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Re: Peirce and teleology

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Russ Abbott

Re: Peirce and teleology

I object to the snarkiness of the term Inner Sanctum. But that aside, I now have 2 points.

It struck me this morning that the position you attribute to Peirce (and that you accept yourself?) imports teleology into biology (or even physics if it applies to matter as well). If a biological organism B does act A because something C is the case that suggests that B expects that doing A when C is the case will produce some anticipated result R, i.e., that B is attempting to bring about R, i.e., that B is acting teleologically. But I thought that teleology had been banned from biology. The emphasis is on the because, which was the word you used. I'm assuming that Peirce is distinguishing between (a) belief and action in this sense and (b) traditional physics where, for example, a rock dropped from a height falls to the ground because of gravity. It would be useful if you would clarify what Peirce means by because if it isn't intended teleologically.

I hesitate to add this point because I don't want the discussion to get sidetracked onto a discussion of subjective experience. But since you brought it up, here goes. I don't see what Peirce accomplishes by calling feeling a relation to a relation. Is his claim that someone like me claims to have a subjective experience if and only if (Peirce can demonstrate that) I'm in a relation to a relation? Since I'm not sure what he means by a relation to a relation, I'd need clarification to see whether I agree or even if it's simply a tautology.

-- Russ Abbott
_____________________________________________

Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

Google voice: 747-999-5105

Google+: https://plus.google.com/114865618166480775623/

vita: http://sites.google.com/site/russabbott/
_____________________________________________

On Mon, Apr 9, 2012 at 9:37 AM, Douglas Roberts <[hidden email]> wrote:

Nick,

It's actually pretty simple. No surprise, there, what with me being an engineer & all. There are only two requirements for getting me to believe in something:
I have to be interested enough about the topic to even care if it is worth believing in, and

Sufficient evidence must exist to support whatever claim is requiring my belief.
Sadly, the topic of "induction" and all the intricacies involving the philosophy of "induction" as a thought process does not meet requirement number 1, above.

--Doug

On Sun, Apr 8, 2012 at 12:23 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Hi doug, and Bruce

I realize that the following was hundreds of words deep in a verbose email message, and so it is understandable that you did not respond, but I am curious about your response.

I think we either have to be prepared to say why our faith [in induction]

is better than their [faith in God], or be prepared to be beaten all the way back

into the Dark Ages. Hence my interest in the problem of induction.

Also, I was curious about your comment that you were not all that keen on induction. Can you describe how, if not by induction, you come to believe things.

Nick

From: [hidden email] [hidden email] On Behalf Of Douglas Roberts
Sent: Wednesday, April 04, 2012 10:37 PM

To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] So, *Are* We Alone?

Yes, well; I'm not entirely sure it works that way, at least not for me. It's either interesting, or it's not. Examining how other folks derive their fascinations just doesn't, you know, get my hormones flowing.

--Doug
On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 8:12 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Where we seem to disagree is on one of my most fundatmental ideas: if somebody finds something interesting, there must be an underlying question or issue to which the phenomenon has gotten attached in their mind that I WOULD find interesting if I knew it.

I was asking you to expand my experience.

Or not.

Nick

From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Douglas Roberts
Sent: Wednesday, April 04, 2012 5:09 PM

To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] So, *Are* We Alone?

<Lilke>
On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 5:06 PM, Bruce Sherwood <[hidden email]> wrote:

Uh, does there have to be a reason? I'm interested just because I am
-- a portion of trying to understand as much about the Universe we
inhabit as is possible.

To put it another way: Why are you interested in the details of the
definition or use of induction? I found that discussion massively
uninteresting and irrelevant to the actual practice of science. There
are many variants of philistinism, and of engagement.

Bruce

On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 2:55 PM, Nicholas Thompson
<[hidden email]> wrote:
> I go back to the original question I asked Owen. Why are these fantasies
> INTERESTING?. Now, quickly, I have to admit, they don’t capture my
> imagination that well. But I also have to admit that I firmly believe that
> NOBODY is interested in anything for nothing. IE, wherever there is an
> interest in something, there is a cognitive quandary, a seam in our thinking
> that needs to be respected. So I assume that there IS a reason these
> fantasies are interesting [to others] and that that REASON is interesting.
> The reason is always more pragmantic and immediate than our fighting off
> being absorbed into a black hole. Speaking of which: Weren’t the
> Kardashians some race on some planet on StarTrek. What color where THEIR
> noses? And how did the writers of StarTrek know they were coming
>
>
>
> Nick

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

--
Doug Roberts
[hidden email]
[hidden email]
http://parrot-farm.net/Second-Cousins

<a href="tel:505-455-7333" target="_blank">505-455-7333 - Office
<a href="tel:505-670-8195" target="_blank">505-670-8195 - Cell

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

--
Doug Roberts
[hidden email]
[hidden email]
http://parrot-farm.net/Second-Cousins

<a href="tel:505-455-7333" value="+15054557333" target="_blank">505-455-7333 - Office
<a href="tel:505-670-8195" value="+15056708195" target="_blank">505-670-8195 - Cell

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

--
Doug Roberts
[hidden email]
[hidden email]
http://parrot-farm.net/Second-Cousins

<a href="tel:505-455-7333" value="+15054557333" target="_blank">505-455-7333 - Office
<a href="tel:505-670-8195" value="+15056708195" target="_blank">505-670-8195 - Cell

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Nick Thompson

Re: Peirce and teleology

Well, “relation to a relation” is my way of talking, not Peirce’s. he uses the word “sign”, but he uses that term in such contorted and ephemeral ways that I have started to try to understand him WITHOUT using it.

Sorry, I didn’t mean to be snarky. It is “inner” and it is a kind of “sanctum”, isn’t it? The second meaning from Dick.com is · “A private or secret place to which few other people are admitted.” Isnt that a fair reading of your position with respect to emotions and motivations? IE., that our behaviors arise from such a privileged causal place?

I think Peirce imports teleonomy into biology, but not teleology. You recall that my general position is that everybody else but me confuses causality at a lower level with structure at a higher level. I.e., when we say that joe wants a hot fudge Sunday, we are not referring to an inner causal demon who is pressing Joe toward the Sunday shop, rather we are referring to an organization of Joe’s behavior over time with respect to icecream shops and the presense of some triggering even that sets that structure in motion in the present instance. On my account, thinking that joes Sundae hunger cause his sundae eating is hypostization. I think Peirce would agree with this position.

Rushing, but not snarky,

Nick

From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott
Sent: Monday, April 09, 2012 11:23 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Peirce and teleology

I object to the snarkiness of the term Inner Sanctum. But that aside, I now have 2 points.

It struck me this morning that the position you attribute to Peirce (and that you accept yourself?) imports teleology into biology (or even physics if it applies to matter as well). If a biological organism B does act A because something C is the case that suggests that B expects that doing A when C is the case will produce some anticipated result R, i.e., that B is attempting to bring about R, i.e., that B is acting teleologically. But I thought that teleology had been banned from biology. The emphasis is on the because, which was the word you used. I'm assuming that Peirce is distinguishing between (a) belief and action in this sense and (b) traditional physics where, for example, a rock dropped from a height falls to the ground because of gravity. It would be useful if you would clarify what Peirce means by because if it isn't intended teleologically.

I hesitate to add this point because I don't want the discussion to get sidetracked onto a discussion of subjective experience. But since you brought it up, here goes. I don't see what Peirce accomplishes by calling feeling a relation to a relation. Is his claim that someone like me claims to have a subjective experience if and only if (Peirce can demonstrate that) I'm in a relation to a relation? Since I'm not sure what he means by a relation to a relation, I'd need clarification to see whether I agree or even if it's simply a tautology.

-- Russ Abbott
_____________________________________________

Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

Google voice: 747-999-5105

Google+: https://plus.google.com/114865618166480775623/

vita: http://sites.google.com/site/russabbott/
_____________________________________________

On Mon, Apr 9, 2012 at 9:37 AM, Douglas Roberts <[hidden email]> wrote:

Nick,

It's actually pretty simple. No surprise, there, what with me being an engineer & all. There are only two requirements for getting me to believe in something:

I have to be interested enough about the topic to even care if it is worth believing in, and
Sufficient evidence must exist to support whatever claim is requiring my belief.

Sadly, the topic of "induction" and all the intricacies involving the philosophy of "induction" as a thought process does not meet requirement number 1, above.

--Doug

On Sun, Apr 8, 2012 at 12:23 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Hi doug, and Bruce

I realize that the following was hundreds of words deep in a verbose email message, and so it is understandable that you did not respond, but I am curious about your response.

I think we either have to be prepared to say why our faith [in induction]

is better than their [faith in God], or be prepared to be beaten all the way back

into the Dark Ages. Hence my interest in the problem of induction.

Also, I was curious about your comment that you were not all that keen on induction. Can you describe how, if not by induction, you come to believe things.

Nick

From: [hidden email] [hidden email] On Behalf Of Douglas Roberts
Sent: Wednesday, April 04, 2012 10:37 PM

To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] So, *Are* We Alone?

Yes, well; I'm not entirely sure it works that way, at least not for me. It's either interesting, or it's not. Examining how other folks derive their fascinations just doesn't, you know, get my hormones flowing.

--Doug

On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 8:12 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Where we seem to disagree is on one of my most fundatmental ideas: if somebody finds something interesting, there must be an underlying question or issue to which the phenomenon has gotten attached in their mind that I WOULD find interesting if I knew it.

I was asking you to expand my experience.

Or not.

Nick

From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Douglas Roberts
Sent: Wednesday, April 04, 2012 5:09 PM

To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] So, *Are* We Alone?

<Lilke>

On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 5:06 PM, Bruce Sherwood <[hidden email]> wrote:

Uh, does there have to be a reason? I'm interested just because I am
-- a portion of trying to understand as much about the Universe we
inhabit as is possible.

To put it another way: Why are you interested in the details of the
definition or use of induction? I found that discussion massively
uninteresting and irrelevant to the actual practice of science. There
are many variants of philistinism, and of engagement.

Bruce

On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 2:55 PM, Nicholas Thompson
<[hidden email]> wrote:

> I go back to the original question I asked Owen. Why are these fantasies
> INTERESTING?. Now, quickly, I have to admit, they don’t capture my
> imagination that well. But I also have to admit that I firmly believe that
> NOBODY is interested in anything for nothing. IE, wherever there is an
> interest in something, there is a cognitive quandary, a seam in our thinking
> that needs to be respected. So I assume that there IS a reason these
> fantasies are interesting [to others] and that that REASON is interesting.
> The reason is always more pragmantic and immediate than our fighting off
> being absorbed into a black hole. Speaking of which: Weren’t the
> Kardashians some race on some planet on StarTrek. What color where THEIR
> noses? And how did the writers of StarTrek know they were coming
>
>
>
> Nick

============================================================

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

--
Doug Roberts
[hidden email]
[hidden email]

http://parrot-farm.net/Second-Cousins

<a href="tel:505-455-7333" target="_blank">505-455-7333 - Office
<a href="tel:505-670-8195" target="_blank">505-670-8195 - Cell

--
Doug Roberts
[hidden email]
[hidden email]

http://parrot-farm.net/Second-Cousins

<a href="tel:505-455-7333" target="_blank">505-455-7333 - Office
<a href="tel:505-670-8195" target="_blank">505-670-8195 - Cell

--
Doug Roberts
[hidden email]
[hidden email]

http://parrot-farm.net/Second-Cousins

<a href="tel:505-455-7333" target="_blank">505-455-7333 - Office
<a href="tel:505-670-8195" target="_blank">505-670-8195 - Cell

Russ Abbott

Re: Peirce and teleology

Nick,

Please see below.

-- Russ

On Mon, Apr 9, 2012 at 12:14 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Well, “relation to a relation” is my way of talking, not Peirce’s. he uses the word “sign”, but he uses that term in such contorted and ephemeral ways that I have started to try to understand him WITHOUT using it.

[Russ] Does this mean that we are no longer talking about whether feeling is synonymous with relation to a relation?

Sorry, I didn’t mean to be snarky. It is “inner” and it is a kind of “sanctum”, isn’t it? The second meaning from Dick.com is “A private or secret place to which few other people are admitted.” Isn't that a fair reading of your position with respect to emotions and motivations? IE., that our behaviors arise from such a privileged causal place?

[Russ] I don't think I said much about emotions or motivations specifically. I generally talk about subjective experience. That includes the experience of having emotion. Motivation may be something else. I don't think of my subjective experience as “A private or secret place to which few other people are admitted.” Although as far as I know, it's not possible for anyone else to share my subjective experience -- at least given current technology. It may be in the future thought. That's not very sanctum-like -- although if we ever do develop technology that allows people to share other people's subjective experience, it will certainly raise many privacy issues.

I think Peirce imports teleonomy into biology, but not teleology. You recall that my general position is that everybody else but me confuses causality at a lower level with structure at a higher level. I.e., when we say that joe wants a hot fudge Sunday, we are not referring to an inner causal demon who is pressing Joe toward the Sunday shop, rather we are referring to an organization of Joe’s behavior over time with respect to icecream shops and the presense of some triggering even that sets that structure in motion in the present instance. On my account, thinking that joes Sundae hunger cause his sundae eating is hypostization. I think Peirce would agree with this position.

[Russ] Merriam-Webster defines teleonomy (nice word; I didn't realize there was a word for that) as "the quality of apparent purposefulness of structure or function in living organisms due to evolutionary adaptation." I already have what I think is a good explanation of teleonomy: mutation produces what in effect is some functionality in the world, which happens enhance survival. I see that as applying to biological organisms in general. If that's what you and Peirce are saying, I guess we agree. Otherwise, I'm not sure where we are. I wouldn't disagree with your description of Joe's behavior.

[Russ] This seems to be drifting into a discussion of "free will" rather than subjective experience. Sam Harris recently gave quite a convincing talk about "The Illusion of Free Will." As far as I'm concerned, though, denying free will does not require denying the reality of subjective experience.

Rushing, but not snarky,

Nick

Nick Thompson

Re: Peirce and teleology

Russ,

A am at least tempted by what I see in Peirce as a weird kind of reductive panpsychist: Mind is everywhere, but it consists in the that fact that one entity stands in relation to a relation between two other entities.

This is not, however, something that I am prepared to go to the wall about, either to say that it is correct, OR that it is a correct understanding of Peirce.

Have to bail on this for a few days.

Best,

Nick

From: Russ Abbott [mailto:[hidden email]]
Sent: Monday, April 09, 2012 2:06 PM
To: Nicholas Thompson
Cc: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Peirce and teleology

Nick,

Please see below.

-- Russ

On Mon, Apr 9, 2012 at 12:14 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Well, “relation to a relation” is my way of talking, not Peirce’s. he uses the word “sign”, but he uses that term in such contorted and ephemeral ways that I have started to try to understand him WITHOUT using it.

[Russ] Does this mean that we are no longer talking about whether feeling is synonymous with relation to a relation?

Sorry, I didn’t mean to be snarky. It is “inner” and it is a kind of “sanctum”, isn’t it? The second meaning from Dick.com is “A private or secret place to which few other people are admitted.” Isn't that a fair reading of your position with respect to emotions and motivations? IE., that our behaviors arise from such a privileged causal place?

Rushing, but not snarky,

Nick

Eric Charles

Peirce and belief, etc.

In reply to this post by Russ Abbott

Russ stated: "If Peirce wants to define belief in that way, it's not clear to me what good that does in clarifying anything." Similar qualms were expressed about 'truth'.

These seem like important statements that have not been addressed, so I would like to try to address them. I apologize for the length, but the questions seem important to me, because they strike right at the heart of the matter: If Peirce, or Holt, or any of the other thinkers at play here, are not adding clarity, then they are, by their own criterion, missing their mark. From the perspective of a scientific psychologists, which was one of many perspectives Peirce was concerned with, a great deal of confusion is entrenched in modern thought about the relationship between mind and behavior. In particular, I would argue, we have confused the thing to be explained with a particular variety of explanation that is commonly offered. One goal is Peirce's definition of 'belief' is to clarify what we are trying to explain, which is a necess! ary first step to judging the possible explanations.

Before we get too deep into the psychology, it should be noted that progress is often made in the "hard" sciences when the thing-to-be-explained is made more clear. For example, Newton's theory of gravity was a 'theory' because he declared that the cause of terrestrial bodies falling towards the earth was one and the same as the cause of planets moving in orbits; that is, a falling apple can be used as a metaphor or model for explaining orbiting planets. People had for centuries declared that celestial phenomenon had different causes than terrestrial phenomenon, and Newton progressed the field by clarifying the thing-to-be-explained. Though I can't put an exact name on the event, chemistry was similarly advanced when its basic descriptive content was clarified to be the way that atoms combine to form molecules - and again advanced when it was further clarified that we were concerned with atoms and molecules measur! ed in terms of moles (a metric regarding the number of atoms/m! olecules ) instead of their combination in metrics of weight or mass.

Back to psychology, you must start by granting me, at least for the moment, that language is a distraction to psychologists - either because people don't know themselves perfectly, because they may intentionally lie, or because speaking just isn't a perfect tool. Language is also problematic because when we focus on verbal interaction, we forget that, in our day-to-day lives, we go about much of our business without language, or with language as a supplement to things that are already happening. For example, I might see a boy trying to hit a bee hive with a rock, and ask, "Why on earth are you trying to hit that hive?!?" He replies, "I don't like bees." The analysis being offered of these events is as follows: 1) By observing the behavior of the boy, I could see what he was trying to do - hit the hive. 2) I asked for an explanation of this behavior. 3) The boy explained his trying-to-hit-the-hive on the bas! is of a dislike. Similarly, let us imagine that we see a woman studying a jigsaw puzzle for a while, then confidently picking up a piece and attempting to put it in a hole. Whether the piece fits or not, we might ask, "Why on earth did you believe that would work?!?" and she might reply "I rotated it in my head, and the shape and colors seemed to line up." The analysis being offered of these events is as follows: 1) By observing the behavior of the woman we have seen her belief - that the piece would fit. 2) I asked for an explanation of this behavior. 3) The woman explained by reference to manipulations of an internal, mental model of the pieces.

When I asked about the boy's trying, I was asking for an explanation of something I saw him doing. Thus, trying = something about behavior. When I asked about what the woman's belief, I was asking for an explanation about her behavior. Thus belief = something about behavior. If those questions were not asking about somethi! ng observable, then the whole interaction is nonsensical.
!
Now, both the woman and the boy offered explanations that we would normally take to be dualistic in some manner (perhaps mind-body dualism, perhaps brain-behavior dualism). There are many who would argue that the boy's explanation, in terms of his 'dislike', is not dualistic, but that is a somewhat different discussion, and the woman's explanation is clearly dualistic. In any case, while we must take seriously the explanations people offer for their own behavior, we must also maintain our suspicion of language. Thus, we must treat the explanation they offered as a hypothesis.

To make their hypothesized-explanations even potentially coherent, we must be absolutely sure to not confuse their explanation with the thing to be explained. We must at all costs not confuse the woman's "belief" with "that she mentally rotated the object and it lined up in her head." That is, to explain the belief is one thing, to explain the lining up in he! r head is another thing. That she believed is that she acted confidently in placing the piece. That she acted confidently might or might not be well-explained by things that occur in her inaccessible (to us) mental theater.

So, that's it. What Peirce's observation allows us to do is to judge these and other possible explanations based on the evidence we can amass to support them. We can ask, "Is the relevant something-about-behavior best explained using dualistic explanations, or by using non-dualistic explanations in terms of operant and classical condition, more dynamic and full-bodied developmental effects, evolutionary processes, etc.?"

Now, I will readily admit that I have a bias against dualistic explanations --- both because I think the force of evidence is against them and because I think they are somewhat i! ncoherent --- but that is a different issue. Step 1 is in adva! ncing th e science of psychology (130 years ago, and still today) is to clarify the thing-to-be-explained when we ask about things like 'belief', so that the the thing-to-be-explained can be kept separate from the explanation, and so that the plausibility of different explanations can be coherently investigated and the resulting evidence can be judged fairly. The thing-to-be-explained is why people act the way they do, with different aspects of their actions taking center stage in different questions.

The end there seems a bit rambling, but hopefully Russ's question is no longer left hanging.

Eric