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Shorthands for Brain-stuff

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Eric Charles-2

Shorthands for Brain-stuff

During last Friday's meeting, there was a discussion about brains and behavior. We were somehow discussing murders and Bruce brought up an example of a friend who helps determine (using EEG and MRI) whether the behavior of the murder had an "organic" cause. People with an organic cause go to mental-health facilities, those would get the death penalty (roughly speaking, obviously there in-between scenarios). Nick quickly pointed out that was some variety of crazy dualism, because all behavior has an organic cause. A few back and forths revealed a two things that seemed worth capturing:

1) IF we are really talking about "does the behavior have an organic cause", THEN Nick is surely correct, and all the EEGs and MRIs are doing is telling us how obvious/easily-detectable-by-current-means the organic cause is. In some future world, where our instruments have much, much finer resolution, we will be able to find an "organic cause" for every behavior, which means the whole process as currently performed is just silly.

2) However, if that talk of organic causes is just a useful shorthand of some sort, the process might be perfectly reasonable, just poorly specified.

3) At some point Bruce said that we were trying to determine whether the person was capable of premeditation, and that seemed (to me) to create a window for a perfectly reasonable process, while still acknowledging Nick's point.

4) IF we were interested in "can the person premeditate" and we had separate research showing that certain types of obvious (with current technology) EEG and MRI results were highly correlated with an inability to sustain behavior-directed-towards-a-goal, then we could reasonable use EEG and MRI results to abduct whether or not the person in question was capable of premeditation.

5) Of course, if we had a video of the person premeditating, none of the brain scans would be necessary or relevant --- this would be an example of the broader principle that, when asking questions about psychology, behavioral evidence beats anatomical evidence. However, absent such direct evidence, it is perfectly reasonable to look for known correlates of behavioral patterns, including neuo-anatomical correlates.

6) Some weird things happen to our thinking if we forget that we are using the anatomy to make inferences about behavior-patterns. The whole process makes sense if the thing we are interested in is ability-to-premeditate, and we are using the neuro-anatomy to guess at that, because that keeps us clear that the neuro-anatomy is not itself premeditation or the lack thereof. The whole process is incoherent if we think some mass killers kill because of the way their brains are, but others mass killers kill and their brains have nothing to do with it. THAT SAID, it can be a useful shorthand to talk as if we are interested in the neuro-anatomy itself. The useful shorthand is not only much quicker in a conversation or in writing, it also adds a false sense of definitiveness to the scientific findings (which is useful to the scientist), which in turn adds a false sense of definitiveness to the legal proceedings (which is useful to the legal system). Challenging the shorthand therefore feels like a challenge to the basic functioning of science and the legal system that accepts such science.

[hidden email]

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Frank Wimberly-2

Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

Perhaps there is brain chemistry and pathological brain chemistry and the latter is associated with pathological, criminal behavior, it would be useful to the courts, I assume, to know about the defendant's brain. This is probably not possible at present and might not be admissible.

---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505

505 670-9918
Santa Fe, N

On Sun, Oct 4, 2020, 10:13 AM Eric Charles <[hidden email]> wrote:

During last Friday's meeting, there was a discussion about brains and behavior. We were somehow discussing murders and Bruce brought up an example of a friend who helps determine (using EEG and MRI) whether the behavior of the murder had an "organic" cause. People with an organic cause go to mental-health facilities, those would get the death penalty (roughly speaking, obviously there in-between scenarios). Nick quickly pointed out that was some variety of crazy dualism, because all behavior has an organic cause. A few back and forths revealed a two things that seemed worth capturing:

1) IF we are really talking about "does the behavior have an organic cause", THEN Nick is surely correct, and all the EEGs and MRIs are doing is telling us how obvious/easily-detectable-by-current-means the organic cause is. In some future world, where our instruments have much, much finer resolution, we will be able to find an "organic cause" for every behavior, which means the whole process as currently performed is just silly.

2) However, if that talk of organic causes is just a useful shorthand of some sort, the process might be perfectly reasonable, just poorly specified.

3) At some point Bruce said that we were trying to determine whether the person was capable of premeditation, and that seemed (to me) to create a window for a perfectly reasonable process, while still acknowledging Nick's point.

4) IF we were interested in "can the person premeditate" and we had separate research showing that certain types of obvious (with current technology) EEG and MRI results were highly correlated with an inability to sustain behavior-directed-towards-a-goal, then we could reasonable use EEG and MRI results to abduct whether or not the person in question was capable of premeditation.

5) Of course, if we had a video of the person premeditating, none of the brain scans would be necessary or relevant --- this would be an example of the broader principle that, when asking questions about psychology, behavioral evidence beats anatomical evidence. However, absent such direct evidence, it is perfectly reasonable to look for known correlates of behavioral patterns, including neuo-anatomical correlates.

6) Some weird things happen to our thinking if we forget that we are using the anatomy to make inferences about behavior-patterns. The whole process makes sense if the thing we are interested in is ability-to-premeditate, and we are using the neuro-anatomy to guess at that, because that keeps us clear that the neuro-anatomy is not itself premeditation or the lack thereof. The whole process is incoherent if we think some mass killers kill because of the way their brains are, but others mass killers kill and their brains have nothing to do with it. THAT SAID, it can be a useful shorthand to talk as if we are interested in the neuro-anatomy itself. The useful shorthand is not only much quicker in a conversation or in writing, it also adds a false sense of definitiveness to the scientific findings (which is useful to the scientist), which in turn adds a false sense of definitiveness to the legal proceedings (which is useful to the legal system). Challenging the shorthand therefore feels like a challenge to the basic functioning of science and the legal system that accepts such science.

[hidden email]
- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam
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Marcus G. Daniels

Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

Something brought a perpetrator’s brain chemistry into a state where premeditation was being performed. How would that process be prevented given the prior brain chemistry and its coupling to the environment?

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Sunday, October 4, 2020 10:07 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Shorthands for Brain-stuff

---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505

505 670-9918
Santa Fe, N

On Sun, Oct 4, 2020, 10:13 AM Eric Charles <[hidden email]> wrote:

During last Friday's meeting, there was a discussion about brains and behavior. We were somehow discussing murders and Bruce brought up an example of a friend who helps determine (using EEG and MRI) whether the behavior of the murder had an "organic" cause. People with an organic cause go to mental-health facilities, those would get the death penalty (roughly speaking, obviously there in-between scenarios). Nick quickly pointed out that was some variety of crazy dualism, because all behavior has an organic cause. A few back and forths revealed a two things that seemed worth capturing:

1) IF we are really talking about "does the behavior have an organic cause", THEN Nick is surely correct, and all the EEGs and MRIs are doing is telling us how obvious/easily-detectable-by-current-means the organic cause is. In some future world, where our instruments have much, much finer resolution, we will be able to find an "organic cause" for every behavior, which means the whole process as currently performed is just silly.

2) However, if that talk of organic causes is just a useful shorthand of some sort, the process might be perfectly reasonable, just poorly specified.

3) At some point Bruce said that we were trying to determine whether the person was capable of premeditation, and that seemed (to me) to create a window for a perfectly reasonable process, while still acknowledging Nick's point.

4) IF we were interested in "can the person premeditate" and we had separate research showing that certain types of obvious (with current technology) EEG and MRI results were highly correlated with an inability to sustain behavior-directed-towards-a-goal, then we could reasonable use EEG and MRI results to abduct whether or not the person in question was capable of premeditation.

5) Of course, if we had a video of the person premeditating, none of the brain scans would be necessary or relevant --- this would be an example of the broader principle that, when asking questions about psychology, behavioral evidence beats anatomical evidence. However, absent such direct evidence, it is perfectly reasonable to look for known correlates of behavioral patterns, including neuo-anatomical correlates.

6) Some weird things happen to our thinking if we forget that we are using the anatomy to make inferences about behavior-patterns. The whole process makes sense if the thing we are interested in is ability-to-premeditate, and we are using the neuro-anatomy to guess at that, because that keeps us clear that the neuro-anatomy is not itself premeditation or the lack thereof. The whole process is incoherent if we think some mass killers kill because of the way their brains are, but others mass killers kill and their brains have nothing to do with it. THAT SAID, it can be a useful shorthand to talk as if we are interested in the neuro-anatomy itself. The useful shorthand is not only much quicker in a conversation or in writing, it also adds a false sense of definitiveness to the scientific findings (which is useful to the scientist), which in turn adds a false sense of definitiveness to the legal proceedings (which is useful to the legal system). Challenging the shorthand therefore feels like a challenge to the basic functioning of science and the legal system that accepts such science.

- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
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thompnickson2

Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

In reply to this post by Eric Charles-2

That was great, Eric. It leads me to try and figure out the minimum conditions under which I would accept neurological evidence in a courtroom. So, another hypothetical.

Let it be the case that we have done studies of a thousand subjects arrayed with brain probes like an inverse porcupine. We do a simple procedure in which we tell them to do an act, like “pick up a pencil” and then watch the brain activity while they are fulfilling the act. And then over and over again with similar acts. From these studies, we learn that during that period of act-fulfillment, one particular region of hypothalamus, always goes “bling-bling.” We name this location the “teleonucleus” (locus teleonomis). We now ask ten of the subjects to do their bit for science and come back for further studies. We insert a deep electode in to l. teleonomis and find that by activating and inactivating the electrode, we turn on and .off the ability of the subjects to perform the simple request on command. So now we have good evidence that activity in l.teleonomicus is necessary to and sufficient for the formation of and action upon an intention.

Now, unlikely as all that is, we get to the hard part. We have to find some case in which sampling the activity of l. teleonomicus is easier than asking the subjects to perform simple commands. Ok, I can think of one. Jones is accused of a terrible crime which requires forming and acting on an intention. The police bungle the arrest and jones is shot dead. Jones’s wife sues the police, claiming the underlying crime could not have been performed by Jones because he was incapable of forming an intention. Since Jones is dead, the simple test procedure cannot be performed. So Jones’s wife demands an autopsy, where it is found that indeed, Jones had developed a cancerous lesion in l. teleonomicus. Judgment is made in favor if the wife.

Possible, yes. But so improbable that I still cannot understand the rapturous applause and millions of grant dollars that follow when somebody shows that activity of the brains is – wonder of wonders! – actually related to behavior.

Nick

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Eric Charles
Sent: Sunday, October 4, 2020 10:13 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: [FRIAM] Shorthands for Brain-stuff

2) However, if that talk of organic causes is just a useful shorthand of some sort, the process might be perfectly reasonable, just poorly specified.

thompnickson2

Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

In reply to this post by Frank Wimberly-2

So, here is the logic of my argument, S.A.I.I.

PREMISE: It must in principle be true that ever thought, deed, feeling, etc that we experience—no matter how bestial or high-minded, no matter how voluntary or inadvertent-- is accompanied by some relation between an organic event and an environmental event, or some organic event that occurs spontaneously. I don’t know quite know what “spontaneously” means but I am slipping it in there to keep Glen off my back.

THEREFORE: That an act has some organismic concomitant cannot provide a means for discriminating between a guilty act and a non-guilty act.

Let us say that I go to pick up my anti-depressant pill and instead the pharmacist issues me a Murderous Rage Pill, whose trade name is Marsipan. I climb to the top of the cathedral bell tower and mow down Bleeding Heart Liberals by the dozens. At a bench trial, my attorney pleads that because I had taken the Marsipan, and Marsipan clearly causes an organic change in my brain, I am therefore not guilty of my actions. The district attorney objects to the defense, claiming that the crucial dimension here is the relation between my taking the pill and my intent. He provides evidence that the pharmacist and I are both members of a secret anti-BHL group and that I had full awareness of the consequences of taking Marsipan when I took it. The judge rules that I am indeed guilty of the act, but that he will entertain a defense of justifiable homicide. He says, “Somebody had to do it.” I am released.

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Sunday, October 4, 2020 11:07 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Shorthands for Brain-stuff

---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505

505 670-9918
Santa Fe, N

On Sun, Oct 4, 2020, 10:13 AM Eric Charles <[hidden email]> wrote:

During last Friday's meeting, there was a discussion about brains and behavior. We were somehow discussing murders and Bruce brought up an example of a friend who helps determine (using EEG and MRI) whether the behavior of the murder had an "organic" cause. People with an organic cause go to mental-health facilities, those would get the death penalty (roughly speaking, obviously there in-between scenarios). Nick quickly pointed out that was some variety of crazy dualism, because all behavior has an organic cause. A few back and forths revealed a two things that seemed worth capturing:

1) IF we are really talking about "does the behavior have an organic cause", THEN Nick is surely correct, and all the EEGs and MRIs are doing is telling us how obvious/easily-detectable-by-current-means the organic cause is. In some future world, where our instruments have much, much finer resolution, we will be able to find an "organic cause" for every behavior, which means the whole process as currently performed is just silly.

2) However, if that talk of organic causes is just a useful shorthand of some sort, the process might be perfectly reasonable, just poorly specified.

3) At some point Bruce said that we were trying to determine whether the person was capable of premeditation, and that seemed (to me) to create a window for a perfectly reasonable process, while still acknowledging Nick's point.

4) IF we were interested in "can the person premeditate" and we had separate research showing that certain types of obvious (with current technology) EEG and MRI results were highly correlated with an inability to sustain behavior-directed-towards-a-goal, then we could reasonable use EEG and MRI results to abduct whether or not the person in question was capable of premeditation.

5) Of course, if we had a video of the person premeditating, none of the brain scans would be necessary or relevant --- this would be an example of the broader principle that, when asking questions about psychology, behavioral evidence beats anatomical evidence. However, absent such direct evidence, it is perfectly reasonable to look for known correlates of behavioral patterns, including neuo-anatomical correlates.

6) Some weird things happen to our thinking if we forget that we are using the anatomy to make inferences about behavior-patterns. The whole process makes sense if the thing we are interested in is ability-to-premeditate, and we are using the neuro-anatomy to guess at that, because that keeps us clear that the neuro-anatomy is not itself premeditation or the lack thereof. The whole process is incoherent if we think some mass killers kill because of the way their brains are, but others mass killers kill and their brains have nothing to do with it. THAT SAID, it can be a useful shorthand to talk as if we are interested in the neuro-anatomy itself. The useful shorthand is not only much quicker in a conversation or in writing, it also adds a false sense of definitiveness to the scientific findings (which is useful to the scientist), which in turn adds a false sense of definitiveness to the legal proceedings (which is useful to the legal system). Challenging the shorthand therefore feels like a challenge to the basic functioning of science and the legal system that accepts such science.

- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
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Marcus G. Daniels

Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

In reply to this post by thompnickson2

Nick writes:

< Jones is accused of a terrible crime which requires forming and acting on an intention. The police bungle the arrest and jones is shot dead. Jones’s wife sues the police, claiming the underlying crime could not have been performed by Jones because he was incapable of forming an intention. Since Jones is dead, the simple test procedure cannot be performed. So Jones’s wife demands an autopsy, where it is found that indeed, Jones had developed a cancerous lesion in l. teleonomicus. Judgment is made in favor if the wife. >

Still haven’t addressed the dualism in your l.teleonomicus argument. You’ve just compartmentalized it as a magic black box.

The wife may have case because the cops bungled the arrest. They don’t determine guilt or innocence.

Marcus

Frank Wimberly-2

Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

In reply to this post by thompnickson2

So, the existence of a biochemical imbalance is associated with a predisposition to commit violent crime is so trivial and obvious that it's not worth mentioning?

---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505

505 670-9918
Santa Fe, NM

On Sun, Oct 4, 2020, 1:42 PM <[hidden email]> wrote:

That was great, Eric. It leads me to try and figure out the minimum conditions under which I would accept neurological evidence in a courtroom. So, another hypothetical.

Let it be the case that we have done studies of a thousand subjects arrayed with brain probes like an inverse porcupine. We do a simple procedure in which we tell them to do an act, like “pick up a pencil” and then watch the brain activity while they are fulfilling the act. And then over and over again with similar acts. From these studies, we learn that during that period of act-fulfillment, one particular region of hypothalamus, always goes “bling-bling.” We name this location the “teleonucleus” (locus teleonomis). We now ask ten of the subjects to do their bit for science and come back for further studies. We insert a deep electode in to l. teleonomis and find that by activating and inactivating the electrode, we turn on and .off the ability of the subjects to perform the simple request on command. So now we have good evidence that activity in l.teleonomicus is necessary to and sufficient for the formation of and action upon an intention.

Now, unlikely as all that is, we get to the hard part. We have to find some case in which sampling the activity of l. teleonomicus is easier than asking the subjects to perform simple commands. Ok, I can think of one. Jones is accused of a terrible crime which requires forming and acting on an intention. The police bungle the arrest and jones is shot dead.   Jones’s wife sues the police, claiming the underlying crime could not have been performed by Jones because he was incapable of forming an intention. Since Jones is dead, the simple test procedure cannot be performed. So Jones’s wife demands an autopsy, where it is found that indeed, Jones had developed a cancerous lesion in l. teleonomicus. Judgment is made in favor if the wife.

Possible, yes. But so improbable that I still cannot understand the rapturous applause and millions of grant dollars that follow when somebody shows that activity of the brains is – wonder of wonders! – actually related to behavior.

Nick
Nicholas Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
Clark University
[hidden email]
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Eric Charles
Sent: Sunday, October 4, 2020 10:13 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: [FRIAM] Shorthands for Brain-stuff

During last Friday's meeting, there was a discussion about brains and behavior. We were somehow discussing murders and Bruce brought up an example of a friend who helps determine (using EEG and MRI) whether the behavior of the murder had an "organic" cause. People with an organic cause go to mental-health facilities, those would get the death penalty (roughly speaking, obviously there in-between scenarios). Nick quickly pointed out that was some variety of crazy dualism, because all behavior has an organic cause. A few back and forths revealed a two things that seemed worth capturing:

1) IF we are really talking about "does the behavior have an organic cause", THEN Nick is surely correct, and all the EEGs and MRIs are doing is telling us how obvious/easily-detectable-by-current-means the organic cause is. In some future world, where our instruments have much, much finer resolution, we will be able to find an "organic cause" for every behavior, which means the whole process as currently performed is just silly.

2) However, if that talk of organic causes is just a useful shorthand of some sort, the process might be perfectly reasonable, just poorly specified.

3) At some point Bruce said that we were trying to determine whether the person was capable of premeditation, and that seemed (to me) to create a window for a perfectly reasonable process, while still acknowledging Nick's point.

4) IF we were interested in "can the person premeditate" and we had separate research showing that certain types of obvious (with current technology) EEG and MRI results were highly correlated with an inability to sustain behavior-directed-towards-a-goal, then we could reasonable use EEG and MRI results to abduct whether or not the person in question was capable of premeditation.

5) Of course, if we had a video of the person premeditating, none of the brain scans would be necessary or relevant --- this would be an example of the broader principle that, when asking questions about psychology, behavioral evidence beats anatomical evidence. However, absent such direct evidence, it is perfectly reasonable to look for known correlates of behavioral patterns, including neuo-anatomical correlates.

6) Some weird things happen to our thinking if we forget that we are using the anatomy to make inferences about behavior-patterns. The whole process makes sense if the thing we are interested in is ability-to-premeditate, and we are using the neuro-anatomy to guess at that, because that keeps us clear that the neuro-anatomy is not itself premeditation or the lack thereof. The whole process is incoherent if we think some mass killers kill because of the way their brains are, but others mass killers kill and their brains have nothing to do with it. THAT SAID, it can be a useful shorthand to talk as if we are interested in the neuro-anatomy itself. The useful shorthand is not only much quicker in a conversation or in writing, it also adds a false sense of definitiveness to the scientific findings (which is useful to the scientist), which in turn adds a false sense of definitiveness to the legal proceedings (which is useful to the legal system). Challenging the shorthand therefore feels like a challenge to the basic functioning of science and the legal system that accepts such science.

- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/

thompnickson2

Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

It’s not trivial, but not because it helps you diagnose, but because it helps you treat.

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Sunday, October 4, 2020 2:24 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Shorthands for Brain-stuff

So, the existence of a biochemical imbalance is associated with a predisposition to commit violent crime is so trivial and obvious that it's not worth mentioning?

---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505

505 670-9918
Santa Fe, NM

On Sun, Oct 4, 2020, 1:42 PM <[hidden email]> wrote:

That was great, Eric. It leads me to try and figure out the minimum conditions under which I would accept neurological evidence in a courtroom. So, another hypothetical.

Let it be the case that we have done studies of a thousand subjects arrayed with brain probes like an inverse porcupine. We do a simple procedure in which we tell them to do an act, like “pick up a pencil” and then watch the brain activity while they are fulfilling the act. And then over and over again with similar acts. From these studies, we learn that during that period of act-fulfillment, one particular region of hypothalamus, always goes “bling-bling.” We name this location the “teleonucleus” (locus teleonomis). We now ask ten of the subjects to do their bit for science and come back for further studies. We insert a deep electode in to l. teleonomis and find that by activating and inactivating the electrode, we turn on and .off the ability of the subjects to perform the simple request on command. So now we have good evidence that activity in l.teleonomicus is necessary to and sufficient for the formation of and action upon an intention.

Now, unlikely as all that is, we get to the hard part. We have to find some case in which sampling the activity of l. teleonomicus is easier than asking the subjects to perform simple commands. Ok, I can think of one. Jones is accused of a terrible crime which requires forming and acting on an intention. The police bungle the arrest and jones is shot dead.   Jones’s wife sues the police, claiming the underlying crime could not have been performed by Jones because he was incapable of forming an intention. Since Jones is dead, the simple test procedure cannot be performed. So Jones’s wife demands an autopsy, where it is found that indeed, Jones had developed a cancerous lesion in l. teleonomicus. Judgment is made in favor if the wife.

Possible, yes. But so improbable that I still cannot understand the rapturous applause and millions of grant dollars that follow when somebody shows that activity of the brains is – wonder of wonders! – actually related to behavior.

Nick
Nicholas Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
Clark University
[hidden email]
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Eric Charles
Sent: Sunday, October 4, 2020 10:13 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: [FRIAM] Shorthands for Brain-stuff

During last Friday's meeting, there was a discussion about brains and behavior. We were somehow discussing murders and Bruce brought up an example of a friend who helps determine (using EEG and MRI) whether the behavior of the murder had an "organic" cause. People with an organic cause go to mental-health facilities, those would get the death penalty (roughly speaking, obviously there in-between scenarios). Nick quickly pointed out that was some variety of crazy dualism, because all behavior has an organic cause. A few back and forths revealed a two things that seemed worth capturing:

1) IF we are really talking about "does the behavior have an organic cause", THEN Nick is surely correct, and all the EEGs and MRIs are doing is telling us how obvious/easily-detectable-by-current-means the organic cause is. In some future world, where our instruments have much, much finer resolution, we will be able to find an "organic cause" for every behavior, which means the whole process as currently performed is just silly.

2) However, if that talk of organic causes is just a useful shorthand of some sort, the process might be perfectly reasonable, just poorly specified.

3) At some point Bruce said that we were trying to determine whether the person was capable of premeditation, and that seemed (to me) to create a window for a perfectly reasonable process, while still acknowledging Nick's point.

4) IF we were interested in "can the person premeditate" and we had separate research showing that certain types of obvious (with current technology) EEG and MRI results were highly correlated with an inability to sustain behavior-directed-towards-a-goal, then we could reasonable use EEG and MRI results to abduct whether or not the person in question was capable of premeditation.

5) Of course, if we had a video of the person premeditating, none of the brain scans would be necessary or relevant --- this would be an example of the broader principle that, when asking questions about psychology, behavioral evidence beats anatomical evidence. However, absent such direct evidence, it is perfectly reasonable to look for known correlates of behavioral patterns, including neuo-anatomical correlates.

6) Some weird things happen to our thinking if we forget that we are using the anatomy to make inferences about behavior-patterns. The whole process makes sense if the thing we are interested in is ability-to-premeditate, and we are using the neuro-anatomy to guess at that, because that keeps us clear that the neuro-anatomy is not itself premeditation or the lack thereof. The whole process is incoherent if we think some mass killers kill because of the way their brains are, but others mass killers kill and their brains have nothing to do with it. THAT SAID, it can be a useful shorthand to talk as if we are interested in the neuro-anatomy itself. The useful shorthand is not only much quicker in a conversation or in writing, it also adds a false sense of definitiveness to the scientific findings (which is useful to the scientist), which in turn adds a false sense of definitiveness to the legal proceedings (which is useful to the legal system). Challenging the shorthand therefore feels like a challenge to the basic functioning of science and the legal system that accepts such science.

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thompnickson2

Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

In reply to this post by Marcus G. Daniels

Marcus,

Thanks for engaging.

However, I am not sure I understand your comment.

The statement that events in the brain mediate events in behavior are in no way inconsistent with materialism, a form of monism, are they?

Nick

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Marcus Daniels
Sent: Sunday, October 4, 2020 2:00 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Shorthands for Brain-stuff

Nick writes:

Still haven’t addressed the dualism in your l.teleonomicus argument. You’ve just compartmentalized it as a magic black box.

The wife may have case because the cops bungled the arrest. They don’t determine guilt or innocence.

Marcus

Marcus G. Daniels

Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

An intent is an outcome; an intent is not a cause. In your model intents come from the l.teleonomicus, machinery that follows the same rules of physics as everything else.

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of [hidden email]
Sent: Sunday, October 4, 2020 2:40 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Shorthands for Brain-stuff

Marcus,

Thanks for engaging.

However, I am not sure I understand your comment.

The statement that events in the brain mediate events in behavior are in no way inconsistent with materialism, a form of monism, are they?

Nick

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

Nick writes:

Still haven’t addressed the dualism in your l.teleonomicus argument. You’ve just compartmentalized it as a magic black box.

The wife may have case because the cops bungled the arrest. They don’t determine guilt or innocence.

Marcus

thompnickson2

Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

Marcus,

Please see larding, below; thanks again for your help in thinking about this.

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Marcus Daniels
Sent: Sunday, October 4, 2020 3:56 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Shorthands for Brain-stuff

An intent is an outcome; an intent is not a cause.

[NST===>I absolutely agree that an intent is not a cause. I would call it a design, a higher order structure of behavior over time and space such that the responses to a variety of circumstances converge on single outcome. So I guess I would have to disagree that an intent IS an outcome. <===nst]

In your model intents come from the l.teleonomicus, machinery that follows the same rules of physics as everything else.

[NST===>Yes, but not just those laws. <===nst]

Marcus,

Thanks for engaging.

However, I am not sure I understand your comment.

The statement that events in the brain mediate events in behavior are in no way inconsistent with materialism, a form of monism, are they?

Nick

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

Nick writes:

Still haven’t addressed the dualism in your l.teleonomicus argument. You’ve just compartmentalized it as a magic black box.

The wife may have case because the cops bungled the arrest. They don’t determine guilt or innocence.

Marcus

Marcus G. Daniels

Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

MGD> In your model intents come from the l.teleonomicus, machinery that follows the same rules of physics as everything else.

[NST===>Yes, but not just those laws. <===nst]

What other rules? There are rules that override physics? How is that lump of goo different from any other lump of goo?

Marcus

Frank Wimberly-2

Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

Having worked in the field of causal reasoning for many years I am inclined to say that every event is both a cause and an effect. But perhaps you're using the words differently.

---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505

505 670-9918
Santa Fe, NM

On Sun, Oct 4, 2020, 9:11 PM Marcus Daniels <[hidden email]> wrote:

MGD> In your model intents come from the l.teleonomicus, machinery that follows the same rules of physics as everything else.

[NST===>Yes, but not just those laws. <===nst]

What other rules? There are rules that override physics? How is that lump of goo different from any other lump of goo?

Marcus

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thompnickson2

Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

In reply to this post by Marcus G. Daniels

Marcus,

Physics is the constitution, chemistry the legislation, biology the executive orders, and psychology, the departmental regulations policies.

Unlike in our own government, nobody on the right gets to violate anybody on the left.

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Marcus Daniels
Sent: Sunday, October 4, 2020 9:11 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Shorthands for Brain-stuff

MGD> In your model intents come from the l.teleonomicus, machinery that follows the same rules of physics as everything else.

[NST===>Yes, but not just those laws. <===nst]

What other rules? There are rules that override physics? How is that lump of goo different from any other lump of goo?

Marcus

thompnickson2

Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

In reply to this post by Marcus G. Daniels

Sorry. Forgot your second question See below:

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

MGD> In your model intents come from the l.teleonomicus, machinery that follows the same rules of physics as everything else.

[NST===>Yes, but not just those laws. <===nst]

What other rules? There are rules that override physics? How is that lump of goo different from any other lump of goo?[NST===>lumps of goo can differ in their structure. <===nst]

Marcus

thompnickson2

Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

In reply to this post by Frank Wimberly-2

Frank,

Causality is one of the great cesspools of philosophy, and I am in no position to pump it. For one thing, it seems to me that causality statements are classic instances of category errors. We speak of event A causing event B, but, whenever we do, we are adverting to evidence that shows that Events of Class A have been necessary or sufficient conditions for event of Class B. So, like any things, causality lives at a higher level of organization than that to which we normally attribute it. We can say that a single event of B following A is consistent with causality, but we probably should be careful never to say that event A caused event B. After all, this instance of B following A, could always, conceivably, be a coincidence.

I would love to know what your collaborators think of that assertion. Is this the kind of thing that George Duncan could dope-slap me about?

Nick

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Sunday, October 4, 2020 9:21 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Shorthands for Brain-stuff

Having worked in the field of causal reasoning for many years I am inclined to say that every event is both a cause and an effect. But perhaps you're using the words differently.

---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505

505 670-9918
Santa Fe, NM

On Sun, Oct 4, 2020, 9:11 PM Marcus Daniels <[hidden email]> wrote:

MGD> In your model intents come from the l.teleonomicus, machinery that follows the same rules of physics as everything else.
[NST===>Yes, but not just those laws. <===nst]

What other rules? There are rules that override physics? How is that lump of goo different from any other lump of goo?

Marcus
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Frank Wimberly-2

Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

No, but Clark Glymour might.

Seriously though, our working definition of "A causes B" is that the occurrence of A determines the probability density over the set of possible values of the occurrence of B. There are many ways to quibble with this definition but we were able to construct a set of algorithms for learning causal models (in the form of digraphs) from observational data notwithstanding the quibbles.

As I posted recently, Tetrad, the software implementation of those algorithms, won a SAIL award at the World Artificial Intelligence Conference.

---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505

505 670-9918
Santa Fe, NM

On Sun, Oct 4, 2020, 9:42 PM <[hidden email]> wrote:

Frank,

Causality is one of the great cesspools of philosophy, and I am in no position to pump it. For one thing, it seems to me that causality statements are classic instances of category errors. We speak of event A causing event B, but, whenever we do, we are adverting to evidence that shows that Events of Class A have been necessary or sufficient conditions for event of Class B. So, like any things, causality lives at a higher level of organization than that to which we normally attribute it. We can say that a single event of B following A is consistent with causality, but we probably should be careful never to say that event A caused event B. After all, this instance of B following A, could always, conceivably, be a coincidence.

I would love to know what your collaborators think of that assertion. Is this the kind of thing that George Duncan could dope-slap me about?

Nick

Nicholas Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
Clark University
[hidden email]
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Sunday, October 4, 2020 9:21 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Shorthands for Brain-stuff

Having worked in the field of causal reasoning for many years I am inclined to say that every event is both a cause and an effect. But perhaps you're using the words differently.
---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505

505 670-9918
Santa Fe, NM

On Sun, Oct 4, 2020, 9:11 PM Marcus Daniels <[hidden email]> wrote:

MGD> In your model intents come from the l.teleonomicus, machinery that follows the same rules of physics as everything else.
[NST===>Yes, but not just those laws. <===nst]

What other rules? There are rules that override physics? How is that lump of goo different from any other lump of goo?

Marcus
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Marcus G. Daniels

Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

In reply to this post by thompnickson2

Nick> Physics is the constitution, chemistry the legislation, biology the executive orders, and psychology, the departmental regulations policies.

Nick> Unlike in our own government, nobody on the right gets to violate anybody on the left.

So in principle, we ought to be able simulate – atom by atom -- possible trajectories of a perpetrator and the perpetrator’s environment as they develop. If a departmental regulation is missing pages, maybe you do get a psychopath, but the coupled dynamical systems are nothing more than that. The criminal at that moment must be.

Marcus

Russ Abbott

Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

In reply to this post by Frank Wimberly-2

One obvious quibble is to ask whether "A determines the probability density over ..." isn't just a way of substituting the word determines for causes.

On the other hand, I like this approach. Another way to think about is that changing A results in a change in B (or a change in the probability of B). It's like A is something like a remote control for B.

What's especially interesting about this approach is that one is not obligated to show how that change happens -- just that it does.

-- Russ Abbott
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

On Sun, Oct 4, 2020 at 9:06 PM Frank Wimberly <[hidden email]> wrote:

No, but Clark Glymour might.

Seriously though, our working definition of "A causes B" is that the occurrence of A determines the probability density over the set of possible values of the occurrence of B. There are many ways to quibble with this definition but we were able to construct a set of algorithms for learning causal models (in the form of digraphs) from observational data notwithstanding the quibbles.

As I posted recently, Tetrad, the software implementation of those algorithms, won a SAIL award at the World Artificial Intelligence Conference.

---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505

505 670-9918
Santa Fe, NM

On Sun, Oct 4, 2020, 9:42 PM <[hidden email]> wrote:
Frank,

Causality is one of the great cesspools of philosophy, and I am in no position to pump it. For one thing, it seems to me that causality statements are classic instances of category errors. We speak of event A causing event B, but, whenever we do, we are adverting to evidence that shows that Events of Class A have been necessary or sufficient conditions for event of Class B. So, like any things, causality lives at a higher level of organization than that to which we normally attribute it. We can say that a single event of B following A is consistent with causality, but we probably should be careful never to say that event A caused event B. After all, this instance of B following A, could always, conceivably, be a coincidence.

I would love to know what your collaborators think of that assertion. Is this the kind of thing that George Duncan could dope-slap me about?

Nick

Nicholas Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
Clark University
[hidden email]
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Sunday, October 4, 2020 9:21 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Shorthands for Brain-stuff

Having worked in the field of causal reasoning for many years I am inclined to say that every event is both a cause and an effect. But perhaps you're using the words differently.
---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505

505 670-9918
Santa Fe, NM

On Sun, Oct 4, 2020, 9:11 PM Marcus Daniels <[hidden email]> wrote:

MGD> In your model intents come from the l.teleonomicus, machinery that follows the same rules of physics as everything else.
[NST===>Yes, but not just those laws. <===nst]

What other rules? There are rules that override physics? How is that lump of goo different from any other lump of goo?

Marcus
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gepr

Re: Shorthands for Brain-stuff

Yes! The manipulationist conception of fault (cause) can help rescue the thread.

Progress targets a higher order intervention than justice targets. Establishing which of us machines premeditates then murders *seems* to be the first step. Then a progressive intervention attempts to mitigate with systemic intervention whereas a justice intervention acts more locally on the particular machine, hoping for some occult percolation out to other machines.

But the manipulationist conception admits that we have to intervene upstream to establish the initial categorization in the first place. The sub-thread about intent, outcome, naive cause-effect, etc. is a distraction from the main point, which is *how* to establish the category of things/behaviors you want to punish/avoid. If the "organic correlate" is a pathological "lesion" that *spans* the human body, say to the parents or being a member of the People of Praise cult, then EEG and fMRI indicators are obviously inadequate because they artificially slice the lesion into two parts and ignore the part outside the one machine. If the organic correlate is clearly, statistically, establishable by comparing individuals, then maybe EEG/fMRI type locales are adequate.

The manipulationist conception helps demonstrate category errors with cautionary tales like Minority Report <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minority_Report_(film)>. Justice approaches, which try to bound the lesion to being inside human skin (often artificially) avoid punishing things like "the ability to premeditate" and rightly focus on punishing actual murder. It's fine to think whatever you want. Just be careful what premeditation you *act* on. I think a useful line between progressive vs justice approaches is drawn by the *permanence* of the consequences. If an intervention is irreversible, then maybe it's best to take a small-scoped justice approach. If it's reversible, then you can try out a systemic intervention as long as you also install measures for backing out of it if it goes horribly wrong.

On October 4, 2020 9:48:35 PM PDT, Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote:

>One obvious quibble is to ask whether "A determines the probability
>density over ..." isn't just a way of substituting the word *determines
>*for
>*causes*.
>
>On the other hand, I like this approach. Another way to think about is
>that
>changing A results in a change in B (or a change in the probability of
>B).
>It's like A is something like a remote control for B.
>
>What's especially interesting about this approach is that one is not
>obligated to show how that change happens -- just that it does.

uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen