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emergence, again

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Nick Thompson

emergence, again

I am told on Higher Authority that I cannot think about emergence any more before I have read the following reference:

Cartwright, Nancy D. "Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts?" Pacific Philosophy Quarterly, 61, 1980 (pp 64-75). Reprinted in The Philosophy of Science Reader, 1980, Yuri V. Balashov (ed). Routledge Press. Reprinted in Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, 1998, Martin Curd and J.A. Cover (ed). Norton & Company Inc. Also in Readings on Laws of Nature, 2004 J.W.Carroll (ed). University of Pittsburgh Press.

Does anybody have a copy? Ingenta has it, but they want big bucks for it.

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Tom Johnson

Re: emergence, again

Try this:
http://physicsandfact.notlong.com

-tj

On Tue, Apr 28, 2009 at 8:38 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

I am told on Higher Authority that I cannot think about emergence any more before I have read the following reference:

Cartwright, Nancy D. "Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts?" Pacific Philosophy Quarterly, 61, 1980 (pp 64-75). Reprinted in The Philosophy of Science Reader, 1980, Yuri V. Balashov (ed). Routledge Press. Reprinted in Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, 1998, Martin Curd and J.A. Cover (ed). Norton & Company Inc. Also in Readings on Laws of Nature, 2004 J.W.Carroll (ed). University of Pittsburgh Press.

Does anybody have a copy? Ingenta has it, but they want big bucks for it.

N

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

--
==========================================
J. T. Johnson
Institute for Analytic Journalism -- Santa Fe, NM USA
www.analyticjournalism.com
505.577.6482(c) 505.473.9646(h)
http://www.jtjohnson.com [hidden email]

"You never change things by fighting the existing reality.
To change something, build a new model that makes the
existing model obsolete."
-- Buckminster Fuller
==========================================

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Owen Densmore

Re: emergence, again

Administrator

In reply to this post by Nick Thompson

Well, you might also look at Miller/Page's Complex Adaptive Systems
book. It has quite a bit on emergence. As does our standard source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergence

The Bedau and Humphreys book you've found looked promising.

It's interesting that looking for emergence in Amazon shows several
SFI related authors and books. Holland's Emergence: From Chaos to
Order, and Hidden Order both show up, as does Morowitz: The Emergence
of Everything, and Strogatz's Sync: How Order Emerges from Chaos.

I'd not suggest Yet Another Physics Is Unreal Rant. Physics is real.
I live in it. "Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts?" sounds
fishy. OK, I'm biased.

-- Owen

On Apr 28, 2009, at 8:38 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:

> I am told on Higher Authority that I cannot think about emergence
> any more before I have read the following reference:
>
> Cartwright, Nancy D. "Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts?"
> Pacific Philosophy Quarterly, 61, 1980 (pp 64-75). Reprinted in The
> Philosophy of Science Reader, 1980, Yuri V. Balashov (ed).
> Routledge Press. Reprinted in Philosophy of Science: The Central
> Issues, 1998, Martin Curd and J.A. Cover (ed). Norton & Company Inc.
> Also in Readings on Laws of Nature, 2004 J.W.Carroll (ed).
> University of Pittsburgh Press.
>
> Does anybody have a copy? Ingenta has it, but they want big bucks
> for it.
>
> N

Nick Thompson

Re: emergence, again

In reply to this post by Nick Thompson

Owen,

At the risk of further confirming your distaste for philosophy, my problem
is not with SFI types, who by and large seem to accept an Juarrero-esque
take on emergence. It's those philosophers who are suspicious of it that I
am struggling with. NOT Wimsatt, by the way who makes perfect sense. Here
is the kind of problem that bothers philosophers: let a, b, and c
constitute macro-entity E and let the behavior of E. be controled by the
properties and intereactions of a, b and c. Now, let one of the behaviors
of E to control the behavior of a, b, or c. Is there a problem here?

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

> [Original Message]
> From: Owen Densmore <[hidden email]>
> To: <[hidden email]>; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity
Coffee Group <[hidden email]>

> Date: 4/28/2009 9:30:35 PM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] emergence, again
>
> Well, you might also look at Miller/Page's Complex Adaptive Systems
> book. It has quite a bit on emergence. As does our standard source:
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergence
>
> The Bedau and Humphreys book you've found looked promising.
>
> It's interesting that looking for emergence in Amazon shows several
> SFI related authors and books. Holland's Emergence: From Chaos to
> Order, and Hidden Order both show up, as does Morowitz: The Emergence
> of Everything, and Strogatz's Sync: How Order Emerges from Chaos.
>
> I'd not suggest Yet Another Physics Is Unreal Rant. Physics is real.
> I live in it. "Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts?" sounds
> fishy. OK, I'm biased.
>
> -- Owen
>
>
> On Apr 28, 2009, at 8:38 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> > I am told on Higher Authority that I cannot think about emergence
> > any more before I have read the following reference:
> >
> > Cartwright, Nancy D. "Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts?"
> > Pacific Philosophy Quarterly, 61, 1980 (pp 64-75). Reprinted in The
> > Philosophy of Science Reader, 1980, Yuri V. Balashov (ed).
> > Routledge Press. Reprinted in Philosophy of Science: The Central
> > Issues, 1998, Martin Curd and J.A. Cover (ed). Norton & Company Inc.
> > Also in Readings on Laws of Nature, 2004 J.W.Carroll (ed).
> > University of Pittsburgh Press.
> >
> > Does anybody have a copy? Ingenta has it, but they want big bucks
> > for it.
> >
> > N

Russell Standish

Re: emergence, again

On Tue, Apr 28, 2009 at 09:33:42PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> Here
> is the kind of problem that bothers philosophers: let a, b, and c
> constitute macro-entity E and let the behavior of E. be controled by the
> properties and intereactions of a, b and c. Now, let one of the behaviors
> of E to control the behavior of a, b, or c. Is there a problem here?
>
> Nick
>

No. It sounds like a perfectly reasonable way of building a control
system. Should there be a problem?

--

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email]
Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Nick Thompson

Re: emergence, again

In reply to this post by Nick Thompson

I should have said that the properties of a, b, c and E are synchronic.
Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

> [Original Message]
> From: russell standish <[hidden email]>
> To: <[hidden email]>; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity
Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
> Date: 4/29/2009 6:14:43 PM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] emergence, again
>
> On Tue, Apr 28, 2009 at 09:33:42PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> > Here
> > is the kind of problem that bothers philosophers: let a, b, and c
> > constitute macro-entity E and let the behavior of E. be controled by the
> > properties and intereactions of a, b and c. Now, let one of the
behaviors

> > of E to control the behavior of a, b, or c. Is there a problem here?
> >
> > Nick
> >
>
> No. It sounds like a perfectly reasonable way of building a control
> system. Should there be a problem?
>
> --
>
>

Russ Abbott

Re: emergence, again

Unless you can tell me why I'm wrong, I will continue to claim that I've solved the problems of emergence and reductionism in "The reductionist blind spot." (Yes, it's an audacious claim.) You are welcome to look elsewhere of course, but that paper is a significant advance beyond anything in the literature including Cartwright, Miller/Page, and Bedau and Humphrey's collection. If you disagree, tell me why. Sometimes it seems to me that people prefer to think of emergence as mysterious. It's not.

-- Russ

On Tue, Apr 28, 2009 at 9:29 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

I should have said that the properties of a, b, c and E are synchronic.

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

> [Original Message]

> From: russell standish <[hidden email]>

> To: <[hidden email]>; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity
Coffee Group <[hidden email]>

> Date: 4/29/2009 6:14:43 PM

> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] emergence, again
>

> On Tue, Apr 28, 2009 at 09:33:42PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> > Here
> > is the kind of problem that bothers philosophers: let a, b, and c
> > constitute macro-entity E and let the behavior of E. be controled by the
> > properties and intereactions of a, b and c. Now, let one of the
behaviors
> > of E to control the behavior of a, b, or c. Is there a problem here?
> >
> > Nick
> >
>
> No. It sounds like a perfectly reasonable way of building a control
> system. Should there be a problem?
>
> --
>
>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Mathematics
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email]
> Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au
>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Nick Thompson

Re: emergence, again

In reply to this post by Nick Thompson

Better than WIMSATT?

OK, OK. I'll read the article.

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email];[hidden email]

Sent: 4/28/2009 11:46:08 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] emergence, again

Unless you can tell me why I'm wrong, I will continue to claim that I've solved the problems of emergence and reductionism in "The reductionist blind spot." (Yes, it's an audacious claim.) You are welcome to look elsewhere of course, but that paper is a significant advance beyond anything in the literature including Cartwright, Miller/Page, and Bedau and Humphrey's collection. If you disagree, tell me why. Sometimes it seems to me that people prefer to think of emergence as mysterious. It's not.

-- Russ

On Tue, Apr 28, 2009 at 9:29 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

I should have said that the properties of a, b, c and E are synchronic.

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

> [Original Message]
> From: russell standish <[hidden email]>

> To: <[hidden email]>; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity
Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
> Date: 4/29/2009 6:14:43 PM

> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] emergence, again
>

> On Tue, Apr 28, 2009 at 09:33:42PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> > Here
> > is the kind of problem that bothers philosophers: let a, b, and c
> > constitute macro-entity E and let the behavior of E. be controled by the
> > properties and intereactions of a, b and c. Now, let one of the
behaviors

> > of E to control the behavior of a, b, or c. Is there a problem here?
> >
> > Nick
> >
>
> No. It sounds like a perfectly reasonable way of building a control
> system. Should there be a problem?
>
> --
>
>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Mathematics
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email]
> Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au
>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Russell Standish

Re: emergence, again

In reply to this post by Russ Abbott

On Tue, Apr 28, 2009 at 10:45:48PM -0700, Russ Abbott wrote:

> Unless you can tell me why I'm wrong, I will continue to claim that I've
> solved the problems of emergence and reductionism in "The reductionist blind
> spot <http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00004540/>." (Yes, it's an
> audacious claim.) You are welcome to look elsewhere of course, but that
> paper is a significant advance beyond anything in the literature including
> Cartwright, Miller/Page, and Bedau and Humphrey's collection. If you
> disagree, tell me why. Sometimes it seems to me that people prefer to think
> of emergence as mysterious. It's not.
>
> -- Russ
>

Can somebody remind me what are the supposed problems with emergence and
reductionism?

--

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email]
Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

glen e. p. ropella-2

Re: emergence, again

In reply to this post by Nick Thompson

Thus spake Nicholas Thompson circa 04/28/2009 08:33 PM:
> let a, b, and c
> constitute macro-entity E and let the behavior of E. be controled by the
> properties and intereactions of a, b and c. Now, let one of the behaviors
> of E to control the behavior of a, b, or c. Is there a problem here?

There's no problem with it. It's called an impredicative definition,
which basically means the application of a universal quantifier (e.g.
"for all") over a set as a part of the definition of the members of that
set. (IIRC, of course... ;-)

Here's a quote from Barwise and Moss' "Vicious Circles" that may address
the "problem" you've heard "philosophers" talk about:

"In certain circles, it has been thought that there is a conflict
between circular phenomena, on the one hand, and mathematical rigor, on
the other. This belief rests on two assumptions. One is that anything
mathematically rigorous must be reducible to set theory. The other
assumption is that the only coherent conception of set precludes
circularity. As a result of these two assumptions, it is not uncommon
to hear circular analyses of philosophical, linguistic, or computational
phenomena attacked on the grounds that they conflict with one of the
basic axioms of mathematics. But both assumptions are mistaken and the
attack is groundless."

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

John Kennison

Re: emergence, again

Re: [FRIAM] emergence, again
As a practicing mathematician, my understanding is that it is permissible to define anything by a property if and only if you can prove there exists a unique thing with that property.
For example, you cannot define sqrt(49) as “an integer whose square is 49” since there are two such integers. Nor could you define sqrt(-1) as the real number whose square is –1 as there is no such real number (and you can’t define sqrt(-1) as the complex number whose square is –1 as there are two such complex numbers, i and –i.)
So circular definitions (where A is defined in terms of B and B in terms of A) are permissible if and only if you can show there is a unique pair (A,B) with the given relation.

On 4/29/09 9:21 AM, "glen e. p. ropella" <[hidden email]> wrote:

Thus spake Nicholas Thompson circa 04/28/2009 08:33 PM:
> let a, b, and c
> constitute macro-entity E and let the behavior of E. be controled by the
> properties and intereactions of a, b and c. Now, let one of the behaviors
> of E to control the behavior of a, b, or c. Is there a problem here?

There's no problem with it. It's called an impredicative definition,
which basically means the application of a universal quantifier (e.g.
"for all") over a set as a part of the definition of the members of that
set. (IIRC, of course... ;-)

Here's a quote from Barwise and Moss' "Vicious Circles" that may address
the "problem" you've heard "philosophers" talk about:

"In certain circles, it has been thought that there is a conflict
between circular phenomena, on the one hand, and mathematical rigor, on
the other. This belief rests on two assumptions. One is that anything
mathematically rigorous must be reducible to set theory. The other
assumption is that the only coherent conception of set precludes
circularity. As a result of these two assumptions, it is not uncommon
to hear circular analyses of philosophical, linguistic, or computational
phenomena attacked on the grounds that they conflict with one of the
basic axioms of mathematics. But both assumptions are mistaken and the
attack is groundless."

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Nick Thompson

Re: emergence, again

In reply to this post by Nick Thompson

Russ Standish wrote __

Can somebody remind me what are the supposed problems with emergence and
> reductionism?

Russ, I will do my best but you have to promise not to growl at me when I
get it wrong.

Two problems, closely related:

(1) Self Cause; (2) Downward Causation

It is one of those problems that appears and dissappears as you rotate it
in your hands. In my attempts to stabilize my thinking about the problem,
I have been imagining an equilateral triangle of wood built out of three
one-by-two's and hinges, so you can stand it on its edge and press down on
its apex. The emergent property is the extreme resistance of the triangle
to downward force applied to its apex. The downward causation is to the
property of the hinges which are inflexible under these circumstances. I
cant work this out right now ... late for a meeting ... but I think if you
ask yourself questions like Why does the triangle resist compression
[unlike a parallelogram]? and Why are the hinges rigid? you will experience
some cognitive vertigo. If not, then all power to you.

rushing to a meeting. Hope to pick this up later today.

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

> [Original Message]
> From: russell standish <[hidden email]>
> To: <[hidden email]>; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee
Group <[hidden email]>
> Date: 4/29/2009 11:43:51 PM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] emergence, again
>
> On Tue, Apr 28, 2009 at 10:45:48PM -0700, Russ Abbott wrote:
> > Unless you can tell me why I'm wrong, I will continue to claim that I've
> > solved the problems of emergence and reductionism in "The reductionist
blind
> > spot <http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00004540/>." (Yes, it's an
> > audacious claim.) You are welcome to look elsewhere of course, but that
> > paper is a significant advance beyond anything in the literature
including
> > Cartwright, Miller/Page, and Bedau and Humphrey's collection. If you
> > disagree, tell me why. Sometimes it seems to me that people prefer to
think

> > of emergence as mysterious. It's not.
> >
> > -- Russ
> >
>
> Can somebody remind me what are the supposed problems with emergence and
> reductionism?
>
> --
>
>

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Mathematics
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email]
> Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au
>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Owen Densmore

Re: emergence, again

Administrator

In reply to this post by Nick Thompson

After poking about a bit in the Emergence realm, I find I enjoy Miller/
Page's discussion, mainly because it summarizes the puzzle and puts it
into perspective. And I like their prose.

Basically, its the wide domain of local interactions (at a micro
level) producing a global behavior (macro) not obviously connected to
the local interactions. [Their use of perception (macro) of unrelated
pixels (micro) is a bit involved, but makes their point in a very
human domain.]

This leads me to suggest something. How about you pause for a bit,
and put together your thoughts on the matter, and present them at a
Wedtech .. or even as a blog/wiki article. Then we can decide whether
to haul in the philosophers, and if so, how.

-- Owen

On Apr 28, 2009, at 8:38 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:

Robert Howard-2-3

Re: emergence, again

In reply to this post by John Kennison

Re: [FRIAM] emergence, again

John: So circular definitions are permissible if and only if you can show there is a unique pair with the given relation.

That’s very interesting. How do you prove you have a unique pair? Do you know an example of such a circular definition that is popular or obvious? For example, I would define sqrt(49) as 7, but I would never define 7 as the sqrt(49). I always thought definitions should reduce the complexity of understanding. 7 seems simpler than sqrt(49) – a number is simpler than a functional lookup. And when you get to a minimum complexity, you state it as an axiom, or throw in the towel. I’ve never heard of circular logic as being an acceptable final state; that is, when you encounter one, it implies there’s more work to do.

Rob

From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of John Kennison
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2009 8:03 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] emergence, again

As a practicing mathematician, my understanding is that it is permissible to define anything by a property if and only if you can prove there exists a unique thing with that property.
For example, you cannot define sqrt(49) as “an integer whose square is 49” since there are two such integers. Nor could you define sqrt(-1) as the real number whose square is –1 as there is no such real number (and you can’t define sqrt(-1) as the complex number whose square is –1 as there are two such complex numbers, i and –i.)
So circular definitions (where A is defined in terms of B and B in terms of A) are permissible if and only if you can show there is a unique pair (A,B) with the given relation.

On 4/29/09 9:21 AM, "glen e. p. ropella" <[hidden email]> wrote:

glen e. p. ropella-2

Re: emergence, again

In reply to this post by John Kennison

Thus spake John Kennison circa 04/29/2009 08:02 AM:

> As a practicing mathematician, my understanding is that it is
> permissible to define anything by a property if and only if you can
> prove there exists a unique thing with that property. For example,
> you cannot define sqrt(49) as "an integer whose square is 49" since
> there are two such integers. Nor could you define sqrt(-1) as the
> real number whose square is -1 as there is no such real number (and
> you can't define sqrt(-1) as the complex number whose square is -1 as
> there are two such complex numbers, i and -i.) So circular
> definitions (where A is defined in terms of B and B in terms of A)
> are permissible if and only if you can show there is a unique pair
> (A,B) with the given relation.

I think that's right. The relevant axiom is the anti-foundation axiom
(AFA). And I believe it can be proven that the AFA means that every
system of equations has a unique solution. (If we assume the foundation
axiom instead, as in the "usual" math, that's not true.)

But the AFA can be stated as: a set can contain itself as its only
element, which is the simplest form of the circularity issue broached by
Nick.

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Nick Thompson

Re: emergence, again

In reply to this post by Nick Thompson

Re: [FRIAM] emergence, again

Hmmm! I had always thought that it was explanations that simplified; it never occured to me that a definition was under any such obligation.

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email]

Sent: 4/29/2009 10:04:19 AM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] emergence, again

John: So circular definitions are permissible if and only if you can show there is a unique pair with the given relation.

Thats very interesting. How do you prove you have a unique pair? Do you know an example of such a circular definition that is popular or obvious? For example, I would define sqrt(49) as 7, but I would never define 7 as the sqrt(49). I always thought definitions should reduce the complexity of understanding. 7 seems simpler than sqrt(49) a number is simpler than a functional lookup. And when you get to a minimum complexity, you state it as an axiom, or throw in the towel. Ive never heard of circular logic as being an acceptable final state; that is, when you encounter one, it implies theres more work to do.

Rob

From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of John Kennison
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2009 8:03 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] emergence, again

As a practicing mathematician, my understanding is that it is permissible to define anything by a property if and only if you can prove there exists a unique thing with that property.
For example, you cannot define sqrt(49) as an integer whose square is 49 since there are two such integers. Nor could you define sqrt(-1) as the real number whose square is 1 as there is no such real number (and you cant define sqrt(-1) as the complex number whose square is 1 as there are two such complex numbers, i and i.)
So circular definitions (where A is defined in terms of B and B in terms of A) are permissible if and only if you can show there is a unique pair (A,B) with the given relation.

On 4/29/09 9:21 AM, "glen e. p. ropella" <[hidden email]> wrote:

Thus spake Nicholas Thompson circa 04/28/2009 08:33 PM:
> let a, b, and c
> constitute macro-entity E and let the behavior of E. be controled by the
> properties and intereactions of a, b and c. Now, let one of the behaviors
> of E to control the behavior of a, b, or c. Is there a problem here?

There's no problem with it. It's called an impredicative definition,
which basically means the application of a universal quantifier (e.g.
"for all") over a set as a part of the definition of the members of that
set. (IIRC, of course... ;-)

Here's a quote from Barwise and Moss' "Vicious Circles" that may address
the "problem" you've heard "philosophers" talk about:

"In certain circles, it has been thought that there is a conflict
between circular phenomena, on the one hand, and mathematical rigor, on
the other. This belief rests on two assumptions. One is that anything
mathematically rigorous must be reducible to set theory. The other
assumption is that the only coherent conception of set precludes
circularity. As a result of these two assumptions, it is not uncommon
to hear circular analyses of philosophical, linguistic, or computational
phenomena attacked on the grounds that they conflict with one of the
basic axioms of mathematics. But both assumptions are mistaken and the
attack is groundless."

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com

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Owen Densmore

Re: emergence, again

Administrator

After reading the On Emergence chapter (ch 4) in Miller/Page, I think
it has a solid conceptual framework for how to approach emergence.
Have you access to the book? I could fax/copy it if you'd like.

-- Owen

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Owen Densmore

Re: emergence, again

Administrator

In reply to this post by Russ Abbott

Hi Russ. Could you say a bit more than just "read the article"?

For example, I'm not sure we're directly concerned with reductionism.
I see the connection, certainly, but defining emergence clearly,
offering a theorem based structure, classifying types of
emergence, ... is a big deal and it'd be nice to have a hint at your
approach before plowing through 9501 words of text!

-- Owen

On Apr 28, 2009, at 11:45 PM, Russ Abbott wrote:

> Unless you can tell me why I'm wrong, I will continue to claim that
> I've solved the problems of emergence and reductionism in "The
> reductionist blind spot." (Yes, it's an audacious claim.) You are
> welcome to look elsewhere of course, but that paper is a significant
> advance beyond anything in the literature including Cartwright,
> Miller/Page, and Bedau and Humphrey's collection. If you disagree,
> tell me why. Sometimes it seems to me that people prefer to think of
> emergence as mysterious. It's not.
>
> -- Russ
>

John Kennison

Re: emergence, again

In reply to this post by Robert Howard-2-3

My favorite example is the following definition for a pair of differentiable functions, s and c, from the reals to the reals. They are defined so that:

s' = c, c' =- s, s(0) = 1-c(0), c(0) = 1+s(0)

Of course, the last two conditions just say that s(0) = 0 and c(0) = 1. The only possible pair with these properties are s(x) = sin x
and c(x0 = cos x. One waty to see this is to note that s and c are both solutions of y'' + y = 0 and the only known solutions of that equation are of the form Asin(x) + Bcos x where A,B are arbitrary constants. But even if calculus had been developed before trig, one can still prove there exists a unique pair of solutions to the conditions defining s and c by appealing to quite general existence and uniqueness theorems for differential equations. In fact, I understand that some exotic but useful functions are defined by differential equations, sometimes for pairs of functions (I am a category theorist, not a differential equations theorist, but I have had courses in that subject, which are still a dim memory)

________________________________________
From: [hidden email] [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Robert Howard [[hidden email]]
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2009 12:04 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] emergence, again

John: So circular definitions are permissible if and only if you can show there is a unique pair with the given relation.

That’s very interesting. How do you prove you have a unique pair? Do you know an example of such a circular definition that is popular or obvious? For example, I would define sqrt(49) as 7, but I would never define 7 as the sqrt(49). I always thought definitions should reduce the complexity of understanding. 7 seems simpler than sqrt(49) – a number is simpler than a functional lookup. And when you get to a minimum complexity, you state it as an axiom, or throw in the towel. I’ve never heard of circular logic as being an acceptable final state; that is, when you encounter one, it implies there’s more work to do.

Rob

________________________________
From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of John Kennison
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2009 8:03 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] emergence, again

As a practicing mathematician, my understanding is that it is permissible to define anything by a property if and only if you can prove there exists a unique thing with that property.
For example, you cannot define sqrt(49) as “an integer whose square is 49” since there are two such integers. Nor could you define sqrt(-1) as the real number whose square is –1 as there is no such real number (and you can’t define sqrt(-1) as the complex number whose square is –1 as there are two such complex numbers, i and –i.)
So circular definitions (where A is defined in terms of B and B in terms of A) are permissible if and only if you can show there is a unique pair (A,B) with the given relation.

On 4/29/09 9:21 AM, "glen e. p. ropella" <[hidden email]> wrote:
Thus spake Nicholas Thompson circa 04/28/2009 08:33 PM:
> let a, b, and c
> constitute macro-entity E and let the behavior of E. be controled by the
> properties and intereactions of a, b and c. Now, let one of the behaviors
> of E to control the behavior of a, b, or c. Is there a problem here?

There's no problem with it. It's called an impredicative definition,
which basically means the application of a universal quantifier (e.g.
"for all") over a set as a part of the definition of the members of that
set. (IIRC, of course... ;-)

Here's a quote from Barwise and Moss' "Vicious Circles" that may address
the "problem" you've heard "philosophers" talk about:

"In certain circles, it has been thought that there is a conflict
between circular phenomena, on the one hand, and mathematical rigor, on
the other. This belief rests on two assumptions. One is that anything
mathematically rigorous must be reducible to set theory. The other
assumption is that the only coherent conception of set precludes
circularity. As a result of these two assumptions, it is not uncommon
to hear circular analyses of philosophical, linguistic, or computational
phenomena attacked on the grounds that they conflict with one of the
basic axioms of mathematics. But both assumptions are mistaken and the
attack is groundless."

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Ted Carmichael

Re: emergence, again

In reply to this post by Russ Abbott

On Wed, Apr 29, 2009 at 1:45 AM, Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote:

Sometimes it seems to me that people prefer to think of emergence as mysterious. It's not.

I agree. That's generally the problem I have when folks start talking about downward causation.

I had an interesting conversation with Mark Bedau at a conference last month. He said (and I'm paraphrasing) that any conceptual model is fine, as long as you find it useful in some way. Emergence is a surprising property of a system because it is behavior that is not explicitly accounted for in the micro rules, and so it is useful to talk about emergence.

It is also useful to talk about downward causation. I think the error is when folks take an emergent property from the "surprising" category and put it in the "mysterious" category, as if it can't be understood in terms of rules and interactions of the system's constituent parts.

It's useful to say: when a school of fish turn left, that behavior influences a single fish to also turn left. But we all know, from programming these models, that the single fish is really only influenced by his simple rules, and the behavior of the nearby individuals that he interacts with. (And he, of course, influences them in turn.)

When I program CAS models, I try to avoid programming any downward causation. I prefer to have emergent properties come from the simple rules, rather than explicitly control for it with macro-level rules. I think to do otherwise is tricky business, and it's very easy to artificially introduce behavior that you are trying to explain, thereby undermining your explanation.

Personally, I think even difficult concepts - such as consciousness, or intelligence - can be explained without resorting to "mysterious" downward causation. (Even though we're not there yet.) And even if it is sometimes more useful to use a conceptual model of consciousness that utilizes macro-level causation, I think it would be a mistake to assume that this is the "real" model, or the only model available to us.

Just my two cents.

Cheers,

Ted

On Tue, Apr 28, 2009 at 9:29 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

I should have said that the properties of a, b, c and E are synchronic.

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

> [Original Message]

> From: russell standish <[hidden email]>

> To: <[hidden email]>; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity
Coffee Group <[hidden email]>

> Date: 4/29/2009 6:14:43 PM

> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] emergence, again
>

> On Tue, Apr 28, 2009 at 09:33:42PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> > Here
> > is the kind of problem that bothers philosophers: let a, b, and c
> > constitute macro-entity E and let the behavior of E. be controled by the
> > properties and intereactions of a, b and c. Now, let one of the
behaviors
> > of E to control the behavior of a, b, or c. Is there a problem here?
> >
> > Nick
> >
>
> No. It sounds like a perfectly reasonable way of building a control
> system. Should there be a problem?
>
> --
>
>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Mathematics
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email]
> Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au
>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org