Natural Design as a primitive property (was FRIAM and Causality)

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Natural Design as a primitive property (was FRIAM and Causality)

Nick Thompson
All,

I confess I have not followed the mathematical side of this discussion into
the blue underlined stuff.  Nor do I claim to understand all of the plain
text.

However, I am tempted by the idea of a mathematical formalization of
"natural design".  Here is the argument:  What EVERYBODY --from the most
dyed in the wool Natural Theologist to the most flaming Dawkinsian --
agrees on is that there is some property of natural objects which we might
roughly call their designedness.  Tremendous confusion has been sewn by
biologists by confusing that property -- whatever it might be --  with the
CAUSES of that property, variously God or Natural selection, or
what-have-you.   So much of what passes for causal explanation in biology
is actually description of the "adaptation relation" or what I call, just
to be a trouble-maker, "natural design".  

It seems to me that you mathematicians could do a great deal for biology by
putting your minds to a formalization of "natural design".  It would put
Darwin's theory -- "natural selection begets natural design" out of the
reach of tautology once and for all.  What I am looking for here is a
mathematical formalization of the relations --hierarchy of relations, I
would suppose -- that leads to attributions of "designedness".  Assuming
that one had put a computer on a British Survey Vessel and sent it round
the world for five years looking at the creatures and their surroundings,
what is the mathematical description of the relation that would have to be
obtained before the computer would come home saying that creatures were
designed (and rocks weren't).   Then -- and only then -- are we in a
position to ask the question, "is natural selection the best explanation
for this property.  

My supposition is that ALL current theories will not survive such an
analysis.  Indeed, we may need a new metaphor altogether.  Many of you will
be familiar with the notion of fitness landscape.  For intuitive purposes,
let me turn the landscape upside down, so its peaks are chasms and its
valleys are peaks.  Now, drop a ball at random into the upside down
landscape.  Assuming that the landscape is rigid, the ball will roll around
until it finds a local minimum.  If you put some jitter in the rolling, it
might, depending on the size of the jitter and the roughness of the
landscape, find the absolute minimum.  But all of this assumes that the
ball has no effect on the landscape!  If we turn the landscape into a
semi-rigid net so that the ball deforms the landscape as it rolls through
it, then we have a much better metaphor for the relation between an
organism's design and the environment in which it is operating.  Some
organisms -- weedy species -- cause the environment to rise under their
feet, so to speak, so they are constantly driven out of whatever valley
they settle in;  Other organisms modify the environment in their favor and
in effect, dig their way into a pit in the landscape.  If the ball
representing such organisms has inadequate jitter or the landscape is not
sufficiently springy, such an organism can dig its way  into a pit and then
go extinct.  

In short we need a dynamical theory.  But such a theory will never happen
until we have a  sufficiently subtle (and verbalizable) mathematical
formalization of the momentary relation between organisms and their
environments that we are trying to explain.   Get at it, you
mathematicians!!!!

Nick




> Hi,
>
> D'Espagnat gives a very biased view of QM. For a critical view of the
> book see for instance
>
> Esfeld, Michael
> Review of "Bernard d'Espagnat, On physics and philosophy, Princeton:
> Princeton University Press 2006", Studies in History and Philosophy of
> Modern Physics 38B (2007), pp. 989-992
>
>
http://www.unil.ch/webdav/site/philo/shared/DocsPerso/EsfeldMichael/2007/Esp
agnat-SHPMP07.pdf

>
> Gus Koehler wrote:
> > Bernard D'Espagnat, practicing and well know physicist, in his 2006 On
> > Physics and Philosophy makes the following points based on contemporary
> > limits that nature has imposed us via quantum mechanics:
>
>
> Regards,
> G?nther
>
> --
> G?nther Greindl
> Department of Philosophy of Science
> University of Vienna
> guenther.greindl at univie.ac.at
> http://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/
>
> Blog: http://dao.complexitystudies.org/
> Site: http://www.complexitystudies.org
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 5
> Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2007 14:05:38 +0000
> From: sy at synapse9.com
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] FRIAM and causality
> To: "The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group"
> <friam at redfish.com>
> Message-ID:
>
        <1164569392-1196172318-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-1644186245-
@bxe010.bisx.prod.on.blackberry>
>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252"
>
> Glen,
> Nearly all you say fits closely with my approach, except the word 'any'
in the following quote.
>
> " To the contrary, I assume every actual system has an inherent
> "hierarchicability" (following the word "extensibility") with respect to
> any observer(s).  In other words, a system can be projected onto any
> ordering, depending on the attributes imputed by the projection."
>
> If you insert 'an' there instead, the combination of the possible and
discovered orderings will reveal an image of other things.

>
> Phil
>
> Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBerry
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: "Glen E. P. Ropella" <gepr at tempusdictum.com>
>
> Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2007 03:51:12
> To:The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam at redfish.com>
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] FRIAM and causality
>
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> G?nther Greindl on 11/21/2007 04:48 PM:
> > So you probably won't even support sup/inf hierarchy, I gather; I'm no
> > Relativity pundit - do you think that follows from SR or is it a
> > philosophical view?
>
> It's somewhere in between.  But I don't derive the principle from SR.  I
> derive it from everyday experience.  I tend to believe that any measure
> (including relative ones like ordering and sup/inf) are mere aspects of
> the underlying relations.  So, it's not that I don't support hierarchy.
>  To the contrary, I assume every actual system has an inherent
> "hierarchicability" (following the word "extensibility") with respect to
> any observer(s).  In other words, a system can be projected onto any
> ordering, depending on the attributes imputed by the projection.
>
> No single ordering will tell us much about the system because (assuming
> it's accurate) it only shows us one aspect (interpretation, usage) of
> the system.  In order to make a claim that we've identified a
> cause-effect graph, we have to make several (in some cases infinite)
> projections based on various imputed attributes.
>
> >> Such distinctions do NOT require one to consider [in]determinism.  But,
> >> they do require one to consider historical accumulation and
canalization
> >> of causes, i.e. where and how ignorance (particularly of "negligible"
> >> influences e.g. events very FAR away in space or time) affects
causality.

> >
> > Ok, I see what you mean - but just to be careful with terminology: I
> > guess you mean "affects the process under investigation causally" and
> > not "affects causality" (last two words above paragraph)
> > Former interpretation: we agree. Latter interpretation: we should
> > discuss ;-))
>
> Hmmm.  At first blush, I'd say I agree with _both_ phrasings.  I'd say
> (weakly) that ignorance -affects the process under investigation
> causally-.  And I'd say (strongly) that ignorance -affects causality-.
> How do those phrases make a difference to you?
>
> - --
> glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com
> The United States is a nation of laws: badly written and randomly
> enforced. -- Frank Zappa
>
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>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 6
> Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2007 07:01:38 -0800
> From: "Glen E. P. Ropella" <gepr at tempusdictum.com>
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] FRIAM and causality
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> <friam at redfish.com>
> Message-ID: <474C3152.9080500 at tempusdictum.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> sy at synapse9.com on 11/27/2007 06:05 AM:
> > Nearly all you say fits closely with my approach, except the word
> > 'any' in the following quote.
> >
> > "To the contrary, I assume every actual system has an inherent
> > 'hierarchicability' (following the word 'extensibility') with respect
> > to any observer(s).  In other words, a system can be projected onto
> > any ordering, depending on the attributes imputed by the projection."
> >
> >
> > If you insert 'an' there instead, the combination of the possible and
> > discovered orderings will reveal an image of other things.
>
> Good point.  I was just thinking this over as I read Esfeld's review
> (thanks G?nther).  On the one hand, the system can be projected onto
> _any_ ordering.  But, as I think you're pointing out, some orderings
> will be a close fit ("natural") and others will be like putting a square
> peg into a round hole.  So, some projections will work better than
> others.  (I have to qualify that with "for a particular purpose"
> however. ;-)  And the projections that work best provide a better
> measure of the system than others (for that particular purpose).
>
> The part of Esfeld's review that got me thinking this way was the idea
> that nonseparability and holism do not necessarily imply that we cannot
> understand a system.  Similarly, the "hierarchicability" concept I used
> is not intended to imply that all imputations of hierarchy/order are
> equally [use|meaning]ful.
>
> Another thought that keeps ricocheting around in my head is the problem
> of my use of the word "ignorance".  My usage of the word is often
> challenged; but, I keep using it anyway. [grin]  I'm stubborn.  But, by
> "ignorance", I don't _merely_ mean "lack of knowledge" of a given person
> or a set of people.  It also means the act or possibility of some
> influence (element of cause) being negligible ... or marginalized. This
> semantic hair splitting comes up in the Esfeld review, too, when he says:
>
> "In none of these interpretations is any link from nonseparability and
> holism to our ignorance of what nature is in itself."
>
> If I use my definition of "ignorance", then nonseparability and holism
> _do_ imply that a form of ignorance (i.e. the marginalization of
> particular influences) always obtains.  Because we cannot know or
> understand _everything_... because our models, by definition, cannot
> ever be completely accurate, we _must_ consider some parts negligible.
> (And by "we", I mean "any bounded entity that uses transduction across
> that boundary to understand its environment" ... e.g. trees, ants,
> cells, humans, etc.)
>
> In the case of complex cause, we can make multiple projections into
> various orderings and select the ones that work best (for a particular
> purpose).  By such selection we can _approach_ an accurate understanding
> of the system; but it is a limit process.
>
> - --
> glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com
> There is nothing as permanent as a temporary government program. --
> Milton Friedman
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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>
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>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 7
> Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2007 07:55:08 -0800
> From: "Gus Koehler" <gus at timestructures.com>
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Is mathematical pattern the theory of everything?
> To: "'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'"
> <friam at redfish.com>
> Message-ID: <001701c8310d$e5f84c90$6401a8c0 at EA5E71A6DE4A4D9>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> Thank you for drawing this excellent review to our attention.  References
to

> differing views from D'Espaganat is very helpful.  In any case, the review
> does not negate my essential point but only adds to it, and that is the
> fundamental difficulties with trying to establish some foundation for
> realism given quantum mechanics.  These implications need to be brought
> forward in the Friam discussion.
>
> Regards,
>
> Gus
> Gus Koehler, Ph.D.
> President and Principal
> Time Structures, Inc.
> 1545 University Ave.
> Sacramento, CA 95825
> 916-564-8683, Fax: 916-564-7895
> Cell: 916-716-1740
> www.timestructures.com
>  
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: friam-bounces at redfish.com [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] On
Behalf

> Of G?nther Greindl
> Sent: Tuesday, November 27, 2007 4:27 AM
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Is mathematical pattern the theory of everything?
>
> Hi,
>
> D'Espagnat gives a very biased view of QM. For a critical view of the book
> see for instance
>
> Esfeld, Michael
> Review of "Bernard d'Espagnat, On physics and philosophy, Princeton:
> Princeton University Press 2006", Studies in History and Philosophy of
> Modern Physics 38B (2007), pp. 989-992
>
>
http://www.unil.ch/webdav/site/philo/shared/DocsPerso/EsfeldMichael/2007/Esp

> agnat-SHPMP07.pdf
>
> Gus Koehler wrote:
> > Bernard D'Espagnat, practicing and well know physicist, in his 2006 On
> > Physics and Philosophy makes the following points based on
> > contemporary limits that nature has imposed us via quantum mechanics:
>
>
> Regards,
> G?nther
>
> --
> G?nther Greindl
> Department of Philosophy of Science
> University of Vienna
> guenther.greindl at univie.ac.at
> http://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/
>
> Blog: http://dao.complexitystudies.org/
> Site: http://www.complexitystudies.org
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives,
> unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> Friam mailing list
> Friam at redfish.com
> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>
>
> End of Friam Digest, Vol 53, Issue 24
> *************************************




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Natural Design as a primitive property (was FRIAM and Causality)

Robert J. Cordingley
Quick thought.  Isn't 'designedness' directly proportional to a local
reduction in entropy (= a measure of disorder, etc.) ?  There's lots of
math on entropy.
Robert C

Nicholas Thompson wrote:

> All,
>
> I confess I have not followed the mathematical side of this discussion into
> the blue underlined stuff.  Nor do I claim to understand all of the plain
> text.
>
> However, I am tempted by the idea of a mathematical formalization of
> "natural design".  Here is the argument:  What EVERYBODY --from the most
> dyed in the wool Natural Theologist to the most flaming Dawkinsian --
> agrees on is that there is some property of natural objects which we might
> roughly call their designedness.  Tremendous confusion has been sewn by
> biologists by confusing that property -- whatever it might be --  with the
> CAUSES of that property, variously God or Natural selection, or
> what-have-you.   So much of what passes for causal explanation in biology
> is actually description of the "adaptation relation" or what I call, just
> to be a trouble-maker, "natural design".  
>
> It seems to me that you mathematicians could do a great deal for biology by
> putting your minds to a formalization of "natural design".  It would put
> Darwin's theory -- "natural selection begets natural design" out of the
> reach of tautology once and for all.  What I am looking for here is a
> mathematical formalization of the relations --hierarchy of relations, I
> would suppose -- that leads to attributions of "designedness".  Assuming
> that one had put a computer on a British Survey Vessel and sent it round
> the world for five years looking at the creatures and their surroundings,
> what is the mathematical description of the relation that would have to be
> obtained before the computer would come home saying that creatures were
> designed (and rocks weren't).   Then -- and only then -- are we in a
> position to ask the question, "is natural selection the best explanation
> for this property.  
>
> My supposition is that ALL current theories will not survive such an
> analysis.  Indeed, we may need a new metaphor altogether.  Many of you will
> be familiar with the notion of fitness landscape.  For intuitive purposes,
> let me turn the landscape upside down, so its peaks are chasms and its
> valleys are peaks.  Now, drop a ball at random into the upside down
> landscape.  Assuming that the landscape is rigid, the ball will roll around
> until it finds a local minimum.  If you put some jitter in the rolling, it
> might, depending on the size of the jitter and the roughness of the
> landscape, find the absolute minimum.  But all of this assumes that the
> ball has no effect on the landscape!  If we turn the landscape into a
> semi-rigid net so that the ball deforms the landscape as it rolls through
> it, then we have a much better metaphor for the relation between an
> organism's design and the environment in which it is operating.  Some
> organisms -- weedy species -- cause the environment to rise under their
> feet, so to speak, so they are constantly driven out of whatever valley
> they settle in;  Other organisms modify the environment in their favor and
> in effect, dig their way into a pit in the landscape.  If the ball
> representing such organisms has inadequate jitter or the landscape is not
> sufficiently springy, such an organism can dig its way  into a pit and then
> go extinct.  
>
> In short we need a dynamical theory.  But such a theory will never happen
> until we have a  sufficiently subtle (and verbalizable) mathematical
> formalization of the momentary relation between organisms and their
> environments that we are trying to explain.   Get at it, you
> mathematicians!!!!
>
> Nick
>  
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Natural Design as a primitive property (was FRIAM and Causality)

glen ep ropella
In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
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Hash: SHA1

Nicholas Thompson on 11/27/2007 10:22 AM:
> In short we need a dynamical theory.  But such a theory will never happen
> until we have a  sufficiently subtle (and verbalizable) mathematical
> formalization of the momentary relation between organisms and their
> environments that we are trying to explain.   Get at it, you
> mathematicians!!!!

Isn't this what Robert Rosen tried to do?  Granted his work is woefully
incomplete; but do you see some fundamental flaw in his work that
prevents it from providing (at least the foundations for) the
formalization you're looking for?

- --
glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com
The fear of death follows from the fear of life. A man who lives fully
is prepared to die at any time. -- Mark Twain

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