The coat hook of the mind
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Bergson allegedly said that the brain is the
coat hook of the mind ("das Gehirn ist der Kleiderhaken des Geistes"), but I can't pin down the origin of this quote. In modern language, one could say that the brain is like a wire frame model or polygon mesh of the mind: the vertices correspond to neural assemblies, and the edges to connections betwen them. Are these metaphors useful? -J. ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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On May 5, 2010, at 11:12 PM, Jochen Fromm wrote: > Bergson allegedly said that the brain is the coat hook of the mind ("das Gehirn ist der Kleiderhaken des Geistes"), but I can't pin down the origin of this quote. > > In modern language, one could say that the brain > is like a wire frame model or polygon mesh of the mind: the vertices correspond to neural assemblies, and the edges to connections betwen them. > > Are these metaphors useful? For what? Miles :) ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by Jochen Fromm-4
Jochen,
I take metaphors VERY seriously; I think they are the wet edge of science. But a metaphor is only as good as its heuristic power and i can't see what this one implies. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ http://www.cusf.org [City University of Santa Fe] > [Original Message] > From: Jochen Fromm <[hidden email]> > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 5/6/2010 4:10:46 AM > Subject: [FRIAM] The coat hook of the mind > > Bergson allegedly said that the brain is the > coat hook of the mind ("das Gehirn ist der > Kleiderhaken des Geistes"), but I can't pin > down the origin of this quote. > > In modern language, one could say that the brain > is like a wire frame model or polygon mesh of the > mind: the vertices correspond to neural assemblies, > and the edges to connections betwen them. > > Are these metaphors useful? > > -J. > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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Whereas "the wet edge of science" brings to mind ... ? A cooked noodle?
-- Russ On Thu, May 6, 2010 at 12:05 AM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote: Jochen, ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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Nick said:
To which Russ replied: I took it to mean "the whetted edge" for which the metaphorical source is perhaps more obviously apt (an edge deliberately or carefully kept sharp?) than "wet" which for me is interestingly allusory (makes me think of our general reference to brain-stuff as wet-ware?) but not as obviously useful. Perhaps Nick has something more specific in mind? I'm curious about how this group comes down on the topic of the utility of metaphor in general. I find that most people are fairly strongly polarized on the topic and most have not given more than casual thought to it. For myself, Lakoff and Johnson captured me 30 years ago with "Metaphors we Live By" but I regularly encounter strong opposition to the idea that metaphor is central to our understanding and communication. Some of this I attribute to the *very* lame use of overt metaphor in rhetoric by many. On the other hand, I'm willing to accept the possibility that some people simply don't (think that they?) use analogy much in their understanding of the world around them. I accept that metaphor is more obviously used in the understanding of, for example, human nature more than perhaps the physical world. I believe that Lakoff and Nunez make some very compelling arguements tying metaphor into Mathematics in their book "Where Mathematics Comes From". Since there are many modelers here, I would promote the idea that the use of metaphor in everyday language is an informal act of building and using models. Models built using familiar concepts and their inter-relations to understand less-familiar domains. And of course it would be natural to ask if it is "turtles/models all the way down" and *that* is a truly interesting question. Where *do* models, analogies, metaphors ground out? In direct experience? In atomic elements of intuitive understanding? In response to Jochen's original quote of Bergson: "The brain is the coathook of the mind" is mildly useful to remind us (perhaps) that the stuff of the mind (ideas?) are merely things we use the structure (coat-hook) of the brain to hold them in place and provide some bit of arrangement. It is not a deep or strong metaphor as I see it, but I find that metaphors originating in other languages, cultures, times often elude me until I've considered or discussed them with others. In my question of whether and why not everyone accepts metaphors as important to understanding, it might be worth noting that if Bergman's metaphorical association of brain to coat-hook (and mind to coats, hats, scarves?) feels like a mnemonic device more than an explanatory device and in it's brevity feels like more of a "quip" than an explanation. In rhetoric, it seems we use many devices besides direct explanation to persuade... in fact, we often evade explanation altogether in favor of creating associations that support the cause of our rhetoric, independent of their validity. Colorful and superficially apt associations seem to often be the stuff of rhetoric. I believe we may have some scholars of rhetoric here who could correct me, as I am speaking mostly of the informal rhetoric used in everyday talk, in advertising, in politics. To credit Jochen's original question, I would also say that Bergson's use of "coat hook" served to "hook" me into this conversation... while I understood "coat hook of the mind" fairly literally in the sense of what coat-hooks are designed for, I could not help but have the image of the "hookness" of a coat hook and the allusions to many other forms of hooks inform my thinking and feeling about the question at hand, causing many "threads" of my thinking to be "snagged" by the idea of "hooks" as well as images of a long shepherd's "hook" reaching out onto the stage of my vaudeville act here to pull me off the stage... - Steve ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The coat hook of the mind
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Steve Smith wrote circa 10-05-06 08:30 AM:
> I'm curious about how this group comes down on the topic of the utility of > metaphor in general. I find that most people are fairly strongly polarized on > the topic and most have not given more than casual thought to it. In my naive perspective, I think of metaphor as a kind of linguistic trickiness, not necessarily purely rhetorical in the sense that the trickster wants to persuade, but more of a magus or "teacher" trying to get someone to open their mind a little bit more. > Since there are many modelers here, I would promote the idea that the use of > metaphor in everyday language is an informal act of building and using models. > Models built using familiar concepts and their inter-relations to understand > less-familiar domains. And of course it would be natural to ask if it is > "turtles/models all the way down" and *that* is a truly interesting question. > Where *do* models, analogies, metaphors ground out? In direct experience? In > atomic elements of intuitive understanding? To me, metaphor is distinct from analogy in the sense that metaphor is a language game... a game of swapping the _names_ of things to manipulate thoughts (your own or others). And in that sense, it's an epistemological tool. Analogy, on the other hand, is more real, more ontological. Analogy is the result of a real similarity between two things, not just a language game. I enjoy examining the etymology of words in situations like this. Metaphor parses out as something like "the carrier for a transfer". The word-swappage is a medium through which we modify thought. Analog parses out as "a comparison of proportions". Analogies arise from a kind of validation process: measure thing #1, measure thing #2, compare the measurements, if they're similar, they're analogous (under that measure). Hence, analogy is fundamentally related to concrete, physical modeling (which is etymologically related to "measure") whereas metaphor is more related to the mind and how we think. Metaphors can be fantastical and imaginary whereas analogies have to be more concretely grounded to some repeatable method of measurement. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by Jochen Fromm-4
Interesting, Glen.
We seem to disagree quite thoroughly. To me, analogies are part of the implicature of scientific metaphors. EG, if the natural selection metaphor is correct, then pigeon varieties : pigeon species :: species of animals : all animals. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ http://www.cusf.org [City University of Santa Fe] > [Original Message] > From: glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]> > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 5/6/2010 10:22:46 AM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The coat hook of the mind > > Steve Smith wrote circa 10-05-06 08:30 AM: > > I'm curious about how this group comes down on the topic of the utility of > > metaphor in general. I find that most people are fairly strongly polarized on > > the topic and most have not given more than casual thought to it. > > In my naive perspective, I think of metaphor as a kind of linguistic > trickiness, not necessarily purely rhetorical in the sense that the > trickster wants to persuade, but more of a magus or "teacher" trying to > get someone to open their mind a little bit more. > > > Since there are many modelers here, I would promote the idea that the use of > > metaphor in everyday language is an informal act of building and using models. > > Models built using familiar concepts and their inter-relations to understand > > less-familiar domains. And of course it would be natural to ask if it is > > "turtles/models all the way down" and *that* is a truly interesting question. > > Where *do* models, analogies, metaphors ground out? In direct experience? In > > atomic elements of intuitive understanding? > > To me, metaphor is distinct from analogy in the sense that metaphor is a > language game... a game of swapping the _names_ of things to manipulate > thoughts (your own or others). And in that sense, it's an > epistemological tool. Analogy, on the other hand, is more real, more > ontological. Analogy is the result of a real similarity between two > things, not just a language game. > > I enjoy examining the etymology of words in situations like this. > Metaphor parses out as something like "the carrier for a transfer". The > word-swappage is a medium through which we modify thought. Analog > parses out as "a comparison of proportions". Analogies arise from a > kind of validation process: measure thing #1, measure thing #2, compare > the measurements, if they're similar, they're analogous (under that > measure). > > Hence, analogy is fundamentally related to concrete, physical modeling > (which is etymologically related to "measure") whereas metaphor is more > related to the mind and how we think. Metaphors can be fantastical and > imaginary whereas analogies have to be more concretely grounded to some > repeatable method of measurement. > > -- > glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The coat hook of the mind
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Nicholas Thompson wrote circa 10-05-06 10:15 AM:
> We seem to disagree quite thoroughly. To me, analogies are part of the > implicature of scientific metaphors. > > EG, if the natural selection metaphor is correct, then > > pigeon varieties : pigeon species :: species of animals : all animals. It's not clear to me that we disagree at all, much less thoroughly. You seem to be using metaphor exclusively as a mental construct, which agrees with my naive sense of the word. And you claim metaphors imply (again, a mental construct since logic/math are mental constructs) analogies, which agrees with my naive sense of the words. And metaphors, even in your restricted sense, are quite distinct from analogies, which agrees quite nicely with my naive sense. So, what exactly do you disagree with? -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
I think the source of the quote is Henri
Bergson's book "Matter and Memory": "That there is a close connexion between a state of consciousness and the brain we do not dispute. But there is also a close connexion between a coat and the nail on which it hangs, for, if the nail is pulled out, the coat falls to the ground. Shall we say, then, that the shape of the nail gives us the shape of the coat, or in any way corresponds to it?" (introduction, page xi) What Henri Bergson (1859-1941) suggests is that the brain is like the coat hook of the mind. The coat itself is completely independent from the nail or the hook, but the coat on the hook is not possible without the hook, if we take the hook away, everything breaks down. This is very similar to the modern idea of supervenience: although it is independent from it, the mind rests and depends on the brain, like the coat on the coat hook or coat-hanger. The mind can also be there, or it can be absent, like a coat which can be present or absent on a coat hook. And the mind takes only a form or shape which the connections in the brain allow, like the coat which takes only the form which the nail, coat hook or coat-hanger allows. The question of Henri Bergson if the brain determines the shape of the mind is especially interesting: if we can answer how it does it exactly, we have crossed the gap between Psychology and Physiology (or Neuroscience). -J. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Nicholas Thompson" <[hidden email]> To: <[hidden email]> Sent: Thursday, May 06, 2010 9:05 AM Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The coat hook of the mind > > a metaphor is only as good as its heuristic power and i can't see what > this one implies. > ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by Jochen Fromm-4
Ah! Thanks for the clarification.
N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ http://www.cusf.org [City University of Santa Fe] > [Original Message] > From: Jochen Fromm <[hidden email]> > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 5/6/2010 5:29:17 PM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The coat hook of the mind > > I think the source of the quote is Henri > Bergson's book "Matter and Memory": > "That there is a close connexion between > a state of consciousness and the brain we > do not dispute. But there is also a close > connexion between a coat and the nail on > which it hangs, for, if the nail is pulled > out, the coat falls to the ground. Shall > we say, then, that the shape of the nail > gives us the shape of the coat, or in any > way corresponds to it?" (introduction, page xi) > > What Henri Bergson (1859-1941) suggests is > that the brain is like the coat hook of the mind. > The coat itself is completely independent from > the nail or the hook, but the coat on the hook is > not possible without the hook, if we take the hook > away, everything breaks down. This is very similar > to the modern idea of supervenience: although it is > independent from it, the mind rests and depends > on the brain, like the coat on the coat hook or > coat-hanger. > > The mind can also be there, or it can be absent, > like a coat which can be present or absent on > a coat hook. And the mind takes only a form > or shape which the connections in the brain > allow, like the coat which takes only the form > which the nail, coat hook or coat-hanger > allows. The question of Henri Bergson if > the brain determines the shape of the mind > is especially interesting: if we can answer how > it does it exactly, we have crossed the gap > between Psychology and Physiology (or > Neuroscience). > > -J. > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Nicholas Thompson" <[hidden email]> > To: <[hidden email]> > Sent: Thursday, May 06, 2010 9:05 AM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The coat hook of the mind > > > > > > a metaphor is only as good as its heuristic power and i can't see what > > this one implies. > > > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by Steve Smith
Metaphors are essential and important,
as Lakoff and Johnson argued so convincingly. Many of our discussions here are philosophical, and the main tool of Philosophy is language. The earliest types of Philosophy takes the form of a dialog or discourse (Plato or Aristotles). Since then, Philosophy has used logic and linguistic examination. Using linguistic tools, one can find metaphors and analogies or categories and classifications. Metaphors belongs to the best things we can find in Philosophy. Metaphors lead to meaning and understanding. Without metaphors, it is impossible to achieve an understanding of abstract items. They give meaning to abstract things. Understanding, meaning and semantics require a connection or relationship between two worlds. Meaning arises from a *mapping* between two worlds.. ..from connections between physical ojects and abstract symbols ..from metaphors and analogies, which map abstract domains to concrete domains ..from dictionaries which map one language to another Equations and metaphors are similar, they relate two different terms, things, and sides. Metaphors let us express one thing in terms of another. In this sense, metaphors are the "calculus of the mind". A function is at it's core a mapping from one thing to another. An equation means to find a mapping from one thing to another, too. A law (of nature) is at it's core a mapping from one world to another. Here we come back to Russ' question why theorems and laws of nature exist: according to this definition, one would say because there are many worlds which can be mapped to each other in a meaningful way. -J. ----- Original Message ----- From: Steve Smith To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group Sent: Thursday, May 06, 2010 5:30 PM Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The coat hook of the mind I'm curious about how this group comes down on the topic of the utility of metaphor in general. I find that most people are fairly strongly polarized on the topic and most have not given more than casual thought to it. For myself, Lakoff and Johnson captured me 30 years ago with "Metaphors we Live By" but I regularly encounter strong opposition to the idea that metaphor is central to our understanding and communication. ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The coat hook of the mind
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Jochen Fromm wrote circa 10-05-06 01:41 PM:
> Equations and metaphors are similar, they > relate two different terms, things, and sides. > Metaphors let us express one thing in terms of another. > In this sense, metaphors are the "calculus of the mind". Can we really say this? My experience with metaphors is that they are always inexact, imprecise, inaccurate, etc. They're fuzzy constructs. Granted, they do help one think. But they're more like fuzzy "waypoints" that provide a general direction of thought rather than, say, a precise coordinate system and a vector in that system. Analogies in general, on the other hand, can be very precise (or very imprecise). I suppose if you replaced = with ≈ (approximately equal to, or similar to), then we might come closer to what we normally think of as equations. Byers talks a bit about how "equals" is a type of lens through which a thing can be viewed in a totally different way (e.g. e = mc^2). But even there, for us to use "=", we have to be really serious about the mapping being exact, not fuzzy or vague like metaphors. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by Jochen Fromm-4
Glen, 'n' all:
I think one of the implications of the The Rant I recently posted is that metaphors can be made unfuzzy, precise, and exact if we are willing to take the time to separate out their implications into those that we already know to be false, those we already know to be true, and those that are not yet known to be true of false. nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ http://www.cusf.org [City University of Santa Fe] > [Original Message] > From: glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]> > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 5/7/2010 4:34:20 PM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The coat hook of the mind > > Jochen Fromm wrote circa 10-05-06 01:41 PM: > Equations and metaphors are similar, they > relate two different terms, things, and sides. > Metaphors let us express one thing in terms of another. > In this sense, metaphors are the "calculus of the mind". always inexact, imprecise, inaccurate, etc. They're fuzzy constructs. Granted, they do help one think. But they're more like fuzzy "waypoints" that provide a general direction of thought rather than, say, a precise coordinate system and a vector in that system. Analogies in general, on the other hand, can be very precise (or very imprecise). I suppose if you replaced = with â (approximately equal to, or similar to), then we might come closer to what we normally think of as equations. Byers talks a bit about how "equals" is a type of lens through which a thing can be viewed in a totally different way (e.g. e = mc^2). But even there, for us to use "=", we have to be really serious about the mapping being exact, not fuzzy or vague like metaphors. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The coat hook of the mind
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In reply to this post by Jochen Fromm-4
Is it just me ? I'm unable to extract any meaningful information from
this quote which correlates to the subsequent analysis. Would the man on the Clapham omnibus start from Dr Suess's "Fox in Socks on Knox in Box" and end up postulating that Schroedingers Fox is half alive in a Box in Fort Knox, or that taking away the Box makes everything break down? I'm indebted to someone at the Artificial Intelligence lab at U-Mich for the full text http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/people/dreeves/Fox-In-Socks.txt the "hidden" metaphors (allusions) of which have inspired many computer designers Sarbajit On 5/7/10, Jochen Fromm <[hidden email]> wrote: > I think the source of the quote is Henri > Bergson's book "Matter and Memory": > "That there is a close connexion between > a state of consciousness and the brain we > do not dispute. But there is also a close > connexion between a coat and the nail on > which it hangs, for, if the nail is pulled > out, the coat falls to the ground. Shall > we say, then, that the shape of the nail > gives us the shape of the coat, or in any > way corresponds to it?" (introduction, page xi) > > What Henri Bergson (1859-1941) suggests is > that the brain is like the coat hook of the mind. > The coat itself is completely independent from > the nail or the hook, but the coat on the hook is > not possible without the hook, if we take the hook > away, everything breaks down. This is very similar > to the modern idea of supervenience: although it is > independent from it, the mind rests and depends > on the brain, like the coat on the coat hook or > coat-hanger. > > The mind can also be there, or it can be absent, > like a coat which can be present or absent on > a coat hook. And the mind takes only a form > or shape which the connections in the brain > allow, like the coat which takes only the form > which the nail, coat hook or coat-hanger > allows. The question of Henri Bergson if > the brain determines the shape of the mind > is especially interesting: if we can answer how > it does it exactly, we have crossed the gap > between Psychology and Physiology (or > Neuroscience). > > -J. > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Nicholas Thompson" <[hidden email]> > To: <[hidden email]> > Sent: Thursday, May 06, 2010 9:05 AM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The coat hook of the mind > > >> >> a metaphor is only as good as its heuristic power and i can't see what >> this one implies. >> > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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Because there is safety in derision
I talked about an apparition, I took no trouble to convince, Or seem plausible to a man of sense. Distrustful of thar popular eye Whether it be bold or sly. Fifteen apparitions have I seen; The worst a coat upon a coat-hanger. I have found nothing half so good As my long-planned half solitude, Where I can sit up half the night With some friend that has the wit Not to allow his looks to tell When I am unintelligible. Fifteen apparitions have I seen; The worst a coat upon a coat-hanger. When a man grows old his joy Grows more deep day after day, His empty heart is full at length, But he has need of all that strength Because of the increasing Night That opens her mystery and fright. Fifteen apparitions have I seen; The worst a coat upon a coat-hanger. --The Apparitions, by W. B. Yeats > Is it just me ? I'm unable to extract any meaningful information from > this quote which correlates to the subsequent analysis. > > Would the man on the Clapham omnibus start from Dr Suess's "Fox in > Socks on Knox in Box" and end up postulating that Schroedingers Fox is > half alive in a Box in Fort Knox, or that taking away the Box makes > everything break down? > > I'm indebted to someone at the Artificial Intelligence lab at U-Mich > for the full text > http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/people/dreeves/Fox-In-Socks.txt > the "hidden" metaphors (allusions) of which have inspired many > computer designers > > Sarbajit > > On 5/7/10, Jochen Fromm <[hidden email]> wrote: > > I think the source of the quote is Henri > > Bergson's book "Matter and Memory": > > "That there is a close connexion between > > a state of consciousness and the brain we > > do not dispute. But there is also a close > > connexion between a coat and the nail on > > which it hangs, for, if the nail is pulled > > out, the coat falls to the ground. Shall > > we say, then, that the shape of the nail > > gives us the shape of the coat, or in any > > way corresponds to it?" (introduction, page xi) > > > > What Henri Bergson (1859-1941) suggests is > > that the brain is like the coat hook of the mind. > > The coat itself is completely independent from > > the nail or the hook, but the coat on the hook is > > not possible without the hook, if we take the hook > > away, everything breaks down. This is very similar > > to the modern idea of supervenience: although it is > > independent from it, the mind rests and depends > > on the brain, like the coat on the coat hook or > > coat-hanger. > > > > The mind can also be there, or it can be absent, > > like a coat which can be present or absent on > > a coat hook. And the mind takes only a form > > or shape which the connections in the brain > > allow, like the coat which takes only the form > > which the nail, coat hook or coat-hanger > > allows. The question of Henri Bergson if > > the brain determines the shape of the mind > > is especially interesting: if we can answer how > > it does it exactly, we have crossed the gap > > between Psychology and Physiology (or > > Neuroscience). > > > > -J. > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: "Nicholas Thompson" <[hidden email]> > > To: <[hidden email]> > > Sent: Thursday, May 06, 2010 9:05 AM > > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The coat hook of the mind > > > > > >> > >> a metaphor is only as good as its heuristic power and i can't see what > >> this one implies. > >> > > > > > > > > ============================================================ > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The coat hook of the mind
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Nicholas Thompson wrote circa 05/07/2010 05:14 PM:
> I think one of the implications of the The Rant I recently posted is that > metaphors can be made unfuzzy, precise, and exact if we are willing to take > the time to separate out their implications into those that we already know > to be false, those we already know to be true, and those that are not yet > known to be true of false. That's perfectly reasonable. But if it's only the "implications" of the metaphor that can be made precise, then the metaphor itself, regardless of how important it was in the formation of the result, is NOT what is precise. The result of the "implication" (inference) is what is made precise, not the metaphor. Hence, if we can regard analogs as resulting from metaphors, then that falls right in line with my proposition that analogs can be made precise but metaphors cannot. Metaphors _rely_ on the fuzziness. They are the "carriers" of the "transfer". If you remove the fuzziness from them, they are no longer metaphors. RE: Jochen's comment, then, I'd say that analogy is the calculus of the mind. Metaphors are something more fluffy and mental providing the conceptual motivation for the development of analogs. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by Jochen Fromm-4
Glen:
Ok. Let's work with this: You wrote: > That's perfectly reasonable. But if it's only the "implications" of the > metaphor that can be made precise, then the metaphor itself, regardless > of how important it was in the formation of the result, is NOT what is > precise. The result of the "implication" (inference) is what is made > precise, not the metaphor. The metaphor I want to examine is that between the manner in which the different strains of pigeons in Darwin's coop came to be the way they were and the manner in which different species of plants and animals came to be the way they are. What I am imagining that MIGHT contradict what you are saying is that if the metaphor is taken seriously there is an exact, precise, fuzzy sequence of events that arrises from how, say, a tufted pigeon got his tuft and if that exact history were applied (metaphorically) to, say, how the giraffe got his long neck, VERY PRECISE UNFUZZY EXPECTATIONS ABOUT GIRAFFES (emphasis not shouting) would arise some of which would be clearly false and unintended, some of which would be intended and true, and some of which would be unknown. In otherwords, there is something of a confusion between a metaphor and a generalization. If you say your love is like a red, red, rose you have started with a rose, generalized it, and then applied the generalized metaphor to your love. And that is, in some sense, vague. I would agree. But if you were to skip the generalization part and just say, "my love is like this rose", then you would have a very specific metaphor. I guess I am just trying to argue that the issue of vagueness and the issue of metaphoricalness are orthogonal to one another. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ http://www.cusf.org [City University of Santa Fe] > [Original Message] > From: glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]> > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 5/9/2010 3:10:21 PM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The coat hook of the mind > > Nicholas Thompson wrote circa 05/07/2010 05:14 PM: > > I think one of the implications of the The Rant I recently posted is that > > metaphors can be made unfuzzy, precise, and exact if we are willing to take > > the time to separate out their implications into those that we already know > > to be false, those we already know to be true, and those that are not yet > > known to be true of false. > > That's perfectly reasonable. But if it's only the "implications" of the > metaphor that can be made precise, then the metaphor itself, regardless > of how important it was in the formation of the result, is NOT what is > precise. The result of the "implication" (inference) is what is made > precise, not the metaphor. > > Hence, if we can regard analogs as resulting from metaphors, then that > falls right in line with my proposition that analogs can be made precise > but metaphors cannot. Metaphors _rely_ on the fuzziness. They are the > "carriers" of the "transfer". If you remove the fuzziness from them, > they are no longer metaphors. > > RE: Jochen's comment, then, I'd say that analogy is the calculus of the > mind. Metaphors are something more fluffy and mental providing the > conceptual motivation for the development of analogs. > > -- > glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ http://www.cusf.org [City University of Santa Fe] > [Original Message] > From: glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]> > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 5/9/2010 3:10:21 PM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] The coat hook of the mind > > Nicholas Thompson wrote circa 05/07/2010 05:14 PM: > > I think one of the implications of the The Rant I recently posted is that > > metaphors can be made unfuzzy, precise, and exact if we are willing to take > > the time to separate out their implications into those that we already know > > to be false, those we already know to be true, and those that are not yet > > known to be true of false. > > That's perfectly reasonable. But if it's only the "implications" of the > metaphor that can be made precise, then the metaphor itself, regardless > of how important it was in the formation of the result, is NOT what is > precise. The result of the "implication" (inference) is what is made > precise, not the metaphor. > > Hence, if we can regard analogs as resulting from metaphors, then that > falls right in line with my proposition that analogs can be made precise > but metaphors cannot. Metaphors _rely_ on the fuzziness. They are the > "carriers" of the "transfer". If you remove the fuzziness from them, > they are no longer metaphors. > > RE: Jochen's comment, then, I'd say that analogy is the calculus of the > mind. Metaphors are something more fluffy and mental providing the > conceptual motivation for the development of analogs. > > -- > glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Glen,
Nick had a student who harped on him mercilessly for this metaphor stuff. As I recall the argument was pretty sophisticated, but basically boiled down to something like: "Look here, old man. I don't know why you keep ranting about 'implicature.' I want to talk about the metaphor, just the metaphor. What is the content of the metaphor?" Then the student just wanted to talk about the 'true content' and the 'false content', at best adding a third category for stuff we don't know about yet. The argument was very convincing, but something bugged me about it. Your argument seems similar. In the end I suspected, in an unnecessarily high brow manner, than the student was just too Continental in his thinking, while Nick was (I'm not sure how much he appreciates it) working in the tradition of American philosophy. The notion of analyzing a disembodied metaphor - not made by someone, and somehow contextless - sounds like a fun, erudite game, that everyone should know from the start won't really go anywhere. In contrast, we may have chance of getting something concrete out of analyzing a metaphor made by a person in a context. Thus, the question is not what the 'metaphor' intends, but rather what the 'person making the metaphor' intended. The person knew some aspects of the metaphor to be true a priori; the person knew some aspects of the metaphor to be false a priori; and the person made the metaphor because they wanted some aspects to be true that they were unsure about. At least, that is the case for all metaphors that are useful in prompting further investigation, i.e. useful for science. (Nick claims.) Of course, there are other purposes for which a good metaphor might be useful, such as pure rhetoric. I keep remembering a very religious wedding I went to. The minister kept harping on about how the couple being wed was "the salt of the earth." She kept trying and trying to make that sound like a good thing, because the metaphor was made by Jesus, and Jesus surely intended for it to be positive. In the back of the room, I was highly amused, having just watched a program on the salting of Carthage. I imagine that in North Africa, at a certain time, "You are the salt of the earth" could have been a very nasty insult. My point: Surely when we are trying to determine what a metaphor "means," we are trying to determine what the person who used the metaphor "meant." Anyway, I'll stop, as I'm clearly rambling, Eric On Sun, May 9, 2010 05:09 PM, "glen e. p. ropella" <[hidden email]> wrote: Eric CharlesNicholas Thompson wrote circa 05/07/2010 05:14 PM: > I think one of the implications of the The Rant I recently posted is that > metaphors can be made unfuzzy, precise, and exact if we are willing to take > the time to separate out their implications into those that we already know > to be false, those we already know to be true, and those that are not yet > known to be true of false. That's perfectly reasonable. But if it's only the "implications" of the metaphor that can be made precise, then the metaphor itself, regardless of how important it was in the formation of the result, is NOT what is precise. The result of the "implication" (inference) is what is made precise, not the metaphor. Hence, if we can regard analogs as resulting from metaphors, then that falls right in line with my proposition that analogs can be made precise but metaphors cannot. Metaphors _rely_ on the fuzziness. They are the "carriers" of the "transfer". If you remove the fuzziness from them, they are no longer metaphors. RE: Jochen's comment, then, I'd say that analogy is the calculus of the mind. Metaphors are something more fluffy and mental providing the conceptual motivation for the development of analogs. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org Professional Student and Assistant Professor of Psychology Penn State University Altoona, PA 16601 ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
making the metaphor of natural selection precise
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In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Nicholas Thompson wrote circa 10-05-09 03:35 PM:
> The metaphor I want to examine is that between the manner in which the > different strains of pigeons in Darwin's coop came to be the way they were > and the manner in which different species of plants and animals came to be > the way they are. OK. I'm happy to work with that. However, I have to say up front that I STRONGLY doubt that you can make that metaphor precise in any sense. Earlier, you listed: pigeon varieties : pigeon species :: species of animals : all animals 1) So, the metaphor is between the effects (E_s - "s" for synthetic) of the behaviors of an intentional human breeder and the effects (E_n - "n" for natural) of some hypothetical natural process we call "natural selection". Is that right? Is the metaphor between E_s and E_n? 2) Or, is the metaphor between the _methods_ or behaviors as opposed to the effects/results of those methods? I.e. M_s is the methods of the man and M_n is the methods of nature and the metaphor is M_s -> M_n? 3) Or, rather, is the metaphor between the _agent_, one a man and the other nature? I.e. A_s is the man, himself, and A_n is nature, herself? 4) Or, perhaps the metaphor is between the _purposes_ of the two processes/systems? I.e. P_s is the intent of the man and P_n is the "intent" of nature? Which of these more precisely captures the metaphor you want to explore? -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: The coat hook of the mind
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In reply to this post by Eric Charles
I think you're giving me way too much credit, here. I'm not a deep thinker in any sense. So, when I say that metaphors are required to be fuzzy in order to be metaphors, I'm (trying) to say something very practical. Metaphors are quick and dirty ways to wonk someone out of a way of thinking... to change their paradigm. They can be beautiful, as in poetry, life-changing, as in realizing one is addicted to something, brilliant, horrifying, etc. But what they cannot be is precise, because, by definition, they are fuzzy. You can _begin_ the process of refining a metaphor down to precisely where it holds and where it fails. That process will be iterative, like all other (nontrivial) processes. In that process, we'd expect something like the following: M_0 = first metaphor assertion (e.g. "time is money") M_1 = more refined metaphor (e.g. "time and money are equivalent") M_i, M_(i+1), ... M_n. My claim is that there is some i such that 0 < i < n where M_i is no longer a metaphor. When you get around to finally accounting for all the ways in which, say, time is and is not like money, you no longer have a _powerful_ or meaningful metaphor. If it takes you 1000 pages of textbook and 12 lectures to transfer the concept to someone else, then you're not talking about a metaphor. Hence, metaphors cannot be made precise, though the "implied" results of inferring from a metaphor can be made precise. BTW, I don't feel like I'm harping. If I seem to be, I apologize. I could just drop the conversation; but so many people have seemed to find such wondrous subjective satisfaction in elevating metaphor to some fundamental role in how we navigate our world, I thought I'd try to understand what all you loons were talking about. ;-) ERIC P. CHARLES wrote circa 10-05-09 05:31 PM: > Nick had a student who harped on him mercilessly for this metaphor stuff. As I > recall the argument was pretty sophisticated, but basically boiled down to > something like: "Look here, old man. I don't know why you keep ranting about > 'implicature.' I want to talk about the metaphor, just the metaphor. What is > the content of the metaphor?" Then the student just wanted to talk about the > 'true content' and the 'false content', at best adding a third category for > stuff we don't know about yet. The argument was very convincing, but something > bugged me about it. Your argument seems similar. > > In the end I suspected, in an unnecessarily high brow manner, than the student > was just too Continental in his thinking, while Nick was (I'm not sure how much > he appreciates it) working in the tradition of American philosophy. The notion > of analyzing a disembodied metaphor - not made by someone, and somehow > contextless - sounds like a fun, erudite game, that everyone should know from > the start won't really go anywhere. In contrast, we may have chance of getting > something concrete out of analyzing a metaphor made by a person in a context. > > Thus, the question is not what the 'metaphor' intends, but rather what the > 'person making the metaphor' intended. The person knew some aspects of the > metaphor to be true a priori; the person knew some aspects of the metaphor to > be false a priori; and the person made the metaphor because they wanted some > aspects to be true that they were unsure about. At least, that is the case for > all metaphors that are useful in prompting further investigation, i.e. useful > for science. (Nick claims.) > > Of course, there are other purposes for which a good metaphor might be useful, > such as pure rhetoric. > > I keep remembering a very religious wedding I went to. The minister kept > harping on about how the couple being wed was "the salt of the earth." She kept > trying and trying to make that sound like a good thing, because the metaphor > was made by Jesus, and Jesus surely intended for it to be positive. In the back > of the room, I was highly amused, having just watched a program on the salting > of Carthage. I imagine that in North Africa, at a certain time, "You are the > salt of the earth" could have been a very nasty insult. My point: Surely when > we are trying to determine what a metaphor "means," we are trying to determine > what the person who used the metaphor "meant." -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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