Fwd: America and the Middle East: Murder in Libya | The Economist

[Sarbajit Roy (testing)]

Dear Glen

You've confused me even more now.
So I'll just come to your last para

"> I don't want "want" to be involved. 8^)  I'm trying to simplify the
> discussion down to an actionable point.  Which is why I'll ask again:
> If faith is a collection of actions, what actions constitute faith?"

Praxis ?.

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

[glen ropella]

Sarbajit Roy wrote at 09/19/2012 08:30 AM:
>> I don't want "want" to be involved. 8^)  I'm trying to simplify the
>> discussion down to an actionable point.  Which is why I'll ask again:
>> If faith is a collection of actions, what actions constitute faith?"
>
> Praxis ?.

Heh, you didn't provide enough context for me to guess what you mean by
that word.  I'm looking for normal actions ... like "go to the store" or
"pick your nose" or "kneel in front of that plastic statue for 12 hours"
... play with that snake ... eat this wafer ... stare at that table for
24 hours ... etc.  We need a sequence of actions that might actually
cause a person to "have faith".

--
glen

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

[Sarbajit Roy (testing)]

Sorry

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Praxis_(Eastern_Orthodoxy)

"Orthodox writers use the term "praxis" to refer to what others, using
an English rather than a Greek word, call practice of the faith,
especially with regard to ascetic and liturgical life.

Praxis is key to Eastern Orthodox understanding because it is the
basis of faith and works and the understanding of not separating the
two. The importance of praxis, in the sense of action, is indicated in
the dictum of Saint Maximus the Confessor: "Theology without action is
the theology of demons."[3]"

On 9/19/12, glen <[hidden email]> wrote:

> Sarbajit Roy wrote at 09/19/2012 08:30 AM:
>>> I don't want "want" to be involved. 8^)  I'm trying to simplify the
>>> discussion down to an actionable point.  Which is why I'll ask again:
>>> If faith is a collection of actions, what actions constitute faith?"
>>
>> Praxis ?.
>
> Heh, you didn't provide enough context for me to guess what you mean by
> that word.  I'm looking for normal actions ... like "go to the store" or
> "pick your nose" or "kneel in front of that plastic statue for 12 hours"
> ... play with that snake ... eat this wafer ... stare at that table for
> 24 hours ... etc.  We need a sequence of actions that might actually
> cause a person to "have faith".
>
> --
> glen

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

[Sarbajit Roy (testing)]

>We need a sequence of actions that might actually cause a person to "have faith".

2 examples. a)  way cults work, and b) ways a magnet works.

In a (religious) cult, the newbies are first encouraged to join in on
simple actions like clapping. This is a psychological device to get
them to participate and show that nobody objects to their "actions".
Then they are encouraged to "sing a little bit" .. moving onto
dancing, chanting, praise be the lording or whatever ....

Pick a magnet, any magnet. Pick a piece of unmagnetic iron. Gently
stroke said magnet in the same direction repeatedly over said piece of
iron. Note those little (Brainwashed) magnetic dipoles lining up just
so ... That's how the faith model and Al-Qaeda works.

Sarbajit

On 9/19/12, glen <[hidden email]> wrote:

>> Praxis ?.
>
> Heh, you didn't provide enough context for me to guess what you mean by
> that word.  I'm looking for normal actions ... like "go to the store" or
> "pick your nose" or "kneel in front of that plastic statue for 12 hours"
> ... play with that snake ... eat this wafer ... stare at that table for
> 24 hours ... etc.  We need a sequence of actions that might actually
> cause a person to "have faith".
>
> --
> glen
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

[glen ropella]

Thanks for the clarity on "praxis".  That word has too much baggage for
me to be comfortable with it.  Using it would beg people to talk about
stuff unrelated to Nick's assertion.

Sarbajit Roy wrote at 09/19/2012 10:46 AM:

>> We need a sequence of actions that might actually cause a person to "have faith".
>
> 2 examples. a)  way cults work, and b) ways a magnet works.
>
> In a (religious) cult, the newbies are first encouraged to join in on
> simple actions like clapping. This is a psychological device to get
> them to participate and show that nobody objects to their "actions".
> Then they are encouraged to "sing a little bit" .. moving onto
> dancing, chanting, praise be the lording or whatever ....
>
> Pick a magnet, any magnet. Pick a piece of unmagnetic iron. Gently
> stroke said magnet in the same direction repeatedly over said piece of
> iron. Note those little (Brainwashed) magnetic dipoles lining up just
> so ... That's how the faith model and Al-Qaeda works.

Excellent!  Both of these approach what is necessary for Nick to be able
to reconcile the 2 assertions that faith underlies all justification and
belief is action.  They are incomplete in different ways:

In (a), there is still a missing piece between the social comfort
brought by the increasing participation in various activities versus
some belief ascribed to the cult members.  I would posit that a
mole/infiltrator could participate in a cult quite a long time, dancing,
changing, murdering starlets in their homes, etc. _without_ actually
believing the doctrines of the cult (much like most Catholics I've met).
 So, what we need is an idea of how we get to belief from these actions.
 How do we distinguish "lip service" or facetious dancing and chanting
from the chanting and dancing of the true believers?

(b) is inadequate for a different reason, I think.  The brainwashing of
the molecules is a type of memory, which gets at the previous
conversations.  Is memory required for belief?  I'd tentatively say
"yes".  But I have yet to hear an answer from those who believe that
belief is (reducible to) action.  If their answer is "no", then we'd
have to begin discussing whether there is any temporal quality to belief
at all.  E.g. can one only believe what they're doing at any given
instant and the concept of belief is incoherent for discussions of
future and past?  If their answer is "yes", then we have to decide
whether memory (of some type) is sufficient for belief.  E.g. are there
types of memory that do not amount to belief?  Like if I know that some
person thinks 1+1=3, I can remember that, "suspend disbelief", and play
along with that equation for awhile without believing it.

--
glen

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

[Eric Charles]

Glen said: In [Sarbajit's example of cult indoctrination], there is still a missing piece between the social comfort brought by the increasing participation in various activities versus some belief ascribed to the cult members. I would posit that a mole/infiltrator could participate in a cult quite a long time, dancing, changing, murdering starlets in their homes, etc. _without_ actually believing the doctrines of the cult (much like most Catholics I've met). So, what we need is an idea of how we get to belief from these actions. How do we distinguish "lip service" or facetious dancing and chanting from the chanting and dancing of the true believers?

-----

But Glen, when you talk about the infiltrator, or the person
"paying lip-service", you are just appealing to a larger pattern of
behavior.

Agreeing with your assertion, "faking belief" looks different
than "belief"... if you can see enough of the person's behavior and/or see a
close enough level of detail.

We distinguish the two exactly by
determining which larger pattern of behavior exists. This is not proposing some
radically new way of thinking about psychology... it is proposing that we deal
with psychology the same way any other science deals with its special subject
matter. Take Chemistry: 

There are many, many chemicals that look the
same to the human eye, and which react the same under
many conditions (for example, when a set volume is put on a scale), but which
react differently under other conditions (for example, when put in a particular
solution). The chemicals are distinguished by observing a variety of ways in
which the chemicals interact with the world. Similarly, a person who believes X
and a person faking belief in X are distinguished by observing a wide variety
of ways in which the people interact with the world.

Also, for the
record, one of the problems with using "moles" is that it is very difficult to
get people capable of participating in cultural practices of these sorts over
extended periods without becoming believers. The practices become normal to
you, the group becomes "your group", and even if you can still turn them
in/report on them/whatever you are supposed to do, you become sympathetic.

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

[glen ropella]

ERIC P. CHARLES wrote at 09/19/2012 02:54 PM:
> But Glen, when you talk about the infiltrator, or the person
> "paying lip-service", you are just appealing to a larger pattern of
> behavior.

Aha!!  Excellent!  So, tell me how to classify the patterns so that one
pattern is just lip service and the other is belief!  If you do that,
then we'll have our objective function.  I can develop an algorithm for
that and we'll be able to automatically distinguish zombies from actors.
 Then we can begin building machines that try to satisfy it.

> Agreeing with your assertion, "faking belief" looks different
> than "belief"... if you can see enough of the person's behavior and/or see a
> close enough level of detail.

The former, again, sounds like memory.  The latter is something else.
It implies something about scale.  We know actions are multi-scale
(anatomy, physiology, chemistry, physics).  Is there a cut-off below
which we need not go?  Genes?  Chemicals? Or does the multiscalar
requirements for measuring belief extend all the way down?

> a person who believes X
> and a person faking belief in X are distinguished by observing a wide variety
> of ways in which the people interact with the world.

So, in addition to memory and crossing scales, the measures are also
multivalent at any one instant or any one scale.

> Also, for the record, one of the problems with using "moles" is that it is very
> difficult to get people capable of participating in cultural practices of these
> sorts over extended periods without becoming believers. The practices become
> normal to you, the group becomes "your group", and even if you can still turn
> them in/report on them/whatever you are supposed to do, you become sympathetic.

Uh-oh.  This makes it sound like not only is there a multi-scale
problem, but there may also be a hybrid requirement.  The mole either
continuously transitions from non-belief to belief or there's a
threshold.   I.e. some parts of our classifying predicate will be
continuous and some will be discrete.

I have to admit, this seems like a really difficult multi-objective
selection method.  Building a machine that generates belief from a
collection of mechanisms, thereby satisfying the criteria, will be
exceedingly difficult, at least as difficult as artificial life and
intelligence.  But this is what we have to do if we're going to continue
claiming that beliefs reduce to actions.

--
glen

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

[Marcus G. Daniels]

On 9/19/12 4:29 PM, glen wrote:
> I.e. some parts of our classifying predicate will be continuous and
> some will be discrete. I have to admit, this seems like a really
> difficult multi-objective selection method.
Use tabu search (https://projects.coin-or.org/metslib), encoding the
transition rate as binary numbers in the state space.

Marcus

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

[Sarbajit Roy (testing)]

Glen:

(aside) In addition to my "faith" hat, I also have a
"designer/manufacturer of programmable logic controller" hat.

To design an artificial life form (android / zombie ...) capable of
successfully passing among humans in a religious (faith) setting you
would probably need tons of "memory" (or else some channeling
reinforcement, probabilistic determinative  etc. mechanism) and the
ability to dynamically mimic "emotions" such as "boredom", "guilt",
"trust", "sin", "obedience", "lip-service" etc. The zombie wouldn't
have to bring much "knowledge" or "wisdom" to this setting as the more
brain dead it is the easier it is for to pass.

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

[Nick Thompson]

Robots do lip service quite handily.

"We value your call."

Nick

-----Original Message-----
From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf
Of Sarbajit Roy
Sent: Wednesday, September 19, 2012 11:22 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] faith, zombies, and crazy people

Glen:

(aside) In addition to my "faith" hat, I also have a "designer/manufacturer
of programmable logic controller" hat.

To design an artificial life form (android / zombie ...) capable of
successfully passing among humans in a religious (faith) setting you would
probably need tons of "memory" (or else some channeling reinforcement,
probabilistic determinative  etc. mechanism) and the ability to dynamically
mimic "emotions" such as "boredom", "guilt", "trust", "sin", "obedience",
"lip-service" etc. The zombie wouldn't have to bring much "knowledge" or
"wisdom" to this setting as the more brain dead it is the easier it is for
to pass.

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives,
unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

[Sarbajit Roy (testing)]

Apparently its not so simple to achieve
"The Artificial Life of Synthetic Actors"
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.13.8387&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Lots of dynamic collisions and collision detection mechanisms floating about.

Just came across this
http://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2012/06/14/cyber-security-and-the-rise-of-the-silicon-based-life-form/

"Silicon-based life forms now make short work of tasks that once took
us many man hours to accomplish. In addition to carrying crushing
computational loads without complaint, they deliver our communications
at the speed of light, transact business on our behalf and help us
more efficiently perform the tasks we still perform. We think a lot
about the way we interact with them. Few of us, however, think about
how silicon-based life forms interact with one another."

On 9/20/12, Nicholas  Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

> Robots do lip service quite handily.
>
> "We value your call."
>
> Nick
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On
> Behalf
> Of Sarbajit Roy
> Sent: Wednesday, September 19, 2012 11:22 PM
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] faith, zombies, and crazy people
>
> Glen:
>
> (aside) In addition to my "faith" hat, I also have a "designer/manufacturer
> of programmable logic controller" hat.
>
> To design an artificial life form (android / zombie ...) capable of
> successfully passing among humans in a religious (faith) setting you would
> probably need tons of "memory" (or else some channeling reinforcement,
> probabilistic determinative  etc. mechanism) and the ability to dynamically
> mimic "emotions" such as "boredom", "guilt", "trust", "sin", "obedience",
> "lip-service" etc. The zombie wouldn't have to bring much "knowledge" or
> "wisdom" to this setting as the more brain dead it is the easier it is for
> to pass.
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives,
> unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

[Eric Charles]

Glen says:
"I have to admit, this seems like a really difficult multi-objective selection method. "

Yes, yes, yes! But, to stick with the analogy, it is not in-principle more difficult than distinguishing chemical compounds. Admittedly, Chemistry had quite a head start as a formal science. However, if psychologists had their heads out of the rears, and had put in as much effort over the last 100 years into classifying the ways people interact with the world as chemists had put into classifying the ways chemicals interact with the world, the question wouldn't seem so intimidating. We would have achieved, or be close to, whatever psychology's version of the periodic table is (which I know is itself continuously up for re-conceptualization, but the basic one is still incredibly helpful).

As for your more specific question, it is pretty easy to tell believers from fakers... so long as we exclude faker-recursion. That is, it is possible for a human to be a believer faking being a non-believer, etc. If we stick to the original two-option case, it is pretty easy - I submit - because we do it all the time. Specifying exactly how we do it is tricky only because the research hasn't been done. Check out any Daily Show coverage of the presidential debates. One of the best bits so far is the Fox News commentator who, after Romney's speech goes on for quite a while about how great it is that there were so many details, how this will really connect with voters and answer their questions, etc. Then, immediately after Obama's speech he goes off about how the speech included a lot of details, and that is sure to alienate voters. If we only saw the first speech, we might think that the commentator believes details are good, or at least that he believes viewers want details. After seeing the clips next to each other, it is clear that he was merely faking that belief as part of a larger pattern serving some other purpose.

What are the varieties of ways in which we make these distinctions? It is a tremendously complicated, but ultimately tractable question.

Eric

P.S. This problem is of particular interest to one of the topologists on the list - Lee Rudolph - who just had a book on the subject release. I haven't read it yet, but I know it is (among other things) an attempt to apply modern, non-statistical, mathematics to this problem. That would include math that can adequately deal with discrete and non-discrete aspects, etc., which you point out we would need. Lee, can you give a more skilled plug?



On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 06:29 PM, glen <[hidden email]> wrote:

ERIC P. CHARLES wrote at 09/19/2012 02:54 PM:
> But Glen, when you talk about the infiltrator, or the person
> "paying lip-service", you are just appealing to a larger pattern
of
> behavior.

Aha!!  Excellent!  So, tell me how to classify the patterns so that one
pattern is just lip service and the other is belief!  If you do that,
then we'll have our objective function.  I can develop an algorithm for
that and we'll be able to automatically distinguish zombies from actors.
 Then we can begin building machines that try to satisfy it.

> Agreeing with your assertion, "faking belief" looks different
> than "belief"... if you can see enough of the person's behavior
and/or see a
> close enough level of detail.

The former, again, sounds like memory.  The latter is something else.
It implies something about scale.  We know actions are multi-scale
(anatomy, physiology, chemistry, physics).  Is there a cut-off below
which we need not go?  Genes?  Chemicals? Or does the multiscalar
requirements for measuring belief extend all the way down?

> a person who believes X
> and a person faking belief in X are distinguished by observing a wide
variety
> of ways in which the people interact with the world.

So, in addition to memory and crossing scales, the measures are also
multivalent at any one instant or any one scale.

> Also, for the record, one of the problems with using "moles" is
that it is very
> difficult to get people capable of participating in cultural practices of
these
> sorts over extended periods without becoming believers. The practices
become
> normal to you, the group becomes "your group", and even if you
can still turn
> them in/report on them/whatever you are supposed to do, you become
sympathetic. 

Uh-oh.  This makes it sound like not only is there a multi-scale
problem, but there may also be a hybrid requirement.  The mole either
continuously transitions from non-belief to belief or there's a
threshold.   I.e. some parts of our classifying predicate will be
continuous and some will be discrete.

I have to admit, this seems like a really difficult multi-objective
selection method.  Building a machine that generates belief from a
collection of mechanisms, thereby satisfying the criteria, will be
exceedingly difficult, at least as difficult as artificial life and
intelligence.  But this is what we have to do if we're going to continue
claiming that beliefs reduce to actions.

-- 
glen

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

------------

Eric Charles
Assistant Professor of Psychology
Penn State University
Altoona, PA 16601

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

[glen ropella]

Sarbajit Roy wrote at 09/19/2012 08:21 PM:
> (aside) In addition to my "faith" hat, I also have a
> "designer/manufacturer of programmable logic controller" hat.

I wish more people had those hats.  I see lots of silly and useless hats
... I often feel like I live on the outskirts of a permanent fashion show.

> To design an artificial life form (android / zombie ...) capable of
> successfully passing among humans in a religious (faith) setting you
> would probably need tons of "memory" (or else some channeling
> reinforcement, probabilistic determinative  etc. mechanism) and the
> ability to dynamically mimic "emotions" such as "boredom", "guilt",
> "trust", "sin", "obedience", "lip-service" etc. The zombie wouldn't
> have to bring much "knowledge" or "wisdom" to this setting as the more
> brain dead it is the easier it is for to pass.

The trouble is that concepts like "knowledge" and "wisdom" are no
different from "memory" as far as I can tell.  At least nobody's made
the case that they're at all different.  On the one hand, people will
claim their ... phone ... is "smart".  Then right after that, they'll
call it "stupid".  I've seen people do the same with their children,
politicians, their cars, etc.  When put on the spot, everyone cops out
with the "I can't define it. But I know it when I see it."  To which I
say: Pffft.  8^P

--
glen

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

[glen ropella]

But, if this synthetic task is so difficult, what makes the
reductionists believe they're right?  If nobody can actually build a
belief from a collection of actions, what trickiness or delusion allows
them to confidently assert that beliefs are actions?  What (premature?)
conviction allows you to say that this task is no more difficult, in
principle, than distinguishing chemical compounds?

Even worse, if the research has NOT been done, then you're making this
claim without any scientific evidence.

I truly don't understand the conviction.  It seems very much like an
untested ideology.

Re: Lee's book: There are lots of frameworks for dealing with hybrid
systems.  I'd be interested to see the new approach.


ERIC P. CHARLES wrote at 09/20/2012 05:31 AM:

> Yes, yes, yes! But, to stick with the analogy, it is not in-principle more
> difficult than distinguishing chemical compounds. Admittedly, Chemistry had
> quite a head start as a formal science. However, if psychologists had their
> heads out of the rears, and had put in as much effort over the last 100 years
> into classifying the ways people interact with the world as chemists had put
> into classifying the ways chemicals interact with the world, the question
> wouldn't seem so intimidating. We would have achieved, or be close to, whatever
> psychology's version of the periodic table is (which I know is itself
> continuously up for re-conceptualization, but the basic one is still incredibly
> helpful).
>
> As for your more specific question, it is pretty easy to tell believers from
> fakers... so long as we exclude faker-recursion. That is, it is possible for a
> human to be a believer faking being a non-believer, etc. If we stick to the
> original two-option case, it is pretty easy - I submit - because we do it all
> the time. Specifying exactly how we do it is tricky only because the research
> hasn't been done. Check out any Daily Show coverage of the presidential
> debates. One of the best bits so far is the Fox News commentator who, after
> Romney's speech goes on for quite a while about how great it is that there were
> so many details, how this will really connect with voters and answer their
> questions, etc. Then, immediately after Obama's speech he goes off about how
> the speech included a lot of details, and that is sure to alienate voters. If
> we only saw the first speech, we might think that the commentator believes
> details are good, or at least that he believes viewers want details. After
> seeing the clips next to each other, it is clear that he was merely faking that
> belief as part of a larger pattern serving some other purpose.
>
> What are the varieties of ways in which we make these distinctions? It is a
> tremendously complicated, but ultimately tractable question.
>
> Eric
>
> P.S. This problem is of particular interest to one of the topologists on the
> list - Lee Rudolph - who just had a book on the subject release. I haven't read
> it yet, but I know it is (among other things) an attempt to apply modern,
> non-statistical, mathematics to this problem. That would include math that can
> adequately deal with discrete and non-discrete aspects, etc., which you point
> out we would need. Lee, can you give a more skilled plug?

--
glen

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

[glen ep ropella]

Are you talking about this one?

   Qualitative Math for the Social Sciences
   http://www.powells.com/biblio/62-9780415444828-1

$140 on amazon is still a little much for me.  I'll see if any local
libraries carry it.

glen wrote at 09/20/2012 09:13 AM:

> Re: Lee's book: There are lots of frameworks for dealing with hybrid
> systems.  I'd be interested to see the new approach.
>
>
> ERIC P. CHARLES wrote at 09/20/2012 05:31 AM:
>>
>> P.S. This problem is of particular interest to one of the topologists on the
>> list - Lee Rudolph - who just had a book on the subject release. I haven't read
>> it yet, but I know it is (among other things) an attempt to apply modern,
>> non-statistical, mathematics to this problem. That would include math that can
>> adequately deal with discrete and non-discrete aspects, etc., which you point
>> out we would need. Lee, can you give a more skilled plug?

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://tempusdictum.com


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

[Steve Smith]

FWIW Glen, you may find that your local library is willing to order any
book their patrons desire... Los Alamos (albeit a wealthy county) is
very generous about this... I get the impression that county/local
libraries are "desperate" to remain relevant and one method is to make
sure their patrons get anything they want.  I believe most/all public
libraries also have interlibrary loan systems as well, so if anyone in
their network has it, then they can get it for you.

> Are you talking about this one?
>
>     Qualitative Math for the Social Sciences
>     http://www.powells.com/biblio/62-9780415444828-1
>
> $140 on amazon is still a little much for me.  I'll see if any local
> libraries carry it.
>
> glen wrote at 09/20/2012 09:13 AM:
>> Re: Lee's book: There are lots of frameworks for dealing with hybrid
>> systems.  I'd be interested to see the new approach.
>>
>>
>> ERIC P. CHARLES wrote at 09/20/2012 05:31 AM:
>>> P.S. This problem is of particular interest to one of the topologists on the
>>> list - Lee Rudolph - who just had a book on the subject release. I haven't read
>>> it yet, but I know it is (among other things) an attempt to apply modern,
>>> non-statistical, mathematics to this problem. That would include math that can
>>> adequately deal with discrete and non-discrete aspects, etc., which you point
>>> out we would need. Lee, can you give a more skilled plug?

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

[glen ep ropella]

Yep.  I've already broached the subject with my county library.  Their
criteria center around whether the new thing (book, CD, whatever) would
be of use to the average library user.  So, most of the stuff I want
doesn't qualify.  Apparently math isn't very useful to my fellow
citizens. ;-)

But I may be able to convince one of the universities to buy a copy.  I
searched the oregon and california university library catalogs and
nobody seems to have a copy.


Steve Smith wrote at 09/20/2012 02:21 PM:

> FWIW Glen, you may find that your local library is willing to order any
> book their patrons desire... Los Alamos (albeit a wealthy county) is
> very generous about this... I get the impression that county/local
> libraries are "desperate" to remain relevant and one method is to make
> sure their patrons get anything they want.  I believe most/all public
> libraries also have interlibrary loan systems as well, so if anyone in
> their network has it, then they can get it for you.
>> Are you talking about this one?
>>
>>     Qualitative Math for the Social Sciences
>>     http://www.powells.com/biblio/62-9780415444828-1
>>
>> $140 on amazon is still a little much for me.  I'll see if any local
>> libraries carry it.

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://tempusdictum.com


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

[Sarbajit Roy (testing)]

found 1 chapter in this book online
http://www.sci.osaka-cu.ac.jp/~kawauchi/MindRelations.pdf
qv. http://www.sci.osaka-cu.ac.jp/~kawauchi/index.html

On 9/21/12, glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]> wrote:

> Yep.  I've already broached the subject with my county library.  Their
> criteria center around whether the new thing (book, CD, whatever) would
> be of use to the average library user.  So, most of the stuff I want
> doesn't qualify.  Apparently math isn't very useful to my fellow
> citizens. ;-)
>
> But I may be able to convince one of the universities to buy a copy.  I
> searched the oregon and california university library catalogs and
> nobody seems to have a copy.
>
>
> Steve Smith wrote at 09/20/2012 02:21 PM:
>> FWIW Glen, you may find that your local library is willing to order any
>> book their patrons desire... Los Alamos (albeit a wealthy county) is
>> very generous about this... I get the impression that county/local
>> libraries are "desperate" to remain relevant and one method is to make
>> sure their patrons get anything they want.  I believe most/all public
>> libraries also have interlibrary loan systems as well, so if anyone in
>> their network has it, then they can get it for you.
>>> Are you talking about this one?
>>>
>>>     Qualitative Math for the Social Sciences
>>>     http://www.powells.com/biblio/62-9780415444828-1
>>>
>>> $140 on amazon is still a little much for me.  I'll see if any local
>>> libraries carry it.
>
> --
> glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://tempusdictum.com
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

[Nick Thompson]

Glen,

 

I wrote this, this morning but failed to send it.  It’s a little out of sequence.

 

These are REALLY interesting questions you ask here (see below).  I think to the extent that Eric and I can answer them, they are answered in the "interview with and old new realist" paper I sent you.   One of our strategies is a kind of pragmatic appeal to the consequences of believing the view I am pressing on you (and which you understand precisely, I think) vs the consequences of believing the folk theory of the inner mind that is implicit in our language. I think it's evident that with either theory, one is doomed to say something absurd eventually, but that the absurdities that flow from folk-theory are way more damaging than those that flow from our alternative, if only because people so readily confuse the folk theory with simple fact, whatever that might be.  At least with our theory you KNOW when you’re saying something crazy.

 

A strength of our view is that I think it characterizes more accurately how people actually come by their views of themselves and their motives and intentions.  See Kahneman's new book for instance (Fast and Slow Thinking), or the book by Laird (FEELINGS: The Perception of Self) that we read in our “coffee house seminar”  two springs ago.  The seminar's review of that book is nearly published and you will find it on line at  Behavior and Philosophy, in a few weeks.  Attached, in the meantime is a non-final typescript.

 

Thanks for your comments,

 

Nick  

 

-----Original Message-----
From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of glen
Sent: Wednesday, September 19, 2012 6:30 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] faith, zombies, and crazy people

 

ERIC P. CHARLES wrote at 09/19/2012 02:54 PM:

> But Glen, when you talk about the infiltrator, or the person "paying

> lip-service", you are just appealing to a larger pattern of behavior.

 

Aha!!  Excellent!  So, tell me how to classify the patterns so that one pattern is just lip service and the other is belief!  If you do that, then we'll have our objective function.  I can develop an algorithm for that and we'll be able to automatically distinguish zombies from actors.

Then we can begin building machines that try to satisfy it.

 

> Agreeing with your assertion, "faking belief" looks different than

> "belief"... if you can see enough of the person's behavior and/or see

> a close enough level of detail.

 

The former, again, sounds like memory.  The latter is something else.

It implies something about scale.  We know actions are multi-scale (anatomy, physiology, chemistry, physics).  Is there a cut-off below which we need not go?  Genes?  Chemicals? Or does the multiscalar requirements for measuring belief extend all the way down?

 

> a person who believes X

> and a person faking belief in X are distinguished by observing a wide

> variety of ways in which the people interact with the world.

 

So, in addition to memory and crossing scales, the measures are also multivalent at any one instant or any one scale.

 

> Also, for the record, one of the problems with using "moles" is that

> it is very difficult to get people capable of participating in

> cultural practices of these sorts over extended periods without

> becoming believers. The practices become normal to you, the group

> becomes "your group", and even if you can still turn them in/report on them/whatever you are supposed to do, you become sympathetic.

 

Uh-oh.  This makes it sound like not only is there a multi-scale problem, but there may also be a hybrid requirement.  The mole either continuously transitions from non-belief to belief or there's a

threshold.   I.e. some parts of our classifying predicate will be

continuous and some will be discrete.

 

I have to admit, this seems like a really difficult multi-objective selection method.  Building a machine that generates belief from a collection of mechanisms, thereby satisfying the criteria, will be exceedingly difficult, at least as difficult as artificial life and intelligence.  But this is what we have to do if we're going to continue claiming that beliefs reduce to actions.

 

--

glen

 

============================================================

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv

Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org