Shorthands for Brain-stuff

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Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

Russ Abbott
Good, but ...

Identifying manipulation targets then becomes a nearly impossible task. What's going on inside a person so that a trigger results in one action rather than another? In many cases one would have to know the complete history of a person--from his childhood family and environment to whether someone gave him the finger for no apparent reason earlier in the day--to know how he is going to react to any particular triggering event. 

A probabilistic version of LaPlacian causality may be more or less correct, but the number of levels at which one has to apply it in any complex situation makes it virtually impossible to use. An approximate approach like Glen suggests may be the best we can do--at least for now.

-- Russ

On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 7:29 AM uǝlƃ ↙↙↙ <[hidden email]> wrote:
Yes! The manipulationist conception of fault (cause) can help rescue the thread.

Progress targets a higher order intervention than justice targets. Establishing which of us machines premeditates then murders *seems* to be the first step. Then a progressive intervention attempts to mitigate with systemic intervention whereas a justice intervention acts more locally on the particular machine, hoping for some occult percolation out to other machines.

But the manipulationist conception admits that we have to intervene upstream to establish the initial categorization in the first place. The sub-thread about intent, outcome, naive cause-effect, etc. is a distraction from the main point, which is *how* to establish the category of things/behaviors you want to punish/avoid. If the "organic correlate" is a pathological "lesion" that *spans* the human body, say to the parents or being a member of the People of Praise cult, then EEG and fMRI indicators are obviously inadequate because they artificially slice the lesion into two parts and ignore the part outside the one machine. If the organic correlate is clearly, statistically, establishable by comparing individuals, then maybe EEG/fMRI type locales are adequate.

The manipulationist conception helps demonstrate category errors with cautionary tales like Minority Report <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minority_Report_(film)>. Justice approaches, which try to bound the lesion to being inside human skin (often artificially) avoid punishing things like "the ability to premeditate" and rightly focus on punishing actual murder. It's fine to think whatever you want. Just be careful what premeditation you *act* on. I think a useful line between progressive vs justice approaches is drawn by the *permanence* of the consequences. If an intervention is irreversible, then maybe it's best to take a small-scoped justice approach. If it's reversible, then you can try out a systemic intervention as long as you also install measures for backing out of it if it goes horribly wrong.


On October 4, 2020 9:48:35 PM PDT, Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote:
>One obvious quibble is to ask whether "A  determines the probability
>density over ..." isn't just a way of substituting the word *determines
>*for
>*causes*.
>
>On the other hand, I like this approach. Another way to think about is
>that
>changing A results in a change in B (or a change in the probability of
>B).
>It's like A is something like a remote control for B.
>
>What's especially interesting about this approach is that one is not
>obligated to show how that change happens -- just that it does.


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Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

Marcus G. Daniels

Russ wrote:

 

< A probabilistic version of LaPlacian causality may be more or less correct, but the number of levels at which one has to apply it in any complex situation makes it virtually impossible to use. An approximate approach like Glen suggests may be the best we can do--at least for now. >

 

Use for what?    Understanding what it might mean to be alive or designing a system for regulating the behavior of each other?  Or predicting behavior?  Or what?   The impulse that I object to is inventing an unrealistic fantasy like free will just for the sake of reducing cognitive dissonance.   I can’t be necessary to adopt what amounts to a religion in order to function with one another.

 

Marcus


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Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

Frank Wimberly-2
https://www.cmu.edu/dietrich/philosophy/docs/glymour/glymour-kim1999.pdf

I hope that link works.  I have posted it here before.  Please read it if you're interested in this topic.  Glymour is my erstwhile boss and co-author.

---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505

505 670-9918
Santa Fe, NM

On Mon, Oct 5, 2020, 11:04 AM Marcus Daniels <[hidden email]> wrote:

Russ wrote:

 

< A probabilistic version of LaPlacian causality may be more or less correct, but the number of levels at which one has to apply it in any complex situation makes it virtually impossible to use. An approximate approach like Glen suggests may be the best we can do--at least for now. >

 

Use for what?    Understanding what it might mean to be alive or designing a system for regulating the behavior of each other?  Or predicting behavior?  Or what?   The impulse that I object to is inventing an unrealistic fantasy like free will just for the sake of reducing cognitive dissonance.   I can’t be necessary to adopt what amounts to a religion in order to function with one another.

 

Marcus

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Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

Marcus G. Daniels

I forget there are philosophers who are prepared to believe, well, anything.

 

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Monday, October 5, 2020 10:29 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Shorthands for Brain-stuff

 

https://www.cmu.edu/dietrich/philosophy/docs/glymour/glymour-kim1999.pdf

 

I hope that link works.  I have posted it here before.  Please read it if you're interested in this topic.  Glymour is my erstwhile boss and co-author.

---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505

505 670-9918
Santa Fe, NM

 

On Mon, Oct 5, 2020, 11:04 AM Marcus Daniels <[hidden email]> wrote:

Russ wrote:

 

< A probabilistic version of LaPlacian causality may be more or less correct, but the number of levels at which one has to apply it in any complex situation makes it virtually impossible to use. An approximate approach like Glen suggests may be the best we can do--at least for now. >

 

Use for what?    Understanding what it might mean to be alive or designing a system for regulating the behavior of each other?  Or predicting behavior?  Or what?   The impulse that I object to is inventing an unrealistic fantasy like free will just for the sake of reducing cognitive dissonance.   I can’t be necessary to adopt what amounts to a religion in order to function with one another.

 

Marcus

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Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

gepr
Yep. But to be fair, that's part of their job, as long as their belief is temporary ... for the purposes of playing an idea out to its reasonable conclusions. What's inevitable is that any philosopher machine, like any machine, will tend to get stuck in some rut as it ages and degrades ... until it stops ticking entirely. It's tragic, really. We non-philosophers are quite lucky in that, as we degrade, the machine we've built over decades wiggles only a little bit around the ephemeris. Barring a domain-shattering discovery (or a gaslighting nightmare like Fox News), non-philosophers will die believing roughly what they came to believe over their lifetime. But for a machine whose purpose it is to swap beliefs like hats and scarves, they could land anywhere.

On 10/5/20 10:37 AM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> I forget there are philosophers who are prepared to believe, well, anything.

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Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

Marcus G. Daniels
He states his Humpty Dumpty preference, and then says wait for the science to, in effect, falsify it.  (Noting how it is well on the way to doing just that.)   Then there's a lot of in between where he talks in circles.  Don't really see the point.

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of u?l? ???
Sent: Monday, October 5, 2020 10:47 AM
To: [hidden email]
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Shorthands for Brain-stuff

Yep. But to be fair, that's part of their job, as long as their belief is temporary ... for the purposes of playing an idea out to its reasonable conclusions. What's inevitable is that any philosopher machine, like any machine, will tend to get stuck in some rut as it ages and degrades ... until it stops ticking entirely. It's tragic, really. We non-philosophers are quite lucky in that, as we degrade, the machine we've built over decades wiggles only a little bit around the ephemeris. Barring a domain-shattering discovery (or a gaslighting nightmare like Fox News), non-philosophers will die believing roughly what they came to believe over their lifetime. But for a machine whose purpose it is to swap beliefs like hats and scarves, they could land anywhere.

On 10/5/20 10:37 AM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> I forget there are philosophers who are prepared to believe, well, anything.

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Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

Frank Wimberly-2
As I understand it the Humpty Dumpty position is that we may as well talk about mental causation in the traditional ways until science advances on the topic.  And maybe even then?

---
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140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
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505 670-9918
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On Mon, Oct 5, 2020, 12:32 PM Marcus Daniels <[hidden email]> wrote:
He states his Humpty Dumpty preference, and then says wait for the science to, in effect, falsify it.  (Noting how it is well on the way to doing just that.)   Then there's a lot of in between where he talks in circles.  Don't really see the point.

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of u?l? ???
Sent: Monday, October 5, 2020 10:47 AM
To: [hidden email]
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Shorthands for Brain-stuff

Yep. But to be fair, that's part of their job, as long as their belief is temporary ... for the purposes of playing an idea out to its reasonable conclusions. What's inevitable is that any philosopher machine, like any machine, will tend to get stuck in some rut as it ages and degrades ... until it stops ticking entirely. It's tragic, really. We non-philosophers are quite lucky in that, as we degrade, the machine we've built over decades wiggles only a little bit around the ephemeris. Barring a domain-shattering discovery (or a gaslighting nightmare like Fox News), non-philosophers will die believing roughly what they came to believe over their lifetime. But for a machine whose purpose it is to swap beliefs like hats and scarves, they could land anywhere.

On 10/5/20 10:37 AM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> I forget there are philosophers who are prepared to believe, well, anything.

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Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

gepr
I can't speak for anyone else. But for me, the Humpty Dumpty preference is for non-reduction, the idea that a hierarchy of languages (physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology) is to some extent *real* and not merely convenient placeholders for ignorance and uncertainty.

I like to pretend that I'm agnostic to whether or not such layering is real. But my complexity ≠ complicatedness homunculus faces, every day, progress by the reductionists in dismantling some "higher order" language. So, I think it's Fine and Good to *entertain* the idea of fully closed logical abstraction floors and ceilings. But I think it's shaky metaphysics to rely on them.


On 10/5/20 12:02 PM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> As I understand it the Humpty Dumpty position is that we may as well talk about mental causation in the traditional ways until science advances on the topic.  And maybe even then?


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uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

jon zingale
In reply to this post by Marcus G. Daniels
"It can’t be necessary to adopt what amounts to a religion in order to
function with one another."

Maybe not a religion, but perhaps to recognize/engage one's beliefs relative
to another's beliefs?

"In many cases, one would have to know the complete history of a
person--from his childhood family and environment to whether someone gave
him the finger for no apparent reason earlier in the day--to know how he is
going react to any particular triggering event."

What about classes? Can't we get fine approximations via apt
categorizations? I can witness how others, that are similar to this
individual, behaved in the past.

"So, I think it's Fine and Good to *entertain* the idea of fully closed
logical abstraction floors and ceilings. But I think it's shaky metaphysics
to rely on them."

Agreed. Lately, I have been thinking a lot about openness on the left hand
and closedness on the right. There is no adapting to an ever-changing world
when we are closed, but at least we can write global theorems. When we are
open, we are open to catastrophe, and all progress to rectify discrepancies
between model and experience is inherently local.




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Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

Russ Abbott
Can't we get fine approximations via apt categorizations? I can witness how others, that are similar to this
individual, behaved in the past. 
 

Of course we can and do create categories. They will often be useful, but they will almost certainly produce wrong answers in significant numbers of situations. When applied to people such categories often become stereotypes, which can do great damage to both individuals and society.

-- Russ Abbott                                      
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles


On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 2:02 PM jon zingale <[hidden email]> wrote:
"It can’t be necessary to adopt what amounts to a religion in order to
function with one another."

Maybe not a religion, but perhaps to recognize/engage one's beliefs relative
to another's beliefs?

"In many cases, one would have to know the complete history of a
person--from his childhood family and environment to whether someone gave
him the finger for no apparent reason earlier in the day--to know how he is
going react to any particular triggering event."

What about classes? Can't we get fine approximations via apt
categorizations? I can witness how others, that are similar to this
individual, behaved in the past.

"So, I think it's Fine and Good to *entertain* the idea of fully closed
logical abstraction floors and ceilings. But I think it's shaky metaphysics
to rely on them."

Agreed. Lately, I have been thinking a lot about openness on the left hand
and closedness on the right. There is no adapting to an ever-changing world
when we are closed, but at least we can write global theorems. When we are
open, we are open to catastrophe, and all progress to rectify discrepancies
between model and experience is inherently local.




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Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

thompnickson2

Russ,

 

Categories are the stuff or ordinary logic, right.  We are given the category swans.  Knowing that all swans are white, and that this bird is a swan, we know that this bird is white; knowing that this bird is a swan, and that this bird is white, we infer (fallibly, but with some probability) that all swans are white; and knowing that this bird is white, and that all swans are white, we infer (fallibly, but with some probability) that this bird is a swan. 

 

But nobody ever tells me where the category comes from.

 

Nick

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

 

 

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Russ Abbott
Sent: Monday, October 5, 2020 4:11 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Shorthands for Brain-stuff

 

Can't we get fine approximations via apt categorizations? I can witness how others, that are similar to this
individual, behaved in the past. 
 

 

Of course we can and do create categories. They will often be useful, but they will almost certainly produce wrong answers in significant numbers of situations. When applied to people such categories often become stereotypes, which can do great damage to both individuals and society.

 

-- Russ Abbott                                      
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

 

 

On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 2:02 PM jon zingale <[hidden email]> wrote:

"It can’t be necessary to adopt what amounts to a religion in order to
function with one another."

Maybe not a religion, but perhaps to recognize/engage one's beliefs relative
to another's beliefs?

"In many cases, one would have to know the complete history of a
person--from his childhood family and environment to whether someone gave
him the finger for no apparent reason earlier in the day--to know how he is
going react to any particular triggering event."

What about classes? Can't we get fine approximations via apt
categorizations? I can witness how others, that are similar to this
individual, behaved in the past.

"So, I think it's Fine and Good to *entertain* the idea of fully closed
logical abstraction floors and ceilings. But I think it's shaky metaphysics
to rely on them."

Agreed. Lately, I have been thinking a lot about openness on the left hand
and closedness on the right. There is no adapting to an ever-changing world
when we are closed, but at least we can write global theorems. When we are
open, we are open to catastrophe, and all progress to rectify discrepancies
between model and experience is inherently local.




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Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

Eric Charles-2
Wow! Clearly I was negligent in not being online the day after a post... so.... backtracking quite a bit:

There are a few problems with Nick's example, and those problems ripple through some of the later discussion. 

First, he invented an obscure brain injury, rather than using a fairly common one, such as frontal lobe damage from head impact, or hippocampal damage from near-asphyxiation. Frontal lobe damage often corresponds with a deterioration of the ability to anticipate the consequences of actions (among many other things). Hippocampal damage typically corresponds with a deterioration of the ability to form new memories. It would be quite reasonable for a case to hinge upon whether or not a person could anticipate the consequences of their actions. It would also be quite reasonable for a case to hinge upon whether the defendant remembered certain things that happened leading up to the crucial event. 

Second, he imagined that it is easy to tell what a person accused of murder can or cannot do. Certainly, at the least, we must contend with the possibility that the person whose abilities we are examining is not-cooperative. They might be quite good at feigning an inability to engage in long term planning. Ditto feigning challenges anticipating the consequences of actions. Ditto feigning memory issues. How long will we keep them under examination? What are the range of conditions we are allowed to put them in to test their ability? There are serious practical challenges to determining a person's abilities. 

Third, and MUCH more problematically, he glossed the point that the crucial logical step is not deduction or induction, but abduction. Brains are much more flexible and adaptive than most brain-talk gives it credit for. Labeling a brain area as sufficient or necessary for a given function is, at best, a statement of what is typically found under a range of "normal" developmental conditions. The studies Nick proposed did not, in fact, establish what is necessary for the abilities in question, and no brain area is sufficient, because a piece of brain in a petri dish doesn't premeditate. What we established is that a person with a particular set of lesions probably couldn't do a particular thing that the law holds as important. Given the study of enough people, it would be unsurprising to find a few people who could do whatever we are interested with a different part of their brain seeming crucial. A group that is really into dynamic systems and complexity doesn't get to forget that complicated systems can have convergent paths to particular outcomes. 

And the same applies to any other aspect of the physiology we might be interested in, such as the "brain chemistry." If the law says that you are only guilty of murder if you understand the implications of your actions, but I can provide evidence that people with a certain brain chemistry (perhaps one flooded with some drug) typically cannot understand the implications of their actions, AND I can provide evidence the defendant's brain was in that state at the time (because they'd just taken a shit ton of that particular drug), we can infer that the defendant not able to undersand the implication of their actions. That could be the difference between murder and manslaughter. 

This process is also --- I might add --- no different than wondering whether a wheel-chair bound defendant could have made it up the stairs and down the hall in a given amount of time, or if that could only be done by some who could walk and run "normally." If we can get a number of wheel-chair bound people to participate in studies, we might well come up with a very good guess as to the limits of the defendant's abilities, but within a certain range it will be impossible to be sure. Yes, obviously we can learn nothing from such studies that couldn't also be learned by observing the defendant under the right circumstances, but the defendant has no motivation to cooperate (cue image of Rodney King not being able to put on a glove). And just as in the brain-focused cases above, we might well have a doctor examine the defendant's legs and render an opinion about what the defendant is likely to be able to do. But all the medical-examination evidence about their legs doesn't tell us a damn thing directly about what we are interested in, because ultimately we don't care about the defendant's legs at all, we only care whether they could have made it up the stairs and down the hall in the time required to perform the crime. We are interested in the state of their legs only to the extent it us make inferences about broader behavioral abilities. IF the defendant's lawyer convinces the jury that what they really care about is the legs, that would be skillful misdirection. 

If the defendant's lawyer in the prior cases convinced the jury that what they really care about is an MRI result, the same error has occurred. 

On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 6:39 PM <[hidden email]> wrote:

Russ,

 

Categories are the stuff or ordinary logic, right.  We are given the category swans.  Knowing that all swans are white, and that this bird is a swan, we know that this bird is white; knowing that this bird is a swan, and that this bird is white, we infer (fallibly, but with some probability) that all swans are white; and knowing that this bird is white, and that all swans are white, we infer (fallibly, but with some probability) that this bird is a swan. 

 

But nobody ever tells me where the category comes from.

 

Nick

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

 

 

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Russ Abbott
Sent: Monday, October 5, 2020 4:11 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Shorthands for Brain-stuff

 

Can't we get fine approximations via apt categorizations? I can witness how others, that are similar to this
individual, behaved in the past. 
 

 

Of course we can and do create categories. They will often be useful, but they will almost certainly produce wrong answers in significant numbers of situations. When applied to people such categories often become stereotypes, which can do great damage to both individuals and society.

 

-- Russ Abbott                                      
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

 

 

On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 2:02 PM jon zingale <[hidden email]> wrote:

"It can’t be necessary to adopt what amounts to a religion in order to
function with one another."

Maybe not a religion, but perhaps to recognize/engage one's beliefs relative
to another's beliefs?

"In many cases, one would have to know the complete history of a
person--from his childhood family and environment to whether someone gave
him the finger for no apparent reason earlier in the day--to know how he is
going react to any particular triggering event."

What about classes? Can't we get fine approximations via apt
categorizations? I can witness how others, that are similar to this
individual, behaved in the past.

"So, I think it's Fine and Good to *entertain* the idea of fully closed
logical abstraction floors and ceilings. But I think it's shaky metaphysics
to rely on them."

Agreed. Lately, I have been thinking a lot about openness on the left hand
and closedness on the right. There is no adapting to an ever-changing world
when we are closed, but at least we can write global theorems. When we are
open, we are open to catastrophe, and all progress to rectify discrepancies
between model and experience is inherently local.




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Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

jon zingale
This post is wonderful, so I apologize ahead of time for the pedantry.
Rodney King was a victim of a crime. You likely mean O.J.



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Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

Eric Charles-2
Crap, yes, O.J. pretending he couldn't get his hand in the glove. 


On Mon, Oct 5, 2020 at 11:19 PM jon zingale <[hidden email]> wrote:
This post is wonderful, so I apologize ahead of time for the pedantry.
Rodney King was a victim of a crime. You likely mean O.J.



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