterate, _if_ that turned out to be true, then I have an
ethical dilemma w.r.t. particular variables that come under the heading
of "healthcare", "abortion", etc.

> I guess bending my mind to directly think about the distributed 'process
> ecologies' of complex systems, leaves me to make occasional odd errors
> in math...   No, I do mean to be talking about Pareto distributions and
> the inverse power law family or relationships.

I gathered as much.  But I just wanted to make it clear.

> I think my point would be that outside perspectives are highly naturally
> subjective in a hidden way, causing there to be a big difference between
> inside and outside views.  Your premise seems to be that your observer
> is all seeing.

Well, to some extent I want it to be.  On the one hand, if we had the
budget to take the data (even if only with the maximum scale set at
something like city ordinances and a minimum scale set at some small
number of human attributes), we'd have to settle on some concrete
measures that will, by definition, be limited in what they measure.  And
all subsequent observations would be similarly limited.  So, any
feasible observation or experiment will be practically limited.

But, I have in mind a limit process where _if_ we executed some large
number of observations (from neighborhood association, village, town,
city, county, state, all the way up to the feds or perhaps the globe),
then I imagine the whole gamut would show the IPL.  (This statement is
partially circular because invariance to scale is part of the
hypothesis.)  And in that limit, then, yes, I'm suggesting the
accumulated measures are "all seeing".

>  For a real outside observer of any independent cell of
> relationships, the relationships are not participated in and the
> existence of the system they are part of is thus completely invisible.
> It's only when the observer steps inside the system, getting into the
> loop, that they suddenly become aware of the whole other world of
> relationships it represents.   We see this over and over, that systems
> develop in secret from us and then our awareness of them bursts into our
> attention.  I think that's a direct effect of systems developing as
> truly independent cells of relationships.

I can see the picture you're drawing and agree in the abstract.  But, I
still don't know how this applies to the dilemma.  Sorry for being dense.

> Wouldn't it be nice to have a heuristics machine to convert pure syntax
> in to meaningful gobbely gook for any particular inside view...!  

LoL!  Thanks for that joke.  It's the first laugh I've had today.

> I'm not sure how, but this might connect with the structural dilemma
> that nature's design is deceptive because we all think the world we see
> is the one that's there, and we all see different ones, partly because
> of the inverse power law distributions of network connections as I was
> describing to Bill.

Yes, it certainly is related.  Any control has a "surface" of levers and
measures by which it manipulates the controlled system.  That surface is
limited to and a function of the controller.  It's the controller's
"world view".  And to the extent that the controller consists of humans
or human artifacts, it embodies the world views of those humans.  And
those humans _do_ tend to think that their world view is _true_.  And
when world views conflict, the opportunity is there to revise the
conflicting world views; but, that opportunity is often lost on those
who hold the world view.  This is especially acute where the world views
are fossilized into laws, rules, or policy.  And it's worsened by the
design by committee feature of most policy setting bodies.  Indeed, the
world view embodied by a policy is probably _not_ held by any of the
members of the committee that created the policy, making the policy even
more removed from reality than the original world views of the humans on
the committee.

But, I don't think this point is critical to finding and using a
hypothetical IPL between the extent and objectives of a controller
(policy + enforcer).  It might become critical in the resolution of any
conflict that IPL would present with an ethical standing, however.  And
if that's your point, then I'm starting to get it.  Thanks for sticking
with it.

- --
glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com
Know ten things.   Say nine. -- unknown

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[Phil Henshaw-2]

Glen,

> Since I'm putting forth an unjustified thesis (a.k.a.
> hypothesis), I'm not really making detailed claims about the
> control systems being measured.  I'm merely trying to justify
> taking the data in the first place.  And part of the
> justification for taking the data can be toy models arguing
> for/against the hypothesis.  Just to keep it straight, the
> hypothesis is that there's an IPL between the extent and
> number of variables controlled by any given control system.
>
> And just to reiterate, _if_ that turned out to be true, then
> I have an ethical dilemma w.r.t. particular variables that
> come under the heading of "healthcare", "abortion", etc.

Yes, that's the point you're going to notice for certain that a one
fixed control modality may be inappropriate when dealing with things
that are naturally out of your control.  That's where I think a more
conscious effort to think of complex systems as independent entities
with independent behavior is needed, and moving away from treating them
as statistics.   There are lots of situations where the design objective
might be to get things to fit as if engineering a handshake (a *mutual*
homing device) between independent things.  I'm not sure if that departs
entirely from the notion of 'control', though it's rather different from
the narrow sense that quite ignored the presence of complex systems in
the environment which we all inherited.

>
> > I guess bending my mind to directly think about the distributed
> > 'process ecologies' of complex systems, leaves me to make
> occasional odd errors
> > in math...   No, I do mean to be talking about Pareto
> distributions and
> > the inverse power law family or relationships.
>
> I gathered as much.  But I just wanted to make it clear.
>
> > I think my point would be that outside perspectives are highly
> > naturally subjective in a hidden way, causing there to be a big
> > difference between inside and outside views.  Your premise
> seems to be
> > that your observer is all seeing.
>
> Well, to some extent I want it to be.  On the one hand, if we
> had the budget to take the data (even if only with the
> maximum scale set at something like city ordinances and a
> minimum scale set at some small number of human attributes),
> we'd have to settle on some concrete measures that will, by
> definition, be limited in what they measure.  And all
> subsequent observations would be similarly limited.  So, any
> feasible observation or experiment will be practically limited.
>
> But, I have in mind a limit process where _if_ we executed
> some large number of observations (from neighborhood
> association, village, town, city, county, state, all the way
> up to the feds or perhaps the globe), then I imagine the
> whole gamut would show the IPL.  (This statement is partially
> circular because invariance to scale is part of the
> hypothesis.)  And in that limit, then, yes, I'm suggesting
> the accumulated measures are "all seeing".

But every node in the network of your model will represent a hive of
complex behavior at another scale, and the model as a whole will be a
greater complex environment.  I think the fact that all system
structures are embedded in larger complexities, that can't be described
by the same mode of description, is part of what I was suggesting made
finding an implied 'all seeing' observer in an augment raise questions.

> >  For a real outside observer of any independent cell of
> relationships,
> > the relationships are not participated in and the existence of the
> > system they are part of is thus completely invisible. It's
> only when
> > the observer steps inside the system, getting into the
> loop, that they
> > suddenly become aware of the whole other world of
> > relationships it represents.   We see this over and over,
> that systems
> > develop in secret from us and then our awareness of them
> bursts into
> > our attention.  I think that's a direct effect of systems
> developing
> > as truly independent cells of relationships.
>
> I can see the picture you're drawing and agree in the
> abstract.  But, I still don't know how this applies to the
> dilemma.  Sorry for being dense.

It does seem to take getting used to, but a large portion of the complex
systems of interest are of that type.   They're the systems as 'things'
that are organized around a continually evolving networks of relations
that are original to them, and follow a developmental history of growth
and decay as if organisms.  ??.?? ? `?.??  Such a system's network of
relations is hidden because it is largely self-referential, i.e.
internalized.  As in stepping into an unfamiliar conversation, you
suddenly begin to see the complex relationships.   That nature is full
of these kinds of systems, and doesn't bother to provide bodies for
them, is one of the curious surprises.  :,)

 

> > Wouldn't it be nice to have a heuristics machine to convert
> pure syntax
> > in to meaningful gobbely gook for any particular inside view...!  
>
> LoL!  Thanks for that joke.  It's the first laugh I've had today.
>
> > I'm not sure how, but this might connect with the
> structural dilemma
> > that nature's design is deceptive because we all think the world we
> > see is the one that's there, and we all see different ones, partly
> > because of the inverse power law distributions of network
> connections
> > as I was describing to Bill.
>
> Yes, it certainly is related.  Any control has a "surface" of
> levers and measures by which it manipulates the controlled
> system.  That surface is limited to and a function of the
> controller.  It's the controller's "world view".  And to the
> extent that the controller consists of humans or human
> artifacts, it embodies the world views of those humans.  And
> those humans _do_ tend to think that their world view is
> _true_.  And when world views conflict, the opportunity is
> there to revise the conflicting world views; but, that
> opportunity is often lost on those who hold the world view.  
> This is especially acute where the world views are fossilized
> into laws, rules, or policy.  And it's worsened by the design
> by committee feature of most policy setting bodies.  Indeed,
> the world view embodied by a policy is probably _not_ held by
> any of the members of the committee that created the policy,
> making the policy even more removed from reality than the
> original world views of the humans on the committee.
>
> But, I don't think this point is critical to finding and
> using a hypothetical IPL between the extent and objectives of
> a controller (policy + enforcer).  It might become critical
> in the resolution of any conflict that IPL would present with
> an ethical standing, however.  And if that's your point, then
> I'm starting to get it.  Thanks for sticking with it.

Thanks,   Well, your 'controller' is based on a model of some sort, that
will be 'wrong' from the start in many ways and you want it to operate
in a real and changing world of much higher complexity than the original
model.  I think what I can tell of your approach sounds like a
sophisticated way to improve the controller's 'efficiency'.   Maybe a
key step to addressing the larger problem is to get the 'controller' to
ask questions, to become a learning controller, maybe to recognize
unfamiliar situations, or even recognize the presence of other emerging
systems and things, perhaps...

Cheers,

Phil  

>
> - --
> glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com
> Know ten things.   Say nine. -- unknown
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