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beyond reductionism twice

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Douglas Roberts-2

Re: beyond reductionism twice

This list constantly reminds me that we are all, thankfully, different. Offhand, I can not think of a topic that I would be more violently disinterested in than the "philosophy of causation". Unless maybe it would be "the philosophy of complexity", or perhaps "the philosophy of agent-based model design".

But I acknowledge that a not small fraction of you eat this stuff up, so please: have at it!

--Doug

On Tue, Mar 26, 2013 at 11:57 AM, Frank Wimberly <[hidden email]> wrote:

Nick,

Here is the complete citation:

Glymour, C., and Wimberly, F.
      Actual Causes and Thought Experiments,

      in Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, Harry S. Silverstein (eds.),
      Causation and Explanation: Topics in Contemporary Philosopy, MIT Press, Cambridge, July 2007.

I’ll buy a cup of coffee for anyone who reads the whole paper. The book contains a number of papers by luminaries in the area of philosophy of causation including Patrick Suppes, Nancy Cartwright, Christopher Hitchcock, etc. I was surprised to find that it’s available on Google books: http://tinyurl.com/d9l44jh

Frank

Frank C. Wimberly

140 Calle Ojo Feliz
Santa Fe, NM 87505

[hidden email]     [hidden email]

Phone: <a href="tel:%28505%29%20995-8715" value="+15059958715" target="_blank">(505) 995-8715      Cell: <a href="tel:%28505%29%20670-9918" value="+15056709918" target="_blank">(505) 670-9918

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Nicholas Thompson
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 11:57 PM
To: [hidden email]; 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] beyond reductionism twice

Russ,

I don’t know wtf I am. I have always thought of myself as a scientist, but I am sure that many on this list have their doubts. I am certainly not a “hard” scientist.

I was hoping by my comment to lure you into a more lengthy explication of the idea that real scientists don’t think in terms of causes. But now you have smoked me out instead, so here goes.

Many of the philosophers I know, from time to time like to talk about causality as if it were a sophomoric illusion, citing Hume, or some sort of weird quantum theory. But that does not keep them from using causal reasoning freely in their everyday lives. I have never heard a philosopher who was reluctant to say things like “my car stalled because it ran out of gas”. I think what they mean when they deny causality is the denial of something that, as a behaviorist, I never thought to entertain: some deep gear-and-cog mechanism lurking behind experience. If one once concedes that all one means by causality is some forms of relation between previous and successive events such that a previous event makes a successive event more likely, then determining causality is just an exercise in experimentation. The sort of thing that all scientists do all the time. Thus, while “causality” may be unfounded in some fastidious philosophical sense, it is by no means empty. I’ll quote below from a footnote from a paper we just wrote which tries to preempt criticism our use of “causal” arguments in the paper. The footnote makes reference to work by a colleague and friend of mine, here in Santa Fe, Frank Wimberly. I will copy him here to try and get him to speak up. He tends to lurk, until I say something really foolish, which no doubt I have. The whole paper is at http://www.behavior.org/resource.php?id=675 . So, here is the footnote:

Some might argue that in falling back on a more vernacular understanding of causality we have paid too great a price in rigor. However, as our Seminar colleague Frank Wimberly pointed out, the vernacular understanding of casualty is potentially rigorous. Research investigating what aspects of the world lay people are sensitive to when assigning causality suggests people are sensitive to particular types of probabilistic relationships (Cheng, Novick, Liljeholm, & Ford, 2007) and that certain types of experiments are better than others at revealing such relationships (Glymour & Wimberly, 2007).

Frank?

Nick

From: Friam [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 11:05 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] beyond reductionism twice

Nick,

You're the scientist; I'm only a computer scientist. So you are more qualified to talk about science and cause.

Do you think science organizes its theories in terms of causes? I see equations, entities, structures, geometries, and mechanisms, but I don't see causes. As I'm sure you know, the notion of "cause" is very slippery. I think science is better off without it.

But I'm interested in your perspective. What do you think?

[If this is a thread hijack, I apologize. I am very interested in the subject, though.]
-- Russ Abbott
_____________________________________________
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

My paper on how the Fed can fix the economy: ssrn.com/abstract=1977688
Google voice: <a href="tel:747-999-5105" value="+17479995105" target="_blank">747-999-5105
Google+: plus.google.com/114865618166480775623/

vita: sites.google.com/site/russabbott/

CS Wiki and the courses I teach
_____________________________________________
On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 10:02 PM, Steve Smith <[hidden email]> wrote:
Russ -

Steve, you mentioned Lamarkian evolution. I'd be very interested to find out more about some of your daughter's examples.

This was on a long drive from NM to OR last Thanksgiving... in the course of about 30 hours of driving we talked about a LOT of things.

I am pretty sure this first exmaple is merely "neo-Lamarckian" or "Lamarckianesque" as they only applied to the single next generation. The germline of the child does not carry the changes, although if the child experiences the same conditions the parent did, the same epigenetic mechanisms would be in effect in the subsequent generation. This example had to to do with Long Term Potentiation (a feature of neural connectivity). What surprised me most was that this particular example involved the female/mother/eggs which are not manufactured "on the fly". It seems more likely that the father/male/sperm would be prone to this type of effect? There may have been two sub-examples, one about memory and one about "bad mothering"?

A more Lamarckian example was, I think, in Roundworms and involved RNA interference. The result (minus the details) was something like hereditible immunity.

A parallel example I *can* remember was the case of Tasmanian Devils and what is known as DFTD for Devil Facial Tumor Disease. Apparently it is an *infectuous* cancer (non-viral, meaning it isn't about a virus transferring from one host to another, then causing cancer). A cancerous cell from one individual literally becomes part of the other individual's organism... like an accidental organ donation or skin graft. Apparently the Devils are prone to lots of scrapping with each other and when one with a tumor on it's face scraps with one without, a cancerous cell (or cells) can get transferred to from the skin of one to the other and it can in fact 'graft' right into the epithelial layer. I don't know if this is more common/likely because it is cancerous, or if Devils were already exchanging skin cells before this cancer emerged?

The point of this Tasmanian Devil example is that it is as unexpected (to me anyway) as examples of Lamarckian evolution would be.

-- Russ Abbott
_____________________________________________

Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

My paper on how the Fed can fix the economy: ssrn.com/abstract=1977688
Google voice: <a href="tel:747-999-5105" value="+17479995105" target="_blank">747-999-5105
Google+: plus.google.com/114865618166480775623/

vita: sites.google.com/site/russabbott/

CS Wiki and the courses I teach
_____________________________________________

On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 3:42 PM, Steve Smith <[hidden email]> wrote:

Gary/Pamela/(Stephen, Carl, Eric, ...) -

I know several (many?) on this list know Stu better than I... so I apologize if I sounded overly critical. I prefer Pamela's description of him being *careless* with references as opposed to my own use of the *honest*. I also admit that I do not know if he sees himself as a rock-star... that is perhaps the default category I put people in who are simultaneously *good*, *self-possessed* and *charismatic*. I actually *like* most rock stars (within reason) even if I might not care for their music.

As an aside... does anyone remember Chris Langton appearing in Rolling Stone (CA 1990?)... I searched their archives and did not find any references (nor on the internet at large?). I remember the article including a sexed-up spread of him in front of a Connection Machine? I suppose I could be hallucinating or have come from an alternate history?

I also smiled at your term "demigod" as I often use "Titans" to describe the pantheon of my wife's sibling group... she is oldest of 8 *mostly* high functioning, *very* charismatic, *definitely* self-possessed siblings. They all revered their father who was a humble but charismatic physics professor. None of them took up science per se, though one has a PhD in psychology. I would not use *rock star* to describe any of their self-image, though there is one who insists he *is* Elvis... and sometimes we are tempted to believe him. There are definitely characters right out of Greek, Roman, Norse, even Hindu mythology in her family... My wife is Kali *and* Loki rolled into one I think.

I have always been inspired by Kauffman's ideas as best I could understand them, which has been highly variable, depending on the circumstance. This says more about me than about Stu. I read his lecture notes in the late-nineties... the ones which ultimately became the core of _Investigations_ (or so it seemed to me). I had read _OofO_ and _At Home in the Universe_ previously. It may have been coincidence or something stronger like kismet that I read Investigations interleaved with my reading of Christopher Alexander's (Pattern Language fame) _Notes on the Synthesis of Form_ with D'Arcy Thompson's _On Growth and Form_ as backup reference. I was traveling lightly in New Zealand at the time with none of my usual distractions nagging me. It was a month of deep thought informed by Alexander and Kauffman equally.

My nature is to be guarded around people with significant charisma (and me married into aforementioned pantheon!). I appreciate the need for and the value of the persuasive and the self-confident, even in the realm of science where ideas *by definition* must stand on their own. There is value for those who can bring us to *want* to believe enough to put in the hard work to believe things on their own merits. Unfortunately that might be the dividing line between science and Science(tm). I suppose I mistrust those who appear to be trying to corner the franchise on Science(tm) in their neighborhood.

Nevertheless, I am *more* interested in Kauffman's ideas here and hope that we will discuss them a bit?

- Steve

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com

Doug Roberts
[hidden email]

http://parrot-farm.net/Second-Cousins

505-455-7333 - Office
505-672-8213 - Mobile

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com

Victoria Hughes

Re: beyond reductionism twice

Jeees Louise.

… I've been trying so hard to curb my addiction to taking time to respond to the continuously intriguing things that show up at the Friam…. but I must say, Doug, that the phrase "violently disinterested" is a classic, even for you.

And as long as I'm at it, Sas, I laughed out loud at your various descriptions of the Vilmains, from your KaliLoki wife on along….

Thanks you all-

Tory

On Mar 26, 2013, at 12:04 PM, Douglas Roberts <[hidden email]> wrote:

This list constantly reminds me that we are all, thankfully, different. Offhand, I can not think of a topic that I would be more violently disinterested in than the "philosophy of causation". Unless maybe it would be "the philosophy of complexity", or perhaps "the philosophy of agent-based model design".

But I acknowledge that a not small fraction of you eat this stuff up, so please: have at it!
--Doug
On Tue, Mar 26, 2013 at 11:57 AM, Frank Wimberly <[hidden email]> wrote:
Nick,

Here is the complete citation:

Glymour, C., and Wimberly, F.
      Actual Causes and Thought Experiments,
      in Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, Harry S. Silverstein (eds.),
      Causation and Explanation: Topics in Contemporary Philosopy, MIT Press, Cambridge, July 2007.

I’ll buy a cup of coffee for anyone who reads the whole paper. The book contains a number of papers by luminaries in the area of philosophy of causation including Patrick Suppes, Nancy Cartwright, Christopher Hitchcock, etc. I was surprised to find that it’s available on Google books: http://tinyurl.com/d9l44jh

Frank

Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz
Santa Fe, NM 87505

[hidden email]     [hidden email]
Phone: <a href="tel:%28505%29%20995-8715" value="+15059958715" target="_blank">(505) 995-8715      Cell: <a href="tel:%28505%29%20670-9918" value="+15056709918" target="_blank">(505) 670-9918

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Nicholas Thompson
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 11:57 PM
To: [hidden email]; 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] beyond reductionism twice

Russ,

I don’t know wtf I am. I have always thought of myself as a scientist, but I am sure that many on this list have their doubts. I am certainly not a “hard” scientist.

I was hoping by my comment to lure you into a more lengthy explication of the idea that real scientists don’t think in terms of causes. But now you have smoked me out instead, so here goes.

Many of the philosophers I know, from time to time like to talk about causality as if it were a sophomoric illusion, citing Hume, or some sort of weird quantum theory. But that does not keep them from using causal reasoning freely in their everyday lives. I have never heard a philosopher who was reluctant to say things like “my car stalled because it ran out of gas”. I think what they mean when they deny causality is the denial of something that, as a behaviorist, I never thought to entertain: some deep gear-and-cog mechanism lurking behind experience. If one once concedes that all one means by causality is some forms of relation between previous and successive events such that a previous event makes a successive event more likely, then determining causality is just an exercise in experimentation. The sort of thing that all scientists do all the time. Thus, while “causality” may be unfounded in some fastidious philosophical sense, it is by no means empty. I’ll quote below from a footnote from a paper we just wrote which tries to preempt criticism our use of “causal” arguments in the paper. The footnote makes reference to work by a colleague and friend of mine, here in Santa Fe, Frank Wimberly. I will copy him here to try and get him to speak up. He tends to lurk, until I say something really foolish, which no doubt I have. The whole paper is at http://www.behavior.org/resource.php?id=675 . So, here is the footnote:

Some might argue that in falling back on a more vernacular understanding of causality we have paid too great a price in rigor. However, as our Seminar colleague Frank Wimberly pointed out, the vernacular understanding of casualty is potentially rigorous. Research investigating what aspects of the world lay people are sensitive to when assigning causality suggests people are sensitive to particular types of probabilistic relationships (Cheng, Novick, Liljeholm, & Ford, 2007) and that certain types of experiments are better than others at revealing such relationships (Glymour & Wimberly, 2007).

Frank?

Nick

From: Friam [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 11:05 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] beyond reductionism twice

Nick,

You're the scientist; I'm only a computer scientist. So you are more qualified to talk about science and cause.

Do you think science organizes its theories in terms of causes? I see equations, entities, structures, geometries, and mechanisms, but I don't see causes. As I'm sure you know, the notion of "cause" is very slippery. I think science is better off without it.

But I'm interested in your perspective. What do you think?

<image001.gif><image001.gif>[If this is a thread hijack, I apologize. I am very interested in the subject, though.]

<image001.gif><image001.gif>
-- Russ Abbott
_____________________________________________
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

My paper on how the Fed can fix the economy: ssrn.com/abstract=1977688
Google voice: <a href="tel:747-999-5105" value="+17479995105" target="_blank">747-999-5105
Google+: plus.google.com/114865618166480775623/

vita: sites.google.com/site/russabbott/

CS Wiki and the courses I teach
_____________________________________________
On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 10:02 PM, Steve Smith <[hidden email]> wrote:
Russ -

Steve, you mentioned Lamarkian evolution. I'd be very interested to find out more about some of your daughter's examples.

This was on a long drive from NM to OR last Thanksgiving... in the course of about 30 hours of driving we talked about a LOT of things.

I am pretty sure this first exmaple is merely "neo-Lamarckian" or "Lamarckianesque" as they only applied to the single next generation. The germline of the child does not carry the changes, although if the child experiences the same conditions the parent did, the same epigenetic mechanisms would be in effect in the subsequent generation. This example had to to do with Long Term Potentiation (a feature of neural connectivity). What surprised me most was that this particular example involved the female/mother/eggs which are not manufactured "on the fly". It seems more likely that the father/male/sperm would be prone to this type of effect? There may have been two sub-examples, one about memory and one about "bad mothering"?

A more Lamarckian example was, I think, in Roundworms and involved RNA interference. The result (minus the details) was something like hereditible immunity.

A parallel example I *can* remember was the case of Tasmanian Devils and what is known as DFTD for Devil Facial Tumor Disease. Apparently it is an *infectuous* cancer (non-viral, meaning it isn't about a virus transferring from one host to another, then causing cancer). A cancerous cell from one individual literally becomes part of the other individual's organism... like an accidental organ donation or skin graft. Apparently the Devils are prone to lots of scrapping with each other and when one with a tumor on it's face scraps with one without, a cancerous cell (or cells) can get transferred to from the skin of one to the other and it can in fact 'graft' right into the epithelial layer. I don't know if this is more common/likely because it is cancerous, or if Devils were already exchanging skin cells before this cancer emerged?

The point of this Tasmanian Devil example is that it is as unexpected (to me anyway) as examples of Lamarckian evolution would be.

-- Russ Abbott
_____________________________________________

Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

My paper on how the Fed can fix the economy: ssrn.com/abstract=1977688
Google voice: <a href="tel:747-999-5105" value="+17479995105" target="_blank">747-999-5105
Google+: plus.google.com/114865618166480775623/

vita: sites.google.com/site/russabbott/

CS Wiki and the courses I teach
_____________________________________________

On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 3:42 PM, Steve Smith <[hidden email]> wrote:
Gary/Pamela/(Stephen, Carl, Eric, ...) -

I know several (many?) on this list know Stu better than I... so I apologize if I sounded overly critical. I prefer Pamela's description of him being *careless* with references as opposed to my own use of the *honest*. I also admit that I do not know if he sees himself as a rock-star... that is perhaps the default category I put people in who are simultaneously *good*, *self-possessed* and *charismatic*. I actually *like* most rock stars (within reason) even if I might not care for their music.

As an aside... does anyone remember Chris Langton appearing in Rolling Stone (CA 1990?)... I searched their archives and did not find any references (nor on the internet at large?). I remember the article including a sexed-up spread of him in front of a Connection Machine? I suppose I could be hallucinating or have come from an alternate history?

I also smiled at your term "demigod" as I often use "Titans" to describe the pantheon of my wife's sibling group... she is oldest of 8 *mostly* high functioning, *very* charismatic, *definitely* self-possessed siblings. They all revered their father who was a humble but charismatic physics professor. None of them took up science per se, though one has a PhD in psychology. I would not use *rock star* to describe any of their self-image, though there is one who insists he *is* Elvis... and sometimes we are tempted to believe him. There are definitely characters right out of Greek, Roman, Norse, even Hindu mythology in her family... My wife is Kali *and* Loki rolled into one I think.

I have always been inspired by Kauffman's ideas as best I could understand them, which has been highly variable, depending on the circumstance. This says more about me than about Stu. I read his lecture notes in the late-nineties... the ones which ultimately became the core of _Investigations_ (or so it seemed to me). I had read _OofO_ and _At Home in the Universe_ previously. It may have been coincidence or something stronger like kismet that I read Investigations interleaved with my reading of Christopher Alexander's (Pattern Language fame) _Notes on the Synthesis of Form_ with D'Arcy Thompson's _On Growth and Form_ as backup reference. I was traveling lightly in New Zealand at the time with none of my usual distractions nagging me. It was a month of deep thought informed by Alexander and Kauffman equally.

My nature is to be guarded around people with significant charisma (and me married into aforementioned pantheon!). I appreciate the need for and the value of the persuasive and the self-confident, even in the realm of science where ideas *by definition* must stand on their own. There is value for those who can bring us to *want* to believe enough to put in the hard work to believe things on their own merits. Unfortunately that might be the dividing line between science and Science(tm). I suppose I mistrust those who appear to be trying to corner the franchise on Science(tm) in their neighborhood.

Nevertheless, I am *more* interested in Kauffman's ideas here and hope that we will discuss them a bit?

- Steve

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com

<image002.png><image002.png>
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
--
Doug Roberts
[hidden email]
http://parrot-farm.net/Second-Cousins

505-455-7333 - Office
505-672-8213 - Mobile
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com

Merle Lefkoff-2

Re: beyond reductionism twice

Enough already! This is beginning to sound like Facebook.

Frank, I drink tea. As promised, you buy.

Merle

On Tue, Mar 26, 2013 at 12:11 PM, Victoria Hughes
<[hidden email]> wrote:

> Jeees Louise.
> … I've been trying so hard to curb my addiction to taking time to respond to
> the continuously intriguing things that show up at the Friam…. but I must
> say, Doug, that the phrase "violently disinterested" is a classic, even for
> you.
> And as long as I'm at it, Sas, I laughed out loud at your various
> descriptions of the Vilmains, from your KaliLoki wife on along….
> Thanks you all-
> Tory
>
> On Mar 26, 2013, at 12:04 PM, Douglas Roberts <[hidden email]> wrote:
>
> This list constantly reminds me that we are all, thankfully, different.
> Offhand, I can not think of a topic that I would be more violently
> disinterested in than the "philosophy of causation". Unless maybe it would
> be "the philosophy of complexity", or perhaps "the philosophy of agent-based
> model design".
>
> But I acknowledge that a not small fraction of you eat this stuff up, so
> please: have at it!
>
> --Doug
>
>
> On Tue, Mar 26, 2013 at 11:57 AM, Frank Wimberly <[hidden email]>
> wrote:
>>
>> Nick,
>>
>>
>>
>> Here is the complete citation:
>>
>>
>>
>> Glymour, C., and Wimberly, F.
>>
>> Actual Causes and Thought Experiments,
>>
>> in Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, Harry S. Silverstein
>> (eds.),
>>
>> Causation and Explanation: Topics in Contemporary Philosopy, MIT
>> Press, Cambridge, July 2007.
>>
>>
>>
>> I’ll buy a cup of coffee for anyone who reads the whole paper. The book
>> contains a number of papers by luminaries in the area of philosophy of
>> causation including Patrick Suppes, Nancy Cartwright, Christopher Hitchcock,
>> etc. I was surprised to find that it’s available on Google books:
>> http://tinyurl.com/d9l44jh
>>
>>
>>
>> Frank
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Frank C. Wimberly
>>
>> 140 Calle Ojo Feliz
>>
>> Santa Fe, NM 87505
>>
>>
>>
>> [hidden email] [hidden email]
>>
>> Phone: (505) 995-8715 Cell: (505) 670-9918
>>
>>
>>
>> From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Nicholas
>> Thompson
>> Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 11:57 PM
>> To: [hidden email]; 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee
>> Group'
>>
>>
>> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] beyond reductionism twice
>>
>>
>>
>> Russ,
>>
>>
>>
>> I don’t know wtf I am. I have always thought of myself as a scientist,
>> but I am sure that many on this list have their doubts. I am certainly not
>> a “hard” scientist.
>>
>>
>>
>> I was hoping by my comment to lure you into a more lengthy explication of
>> the idea that real scientists don’t think in terms of causes. But now you
>> have smoked me out instead, so here goes.
>>
>>
>>
>> Many of the philosophers I know, from time to time like to talk about
>> causality as if it were a sophomoric illusion, citing Hume, or some sort of
>> weird quantum theory. But that does not keep them from using causal
>> reasoning freely in their everyday lives. I have never heard a philosopher
>> who was reluctant to say things like “my car stalled because it ran out of
>> gas”. I think what they mean when they deny causality is the denial of
>> something that, as a behaviorist, I never thought to entertain: some deep
>> gear-and-cog mechanism lurking behind experience. If one once concedes
>> that all one means by causality is some forms of relation between previous
>> and successive events such that a previous event makes a successive event
>> more likely, then determining causality is just an exercise in
>> experimentation. The sort of thing that all scientists do all the time.
>> Thus, while “causality” may be unfounded in some fastidious philosophical
>> sense, it is by no means empty. I’ll quote below from a footnote from a
>> paper we just wrote which tries to preempt criticism our use of “causal”
>> arguments in the paper. The footnote makes reference to work by a colleague
>> and friend of mine, here in Santa Fe, Frank Wimberly. I will copy him here
>> to try and get him to speak up. He tends to lurk, until I say something
>> really foolish, which no doubt I have. The whole paper is at
>> http://www.behavior.org/resource.php?id=675 . So, here is the footnote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Some might argue that in falling back on a more vernacular understanding
>> of causality we have paid too great a price in rigor. However, as our
>> Seminar colleague Frank Wimberly pointed out, the vernacular understanding
>> of casualty is potentially rigorous. Research investigating what aspects of
>> the world lay people are sensitive to when assigning causality suggests
>> people are sensitive to particular types of probabilistic relationships
>> (Cheng, Novick, Liljeholm, & Ford, 2007) and that certain types of
>> experiments are better than others at revealing such relationships (Glymour
>> & Wimberly, 2007).
>>
>>
>>
>> Frank?
>>
>>
>>
>> Nick
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott
>> Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 11:05 PM
>> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
>> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] beyond reductionism twice
>>
>>
>>
>> Nick,
>>
>>
>>
>> You're the scientist; I'm only a computer scientist. So you are more
>> qualified to talk about science and cause.
>>
>>
>>
>> Do you think science organizes its theories in terms of causes? I see
>> equations, entities, structures, geometries, and mechanisms, but I don't see
>> causes. As I'm sure you know, the notion of "cause" is very slippery. I
>> think science is better off without it.
>>
>>
>>
>> But I'm interested in your perspective. What do you think?
>>
>>
>>
>> <image001.gif><image001.gif>[If this is a thread hijack, I apologize. I am
>> very interested in the subject, though.]
>>
>> <image001.gif><image001.gif>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -- Russ Abbott
>> _____________________________________________
>>
>> Professor, Computer Science
>> California State University, Los Angeles
>>
>>
>>
>> My paper on how the Fed can fix the economy: ssrn.com/abstract=1977688
>> Google voice: 747-999-5105
>>
>> Google+: plus.google.com/114865618166480775623/
>>
>> vita: sites.google.com/site/russabbott/
>>
>> CS Wiki and the courses I teach
>> _____________________________________________
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 10:02 PM, Steve Smith <[hidden email]> wrote:
>>
>> Russ -
>>
>>
>>
>> Steve, you mentioned Lamarkian evolution. I'd be very interested to find
>> out more about some of your daughter's examples.
>>
>> This was on a long drive from NM to OR last Thanksgiving... in the course
>> of about 30 hours of driving we talked about a LOT of things.
>>
>> I am pretty sure this first exmaple is merely "neo-Lamarckian" or
>> "Lamarckianesque" as they only applied to the single next generation. The
>> germline of the child does not carry the changes, although if the child
>> experiences the same conditions the parent did, the same epigenetic
>> mechanisms would be in effect in the subsequent generation. This example
>> had to to do with Long Term Potentiation (a feature of neural connectivity).
>> What surprised me most was that this particular example involved the
>> female/mother/eggs which are not manufactured "on the fly". It seems more
>> likely that the father/male/sperm would be prone to this type of effect?
>> There may have been two sub-examples, one about memory and one about "bad
>> mothering"?
>>
>> A more Lamarckian example was, I think, in Roundworms and involved RNA
>> interference. The result (minus the details) was something like hereditible
>> immunity.
>>
>> A parallel example I *can* remember was the case of Tasmanian Devils and
>> what is known as DFTD for Devil Facial Tumor Disease. Apparently it is an
>> *infectuous* cancer (non-viral, meaning it isn't about a virus transferring
>> from one host to another, then causing cancer). A cancerous cell from one
>> individual literally becomes part of the other individual's organism... like
>> an accidental organ donation or skin graft. Apparently the Devils are
>> prone to lots of scrapping with each other and when one with a tumor on it's
>> face scraps with one without, a cancerous cell (or cells) can get
>> transferred to from the skin of one to the other and it can in fact 'graft'
>> right into the epithelial layer. I don't know if this is more common/likely
>> because it is cancerous, or if Devils were already exchanging skin cells
>> before this cancer emerged?
>>
>> The point of this Tasmanian Devil example is that it is as unexpected (to
>> me anyway) as examples of Lamarckian evolution would be.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -- Russ Abbott
>> _____________________________________________
>>
>> Professor, Computer Science
>> California State University, Los Angeles
>>
>>
>>
>> My paper on how the Fed can fix the economy: ssrn.com/abstract=1977688
>> Google voice: 747-999-5105
>>
>> Google+: plus.google.com/114865618166480775623/
>>
>> vita: sites.google.com/site/russabbott/
>>
>> CS Wiki and the courses I teach
>> _____________________________________________
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 3:42 PM, Steve Smith <[hidden email]> wrote:
>>
>> Gary/Pamela/(Stephen, Carl, Eric, ...) -
>>
>> I know several (many?) on this list know Stu better than I... so I
>> apologize if I sounded overly critical. I prefer Pamela's description of
>> him being *careless* with references as opposed to my own use of the
>> *honest*. I also admit that I do not know if he sees himself as a
>> rock-star... that is perhaps the default category I put people in who are
>> simultaneously *good*, *self-possessed* and *charismatic*. I actually
>> *like* most rock stars (within reason) even if I might not care for their
>> music.
>>
>> As an aside... does anyone remember Chris Langton appearing in Rolling
>> Stone (CA 1990?)... I searched their archives and did not find any
>> references (nor on the internet at large?). I remember the article
>> including a sexed-up spread of him in front of a Connection Machine? I
>> suppose I could be hallucinating or have come from an alternate history?
>>
>> I also smiled at your term "demigod" as I often use "Titans" to describe
>> the pantheon of my wife's sibling group... she is oldest of 8 *mostly* high
>> functioning, *very* charismatic, *definitely* self-possessed siblings.
>> They all revered their father who was a humble but charismatic physics
>> professor. None of them took up science per se, though one has a PhD in
>> psychology. I would not use *rock star* to describe any of their
>> self-image, though there is one who insists he *is* Elvis... and sometimes
>> we are tempted to believe him. There are definitely characters right out of
>> Greek, Roman, Norse, even Hindu mythology in her family... My wife is Kali
>> *and* Loki rolled into one I think.
>>
>> I have always been inspired by Kauffman's ideas as best I could understand
>> them, which has been highly variable, depending on the circumstance. This
>> says more about me than about Stu. I read his lecture notes in the
>> late-nineties... the ones which ultimately became the core of
>> _Investigations_ (or so it seemed to me). I had read _OofO_ and _At Home in
>> the Universe_ previously. It may have been coincidence or something
>> stronger like kismet that I read Investigations interleaved with my reading
>> of Christopher Alexander's (Pattern Language fame) _Notes on the Synthesis
>> of Form_ with D'Arcy Thompson's _On Growth and Form_ as backup reference. I
>> was traveling lightly in New Zealand at the time with none of my usual
>> distractions nagging me. It was a month of deep thought informed by
>> Alexander and Kauffman equally.
>>
>> My nature is to be guarded around people with significant charisma (and me
>> married into aforementioned pantheon!). I appreciate the need for and the
>> value of the persuasive and the self-confident, even in the realm of science
>> where ideas *by definition* must stand on their own. There is value for
>> those who can bring us to *want* to believe enough to put in the hard work
>> to believe things on their own merits. Unfortunately that might be the
>> dividing line between science and Science(tm). I suppose I mistrust those
>> who appear to be trying to corner the franchise on Science(tm) in their
>> neighborhood.
>>
>> Nevertheless, I am *more* interested in Kauffman's ideas here and hope
>> that we will discuss them a bit?
>>
>> - Steve
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ============================================================
>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>>
>>
>>
>> <image002.png><image002.png>
>>
>>
>>
>> ============================================================
>>
>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>>
>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>>
>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ============================================================
>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ============================================================
>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>
>
>
>
> --
> Doug Roberts
> [hidden email]
> http://parrot-farm.net/Second-Cousins
>
> 505-455-7333 - Office
> 505-672-8213 - Mobile
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com

--
Merle Lefkoff, Ph.D.
President, Center for Emergent Diplomacy
Santa Fe, New Mexico, USA
[hidden email]
mobile: (303) 859-5609
skype: merlelefkoff

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com

Victoria Hughes

Re: beyond reductionism twice

(….. but a tad more articulate, and no un-friend option …)
-
Alright. I see your cup of tea and raise you a double espresso.

To more directly answer the proposed topic: I add that I would happily discuss philosophy
(about which I have strong and articulate ideas / information) with anyone
provided that
1. The discussion also references non-European, non-white-male models for awareness, reality, conceptual modeling, etc.
2. The discussion does not devolve into intellectual posturing.

Voilà Merle, less Facebook, more filling.
Hm, or perhaps more provocative.

Or perhaps, gasp, I too may be violently disinterested in the way philosophy is discussed in fora such as this.
!

Tory

On Mar 26, 2013, at 12:18 PM, Merle Lefkoff <[hidden email]> wrote:

> Enough already! This is beginning to sound like Facebook.
>
> Frank, I drink tea. As promised, you buy.
>
> Merle
>
> On Tue, Mar 26, 2013 at 12:11 PM, Victoria Hughes
> <[hidden email]> wrote:
>> Jeees Louise.
>> … I've been trying so hard to curb my addiction to taking time to respond to
>> the continuously intriguing things that show up at the Friam…. but I must
>> say, Doug, that the phrase "violently disinterested" is a classic, even for
>> you.
>> And as long as I'm at it, Sas, I laughed out loud at your various
>> descriptions of the Vilmains, from your KaliLoki wife on along….
>> Thanks you all-
>> Tory
>>
>> On Mar 26, 2013, at 12:04 PM, Douglas Roberts <[hidden email]> wrote:
>>
>> This list constantly reminds me that we are all, thankfully, different.
>> Offhand, I can not think of a topic that I would be more violently
>> disinterested in than the "philosophy of causation". Unless maybe it would
>> be "the philosophy of complexity", or perhaps "the philosophy of agent-based
>> model design".
>>
>> But I acknowledge that a not small fraction of you eat this stuff up, so
>> please: have at it!
>>
>> --Doug
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Mar 26, 2013 at 11:57 AM, Frank Wimberly <[hidden email]>
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Nick,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Here is the complete citation:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Glymour, C., and Wimberly, F.
>>>
>>> Actual Causes and Thought Experiments,
>>>
>>> in Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, Harry S. Silverstein
>>> (eds.),
>>>
>>> Causation and Explanation: Topics in Contemporary Philosopy, MIT
>>> Press, Cambridge, July 2007.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I’ll buy a cup of coffee for anyone who reads the whole paper. The book
>>> contains a number of papers by luminaries in the area of philosophy of
>>> causation including Patrick Suppes, Nancy Cartwright, Christopher Hitchcock,
>>> etc. I was surprised to find that it’s available on Google books:
>>> http://tinyurl.com/d9l44jh
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Frank
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Frank C. Wimberly
>>>
>>> 140 Calle Ojo Feliz
>>>
>>> Santa Fe, NM 87505
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> [hidden email] [hidden email]
>>>
>>> Phone: (505) 995-8715 Cell: (505) 670-9918
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Nicholas
>>> Thompson
>>> Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 11:57 PM
>>> To: [hidden email]; 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee
>>> Group'
>>>
>>>
>>> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] beyond reductionism twice
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Russ,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I don’t know wtf I am. I have always thought of myself as a scientist,
>>> but I am sure that many on this list have their doubts. I am certainly not
>>> a “hard” scientist.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I was hoping by my comment to lure you into a more lengthy explication of
>>> the idea that real scientists don’t think in terms of causes. But now you
>>> have smoked me out instead, so here goes.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Many of the philosophers I know, from time to time like to talk about
>>> causality as if it were a sophomoric illusion, citing Hume, or some sort of
>>> weird quantum theory. But that does not keep them from using causal
>>> reasoning freely in their everyday lives. I have never heard a philosopher
>>> who was reluctant to say things like “my car stalled because it ran out of
>>> gas”. I think what they mean when they deny causality is the denial of
>>> something that, as a behaviorist, I never thought to entertain: some deep
>>> gear-and-cog mechanism lurking behind experience. If one once concedes
>>> that all one means by causality is some forms of relation between previous
>>> and successive events such that a previous event makes a successive event
>>> more likely, then determining causality is just an exercise in
>>> experimentation. The sort of thing that all scientists do all the time.
>>> Thus, while “causality” may be unfounded in some fastidious philosophical
>>> sense, it is by no means empty. I’ll quote below from a footnote from a
>>> paper we just wrote which tries to preempt criticism our use of “causal”
>>> arguments in the paper. The footnote makes reference to work by a colleague
>>> and friend of mine, here in Santa Fe, Frank Wimberly. I will copy him here
>>> to try and get him to speak up. He tends to lurk, until I say something
>>> really foolish, which no doubt I have. The whole paper is at
>>> http://www.behavior.org/resource.php?id=675 . So, here is the footnote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Some might argue that in falling back on a more vernacular understanding
>>> of causality we have paid too great a price in rigor. However, as our
>>> Seminar colleague Frank Wimberly pointed out, the vernacular understanding
>>> of casualty is potentially rigorous. Research investigating what aspects of
>>> the world lay people are sensitive to when assigning causality suggests
>>> people are sensitive to particular types of probabilistic relationships
>>> (Cheng, Novick, Liljeholm, & Ford, 2007) and that certain types of
>>> experiments are better than others at revealing such relationships (Glymour
>>> & Wimberly, 2007).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Frank?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Nick
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott
>>> Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 11:05 PM
>>> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
>>> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] beyond reductionism twice
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Nick,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> You're the scientist; I'm only a computer scientist. So you are more
>>> qualified to talk about science and cause.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Do you think science organizes its theories in terms of causes? I see
>>> equations, entities, structures, geometries, and mechanisms, but I don't see
>>> causes. As I'm sure you know, the notion of "cause" is very slippery. I
>>> think science is better off without it.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But I'm interested in your perspective. What do you think?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> <image001.gif><image001.gif>[If this is a thread hijack, I apologize. I am
>>> very interested in the subject, though.]
>>>
>>> <image001.gif><image001.gif>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -- Russ Abbott
>>> _____________________________________________
>>>
>>> Professor, Computer Science
>>> California State University, Los Angeles
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> My paper on how the Fed can fix the economy: ssrn.com/abstract=1977688
>>> Google voice: 747-999-5105
>>>
>>> Google+: plus.google.com/114865618166480775623/
>>>
>>> vita: sites.google.com/site/russabbott/
>>>
>>> CS Wiki and the courses I teach
>>> _____________________________________________
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 10:02 PM, Steve Smith <[hidden email]> wrote:
>>>
>>> Russ -
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Steve, you mentioned Lamarkian evolution. I'd be very interested to find
>>> out more about some of your daughter's examples.
>>>
>>> This was on a long drive from NM to OR last Thanksgiving... in the course
>>> of about 30 hours of driving we talked about a LOT of things.
>>>
>>> I am pretty sure this first exmaple is merely "neo-Lamarckian" or
>>> "Lamarckianesque" as they only applied to the single next generation. The
>>> germline of the child does not carry the changes, although if the child
>>> experiences the same conditions the parent did, the same epigenetic
>>> mechanisms would be in effect in the subsequent generation. This example
>>> had to to do with Long Term Potentiation (a feature of neural connectivity).
>>> What surprised me most was that this particular example involved the
>>> female/mother/eggs which are not manufactured "on the fly". It seems more
>>> likely that the father/male/sperm would be prone to this type of effect?
>>> There may have been two sub-examples, one about memory and one about "bad
>>> mothering"?
>>>
>>> A more Lamarckian example was, I think, in Roundworms and involved RNA
>>> interference. The result (minus the details) was something like hereditible
>>> immunity.
>>>
>>> A parallel example I *can* remember was the case of Tasmanian Devils and
>>> what is known as DFTD for Devil Facial Tumor Disease. Apparently it is an
>>> *infectuous* cancer (non-viral, meaning it isn't about a virus transferring
>>> from one host to another, then causing cancer). A cancerous cell from one
>>> individual literally becomes part of the other individual's organism... like
>>> an accidental organ donation or skin graft. Apparently the Devils are
>>> prone to lots of scrapping with each other and when one with a tumor on it's
>>> face scraps with one without, a cancerous cell (or cells) can get
>>> transferred to from the skin of one to the other and it can in fact 'graft'
>>> right into the epithelial layer. I don't know if this is more common/likely
>>> because it is cancerous, or if Devils were already exchanging skin cells
>>> before this cancer emerged?
>>>
>>> The point of this Tasmanian Devil example is that it is as unexpected (to
>>> me anyway) as examples of Lamarckian evolution would be.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -- Russ Abbott
>>> _____________________________________________
>>>
>>> Professor, Computer Science
>>> California State University, Los Angeles
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> My paper on how the Fed can fix the economy: ssrn.com/abstract=1977688
>>> Google voice: 747-999-5105
>>>
>>> Google+: plus.google.com/114865618166480775623/
>>>
>>> vita: sites.google.com/site/russabbott/
>>>
>>> CS Wiki and the courses I teach
>>> _____________________________________________
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 3:42 PM, Steve Smith <[hidden email]> wrote:
>>>
>>> Gary/Pamela/(Stephen, Carl, Eric, ...) -
>>>
>>> I know several (many?) on this list know Stu better than I... so I
>>> apologize if I sounded overly critical. I prefer Pamela's description of
>>> him being *careless* with references as opposed to my own use of the
>>> *honest*. I also admit that I do not know if he sees himself as a
>>> rock-star... that is perhaps the default category I put people in who are
>>> simultaneously *good*, *self-possessed* and *charismatic*. I actually
>>> *like* most rock stars (within reason) even if I might not care for their
>>> music.
>>>
>>> As an aside... does anyone remember Chris Langton appearing in Rolling
>>> Stone (CA 1990?)... I searched their archives and did not find any
>>> references (nor on the internet at large?). I remember the article
>>> including a sexed-up spread of him in front of a Connection Machine? I
>>> suppose I could be hallucinating or have come from an alternate history?
>>>
>>> I also smiled at your term "demigod" as I often use "Titans" to describe
>>> the pantheon of my wife's sibling group... she is oldest of 8 *mostly* high
>>> functioning, *very* charismatic, *definitely* self-possessed siblings.
>>> They all revered their father who was a humble but charismatic physics
>>> professor. None of them took up science per se, though one has a PhD in
>>> psychology. I would not use *rock star* to describe any of their
>>> self-image, though there is one who insists he *is* Elvis... and sometimes
>>> we are tempted to believe him. There are definitely characters right out of
>>> Greek, Roman, Norse, even Hindu mythology in her family... My wife is Kali
>>> *and* Loki rolled into one I think.
>>>
>>> I have always been inspired by Kauffman's ideas as best I could understand
>>> them, which has been highly variable, depending on the circumstance. This
>>> says more about me than about Stu. I read his lecture notes in the
>>> late-nineties... the ones which ultimately became the core of
>>> _Investigations_ (or so it seemed to me). I had read _OofO_ and _At Home in
>>> the Universe_ previously. It may have been coincidence or something
>>> stronger like kismet that I read Investigations interleaved with my reading
>>> of Christopher Alexander's (Pattern Language fame) _Notes on the Synthesis
>>> of Form_ with D'Arcy Thompson's _On Growth and Form_ as backup reference. I
>>> was traveling lightly in New Zealand at the time with none of my usual
>>> distractions nagging me. It was a month of deep thought informed by
>>> Alexander and Kauffman equally.
>>>
>>> My nature is to be guarded around people with significant charisma (and me
>>> married into aforementioned pantheon!). I appreciate the need for and the
>>> value of the persuasive and the self-confident, even in the realm of science
>>> where ideas *by definition* must stand on their own. There is value for
>>> those who can bring us to *want* to believe enough to put in the hard work
>>> to believe things on their own merits. Unfortunately that might be the
>>> dividing line between science and Science(tm). I suppose I mistrust those
>>> who appear to be trying to corner the franchise on Science(tm) in their
>>> neighborhood.
>>>
>>> Nevertheless, I am *more* interested in Kauffman's ideas here and hope
>>> that we will discuss them a bit?
>>>
>>> - Steve
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ============================================================
>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> <image002.png><image002.png>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ============================================================
>>>
>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>>>
>>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>>>
>>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ============================================================
>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ============================================================
>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Doug Roberts
>> [hidden email]
>> http://parrot-farm.net/Second-Cousins
>>
>> 505-455-7333 - Office
>> 505-672-8213 - Mobile
>> ============================================================
>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>>
>>
>>
>> ============================================================
>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>
>
>
> --
> Merle Lefkoff, Ph.D.
> President, Center for Emergent Diplomacy
> Santa Fe, New Mexico, USA
> [hidden email]
> mobile: (303) 859-5609
> skype: merlelefkoff
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com

glen ropella

Re: beyond reductionism twice

Victoria Hughes wrote at 03/26/2013 11:27 AM:
> 1. The discussion also references non-European, non-white-male models for awareness, reality, conceptual modeling, etc.
> 2. The discussion does not devolve into intellectual posturing.

This reminded me of the Ulam quote:

"Talking about non-linear mathematics is like talking about non-elephant
zoology." -- Stanislaw Ulam

I willingly admit my ignorance. But honestly, is there _any_ philosophy
that is not, ultimately, intellectual posturing? ;-) Or, further, is
there any speech/verbiage whatsoever that is not, ultimately,
intellectual posturing?

I heard from somewhere a speculation that the emergence of human
language replaced (to whatever extent) grooming. If that's at all true,
then I suppose there is some speech ... pillow talk, platitudes, or
perhaps lyricism/poetry that is as much about physics (soothing and
communion) as it is about the ideal of communication or intellect. And
I suppose one might believe (act as if) the expression of an ideal (an
intellectual artifact) via words is somehow authentic as opposed to
posturing. But, when I examine my own behavior in the light of what I
observe from others and vice versa, it's quite difficult to distinguish
between the former (authentic expression) and the latter (posturing).

But, I also admit my gullibility and naivete.

--
=><= glen e. p. ropella
Like it's screwed itself in hell

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com

Russ Abbott

Re: beyond reductionism twice

_Causation and Explanation_ looks like a good book. Strangely, its Amazon paperback price is only $13.52 even though its Amazon Kindle price is $28.80. (I just ordered one of the 3 copies remaining in stock.)

I have no problem with the manipulatist/Baysian/experimentalist/social-studies approach to causation. It's a way to establish a connection between A and B that's stronger than correlation. (More or less: if changing A changes B, then A is a cause of B.)

But that doesn't explain how A causes B. It's in that sort of how-explanation that I don't see scientific talk of causation.

-- Russ Abbott
_____________________________________________

Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

My paper on how the Fed can fix the economy: ssrn.com/abstract=1977688
Google voice: 747-999-5105

Google+: plus.google.com/114865618166480775623/

vita: sites.google.com/site/russabbott/

CS Wiki and the courses I teach
_____________________________________________

On Tue, Mar 26, 2013 at 11:44 AM, glen <[hidden email]> wrote:

Victoria Hughes wrote at 03/26/2013 11:27 AM:

> 1. The discussion also references non-European, non-white-male models for awareness, reality, conceptual modeling, etc.
> 2. The discussion does not devolve into intellectual posturing.

This reminded me of the Ulam quote:

"Talking about non-linear mathematics is like talking about non-elephant
zoology." -- Stanislaw Ulam

I willingly admit my ignorance. But honestly, is there _any_ philosophy
that is not, ultimately, intellectual posturing? ;-) Or, further, is
there any speech/verbiage whatsoever that is not, ultimately,
intellectual posturing?

I heard from somewhere a speculation that the emergence of human
language replaced (to whatever extent) grooming. If that's at all true,
then I suppose there is some speech ... pillow talk, platitudes, or
perhaps lyricism/poetry that is as much about physics (soothing and
communion) as it is about the ideal of communication or intellect. And
I suppose one might believe (act as if) the expression of an ideal (an
intellectual artifact) via words is somehow authentic as opposed to
posturing. But, when I examine my own behavior in the light of what I
observe from others and vice versa, it's quite difficult to distinguish
between the former (authentic expression) and the latter (posturing).

But, I also admit my gullibility and naivete.

--
=><= glen e. p. ropella
Like it's screwed itself in hell

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Victoria Hughes

Re: beyond reductionism twice

In reply to this post by glen ropella

How interesting, Glen!
I'm curious- how do you talk to your friends? Or your children, if you have any? Or those you want to teach you something?

Yes, I do believe, and practice as best I can, opportunities for non-intellectual posturing. I certainly claim the right to posture with knowledge and intellect - but I know absolutely that is not the only philosophy I practice. It is in fact not the best philosophical basis for a variety of purposes.

From my perspective, anything that is actually asking a question, and actually listening and considering the answer, and inquiring into it for new information, and then integrating new information to continue the dialogue, is not intellectual posturing.

Communication exists for many purposes. I believe that communication, of which sharing ideas and information is one category, is not a hierarchical system but a needs-based system. So by that definition, dialogue is always expressing something about the speaker, and her/his intentions towards the listener. And (in most cases other than for a didactic purpose) the purpose is the back and forth of the dialogue. Then what that reciprocity brings to the participants.

If there is no particular forward motion brought about by the dialogue - in the direction of the purpose for which the dialogue was established - than that is posturing.

But there are a myriad of options for philosophical dialogue that do have functional growth / expansion / increased knowledge.

I'm signing off for today, pleasure to bounce ideas back and forth as always.
Tory

On Mar 26, 2013, at 12:44 PM, glen <[hidden email]> wrote:

> Victoria Hughes wrote at 03/26/2013 11:27 AM:
>> 1. The discussion also references non-European, non-white-male models for awareness, reality, conceptual modeling, etc.
>> 2. The discussion does not devolve into intellectual posturing.
>
> This reminded me of the Ulam quote:
>
> "Talking about non-linear mathematics is like talking about non-elephant
> zoology." -- Stanislaw Ulam
>
> I willingly admit my ignorance. But honestly, is there _any_ philosophy
> that is not, ultimately, intellectual posturing? ;-) Or, further, is
> there any speech/verbiage whatsoever that is not, ultimately,
> intellectual posturing?
>
> I heard from somewhere a speculation that the emergence of human
> language replaced (to whatever extent) grooming. If that's at all true,
> then I suppose there is some speech ... pillow talk, platitudes, or
> perhaps lyricism/poetry that is as much about physics (soothing and
> communion) as it is about the ideal of communication or intellect. And
> I suppose one might believe (act as if) the expression of an ideal (an
> intellectual artifact) via words is somehow authentic as opposed to
> posturing. But, when I examine my own behavior in the light of what I
> observe from others and vice versa, it's quite difficult to distinguish
> between the former (authentic expression) and the latter (posturing).
>
> But, I also admit my gullibility and naivete.
>
> --
> =><= glen e. p. ropella
> Like it's screwed itself in hell
>
>
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> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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glen ep ropella

Re: beyond reductionism twice

In reply to this post by Russ Abbott

Russ Abbott wrote at 03/26/2013 12:01 PM:

> _Causation and Explanation_ looks like a good book. Strangely, its
> Amazon paperback price
> <http://www.amazon.com/Causation-Explanation-Topics-Contemporary-Philosophy/dp/B008SLYJ4G/ref=wl_it_dp_o_pC_S_nC?ie=UTF8&colid=QIM4OPN4IQSS&coliid=I1V01X94UI8MFU> is
> only $13.52 even though its Amazon Kindle price is $28.80. (I just
> ordered one of the 3 copies remaining in stock.)
>
> I have no problem with the
> manipulatist/Baysian/experimentalist/social-studies approach to
> causation. It's a way to establish a connection between A and B that's
> stronger than correlation. (More or less: if changing A changes B, then
> A is a cause of B.)
>
> But that doesn't explain how A causes B. It's in that sort of
> how-explanation that I don't see scientific talk of causation.

This one's pretty good:

Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference
by Judea Pearl
http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/174276.Causality

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-255-2847, http://tempusdictum.com
There is no nonsense so errant that it cannot be made the creed of the
vast majority by adequate governmental action. -- Bertrand Russell

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Steve Smith

Grooming Beyond Facebook: Violently Disinteresting Intellectual Posturing on all topics except non-Elephantine Zoology

In reply to this post by glen ropella

Tory/Doug/Glen/Merle/Frank/et alii -

Let me just strike a pose here (formerly known as going on a rant):

I find Doug's comment violently disinteresting and look forward to
participating in a never-ending spiral (feels somewhat circular but
actually gets somewhere) discussion of causality, complexity, and the
philosophy of language, thought, and reality.

It is good to hear your "voice" here again Tory... and I hope somehow
the challenge of non-E, non-W, non-M models of Life, the Universe and
Everything ( sorry, I know Doug Adams was E, W ,M, but he's the only one
who ever actually came up with a simple answer, definitely not vague,
assuredly wrong, but what the hey!). And while we are at it, we might
be able to work in some non-Elephant zoology! Kali is always my "go
to" for non-WME references.

I like the idea (Glen) that communication (at least partially) fills the
niche of physical grooming. Certainly (nod to Merle's comment) a great
deal of Facebook "communication" appears to be roughly mutual grooming
(and preening). I notice it most when I feel the urge to "nit pick"
other people's ideas or commentary.

I did start in on your book chapter Frank, but of course, Google Books
didn't offer me enough continuous pages and I think Russ got the last
copy from Amazon!

- Steve

> Victoria Hughes wrote at 03/26/2013 11:27 AM:
>> 1. The discussion also references non-European, non-white-male models for awareness, reality, conceptual modeling, etc.
>> 2. The discussion does not devolve into intellectual posturing.
> This reminded me of the Ulam quote:
>
> "Talking about non-linear mathematics is like talking about non-elephant
> zoology." -- Stanislaw Ulam
>
> I willingly admit my ignorance. But honestly, is there _any_ philosophy
> that is not, ultimately, intellectual posturing? ;-) Or, further, is
> there any speech/verbiage whatsoever that is not, ultimately,
> intellectual posturing?
>
> I heard from somewhere a speculation that the emergence of human
> language replaced (to whatever extent) grooming. If that's at all true,
> then I suppose there is some speech ... pillow talk, platitudes, or
> perhaps lyricism/poetry that is as much about physics (soothing and
> communion) as it is about the ideal of communication or intellect. And
> I suppose one might believe (act as if) the expression of an ideal (an
> intellectual artifact) via words is somehow authentic as opposed to
> posturing. But, when I examine my own behavior in the light of what I
> observe from others and vice versa, it's quite difficult to distinguish
> between the former (authentic expression) and the latter (posturing).
>
> But, I also admit my gullibility and naivete.
>

Steve Smith

Re: beyond reductionism twice

In reply to this post by Joshua Thorp

On 3/26/13 2:23 AM, Joshua Thorp wrote:

When I was in high school, someone gave me a photocopy of an article from OMNI magazine. It was an interview with Chris Langton about artificial life. I think I have been fascinated with these same twinkling lights ever since. It was pretty inspiring for me, having grown up in Santa Fe myself, it was so cool to see someone I could aspire to -- who could also be living in Santa Fe.

I finally found the reference... it was an interview by Steven Levy titled "It's Alive" in 1991 but without a subscription to Rolling Stone, I can't access their archives directly. At least I'm not *crazy* (in that particular way). I'm surprised how obscure the article went.

- Steve

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glen ropella

Re: beyond reductionism twice

In reply to this post by Victoria Hughes

Victoria Hughes wrote at 03/26/2013 12:02 PM:
> I'm curious- how do you talk to your friends? Or your children, if
> you have any? Or those you want to teach you something?

Great question! I'm often frustrated by my conversations with my
friends. I usually feel like I'm offering alternative explanations for
various things. They almost universally end up believing I'm
"contrarian" or "argumentative". It's unclear to me why they tolerate
me. It usually goes something like this:

Them: X happened. So to compensate, I will do Y.

Me: But perhaps Z really happened and you only thought it was X. And if
that's the case, then perhaps P is a better course of action.

Them: No, there's no way that Z happened. It was definitely X.

Me: There's a person/book/article/theory/... that Z can be mistaken for
X or that X is a side effect of Z.

Them: No way. I know the truth. I have access to reality.

Me: OK.

Then after I get home (it's usually a dinner party or somesuch), I find
the person/book/article/... and e-mail it to them. In response I get
nothing... not even the sound of crickets. 8^)

That's how I usually talk to people, friends or not. I have no
children, thank Cthulu. And I wish people would do the same with me.
I.e. provide alternatives to whatever gravity well I'm stuck in.

> From my perspective, anything that is actually asking a question,
> and actually listening and considering the answer, and inquiring
> into it for new information, and then integrating new information
> to continue the dialogue, is not intellectual posturing.

In any other conversation, I'd agree. But in this conversation, I'll
propose the following. Competent posturing requires just as much
asking, listening, consideration, and integration as does non-posturing.

I say this from the perspective of fighting. A good fighter knows that
the feint is a legitimate fighting move. Yes, you may have to unpack
it's _role_ in the fight. But it's just as much a part of fighting as a
straightforward attack or defense.

The same could be said of, say, my cat's fur fluffing up and it turning
sideways when a dog appears. Yes, it's posturing. But it's just as
much a part of the interaction as the lightning fast pop to the snout.

And remember, I offer this in the spirit of alternatives. I
legitimately believe I'm offering you an alternative, albeit one you
already know but may not have (yet) invoked in this conversation.

> Communication exists for many purposes. I believe that
> communication, of which sharing ideas and information is one
> category, is not a hierarchical system but a needs-based system. So
> by that definition, dialogue is always expressing something about the
> speaker, and her/his intentions towards the listener. And (in most
> cases other than for a didactic purpose) the purpose is the back and
> forth of the dialogue. Then what that reciprocity brings to the
> participants.

Heh, now you're just pushing my buttons! I don't believe communication
(as normally conceived) exists at all. The ideas in your head are
forever and completely alien to my head. You may have a mechanism for
faithfully translating your ideas into your action or inferring ideas
from your perceptions. And I may have similarly faithful translators.
But the similarity between your ideas and mine is zero, even if/when the
similarity in our behaviors is quite high.

But, that doesn't change your conclusion, which I agree with.
Reciprocity is critical to the interaction. The difference is only that
I believe in sharing actions. The ideas are not shared and largely useless.

> If there is no particular forward motion brought about by the
> dialogue - in the direction of the purpose for which the dialogue
> was established - than that is posturing.

I'll offer another alternative. There is no "forward". There is only
movement, change. While we may share a behavior space, we probably
don't share a vector, a line of progression, in that space. Hence, what
you may see as posturing (or aimless wandering), I may legitimately feel
to be progress ... even if it's postmodern gobbledygook.

> But there are a myriad of options for philosophical dialogue that do
> have functional growth / expansion / increased knowledge.

I agree, except there is no such thing as knowledge in the idealistic,
intellectual sense. There is only _competence_, the ability to perform,
to achieve. And that includes the modification of what we _say_ and how
we say it by saying things together.

--
=><= glen e. p. ropella
The ocean parts and the meteors come down

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Steve Smith

Re: beyond reductionism twice

Glen -

I have to say that your world-view (which I think you will claim doesn't
exist or at least that *I* can't possibly come to share) continues to be
more and more fascinating as you pull back more layers of otherwise
"common" understandings which you don't share with the world at large.
I mean this in the most favorable way.

The hardest part about it all is that the more I think I understand your
world view, the more I believe your world view doesn't allow for me to
actually understand your world view!

Why does head hurt when Hulk try to think?

- Steve

> Victoria Hughes wrote at 03/26/2013 12:02 PM:
>> I'm curious- how do you talk to your friends? Or your children, if
>> you have any? Or those you want to teach you something?
> Great question! I'm often frustrated by my conversations with my
> friends. I usually feel like I'm offering alternative explanations for
> various things. They almost universally end up believing I'm
> "contrarian" or "argumentative". It's unclear to me why they tolerate
> me. It usually goes something like this:
>
> Them: X happened. So to compensate, I will do Y.
>
> Me: But perhaps Z really happened and you only thought it was X. And if
> that's the case, then perhaps P is a better course of action.
>
> Them: No, there's no way that Z happened. It was definitely X.
>
> Me: There's a person/book/article/theory/... that Z can be mistaken for
> X or that X is a side effect of Z.
>
> Them: No way. I know the truth. I have access to reality.
>
> Me: OK.
>
> Then after I get home (it's usually a dinner party or somesuch), I find
> the person/book/article/... and e-mail it to them. In response I get
> nothing... not even the sound of crickets. 8^)
>
> That's how I usually talk to people, friends or not. I have no
> children, thank Cthulu. And I wish people would do the same with me.
> I.e. provide alternatives to whatever gravity well I'm stuck in.
>
>> From my perspective, anything that is actually asking a question,
>> and actually listening and considering the answer, and inquiring
>> into it for new information, and then integrating new information
>> to continue the dialogue, is not intellectual posturing.
> In any other conversation, I'd agree. But in this conversation, I'll
> propose the following. Competent posturing requires just as much
> asking, listening, consideration, and integration as does non-posturing.
>
> I say this from the perspective of fighting. A good fighter knows that
> the feint is a legitimate fighting move. Yes, you may have to unpack
> it's _role_ in the fight. But it's just as much a part of fighting as a
> straightforward attack or defense.
>
> The same could be said of, say, my cat's fur fluffing up and it turning
> sideways when a dog appears. Yes, it's posturing. But it's just as
> much a part of the interaction as the lightning fast pop to the snout.
>
> And remember, I offer this in the spirit of alternatives. I
> legitimately believe I'm offering you an alternative, albeit one you
> already know but may not have (yet) invoked in this conversation.
>
>> Communication exists for many purposes. I believe that
>> communication, of which sharing ideas and information is one
>> category, is not a hierarchical system but a needs-based system. So
>> by that definition, dialogue is always expressing something about the
>> speaker, and her/his intentions towards the listener. And (in most
>> cases other than for a didactic purpose) the purpose is the back and
>> forth of the dialogue. Then what that reciprocity brings to the
>> participants.
> Heh, now you're just pushing my buttons! I don't believe communication
> (as normally conceived) exists at all. The ideas in your head are
> forever and completely alien to my head. You may have a mechanism for
> faithfully translating your ideas into your action or inferring ideas
> from your perceptions. And I may have similarly faithful translators.
> But the similarity between your ideas and mine is zero, even if/when the
> similarity in our behaviors is quite high.
>
> But, that doesn't change your conclusion, which I agree with.
> Reciprocity is critical to the interaction. The difference is only that
> I believe in sharing actions. The ideas are not shared and largely useless.
>
>> If there is no particular forward motion brought about by the
>> dialogue - in the direction of the purpose for which the dialogue
>> was established - than that is posturing.
> I'll offer another alternative. There is no "forward". There is only
> movement, change. While we may share a behavior space, we probably
> don't share a vector, a line of progression, in that space. Hence, what
> you may see as posturing (or aimless wandering), I may legitimately feel
> to be progress ... even if it's postmodern gobbledygook.
>
>> But there are a myriad of options for philosophical dialogue that do
>> have functional growth / expansion / increased knowledge.
> I agree, except there is no such thing as knowledge in the idealistic,
> intellectual sense. There is only _competence_, the ability to perform,
> to achieve. And that includes the modification of what we _say_ and how
> we say it by saying things together.
>

Merle Lefkoff-2

Re: beyond reductionism twice

Tory and Glen,

Meaty. Thanks. The Buddhist part of me gets you, Glen. So when I meet in Jordan this summer with our group of grass-roots Palestinian activists (all women in their 20s) I shall facilitate only ACTION, and no--or very little--interactive dialogue. And although I no longer believe in any "forward" motion involving nonlinear social dynamics, I can assure you that I have a PERCEPTION that the motion/movement in regard to Middle East peace building is distinctly backwards.

Do you guys believe the metaphor of the Edge of Chaos is applicable here for promoting hope? I use it to say with a perfectly straight face: this is when change is most likely to happen.

On Mar 26, 2013, at 2:43 PM, Steve Smith wrote:

> Glen -
>
> I have to say that your world-view (which I think you will claim doesn't exist or at least that *I* can't possibly come to share) continues to be more and more fascinating as you pull back more layers of otherwise "common" understandings which you don't share with the world at large. I mean this in the most favorable way.
>
> The hardest part about it all is that the more I think I understand your world view, the more I believe your world view doesn't allow for me to actually understand your world view!
>
> Why does head hurt when Hulk try to think?
>
> - Steve
>> Victoria Hughes wrote at 03/26/2013 12:02 PM:
>>> I'm curious- how do you talk to your friends? Or your children, if
>>> you have any? Or those you want to teach you something?
>> Great question! I'm often frustrated by my conversations with my
>> friends. I usually feel like I'm offering alternative explanations for
>> various things. They almost universally end up believing I'm
>> "contrarian" or "argumentative". It's unclear to me why they tolerate
>> me. It usually goes something like this:
>>
>> Them: X happened. So to compensate, I will do Y.
>>
>> Me: But perhaps Z really happened and you only thought it was X. And if
>> that's the case, then perhaps P is a better course of action.
>>
>> Them: No, there's no way that Z happened. It was definitely X.
>>
>> Me: There's a person/book/article/theory/... that Z can be mistaken for
>> X or that X is a side effect of Z.
>>
>> Them: No way. I know the truth. I have access to reality.
>>
>> Me: OK.
>>
>> Then after I get home (it's usually a dinner party or somesuch), I find
>> the person/book/article/... and e-mail it to them. In response I get
>> nothing... not even the sound of crickets. 8^)
>>
>> That's how I usually talk to people, friends or not. I have no
>> children, thank Cthulu. And I wish people would do the same with me.
>> I.e. provide alternatives to whatever gravity well I'm stuck in.
>>
>>> From my perspective, anything that is actually asking a question,
>>> and actually listening and considering the answer, and inquiring
>>> into it for new information, and then integrating new information
>>> to continue the dialogue, is not intellectual posturing.
>> In any other conversation, I'd agree. But in this conversation, I'll
>> propose the following. Competent posturing requires just as much
>> asking, listening, consideration, and integration as does non-posturing.
>>
>> I say this from the perspective of fighting. A good fighter knows that
>> the feint is a legitimate fighting move. Yes, you may have to unpack
>> it's _role_ in the fight. But it's just as much a part of fighting as a
>> straightforward attack or defense.
>>
>> The same could be said of, say, my cat's fur fluffing up and it turning
>> sideways when a dog appears. Yes, it's posturing. But it's just as
>> much a part of the interaction as the lightning fast pop to the snout.
>>
>> And remember, I offer this in the spirit of alternatives. I
>> legitimately believe I'm offering you an alternative, albeit one you
>> already know but may not have (yet) invoked in this conversation.
>>
>>> Communication exists for many purposes. I believe that
>>> communication, of which sharing ideas and information is one
>>> category, is not a hierarchical system but a needs-based system. So
>>> by that definition, dialogue is always expressing something about the
>>> speaker, and her/his intentions towards the listener. And (in most
>>> cases other than for a didactic purpose) the purpose is the back and
>>> forth of the dialogue. Then what that reciprocity brings to the
>>> participants.
>> Heh, now you're just pushing my buttons! I don't believe communication
>> (as normally conceived) exists at all. The ideas in your head are
>> forever and completely alien to my head. You may have a mechanism for
>> faithfully translating your ideas into your action or inferring ideas
>> from your perceptions. And I may have similarly faithful translators.
>> But the similarity between your ideas and mine is zero, even if/when the
>> similarity in our behaviors is quite high.
>>
>> But, that doesn't change your conclusion, which I agree with.
>> Reciprocity is critical to the interaction. The difference is only that
>> I believe in sharing actions. The ideas are not shared and largely useless.
>>
>>> If there is no particular forward motion brought about by the
>>> dialogue - in the direction of the purpose for which the dialogue
>>> was established - than that is posturing.
>> I'll offer another alternative. There is no "forward". There is only
>> movement, change. While we may share a behavior space, we probably
>> don't share a vector, a line of progression, in that space. Hence, what
>> you may see as posturing (or aimless wandering), I may legitimately feel
>> to be progress ... even if it's postmodern gobbledygook.
>>
>>> But there are a myriad of options for philosophical dialogue that do
>>> have functional growth / expansion / increased knowledge.
>> I agree, except there is no such thing as knowledge in the idealistic,
>> intellectual sense. There is only _competence_, the ability to perform,
>> to achieve. And that includes the modification of what we _say_ and how
>> we say it by saying things together.
>>
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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glen ropella

Re: beyond reductionism twice

In reply to this post by Steve Smith

Steve Smith wrote at 03/26/2013 01:43 PM:
> I have to say that your world-view (which I think you will claim doesn't
> exist or at least that *I* can't possibly come to share) continues to be
> more and more fascinating as you pull back more layers of otherwise
> "common" understandings which you don't share with the world at large.
> I mean this in the most favorable way.
>
> The hardest part about it all is that the more I think I understand your
> world view, the more I believe your world view doesn't allow for me to
> actually understand your world view!

I appreciate the sentiment. Thanks.

The trick lies in the <Delete> key. 8^) I am the worst type of troll.
(Seriously, I can list at least 3 places where the majority of
participants will insist that I'm a troll and nothing but a troll. And
I can't really disagree. cf: Torkel Franzen[*]) I thrive on paradox and
contradiction. Hail Eris!

Nothing is more fun for me than searching for singularities or
discontinuities in seemingly robust thoughts. Finding them is fun, too.
But the search is more fun. And I found quite a bit in common with
your "tunneling" from clique to clique metaphor. So... what? "Same
here", I guess.

Rejoice in Error, brother. http://churchofrobotron.com/

[*]
http://web.archive.org/web/20070609085706/http://www.sm.luth.se/~torkel/eget/net.html
--
=><= glen e. p. ropella
Sign my release from this planet's erosion

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glen ropella

Re: beyond reductionism twice

In reply to this post by Merle Lefkoff-2

Merle Lefkoff wrote at 03/26/2013 02:00 PM:
> Do you guys believe the metaphor of the Edge of Chaos is applicable
> here for promoting hope? I use it to say with a perfectly straight
> face: this is when change is most likely to happen.

I'm not a big fan of the Edge of Chaos. It's attractive, I admit. But
it seems to me that we pattern detectors do more imputing than
detecting. Hence, the interestingness we see at the edge is just as
false as the uninterestingness we see at either extreme.

We could go back to Kauffman's paper, though, and talk about criticality
and the indicators (if any) for a coming phase transition... perhaps a
"mixed state"? What density/spread of 20-something activists does one
need to induce a transition?

--
=><= glen e. p. ropella
Still so goddamn hungry

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Nick Thompson

Re: beyond reductionism twice

In reply to this post by Douglas Roberts-2

Doug,

One day, I will sit down with you over a beer and ruin your life by proving to you (using philosophical methods of course) that you ARE interested in it. At which point you will experience a Saul-to-Paul conversion and appear on the Plaza in white robes and sandals dispensing spiritual wisdom to the masses.

Beware.

Nick

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Douglas Roberts
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 12:04 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] beyond reductionism twice

But I acknowledge that a not small fraction of you eat this stuff up, so please: have at it!

--Doug

On Tue, Mar 26, 2013 at 11:57 AM, Frank Wimberly <[hidden email]> wrote:

Nick,

Here is the complete citation:

Glymour, C., and Wimberly, F.

Actual Causes and Thought Experiments,

in Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, Harry S. Silverstein (eds.),

Causation and Explanation: Topics in Contemporary Philosopy, MIT Press, Cambridge, July 2007.

I’ll buy a cup of coffee for anyone who reads the whole paper. The book contains a number of papers by luminaries in the area of philosophy of causation including Patrick Suppes, Nancy Cartwright, Christopher Hitchcock, etc. I was surprised to find that it’s available on Google books: http://tinyurl.com/d9l44jh

Frank

Frank C. Wimberly

140 Calle Ojo Feliz

Santa Fe, NM 87505

[hidden email] [hidden email]

Phone: <a href="tel:%28505%29%20995-8715" target="_blank">(505) 995-8715 Cell: <a href="tel:%28505%29%20670-9918" target="_blank">(505) 670-9918

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Nicholas Thompson
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 11:57 PM
To: [hidden email]; 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] beyond reductionism twice

Russ,

I don’t know wtf I am. I have always thought of myself as a scientist, but I am sure that many on this list have their doubts. I am certainly not a “hard” scientist.

I was hoping by my comment to lure you into a more lengthy explication of the idea that real scientists don’t think in terms of causes. But now you have smoked me out instead, so here goes.

Many of the philosophers I know, from time to time like to talk about causality as if it were a sophomoric illusion, citing Hume, or some sort of weird quantum theory. But that does not keep them from using causal reasoning freely in their everyday lives. I have never heard a philosopher who was reluctant to say things like “my car stalled because it ran out of gas”. I think what they mean when they deny causality is the denial of something that, as a behaviorist, I never thought to entertain: some deep gear-and-cog mechanism lurking behind experience. If one once concedes that all one means by causality is some forms of relation between previous and successive events such that a previous event makes a successive event more likely, then determining causality is just an exercise in experimentation. The sort of thing that all scientists do all the time. Thus, while “causality” may be unfounded in some fastidious philosophical sense, it is by no means empty. I’ll quote below from a footnote from a paper we just wrote which tries to preempt criticism our use of “causal” arguments in the paper. The footnote makes reference to work by a colleague and friend of mine, here in Santa Fe, Frank Wimberly. I will copy him here to try and get him to speak up. He tends to lurk, until I say something really foolish, which no doubt I have. The whole paper is at http://www.behavior.org/resource.php?id=675 . So, here is the footnote:

Some might argue that in falling back on a more vernacular understanding of causality we have paid too great a price in rigor. However, as our Seminar colleague Frank Wimberly pointed out, the vernacular understanding of casualty is potentially rigorous. Research investigating what aspects of the world lay people are sensitive to when assigning causality suggests people are sensitive to particular types of probabilistic relationships (Cheng, Novick, Liljeholm, & Ford, 2007) and that certain types of experiments are better than others at revealing such relationships (Glymour & Wimberly, 2007).

Frank?

Nick

From: Friam [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 11:05 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] beyond reductionism twice

Nick,

You're the scientist; I'm only a computer scientist. So you are more qualified to talk about science and cause.

Do you think science organizes its theories in terms of causes? I see equations, entities, structures, geometries, and mechanisms, but I don't see causes. As I'm sure you know, the notion of "cause" is very slippery. I think science is better off without it.

But I'm interested in your perspective. What do you think?

[If this is a thread hijack, I apologize. I am very interested in the subject, though.]

-- Russ Abbott
_____________________________________________

Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

My paper on how the Fed can fix the economy: ssrn.com/abstract=1977688
Google voice: <a href="tel:747-999-5105" target="_blank">747-999-5105

Google+: plus.google.com/114865618166480775623/

vita: sites.google.com/site/russabbott/

CS Wiki and the courses I teach
_____________________________________________

On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 10:02 PM, Steve Smith <[hidden email]> wrote:

Russ -

Steve, you mentioned Lamarkian evolution. I'd be very interested to find out more about some of your daughter's examples.

This was on a long drive from NM to OR last Thanksgiving... in the course of about 30 hours of driving we talked about a LOT of things.

I am pretty sure this first exmaple is merely "neo-Lamarckian" or "Lamarckianesque" as they only applied to the single next generation. The germline of the child does not carry the changes, although if the child experiences the same conditions the parent did, the same epigenetic mechanisms would be in effect in the subsequent generation. This example had to to do with Long Term Potentiation (a feature of neural connectivity). What surprised me most was that this particular example involved the female/mother/eggs which are not manufactured "on the fly". It seems more likely that the father/male/sperm would be prone to this type of effect? There may have been two sub-examples, one about memory and one about "bad mothering"?

A more Lamarckian example was, I think, in Roundworms and involved RNA interference. The result (minus the details) was something like hereditible immunity.

A parallel example I *can* remember was the case of Tasmanian Devils and what is known as DFTD for Devil Facial Tumor Disease. Apparently it is an *infectuous* cancer (non-viral, meaning it isn't about a virus transferring from one host to another, then causing cancer). A cancerous cell from one individual literally becomes part of the other individual's organism... like an accidental organ donation or skin graft. Apparently the Devils are prone to lots of scrapping with each other and when one with a tumor on it's face scraps with one without, a cancerous cell (or cells) can get transferred to from the skin of one to the other and it can in fact 'graft' right into the epithelial layer. I don't know if this is more common/likely because it is cancerous, or if Devils were already exchanging skin cells before this cancer emerged?

The point of this Tasmanian Devil example is that it is as unexpected (to me anyway) as examples of Lamarckian evolution would be.

-- Russ Abbott
_____________________________________________

Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

My paper on how the Fed can fix the economy: ssrn.com/abstract=1977688
Google voice: <a href="tel:747-999-5105" target="_blank">747-999-5105

Google+: plus.google.com/114865618166480775623/

vita: sites.google.com/site/russabbott/

CS Wiki and the courses I teach
_____________________________________________

On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 3:42 PM, Steve Smith <[hidden email]> wrote:

Gary/Pamela/(Stephen, Carl, Eric, ...) -

I know several (many?) on this list know Stu better than I... so I apologize if I sounded overly critical. I prefer Pamela's description of him being *careless* with references as opposed to my own use of the *honest*. I also admit that I do not know if he sees himself as a rock-star... that is perhaps the default category I put people in who are simultaneously *good*, *self-possessed* and *charismatic*. I actually *like* most rock stars (within reason) even if I might not care for their music.

As an aside... does anyone remember Chris Langton appearing in Rolling Stone (CA 1990?)... I searched their archives and did not find any references (nor on the internet at large?). I remember the article including a sexed-up spread of him in front of a Connection Machine? I suppose I could be hallucinating or have come from an alternate history?

I also smiled at your term "demigod" as I often use "Titans" to describe the pantheon of my wife's sibling group... she is oldest of 8 *mostly* high functioning, *very* charismatic, *definitely* self-possessed siblings. They all revered their father who was a humble but charismatic physics professor. None of them took up science per se, though one has a PhD in psychology. I would not use *rock star* to describe any of their self-image, though there is one who insists he *is* Elvis... and sometimes we are tempted to believe him. There are definitely characters right out of Greek, Roman, Norse, even Hindu mythology in her family... My wife is Kali *and* Loki rolled into one I think.

I have always been inspired by Kauffman's ideas as best I could understand them, which has been highly variable, depending on the circumstance. This says more about me than about Stu. I read his lecture notes in the late-nineties... the ones which ultimately became the core of _Investigations_ (or so it seemed to me). I had read _OofO_ and _At Home in the Universe_ previously. It may have been coincidence or something stronger like kismet that I read Investigations interleaved with my reading of Christopher Alexander's (Pattern Language fame) _Notes on the Synthesis of Form_ with D'Arcy Thompson's _On Growth and Form_ as backup reference. I was traveling lightly in New Zealand at the time with none of my usual distractions nagging me. It was a month of deep thought informed by Alexander and Kauffman equally.

My nature is to be guarded around people with significant charisma (and me married into aforementioned pantheon!). I appreciate the need for and the value of the persuasive and the self-confident, even in the realm of science where ideas *by definition* must stand on their own. There is value for those who can bring us to *want* to believe enough to put in the hard work to believe things on their own merits. Unfortunately that might be the dividing line between science and Science(tm). I suppose I mistrust those who appear to be trying to corner the franchise on Science(tm) in their neighborhood.

Nevertheless, I am *more* interested in Kauffman's ideas here and hope that we will discuss them a bit?

- Steve

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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College

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Doug Roberts
[hidden email]

http://parrot-farm.net/Second-Cousins

505-455-7333 - Office
505-672-8213 - Mobile

Douglas Roberts-2

Re: beyond reductionism twice

As you say, Nick. And that will either right before, or right afterward I convert to some religion or another.

But in the mean time, we can still have that beer.

--Doug

On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 3:12 AM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Doug,

One day, I will sit down with you over a beer and ruin your life by proving to you (using philosophical methods of course) that you ARE interested in it. At which point you will experience a Saul-to-Paul conversion and appear on the Plaza in white robes and sandals dispensing spiritual wisdom to the masses.

Beware.

Nick

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Douglas Roberts
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2013 12:04 PM

To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] beyond reductionism twice
This list constantly reminds me that we are all, thankfully, different. Offhand, I can not think of a topic that I would be more violently disinterested in than the "philosophy of causation". Unless maybe it would be "the philosophy of complexity", or perhaps "the philosophy of agent-based model design".

But I acknowledge that a not small fraction of you eat this stuff up, so please: have at it!
--Doug
On Tue, Mar 26, 2013 at 11:57 AM, Frank Wimberly <[hidden email]> wrote:
Nick,

Here is the complete citation:

Glymour, C., and Wimberly, F.
      Actual Causes and Thought Experiments,

      in Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, Harry S. Silverstein (eds.),
      Causation and Explanation: Topics in Contemporary Philosopy, MIT Press, Cambridge, July 2007.

I’ll buy a cup of coffee for anyone who reads the whole paper. The book contains a number of papers by luminaries in the area of philosophy of causation including Patrick Suppes, Nancy Cartwright, Christopher Hitchcock, etc. I was surprised to find that it’s available on Google books: http://tinyurl.com/d9l44jh

Frank

Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz

Santa Fe, NM 87505

[hidden email]     [hidden email]

Phone: <a href="tel:%28505%29%20995-8715" target="_blank">(505) 995-8715      Cell: <a href="tel:%28505%29%20670-9918" target="_blank">(505) 670-9918

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Nicholas Thompson
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 11:57 PM
To: [hidden email]; 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] beyond reductionism twice

Russ,

I don’t know wtf I am. I have always thought of myself as a scientist, but I am sure that many on this list have their doubts. I am certainly not a “hard” scientist.

I was hoping by my comment to lure you into a more lengthy explication of the idea that real scientists don’t think in terms of causes. But now you have smoked me out instead, so here goes.

Many of the philosophers I know, from time to time like to talk about causality as if it were a sophomoric illusion, citing Hume, or some sort of weird quantum theory. But that does not keep them from using causal reasoning freely in their everyday lives. I have never heard a philosopher who was reluctant to say things like “my car stalled because it ran out of gas”. I think what they mean when they deny causality is the denial of something that, as a behaviorist, I never thought to entertain: some deep gear-and-cog mechanism lurking behind experience. If one once concedes that all one means by causality is some forms of relation between previous and successive events such that a previous event makes a successive event more likely, then determining causality is just an exercise in experimentation. The sort of thing that all scientists do all the time. Thus, while “causality” may be unfounded in some fastidious philosophical sense, it is by no means empty. I’ll quote below from a footnote from a paper we just wrote which tries to preempt criticism our use of “causal” arguments in the paper. The footnote makes reference to work by a colleague and friend of mine, here in Santa Fe, Frank Wimberly. I will copy him here to try and get him to speak up. He tends to lurk, until I say something really foolish, which no doubt I have. The whole paper is at http://www.behavior.org/resource.php?id=675 . So, here is the footnote:

Some might argue that in falling back on a more vernacular understanding of causality we have paid too great a price in rigor. However, as our Seminar colleague Frank Wimberly pointed out, the vernacular understanding of casualty is potentially rigorous. Research investigating what aspects of the world lay people are sensitive to when assigning causality suggests people are sensitive to particular types of probabilistic relationships (Cheng, Novick, Liljeholm, & Ford, 2007) and that certain types of experiments are better than others at revealing such relationships (Glymour & Wimberly, 2007).

Frank?

Nick

From: Friam [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2013 11:05 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] beyond reductionism twice

Nick,

You're the scientist; I'm only a computer scientist. So you are more qualified to talk about science and cause.

Do you think science organizes its theories in terms of causes? I see equations, entities, structures, geometries, and mechanisms, but I don't see causes. As I'm sure you know, the notion of "cause" is very slippery. I think science is better off without it.

But I'm interested in your perspective. What do you think?

[If this is a thread hijack, I apologize. I am very interested in the subject, though.]
-- Russ Abbott
_____________________________________________

Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

My paper on how the Fed can fix the economy: ssrn.com/abstract=1977688
Google voice: <a href="tel:747-999-5105" target="_blank">747-999-5105
Google+: plus.google.com/114865618166480775623/

vita: sites.google.com/site/russabbott/

CS Wiki and the courses I teach
_____________________________________________
On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 10:02 PM, Steve Smith <[hidden email]> wrote:
Russ -

Steve, you mentioned Lamarkian evolution. I'd be very interested to find out more about some of your daughter's examples.

This was on a long drive from NM to OR last Thanksgiving... in the course of about 30 hours of driving we talked about a LOT of things.

I am pretty sure this first exmaple is merely "neo-Lamarckian" or "Lamarckianesque" as they only applied to the single next generation. The germline of the child does not carry the changes, although if the child experiences the same conditions the parent did, the same epigenetic mechanisms would be in effect in the subsequent generation. This example had to to do with Long Term Potentiation (a feature of neural connectivity). What surprised me most was that this particular example involved the female/mother/eggs which are not manufactured "on the fly". It seems more likely that the father/male/sperm would be prone to this type of effect? There may have been two sub-examples, one about memory and one about "bad mothering"?

A more Lamarckian example was, I think, in Roundworms and involved RNA interference. The result (minus the details) was something like hereditible immunity.

A parallel example I *can* remember was the case of Tasmanian Devils and what is known as DFTD for Devil Facial Tumor Disease. Apparently it is an *infectuous* cancer (non-viral, meaning it isn't about a virus transferring from one host to another, then causing cancer). A cancerous cell from one individual literally becomes part of the other individual's organism... like an accidental organ donation or skin graft. Apparently the Devils are prone to lots of scrapping with each other and when one with a tumor on it's face scraps with one without, a cancerous cell (or cells) can get transferred to from the skin of one to the other and it can in fact 'graft' right into the epithelial layer. I don't know if this is more common/likely because it is cancerous, or if Devils were already exchanging skin cells before this cancer emerged?

The point of this Tasmanian Devil example is that it is as unexpected (to me anyway) as examples of Lamarckian evolution would be.

-- Russ Abbott
_____________________________________________
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

My paper on how the Fed can fix the economy: ssrn.com/abstract=1977688
Google voice: <a href="tel:747-999-5105" target="_blank">747-999-5105
Google+: plus.google.com/114865618166480775623/

vita: sites.google.com/site/russabbott/

CS Wiki and the courses I teach
_____________________________________________

On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 3:42 PM, Steve Smith <[hidden email]> wrote:

Gary/Pamela/(Stephen, Carl, Eric, ...) -

I know several (many?) on this list know Stu better than I... so I apologize if I sounded overly critical. I prefer Pamela's description of him being *careless* with references as opposed to my own use of the *honest*. I also admit that I do not know if he sees himself as a rock-star... that is perhaps the default category I put people in who are simultaneously *good*, *self-possessed* and *charismatic*. I actually *like* most rock stars (within reason) even if I might not care for their music.

As an aside... does anyone remember Chris Langton appearing in Rolling Stone (CA 1990?)... I searched their archives and did not find any references (nor on the internet at large?). I remember the article including a sexed-up spread of him in front of a Connection Machine? I suppose I could be hallucinating or have come from an alternate history?

I also smiled at your term "demigod" as I often use "Titans" to describe the pantheon of my wife's sibling group... she is oldest of 8 *mostly* high functioning, *very* charismatic, *definitely* self-possessed siblings. They all revered their father who was a humble but charismatic physics professor. None of them took up science per se, though one has a PhD in psychology. I would not use *rock star* to describe any of their self-image, though there is one who insists he *is* Elvis... and sometimes we are tempted to believe him. There are definitely characters right out of Greek, Roman, Norse, even Hindu mythology in her family... My wife is Kali *and* Loki rolled into one I think.

I have always been inspired by Kauffman's ideas as best I could understand them, which has been highly variable, depending on the circumstance. This says more about me than about Stu. I read his lecture notes in the late-nineties... the ones which ultimately became the core of _Investigations_ (or so it seemed to me). I had read _OofO_ and _At Home in the Universe_ previously. It may have been coincidence or something stronger like kismet that I read Investigations interleaved with my reading of Christopher Alexander's (Pattern Language fame) _Notes on the Synthesis of Form_ with D'Arcy Thompson's _On Growth and Form_ as backup reference. I was traveling lightly in New Zealand at the time with none of my usual distractions nagging me. It was a month of deep thought informed by Alexander and Kauffman equally.

My nature is to be guarded around people with significant charisma (and me married into aforementioned pantheon!). I appreciate the need for and the value of the persuasive and the self-confident, even in the realm of science where ideas *by definition* must stand on their own. There is value for those who can bring us to *want* to believe enough to put in the hard work to believe things on their own merits. Unfortunately that might be the dividing line between science and Science(tm). I suppose I mistrust those who appear to be trying to corner the franchise on Science(tm) in their neighborhood.

Nevertheless, I am *more* interested in Kauffman's ideas here and hope that we will discuss them a bit?

- Steve

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
--
Doug Roberts
[hidden email]

http://parrot-farm.net/Second-Cousins

<a href="tel:505-455-7333" value="+15054557333" target="_blank">505-455-7333 - Office
<a href="tel:505-672-8213" value="+15056728213" target="_blank">505-672-8213 - Mobile
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com

Doug Roberts
[hidden email]

http://parrot-farm.net/Second-Cousins

505-455-7333 - Office
505-672-8213 - Mobile

Steve Smith

Re: beyond reductionism twice

In reply to this post by Nick Thompson

On 3/26/13 9:12 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:

Doug,

One day, I will sit down with you over a beer and ruin your life by proving to you (using philosophical methods of course) that you ARE interested in it. At which point you will experience a Saul-to-Paul conversion and appear on the Plaza in white robes and sandals dispensing spiritual wisdom to the masses.

Careful... if the wind comes up and Doug's robes blow up (think Marilyn Monroe) it will be exposed that he wears the very same "funny underwear" that he chides the Mormons on. It is a funny world isn't it?

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com

Douglas Roberts-2

Re: beyond reductionism twice

It would almost be worth it to see the look on your face, Steve.

On Tue, Mar 26, 2013 at 9:21 PM, Steve Smith <[hidden email]> wrote:

On 3/26/13 9:12 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:

Doug,

One day, I will sit down with you over a beer and ruin your life by proving to you (using philosophical methods of course) that you ARE interested in it. At which point you will experience a Saul-to-Paul conversion and appear on the Plaza in white robes and sandals dispensing spiritual wisdom to the masses.

Careful... if the wind comes up and Doug's robes blow up (think Marilyn Monroe) it will be exposed that he wears the very same "funny underwear" that he chides the Mormons on. It is a funny world isn't it?

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com

Doug Roberts
[hidden email]

http://parrot-farm.net/Second-Cousins

505-455-7333 - Office
505-672-8213 - Mobile

glen ep ropella

the white male effect (was Re: beyond reductionism twice)

In reply to this post by Victoria Hughes

Victoria Hughes wrote at 03/26/2013 11:27 AM:
> 1. The discussion also references non-European, non-white-male models
> for awareness, reality, conceptual modeling, etc.

I found this interesting:

Is the culturally polarizing effect of science literacy on climate
change risk perceptions related to the "white male effect"? Does the
answer tell us anything about the "asymmetry thesis"?!

http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2013/3/28/is-the-culturally-polarizing-effect-of-science-literacy-on-c.html

"2. The "white male effect" -- the observed tendency of white males to
perceive risk to be lower -- is actually a "white male hierarch" effect.
If you look at the blue lines, you can see they are more or less at
This is consistent with prior CCP research that suggests that the
"effect" is driven by culturally motivated reasoning: white male
hierarch individualists have a cultural stake in perceiving
environmental and technological risks to be low; egalitarian
communitarians -- among whom there are no meaningful gender or race
differences--have a stake in viewing such risks to be high."

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-255-2847, http://tempusdictum.com
A government which robs Peter to pay Paul, can always count on the
support of Paul -- George Bernard Shaw

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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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