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Rosen, Life Itself

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Nick Thompson

Rosen, Life Itself

Dear Anybody Interested in Rosen,

I have continued to plug away at the task of writing a synopsis of the crucial chapter 5 of Rosen. As you see if you go look at

http://www.sfcomplex.org/wiki/RosenNoodles#Comments_on_chapter_5.2C_Entailment_Without_States:_Relational_Biology

the chapter is in danger of defeating me.

Is the passage below any clearer to anybody else than it is to me??? Because of the difficulties of distinguishing my words from Rosen;s, reading of the passage below will be GREATLY facilitated by reading it in HTML.

Rosen writes,

"Now let us suppose that [there is a formalism, F] that describes a set of formal components, interrelated in a particular way. Any two natural systems that realize this formalism can they be said to realize, or manifest, a common organization. Any material system that shares that organization is by definition a realization of that organization."

Rosen now precedes build such a formalism.

We have by now said enough to clearly specify what the formal image of a component must be. It must in fact be a mapping (sic!)

f: A-->B

This formal image clearly possesses the necessary polar structure, embodied in the differentiation it imposes between the domain A of f and its range B. It also posses the necessary duality; the identity of the component is embodied in the mapping f itself, while the influence of larger systems, O, in which the component is embedded, is embodied in the specific arguments in A on which the mapping can operate.

In what follows, I shall never use the term function in its mathematical sense, as a synonym for mapping; I reserve it entirely as an expression of the relation of components to systems and to each other. p. 123, LI.

I have reproduced, rather than summarize this passage, because its meaning is opaque to me.

The first two paragraphs seem to be saying that components map but the last paragraph seems to insist that the function of a component is not to map. What follows in the text is a two-page orgy of notion in which organization is expressed as a series of mappings and metamapping in the manner outlined below. Given the disclaimer in the last sentence above, I havent a clue what he could be saying.

But when the orgy of notation is over, he is clear about what he THINKS he has said.

organization involves a family of sets, a corresponding family of mappings defined on these sets, and above all, the abstract block diagram that interrelates them, that gives them functions. p.126, LI.

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Phil Henshaw-2

Re: Rosen, Life Itself

I find it interesting that he seems to establish the applicability of his formalism to physical systems with the casual word “realize” as in “Any two natural systems that realize this formalism …” as if no demonstration was required. There seems to be no instrumentality for such a transference, the same difficulty of there being no information input-output device for a human mind, just each person’s original recreation device. Whenever natural systems adopt a structure from some other place they do so by reinventing it for themselves, from scratch, which costs you your basis of proof it would seem to me.

From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Nicholas Thompson
Sent: Friday, August 01, 2008 1:02 AM
To: [hidden email]
Cc: [hidden email]
Subject: [FRIAM] Rosen, Life Itself

Dear Anybody Interested in Rosen,

I have continued to plug away at the task of writing a synopsis of the crucial chapter 5 of Rosen. As you see if you go look at

http://www.sfcomplex.org/wiki/RosenNoodles#Comments_on_chapter_5.2C_Entailment_Without_States:_Relational_Biology

the chapter is in danger of defeating me.

Rosen writes,

"Now … let us suppose that … [there is a formalism, F] that describes a set of formal components, interrelated in a particular way. Any two natural systems that realize this formalism … can they be said to realize, or manifest, a common organization. Any material system that shares that organization is by definition a realization of that organization."

Rosen now precedes build such a formalism.

“We have by now said enough to clearly specify what the formal image of a component must be. It must in fact be a mapping (sic!)

“f: A-->B

“This formal image clearly possesses the necessary polar structure, embodied in the differentiation it imposes between the domain A of f and its range B. It also posses the necessary duality; the “identity” of the component is embodied in the mapping f itself, while the influence of larger systems, O, in which the component is embedded, is embodied in the specific arguments in A on which the mapping can operate.

“In what follows, I shall never use the term “function” in its mathematical sense, as a synonym for mapping; I reserve it entirely as an expression of the relation of components to systems and to each other.” p. 123, LI.

I have reproduced, rather than summarize this passage, because its meaning is opaque to me.

But when the orgy of notation is over, he is clear about what he THINKS he has said.…

“…organization … involves a family of sets, a corresponding family of mappings defined on these sets, and above all, the abstract block diagram that interrelates them, that gives them functions”. p.126, LI.

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

Nick Thompson

Re: Rosen, Life Itself

In reply to this post by Nick Thompson

Phil,

Everybody needs to remember that this is my synopsis of Rosen, not Rosen.

Also, I am starting my synopsis on Chapter Five. I have read the previous chapters with great care and understand things abut them, but the synopsis of chapter five will never settle down until somebody has written synopses to the earlier chapters.

Now substance. I am not sure the word "realize" is causal in Rosen's lingo. He just means that some tangible object or process in our worlds has the same formal structure. Am I wrong about this???/

For him, causality consists of entailments in the world "out there". If it is the case that hitting the ball entails the ball dissappearing over the fence, then he would say that the hit caused the ball to fly over the fence. Physical laws get their implication only when they display "congruence" with events in the world. This, according to Rosen, is why Newton can disclaim an interest in causality. Do you have the book at hand? Am I wrong about this???

Have I misjudged the group's interest in Rosen? I have imagined by now that others would be beavering away at synopses of other chapters and/or been so seduced by my incompetence that they would have taken over the synopsizing of chapter five.

I dont know any other way to come to understand a difficult book.

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email];[hidden email]
Cc: [hidden email]

Sent: 8/3/2008 5:36:00 PM

Subject: RE: [FRIAM] Rosen, Life Itself

I find it interesting that he seems to establish the applicability of his formalism to physical systems with the casual word realize as in Any two natural systems that realize this formalism  as if no demonstration was required. There seems to be no instrumentality for such a transference, the same difficulty of there being no information input-output device for a human mind, just each persons original recreation device. Whenever natural systems adopt a structure from some other place they do so by reinventing it for themselves, from scratch, which costs you your basis of proof it would seem to me.

From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Nicholas Thompson
Sent: Friday, August 01, 2008 1:02 AM
To: [hidden email]
Cc: [hidden email]
Subject: [FRIAM] Rosen, Life Itself

Dear Anybody Interested in Rosen,

I have continued to plug away at the task of writing a synopsis of the crucial chapter 5 of Rosen. As you see if you go look at

http://www.sfcomplex.org/wiki/RosenNoodles#Comments_on_chapter_5.2C_Entailment_Without_States:_Relational_Biology

the chapter is in danger of defeating me.

Is the passage below any clearer to anybody else than it is to me??? Because of the difficulties of distinguishing my words from Rosen;s, reading of the passage below will be GREATLY facilitated by reading it in HTML.

Rosen writes,

"Now let us suppose that [there is a formalism, F] that describes a set of formal components, interrelated in a particular way. Any two natural systems that realize this formalism can they be said to realize, or manifest, a common organization. Any material system that shares that organization is by definition a realization of that organization."

Rosen now precedes build such a formalism.

We have by now said enough to clearly specify what the formal image of a component must be. It must in fact be a mapping (sic!)

f: A-->B

This formal image clearly possesses the necessary polar structure, embodied in the differentiation it imposes between the domain A of f and its range B. It also posses the necessary duality; the identity of the component is embodied in the mapping f itself, while the influence of larger systems, O, in which the component is embedded, is embodied in the specific arguments in A on which the mapping can operate.

In what follows, I shall never use the term function in its mathematical sense, as a synonym for mapping; I reserve it entirely as an expression of the relation of components to systems and to each other. p. 123, LI.

I have reproduced, rather than summarize this passage, because its meaning is opaque to me.

The first two paragraphs seem to be saying that components map but the last paragraph seems to insist that the function of a component is not to map. What follows in the text is a two-page orgy of notion in which organization is expressed as a series of mappings and metamapping in the manner outlined below. Given the disclaimer in the last sentence above, I havent a clue what he could be saying.

But when the orgy of notation is over, he is clear about what he THINKS he has said.

organization involves a family of sets, a corresponding family of mappings defined on these sets, and above all, the abstract block diagram that interrelates them, that gives them functions. p.126, LI.

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

Russell Standish

Re: Rosen, Life Itself

On Sun, Aug 03, 2008 at 07:20:22PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> Phil,
>
> Everybody needs to remember that this is my synopsis of Rosen, not Rosen.
>
> Also, I am starting my synopsis on Chapter Five. I have read the previous chapters with great care and understand things abut them, but the synopsis of chapter five will never settle down until somebody has written synopses to the earlier chapters.
>
> Now substance. I am not sure the word "realize" is causal in Rosen's lingo. He just means that some tangible object or process in our worlds has the same formal structure. Am I wrong about this???/

No, it sounds correct to me.

>
> Have I misjudged the group's interest in Rosen? I have imagined by now that others would be beavering away at synopses of other chapters and/or been so seduced by my incompetence that they would have taken over the synopsizing of chapter five.

Perhaps. IIRC the main Rosen postings were from Glen Ropella and
myself. I suspect Glen has a rather dilletante approach to Rosen (I
know I shouldn't really speak for him though) and for myself it is
very much a side issue of a side issue related to my studies of
Emergence.

Right now, I'm trying to devote what little research time I have into
to doing real ALife research. Understanding Rosen doesn't figure on
the critical path. It could be years, if ever, I get back to studying Rosen.

There are a small number of people trying to actively study Rosen in
the ALife community. You could try one of the ALife mailing lists,
although there is no guarantee that these people are members. More
likely, you could just write to them directly and try to set up your
own community (or invite them to join FRIAM).

>
> I dont know any other way to come to understand a difficult book.
>
> Nick
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
> Clark University ([hidden email])
>

--

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email]
Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Merle Lefkoff

Re: Rosen, Life Itself

In reply to this post by Nick Thompson

Nicholas Thompson wrote:

Nick,

Difficult books are like difficult men: challenging for a while, but
ultimately too much trouble and too little payoff for the effort. Give
me effortless elegance every time. Remind me, why are you doing Rosen?
And while I'm at it, I haven't had time to read all the chatter about
life itself and insight and creativity, but this is one of the most
disappointing dialogues yet on friam. The curve of research in
neuroscience has exploded, finally beginning a synthesis that includes
multiple nodes of knowing (including, Nick, contemplative psychology).
Not to mention that quantum ambiguity continues to confound logic. And
as humans, we can't STAND not resolving the amibiguity. Reason is the
way we operate, we must KNOW. But the "not-knowing" is absent here. (Too
Bhuddist for you?) Where in all this discussion is the contemplative
inquiry, the extended epistemology? You want to talk about mind and
life? Then visit the Mind and Life Institute site. This discussion might
have more meaning if you guys were reading Varela and Maturana and
Bateson and Boehm. We all agree there is no non-relational reality, but
that includes our relationship with "God." Even Stu Kauffman is
"Reinventing the Sacred" (while still going after the physicists. I
don't get it. You won, Stu, the 21st century is the Age of Biology!) And
it looks to me like Ann may be the prophet in your midst. Oh, well, I'll
keeping checking in at friam, because as Pablo Cassals the great cellist
said when asked at the age of 94 "why do you keep practicing every day?"
"Because", he said, "I think I detect signs of improvement."

Merle

> Phil,
> Everybody needs to remember that this is my synopsis of Rosen, not Rosen.
> Also, I am starting my synopsis on Chapter Five. I have read the
> previous chapters with great care and understand things abut them, but
> the synopsis of chapter five will never settle down until somebody has
> written synopses to the earlier chapters.
> Now substance. I am not sure the word "realize" is causal in Rosen's
> lingo. He just means that some tangible object or process in our
> worlds has the same formal structure. Am I wrong about this???/
> For him, causality consists of entailments in the world "out there".
> If it is the case that hitting the ball entails the ball dissappearing
> over the fence, then he would say that the hit caused the ball to fly
> over the fence. Physical laws get their implication only when they
> display "congruence" with events in the world. This, according to
> Rosen, is why Newton can disclaim an interest in causality. Do you
> have the book at hand? Am I wrong about this???
> Have I misjudged the group's interest in Rosen? I have imagined by now
> that others would be beavering away at synopses of other chapters
> and/or been so seduced by my incompetence that they would have taken
> over the synopsizing of chapter five.
> I dont know any other way to come to understand a difficult book.
> Nick
> Nicholas S. Thompson
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
> Clark University ([hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>)
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> *From:* Phil Henshaw <mailto:[hidden email]>
> *To: *[hidden email]
> <mailto:[hidden email]>;The Friday Morning Applied
> Complexity Coffee Group <mailto:[hidden email]>
> *Cc: *[hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>
> *Sent:* 8/3/2008 5:36:00 PM
> *Subject:* RE: [FRIAM] Rosen, Life Itself
>
> I find it interesting that he seems to establish the applicability
> of his formalism to physical systems with the casual word
> “realize” as in “/Any two natural systems that realize this
> formalism …” /as if no demonstration was required. There seems to
> be no instrumentality for such a transference, the same difficulty
> of there being no information input-output device for a human
> mind, just each person’s original recreation device. Whenever
> natural systems adopt a structure from some other place they do so
> by reinventing it for themselves, from scratch, which costs you
> your basis of proof it would seem to me.
>
> *From:* [hidden email]
> [mailto:[hidden email]] *On Behalf Of *Nicholas Thompson
> *Sent:* Friday, August 01, 2008 1:02 AM
> *To:* [hidden email]
> *Cc:* [hidden email]
> *Subject:* [FRIAM] Rosen, Life Itself
>
> Dear Anybody Interested in Rosen,
>
> I have continued to plug away at the task of writing a synopsis of
> the crucial chapter 5 of Rosen. As you see if you go look at
>
> http://www.sfcomplex.org/wiki/RosenNoodles#Comments_on_chapter_5.2C_Entailment_Without_States:_Relational_Biology
>
> the chapter is in danger of defeating me.
>
> Is the passage below any clearer to anybody else than it is to
> me??? Because of the difficulties of distinguishing my words from
> Rosen;s, reading of the passage below will be GREATLY facilitated
> by reading it in HTML.
>
> Rosen writes,
>
> "/Now … let us suppose that … [there is a formalism, F] that
> describes a set of formal components, interrelated in a particular
> way. Any two natural systems that realize this formalism … can
> they be said to realize, or manifest, a common organization. Any
> material system that shares that organization is by definition a
> realization of that organization./"
>
> Rosen now precedes build such a formalism.
>
> “/We have by now said enough to clearly specify what the formal
> image of a component must be. It must in fact be a mapping (sic!) /
>
> /“f: A-->B /
>
> /“This formal image clearly possesses the necessary polar
> structure, embodied in the differentiation it imposes between the
> domain A of f and its range B. It also posses the necessary
> duality; the “identity” of the component is embodied in the
> mapping f itself, while the influence of larger systems, O, in
> which the component is embedded, is embodied in the specific
> arguments in A on which the mapping can operate. /
>
> /“In what follows, I shall never use the term “function” in its
> mathematical sense, as a synonym for mapping; I reserve it
> entirely as an expression of the relation of components to systems
> and to each other.” p. 123, LI.* */
>
> I have reproduced, rather than summarize this passage, because its
> meaning is opaque to me.
>
> The first two paragraphs seem to be saying that components map but
> the last paragraph seems to insist that the function of a
> component is not to map. What follows in the text is a two-page
> orgy of notion in which organization is expressed as a series of
> mappings and metamapping in the manner outlined below. Given the
> disclaimer in the last sentence above, I haven’t a clue what he
> could be saying.
>
> But when the orgy of notation is over, he is clear about what he
> THINKS he has said.…
>
> /“…organization … involves a family of sets, a corresponding
> family of mappings defined on these sets, and above all, the
> abstract block diagram that interrelates them, that gives them
> functions”. p.126, LI. /
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
>
> Clark University ([hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>)
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Phil Henshaw-2

Re: Rosen, Life Itself

Merle,
I don't know about you, but I find loads of "effortless elegance" in how
humans "can't STAND not resolving... ambiguity" and the fact that
self-consistency is a hallmark of closed systems. We each build our own one
in a world that houses prolific varieties of conflicting ones, that survive
and thrive on the by-products of their differences through an open system...
Don't you think that formal appearance, that environments thrive as open
systems by housing closed systems with conflicting self-consistent designs,
to be suspicious and possibly useful?

Phil

> -----Original Message-----
> From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On
> Behalf Of Merle Lefkoff
> Sent: Monday, August 04, 2008 1:25 AM
> To: [hidden email]; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity
> Coffee Group
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Rosen, Life Itself
>
> Nicholas Thompson wrote:
>
> Nick,
>
> Difficult books are like difficult men: challenging for a while, but
> ultimately too much trouble and too little payoff for the effort. Give
> me effortless elegance every time. Remind me, why are you doing Rosen?
> And while I'm at it, I haven't had time to read all the chatter about
> life itself and insight and creativity, but this is one of the most
> disappointing dialogues yet on friam. The curve of research in
> neuroscience has exploded, finally beginning a synthesis that includes
> multiple nodes of knowing (including, Nick, contemplative psychology).
> Not to mention that quantum ambiguity continues to confound logic. And
> as humans, we can't STAND not resolving the amibiguity. Reason is the
> way we operate, we must KNOW. But the "not-knowing" is absent here.
> (Too
> Bhuddist for you?) Where in all this discussion is the contemplative
> inquiry, the extended epistemology? You want to talk about mind and
> life? Then visit the Mind and Life Institute site. This discussion
> might
> have more meaning if you guys were reading Varela and Maturana and
> Bateson and Boehm. We all agree there is no non-relational reality, but
> that includes our relationship with "God." Even Stu Kauffman is
> "Reinventing the Sacred" (while still going after the physicists. I
> don't get it. You won, Stu, the 21st century is the Age of Biology!)
> And
> it looks to me like Ann may be the prophet in your midst. Oh, well,
> I'll
> keeping checking in at friam, because as Pablo Cassals the great
> cellist
> said when asked at the age of 94 "why do you keep practicing every
> day?"
> "Because", he said, "I think I detect signs of improvement."
>
> Merle
> > Phil,
> > Everybody needs to remember that this is my synopsis of Rosen, not
> Rosen.
> > Also, I am starting my synopsis on Chapter Five. I have read the
> > previous chapters with great care and understand things abut them,
> but
> > the synopsis of chapter five will never settle down until somebody
> has
> > written synopses to the earlier chapters.
> > Now substance. I am not sure the word "realize" is causal in Rosen's
> > lingo. He just means that some tangible object or process in our
> > worlds has the same formal structure. Am I wrong about this???/
> > For him, causality consists of entailments in the world "out there".
> > If it is the case that hitting the ball entails the ball
> dissappearing
> > over the fence, then he would say that the hit caused the ball to fly
> > over the fence. Physical laws get their implication only when they
> > display "congruence" with events in the world. This, according to
> > Rosen, is why Newton can disclaim an interest in causality. Do you
> > have the book at hand? Am I wrong about this???
> > Have I misjudged the group's interest in Rosen? I have imagined by
> now
> > that others would be beavering away at synopses of other chapters
> > and/or been so seduced by my incompetence that they would have taken
> > over the synopsizing of chapter five.
> > I dont know any other way to come to understand a difficult book.
> > Nick
> > Nicholas S. Thompson
> > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
> > Clark University ([hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>)
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > *From:* Phil Henshaw <mailto:[hidden email]>
> > *To: *[hidden email]
> > <mailto:[hidden email]>;The Friday Morning Applied
> > Complexity Coffee Group <mailto:[hidden email]>
> > *Cc: *[hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>
> > *Sent:* 8/3/2008 5:36:00 PM
> > *Subject:* RE: [FRIAM] Rosen, Life Itself
> >
> > I find it interesting that he seems to establish the
> applicability
> > of his formalism to physical systems with the casual word
> > "realize" as in "/Any two natural systems that realize this
> > formalism ." /as if no demonstration was required. There seems to
> > be no instrumentality for such a transference, the same
> difficulty
> > of there being no information input-output device for a human
> > mind, just each person's original recreation device. Whenever
> > natural systems adopt a structure from some other place they do
> so
> > by reinventing it for themselves, from scratch, which costs you
> > your basis of proof it would seem to me.
> >
> > *From:* [hidden email]
> > [mailto:[hidden email]] *On Behalf Of *Nicholas
> Thompson
> > *Sent:* Friday, August 01, 2008 1:02 AM
> > *To:* [hidden email]
> > *Cc:* [hidden email]
> > *Subject:* [FRIAM] Rosen, Life Itself
> >
> > Dear Anybody Interested in Rosen,
> >
> > I have continued to plug away at the task of writing a synopsis
> of
> > the crucial chapter 5 of Rosen. As you see if you go look at
> >
> >
> http://www.sfcomplex.org/wiki/RosenNoodles#Comments_on_chapter_5.2C_Ent
> ailment_Without_States:_Relational_Biology
> >
> > the chapter is in danger of defeating me.
> >
> > Is the passage below any clearer to anybody else than it is to
> > me??? Because of the difficulties of distinguishing my words from
> > Rosen;s, reading of the passage below will be GREATLY facilitated
> > by reading it in HTML.
> >
> > Rosen writes,
> >
> > "/Now . let us suppose that . [there is a formalism, F] that
> > describes a set of formal components, interrelated in a
> particular
> > way. Any two natural systems that realize this formalism . can
> > they be said to realize, or manifest, a common organization. Any
> > material system that shares that organization is by definition a
> > realization of that organization./"
> >
> > Rosen now precedes build such a formalism.
> >
> > "/We have by now said enough to clearly specify what the formal
> > image of a component must be. It must in fact be a mapping (sic!)
> /
> >
> > /"f: A-->B /
> >
> > /"This formal image clearly possesses the necessary polar
> > structure, embodied in the differentiation it imposes between the
> > domain A of f and its range B. It also posses the necessary
> > duality; the "identity" of the component is embodied in the
> > mapping f itself, while the influence of larger systems, O, in
> > which the component is embedded, is embodied in the specific
> > arguments in A on which the mapping can operate. /
> >
> > /"In what follows, I shall never use the term "function" in its
> > mathematical sense, as a synonym for mapping; I reserve it
> > entirely as an expression of the relation of components to
> systems
> > and to each other." p. 123, LI.* */
> >
> > I have reproduced, rather than summarize this passage, because
> its
> > meaning is opaque to me.
> >
> > The first two paragraphs seem to be saying that components map
> but
> > the last paragraph seems to insist that the function of a
> > component is not to map. What follows in the text is a two-page
> > orgy of notion in which organization is expressed as a series of
> > mappings and metamapping in the manner outlined below. Given the
> > disclaimer in the last sentence above, I haven't a clue what he
> > could be saying.
> >
> > But when the orgy of notation is over, he is clear about what he
> > THINKS he has said..
> >
> > /".organization . involves a family of sets, a corresponding
> > family of mappings defined on these sets, and above all, the
> > abstract block diagram that interrelates them, that gives them
> > functions". p.126, LI. /
> >
> > Nicholas S. Thompson
> >
> > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
> >
> > Clark University ([hidden email]
> <mailto:[hidden email]>)
> >
> > ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> ---
> >
> > ============================================================
> > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Nick Thompson

Re: Rosen, Life Itself

In reply to this post by Nick Thompson

Thanks Russell, for such a direct answer.

I am determined to understand this guy, so I am unlikely to quit altogether
, but I am about to embark on a trip to even Deeper Woods than where I am
now, so will let it go for a bit.

Good luck in work.

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])

> [Original Message]
> From: Russell Standish <[hidden email]>
> To: <[hidden email]>; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity
Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
> Date: 8/4/2008 4:08:30 PM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Rosen, Life Itself
>
> On Sun, Aug 03, 2008 at 07:20:22PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> > Phil,
> >
> > Everybody needs to remember that this is my synopsis of Rosen, not
Rosen.
> >
> > Also, I am starting my synopsis on Chapter Five. I have read the
previous chapters with great care and understand things abut them, but the
synopsis of chapter five will never settle down until somebody has written
synopses to the earlier chapters.
> >
> > Now substance. I am not sure the word "realize" is causal in Rosen's
lingo. He just means that some tangible object or process in our worlds
has the same formal structure. Am I wrong about this???/
>
> No, it sounds correct to me.
>
> >
> > Have I misjudged the group's interest in Rosen? I have imagined by now
that others would be beavering away at synopses of other chapters and/or
been so seduced by my incompetence that they would have taken over the
synopsizing of chapter five.

>
> Perhaps. IIRC the main Rosen postings were from Glen Ropella and
> myself. I suspect Glen has a rather dilletante approach to Rosen (I
> know I shouldn't really speak for him though) and for myself it is
> very much a side issue of a side issue related to my studies of
> Emergence.
>
> Right now, I'm trying to devote what little research time I have into
> to doing real ALife research. Understanding Rosen doesn't figure on
> the critical path. It could be years, if ever, I get back to studying

Rosen.

>
> There are a small number of people trying to actively study Rosen in
> the ALife community. You could try one of the ALife mailing lists,
> although there is no guarantee that these people are members. More
> likely, you could just write to them directly and try to set up your
> own community (or invite them to join FRIAM).
>
> >
> > I dont know any other way to come to understand a difficult book.
> >
> > Nick
> >
> > Nicholas S. Thompson
> > Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
> > Clark University ([hidden email])
> >
>
> --
>
>

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Mathematics
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [hidden email]
> Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au
>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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glen ep ropella

Re: Rosen, Life Itself

In reply to this post by Nick Thompson

Russell Standish wrote:
> Perhaps. IIRC the main Rosen postings were from Glen Ropella and
> myself. I suspect Glen has a rather dilletante approach to Rosen (I
> know I shouldn't really speak for him though) and for myself it is
> very much a side issue of a side issue related to my studies of
> Emergence.

I think others, here, are also interested in Rosen. My approach is as
dilettantish as my approach is to anything. Being a simulant, my
profession dictates I be somewhat of a dilettante in everything I study.
[grin] But, the primary (seems to me) mathematical point Rosen attempts
to make is of serious interest to me.

That point is that there's a fundamental limitation to formal systems
and that this limitation is the inability to handle (well) loopy
reasoning. Rosen cares because reality seems to tolerate or even depend
upon loopy causality. I don't care so much about "reality" or
"causality". I'm not a scientist. But I do care about inferential
entailment, since that's where I make my living.

Math (which is more than formal systems) can handle loopy inference
quite well. But the modeling vernacular can NOT handle it so well. And
that's what I care about and why Rosen's work interests me.

Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> Have I misjudged the group's interest in Rosen? I have imagined by
> now that others would be beavering away at synopses of other chapters
> and/or been so seduced by my incompetence that they would have taken
> over the synopsizing of chapter five.

I agree with Russell and would estimate that most FRIAMers don't have
very much interest in Rosen. This is probably because most FRIAMers
are, at bottom, practical. And, to date, it is infeasible to _use_
Rosen's ideas for anything (other than pickin' up chicks ;-). It's
great arm-chair biology, philosophy, or math; but, ultimately, it's an
immature body of work and the pragmatists will focus elsewhere until
such time as the more esoteric Rosenites come up with something useful
(which I believe they will).

> I dont know any other way to come to understand a difficult book.

This is a much more interesting topic, actually. "Analysis" and
understanding have two base modes: simplification and embeddedness (for
lacks of better terms). A synopsis is an attempt at simplification and
abstraction. Another, just as valid, method is to embed oneself in the
context of the author's words/actions. Having said that, I am typically
like you. I like to boil stuff down to pithy (and erroneous ... because
all models are always false) synopses. But, especially with people like
Rosen, it's often beneficial to try the opposite. Don't simplify and
abstract. Just embed yourself in all the detail you can. To do that,
however, you'd have to read his other works:

Essays on Life Itself
Anticipatory Systems
Theoretical Biology and Complexity
Fund. of Meas. and Rep. of Natural Systems.
... as well as many of his journal articles, listen to interviews, etc.

In his case, I highly recommend this embedding approach, because Life
Itself is a terrible book; but the concepts presented in it are
wonderful concepts.

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com

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Günther Greindl

Re: Rosen, Life Itself

Glen,

> Math (which is more than formal systems) can handle loopy inference
> quite well. But the modeling vernacular can NOT handle it so well. And

which mathematics is not a formal system? If it's not formal it's not
math I would say.

Cheers,
Günther

--
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
[hidden email]

Blog: http://www.complexitystudies.org/
Thesis: http://www.complexitystudies.org/proposal/

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glen ep ropella

Re: Rosen, Life Itself

Günther Greindl wrote:
>> Math (which is more than formal systems) can handle loopy inference
>> quite well. But the modeling vernacular can NOT handle it so well. And
>
> which mathematics is not a formal system? If it's not formal it's not
> math I would say.

Math is the linguistic construct with which one describes a formal
system. You can see this clearly if you consider that a formal system
can be completely defined in logic, as well. A formal system is just
one particular construct. Math is much larger just as logic is much larger.

For a concrete example, just consider Russell's and Whitehead's attempt
to reduce all math to a formal system and note their failure. Or you
can consider Tarski's (and Goedel's) demonstration that any formal
system must be at least partly grounded in a larger formal system.
"Math" includes all the particular formal systems. Further, one can use
math to show how a small formal system is grounded in a larger one (and
that larger one is grounded in yet another larger one, etc). So math is
not only the formal systems, but also the language in which we describe
relations between formal systems.

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com

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Marcus G. Daniels

Re: Rosen, Life Itself

glen e. p. ropella wrote:

> Günther Greindl wrote:
>
>>> Math (which is more than formal systems) can handle loopy inference
>>> quite well. But the modeling vernacular can NOT handle it so well. And
>>>
>> which mathematics is not a formal system? If it's not formal it's not
>> math I would say.
>>
>
> Math is the linguistic construct with which one describes a formal
> system. You can see this clearly if you consider that a formal system
> can be completely defined in logic, as well. A formal system is just
> one particular construct. Math is much larger just as logic is much larger.
>

If Math is a way to create nodes and augment a network of related formal
systems, it doesn't mean that these transactions are against the same
graph, or even that it is necessary to go to the first node of a graph
to understand why it is valid to add this or that node to a large
graph. If it were necessary, then I suppose Math would be `bigger'
than the total set of formal systems.

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glen ep ropella

Re: Rosen, Life Itself

Marcus G. Daniels wrote:
> If Math is a way to create nodes and augment a network of related formal
> systems, it doesn't mean that these transactions are against the same
> graph, or even that it is necessary to go to the first node of a graph
> to understand why it is valid to add this or that node to a large
> graph. If it were necessary, then I suppose Math would be `bigger'
> than the total set of formal systems.

Well, the relationships between formal systems is probably not a clean
graph where each node is completely distinct. It's probably more like a
dynamically evolving sub-structure that generally supports many less
dynamic superstructures. (I'm thinking of it in analogy with neutral
networks, where the formal systems are at the phenomenal level and the
alphabet, grammar rules, and axioms are at the genomic level.) We'd
need some sort of measure of the difference between formal systems. To
my very limited knowledge, we don't have that, in general.

So, it's not obviously appropriate to think about the "size" of math in
relation to that of formal systems graphically (or even discretely), as
you've done. I also don't intend to say that math is "bigger" than
formal systems, only that it is "more". I know I said "larger"... sorry
for that. And I also don't think it's necessarily appropriate to speak
of the relations as "transactions" ... at least not yet, not until we
have some concept of the dynamism (if any) of the substrate on which
math sets (which, in my more speculative hours, I tend to think emerges
from the way our central nervous systems relate to the world out there).

The existence proof I'm pointing out as an example of how math is more
than formal systems (Tarski's indefinability or the GIT) merely shows
that what we call math is not fully captured by formal systems (or _a_
formal system). Proofs of the GIT go a bit further in that they show
mathematical techniques for showing that math is not fully captured by
formal systems. But it's not a good enough measure to describe all the
differences between elements of any set of formal systems.

Besides, the fact that, when using math, we can swap out one referent
(e.g. groups, sets, and topological spaces using the same commutative
diagram) for another also demonstrates the point that math is more than
formal systems, because formal systems are "rigid". So even _if_ we
could think of this relational structure as a graph, the fact that the
graph might change based on aspect without damaging the math involved
makes it even clearer.

Then again, I've got a head cold at the moment. [grin] So, what I think
is clear might well be confused.

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com

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Günther Greindl

Re: Rosen, Life Itself

Glen,

I wanted to reply more fully but I don't have time at the moment, so I'm
just going to say that this:

> The existence proof I'm pointing out as an example of how math is more
> than formal systems (Tarski's indefinability or the GIT) merely shows
> that what we call math is not fully captured by formal systems (or _a_

is not true; interpreting Gödel/Tarski or whomever does not show
anything of the kind without a _prior_ philosophy of mathematics which
is actually just begging the question.

In fact, as Webb argues, Gödel's (and Tarski is a "weaker" Gödel) Inc.
Theorem actually speaks _for_ mechanism (but this remark is definitely
too cryptic in this short email).

I will try to respond more completely when I find the time, if you are
interested in this stuff I suggest getting hold of this book (I already
recommended it once on this list; also a recommendation for the
Rosenites on this list for a quite different take on things (in a
_fundamental_ sort of way)):

Webb, J. Mechanism, Mentalism and Metamathematics: An Essay on Finitism.
http://www.amazon.de/Mechanism-Mentalism-Metamathematics-Finitism-Synthese/dp/9027710465/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=books-intl-de&qid=1218479843&sr=8-2

(it is unfortunately so expensive that one can only hope that a local
library has it: but reading it pays off :-)) (and: some familiarity with
the discussions in the foundations of mathematics (hilbert, frege,
dedekind, peano, russell etc) is assumed in the book)

Cheers,
Günther

--
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
[hidden email]

Blog: http://www.complexitystudies.org/
Thesis: http://www.complexitystudies.org/proposal/

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glen ep ropella

Re: Rosen, Life Itself

Günther Greindl wrote:
> this:
>
> > The existence proof I'm pointing out as an example of how math is more
> > than formal systems (Tarski's indefinability or the GIT) merely shows
> > that what we call math is not fully captured by formal systems (or _a_
>
> is not true; interpreting Gödel/Tarski or whomever does not show
> anything of the kind without a _prior_ philosophy of mathematics which
> is actually just begging the question.

Hmmm. So, let's just examine the GIT. What is shown is that, through a
math technique (Goedel numbering), it can be shown that any particular
(complex enough) formal system will either allow sentences that are
undecidable or that can be both valid ("true") and invalid ("false").

It seems quite clear that because we can use math to demonstrate that
formal systems are inadequate to the task of capturing all of math means
that math is more than formal systems.

I don't believe this requires a prior philosophy of math. All it
requires is the mechanical rigor of formal systems plus a method for
counting the sentences in a formal system. It seems to me that mindless
inference could infer this (which is just another way of saying that I
believe the proofs of the GIT that I've seen ... a.k.a. I believe the
GIT is true ... ;-), with no disrespect intended towards Tarski or Goedel.

> In fact, as Webb argues, Gödel's (and Tarski is a "weaker" Gödel) Inc.
> Theorem actually speaks _for_ mechanism (but this remark is definitely
> too cryptic in this short email).

I agree that the GIT argues for mechanism (as Rosen defines it), with
the exception of a mechanistic method for "jumping out" of the context
of any given mechanism into its entailing context. Meta-math is
precisely a methodology of "jumping in and out of the context" of any
given formalism. And, despite its name, meta-math is just math.

Indeed, that's my point. Math handles this jumping in and out of any
particular context (witness category theory where the diagrams apply to
many different particular bodies of math) but formal systems does not
because formal systems only works with 1 alphabet, grammar, and set of
axioms at any given time. There's been no attempt (as far as I know),
within formal systems, to hop between formal systems in a rigorous way
... to create measures/metrics of them with which to build up spaces of
them. Granted, there has been lots of discussion about the differences
between particular formal systems (e.g. ZFC and its variants). And,
also granted, there's been lots of work to demonstrate the equivalence
of various particular formal systems.

But I don't know of any attempts to build a general theory that works
with all formal systems and their relationships. (I'd love it if someone
would enlighten me to such efforts!) And even if there were, as we
regularize that theory, it will also be subject to the GIT, which means
we will again use math to study the limits of that system.

No matter how high or low in the hierarchy you may go, you will still be
using math, but you will not be locked within any given formal system.
Hence, math is somehow more than (or outside of) formal systems.

I think the non-FS part of math contains, at least, the method of proof
by contradiction, along with other techniques that go beyond
"intuitionist" methods. There are various mathematical behaviors
mathematicians engage in that are not directed by or limited within the
confines of some particular formal system. As I've said before, it is
this ability to hop about symbolically/semantically/referentially that
makes math "more" than formal systems.

And in many ways, this can be used to help justify the idea that math
_is_ reality, because math, like reality, doesn't seem bound within any
particular set of fixed rules. There always seems to be a way to
puncture the formalism and get at some deeper layer underneath. There's
always a way to successfully break the rules, to
reinterpret/remanipulate the situation to one's benefit. So, while it's
reasonable to say "reality is math", it is not reasonable to say
"reality is a formal system".

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com

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Phil Henshaw-2

Re: Rosen, Life Itself - in context

Glen,
You say math can jump in and out of context with 'meta-math', "a mechanistic
method for "jumping out" of the context of any given mechanism into its
entailing context." If you have a complete mathematical representation of
a button, how would you derive a representation of a button hole from it?

Phil

> -----Original Message-----
> From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On
> Behalf Of glen e. p. ropella
> Sent: Monday, August 11, 2008 5:33 PM
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Rosen, Life Itself
>
> Günther Greindl wrote:
> > this:
> >
> > > The existence proof I'm pointing out as an example of how math is
> more
> > > than formal systems (Tarski's indefinability or the GIT) merely
> shows
> > > that what we call math is not fully captured by formal systems (or
> _a_
> >
> > is not true; interpreting Gödel/Tarski or whomever does not show
> > anything of the kind without a _prior_ philosophy of mathematics
> which
> > is actually just begging the question.
>
> Hmmm. So, let's just examine the GIT. What is shown is that, through
> a
> math technique (Goedel numbering), it can be shown that any particular
> (complex enough) formal system will either allow sentences that are
> undecidable or that can be both valid ("true") and invalid ("false").
>
> It seems quite clear that because we can use math to demonstrate that
> formal systems are inadequate to the task of capturing all of math
> means
> that math is more than formal systems.
>
> I don't believe this requires a prior philosophy of math. All it
> requires is the mechanical rigor of formal systems plus a method for
> counting the sentences in a formal system. It seems to me that
> mindless
> inference could infer this (which is just another way of saying that I
> believe the proofs of the GIT that I've seen ... a.k.a. I believe the
> GIT is true ... ;-), with no disrespect intended towards Tarski or
> Goedel.
>
> > In fact, as Webb argues, Gödel's (and Tarski is a "weaker" Gödel)
> Inc.
> > Theorem actually speaks _for_ mechanism (but this remark is
> definitely
> > too cryptic in this short email).
>
> I agree that the GIT argues for mechanism (as Rosen defines it), with
> the exception of a mechanistic method for "jumping out" of the context
> of any given mechanism into its entailing context. Meta-math is
> precisely a methodology of "jumping in and out of the context" of any
> given formalism. And, despite its name, meta-math is just math.
>
> Indeed, that's my point. Math handles this jumping in and out of any
> particular context (witness category theory where the diagrams apply to
> many different particular bodies of math) but formal systems does not
> because formal systems only works with 1 alphabet, grammar, and set of
> axioms at any given time. There's been no attempt (as far as I know),
> within formal systems, to hop between formal systems in a rigorous way
> ... to create measures/metrics of them with which to build up spaces of
> them. Granted, there has been lots of discussion about the differences
> between particular formal systems (e.g. ZFC and its variants). And,
> also granted, there's been lots of work to demonstrate the equivalence
> of various particular formal systems.
>
> But I don't know of any attempts to build a general theory that works
> with all formal systems and their relationships. (I'd love it if
> someone
> would enlighten me to such efforts!) And even if there were, as we
> regularize that theory, it will also be subject to the GIT, which means
> we will again use math to study the limits of that system.
>
> No matter how high or low in the hierarchy you may go, you will still
> be
> using math, but you will not be locked within any given formal system.
> Hence, math is somehow more than (or outside of) formal systems.
>
> I think the non-FS part of math contains, at least, the method of proof
> by contradiction, along with other techniques that go beyond
> "intuitionist" methods. There are various mathematical behaviors
> mathematicians engage in that are not directed by or limited within the
> confines of some particular formal system. As I've said before, it is
> this ability to hop about symbolically/semantically/referentially that
> makes math "more" than formal systems.
>
> And in many ways, this can be used to help justify the idea that math
> _is_ reality, because math, like reality, doesn't seem bound within any
> particular set of fixed rules. There always seems to be a way to
> puncture the formalism and get at some deeper layer underneath.
> There's
> always a way to successfully break the rules, to
> reinterpret/remanipulate the situation to one's benefit. So, while
> it's
> reasonable to say "reality is math", it is not reasonable to say
> "reality is a formal system".
>
> --
> glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

glen ep ropella

Re: Rosen, Life Itself - in context

Phil Henshaw wrote:
> You say math can jump in and out of context with 'meta-math', "a mechanistic
> method for "jumping out" of the context of any given mechanism into its
> entailing context." If you have a complete mathematical representation of
> a button, how would you derive a representation of a button hole from it?

That's a trick question. You cannot have a complete math representation
of a button without also having a complete math representation of a
button hole. So, the representation of the button hole would depend
almost entirely on the representation of the button.

Note that you didn't say "plastic disk with 4 holes and a dimple in the
middle" ... you said "button", which directly implies the functions in
which a "button" participates, which is what requires the representation
of the "button hole."

Oh how we reductionists long for a teleology free language! [grin]

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com

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Phil Henshaw-2

Re: Rosen, Life Itself - in context

So, you get the representation of the unknown context of a thing by somehow
knowing that the thing is not well described without it? How do you know
what you're missing? I don't get where you propose the missing
information to come from.

Phil

> -----Original Message-----
> From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On
> Behalf Of glen e. p. ropella
> Sent: Tuesday, August 12, 2008 2:29 PM
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Rosen, Life Itself - in context
>
> Phil Henshaw wrote:
> > You say math can jump in and out of context with 'meta-math', "a
> mechanistic
> > method for "jumping out" of the context of any given mechanism into
> its
> > entailing context." If you have a complete mathematical
> representation of
> > a button, how would you derive a representation of a button hole from
> it?
>
> That's a trick question. You cannot have a complete math
> representation
> of a button without also having a complete math representation of a
> button hole. So, the representation of the button hole would depend
> almost entirely on the representation of the button.
>
> Note that you didn't say "plastic disk with 4 holes and a dimple in the
> middle" ... you said "button", which directly implies the functions in
> which a "button" participates, which is what requires the
> representation
> of the "button hole."
>
> Oh how we reductionists long for a teleology free language! [grin]
>
> --
> glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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glen ep ropella

Re: Rosen, Life Itself - in context

Phil Henshaw wrote:
> So, you get the representation of the unknown context of a thing by somehow
> knowing that the thing is not well described without it? How do you know
> what you're missing? I don't get where you propose the missing
> information to come from.

What? I don't understand.

Your question was: "Given a complete math representation of a button,
how would you derive a math representation of a button hole?"

I refused to answer the question because it is ill-formed. And I tried
to show how it is ill-formed, basically in two ways: 1) the symbol
"button" refers to a _transform_. In this case the transform is
something like "separate -> together", as in two separate pieces of
cloth being buttoned together. And 2) you can't have a complete math
representation of only one part of the transform. If the math
representation of the transform is _complete_, then you know all you
need to know about the whole thing. If the math representation of the
transform is incomplete, well, then you have to make up (or discover)
some stuff in order to complete it.

If you reformulate the question, I can attempt an answer. But I have no
idea how this relates to changing the level of discourse or "hopping in
and out of particular formal systems". So, it would be handy if you'd
preface your reformulated question with why it's relevant to the thread.

p.s. To see why the symbol "button" refers to a transform instead of
some concrete object, consider that one can never have a _complete_ math
representation of a concrete object. One can _only_ build a complete
math representation of an abstract object. That abstract object can
refer to (or be an aspect of) a concrete object. But, that's the beauty
of concrete objects. Little plastic disks with holes drilled in them
can be used as buttons, worry stones, desk levelers, decision support
systems (assuming the sides are distinguishable), etc. So, obviously,
by "button", you don't mean "little plastic disks with holes in them".
Hence, you must be talking about the _function_ or purpose of "little
plastic disks with holes in them". And one particular function of such
concrete objects is to fasten separate things together.

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com

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Phil Henshaw-2

Re: Rosen, Life Itself - in context

You seem to suggest it is 'illformed' to have local knowledge and unanswered
contextual questions. It may be 'illformed' in a very real sense, but also
the most common of the circumstances we find ourselves in. To date science
has primarily been an art and craft of mathematical representation of things
out of their context, leaving it to engineers to deal with the 'messy bits'.
I'd like to turn science into an art and craft using math to explore our
contexts. So I would find the question well formed, and propose a variety
of exploratory procedures for investigating the environment of he button to
"catch the thread" of it's connections to other things...

Phil

> -----Original Message-----
> From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On
> Behalf Of glen e. p. ropella
> Sent: Wednesday, August 13, 2008 4:53 PM
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Rosen, Life Itself - in context
>
> Phil Henshaw wrote:
> > So, you get the representation of the unknown context of a thing by
> somehow
> > knowing that the thing is not well described without it? How do you
> know
> > what you're missing? I don't get where you propose the missing
> > information to come from.
>
> What? I don't understand.
>
> Your question was: "Given a complete math representation of a button,
> how would you derive a math representation of a button hole?"
>
> I refused to answer the question because it is ill-formed. And I tried
> to show how it is ill-formed, basically in two ways: 1) the symbol
> "button" refers to a _transform_. In this case the transform is
> something like "separate -> together", as in two separate pieces of
> cloth being buttoned together. And 2) you can't have a complete math
> representation of only one part of the transform. If the math
> representation of the transform is _complete_, then you know all you
> need to know about the whole thing. If the math representation of the
> transform is incomplete, well, then you have to make up (or discover)
> some stuff in order to complete it.
>
> If you reformulate the question, I can attempt an answer. But I have
> no
> idea how this relates to changing the level of discourse or "hopping in
> and out of particular formal systems". So, it would be handy if you'd
> preface your reformulated question with why it's relevant to the
> thread.
>
> p.s. To see why the symbol "button" refers to a transform instead of
> some concrete object, consider that one can never have a _complete_
> math
> representation of a concrete object. One can _only_ build a complete
> math representation of an abstract object. That abstract object can
> refer to (or be an aspect of) a concrete object. But, that's the
> beauty
> of concrete objects. Little plastic disks with holes drilled in them
> can be used as buttons, worry stones, desk levelers, decision support
> systems (assuming the sides are distinguishable), etc. So, obviously,
> by "button", you don't mean "little plastic disks with holes in them".
> Hence, you must be talking about the _function_ or purpose of "little
> plastic disks with holes in them". And one particular function of such
> concrete objects is to fasten separate things together.
>
> --
> glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com
>
>
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glen ep ropella

Re: Rosen, Life Itself - in context

Phil Henshaw wrote:
> You seem to suggest it is 'illformed' to have local knowledge and unanswered
> contextual questions.

No, not at all. One can easily have an incomplete math representation
of some aspect of a concrete thing. But one cannot have a complete math
representation of some aspect of a concrete thing and still have part of
that aspect unrepresented. I.e. one cannot have a complete
representation that is incomplete. That's just plain self-contradictory.

I have no problems with incomplete representations. We use them all the
time.

> It may be 'illformed' in a very real sense, but also
> the most common of the circumstances we find ourselves in. To date science
> has primarily been an art and craft of mathematical representation of things
> out of their context, leaving it to engineers to deal with the 'messy bits'.
> I'd like to turn science into an art and craft using math to explore our
> contexts. So I would find the question well formed, and propose a variety
> of exploratory procedures for investigating the environment of he button to
> "catch the thread" of it's connections to other things...

OK. So perhaps you might be willing to change your question to: "Given
an INcomplete math representation of a button, how would you derive a
math representation of a button hole?" If you did that, then we might
be able to formulate an answer. However, although that modified
question is well-formed, it is too vague. We'd need to see an example
math representation of the button to know what's there and what's missing.

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org