Facebook: OK, now what!?
Locked
123
123
Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions
 
|
On Nov 25, 2009, at 12:26 PM, Owen Densmore wrote: > On Nov 25, 2009, at 10:17 AM, Nicholas Thompson wrote: >> <snip> >> Nobody has a hundred friends, so the word, friend, is being extended in a creepy Orwellian way to include strangers. > > I disagree. I was surprised to find just how many work, family, school, church, complexity, .. friends I *do* have. > > [...] > > I'll easily top 200. So would anyone I think who's got diverse contexts mentioned above. No strangers. And not including everyone I do know just to keep the list tight. > > -- Owen > Such a social butterfly! "I'm good enough, I'm smart enough, and doggone it, people like me!" [Stuart Smalley] :-) ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions
|
|
In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
I agree with Nick's distinction between "friend" and
"buddies/colleagues/acquaintances". To the extent that I engage in
FaceBook Friending and LinkedIn Linking, those social networks are for
the latter category (much) more than the former. It is the *next*
boundary that I resist crossing... granting "friend" status to people
who are only *passing* acquaintances.
I might well discover/grow/create new friends through the extra dimensions of engagement that the digitally mediated social networking systems might engender, but I do reserve "friend" to only a handful of people to whom the implied level of commitment is informed, practical and motivated. Unless artificially constrained (by living in a confined group, isolated from others... e.g. rural village or nomadic tribe), I would not expect to be able to know intimately and give that level of trust to more than a handful of people what with the complicating factors of living in a matrix of social/political/economic forces and a milieu of individuals of varying level of acquaintance bouncing off of me every day. Perhaps what I call "friend" others would call "close friend" and what I call "colleague/acquaintance/buddy" is what others would call "friend"... Owen, Not convinced. I think you are describing "buddies," "colleagues", "acquaintances", ie, people with whom you share an interests in a relatively narrow context. A friend, on my account, is a person with whom one shares committment to one another's mutual well-being, as well as many common interests, a division of labor, and means of solving interpersonal problems that arise. I certainly don't have 200 friends. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ http://www.cusf.org [City University of Santa Fe][Original Message] From: Owen Densmore [hidden email] To: [hidden email]; The Friday Morning Applied ComplexityCoffee Group [hidden email] ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: "model" ( was Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions)
|
|
In reply to this post by glen e. p. ropella-2
glen e. p. ropella wrote:
This bit of rhetoric suggests a pretty interesting "model" of your (our) engagement here. In any case, I think I'll take another helping of gravy.Quoting Nicholas Thompson circa 09-11-25 09:36 AM: I would counter that models are often *expressed* in rhetoric, not sub-types of rhetoric. Just as models are sometimes *implemented* in simulations rather than simulations being types of models. Can you give us more justification for subsuming modeling into rhetoric? I think it is time for Doug to get out his random-philosophy-generator to demonstrate once more that one can simulate rhetoric which has no model. But then I would be forced to ask what model of rhetoric the random-philosophy-generator is based on. Can one write a simulation without a model? And that some rhetoric does not *express* any specific consistent model.Not all rhetoric constitutes a model. In my lexicon, a model is presumed to have a referent but there are many, many, many unvalidated models in the world (perhaps you call these theories, hypotheses, etc.) whose referent's qualities and perhaps even existence is still in question. I do not know what a theory or even hypothesis is, if not a model. Perhaps without "proof" or "validation" it is a proto-model?I'd call your (very brief and largely detail-free) rhetoric that celebrity is an effect of being forced to handle a large # of associations and, hence a confusion between "village" and "world" trust is NOT a model. If we include David Sloan Wilson's Multi-Level Selection Theory and inference made from that theory including the above, then I still don't call that a model. I call it one of a theory, thesis, hypothesis, conjecture, or speculation. A model, in my lexicon, must have at least 2 attributes: 1) it must be an extant thing in and of itself and 2) it must have a referent. Your rhetoric has (2) but not (1). And even so, your rhetoric is way too abstract to measure actual human evolution. (Remember that "model" is derived from the same root as "measure"... e.g. a balsa wood airplane is used to measure a real airplane.) You can't measure human evolution with your rhetoric; so, even if you claim it is extant (e.g. in the form of books, video or audio recordings of lectures, etc), it's still quite a stretch to call it a model. Well said...p.s. And YES, I know lots of people will claim that lots of people will disagree with my use of the word "model", here. But I hope you realize now that it doesn't much matter to me whether lots of people disagree with my use of the word model, especially if those disagreeing people aren't professional modelers. And don't expect me to believe that pro persuaders (who make their living building rhetoric) are pro modelers. While pro modelers _are_ pro persuaders, pro persuaders are not necessarily pro modelers. ;-) Some of us (entreprenuers) live by the motto: Model to Persuade; Persuade to Model For the most part, those who fund modeling (and simulation) are seeking to justify their own rhetoric, not inform it. And those of us who seek such funding are relegated to using our own rhetoric to obtain those funded modeling projects. My own rhetoric (used mostly in the privacy of my own head) is that I knowingly model in support of other's rhetoric to obtain the funds to allow me to do my own model development in the pursuit of a higher truth. My model of "a higher truth" includes objective reality and does not admit to supernatural beings or forces. It has been proven to my satisfaction that I cannot validate this model. e.g. I cannot prove that there is an objective reality. Therefore *all* of my models are ultimately grounded in a model which I cannot prove a valid referent. That only slows me down when I'm in a particularly philosophical mood. The rest of the time I proceed blithely. On a good day, we might have the luxury of choosing the models we build based on more criteria than whether they will be funded or not. All the brouhaha in the Right-Wingnut-World about the uncovered "Hoax" of global warming would seem to be a good test case. There is *clearly* a huge amount of rhetoric on all sides of the topic. There *are* numerous relevant models, validated to different degrees. Few, if any, support the rhetoric of "humans have not, will not, cannot influence the global climate!!!!!" It does not surprise me that some modelers (scientists studying climate) might have given over to adjusting/selecting/interpreting their models to fit the rhetoric of their funders. It is even less surprising that those whose rhetoric is in opposition to that rhetoric would attempt to justify their *own* rhetoric based on this failure on the part of the individuals/institutions in question to be entirely unbiased in every way. </series of segues> Model on, - Steve ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions
|
|
In reply to this post by Douglas Roberts-2
Doug -
Wow! You are more of a "best friend" to the FRIAM group than I ever realized... Never again will I poke at you with one of my bendy straws just because I caught you poking at 300+ friends/colleagues/acquaintances with your very cleverly arranged (image balloon animals) bendy straws. Poke away... it makes (some of) us giggle when you do that. - Steve More in the philosophical flow: ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions
|
|
In reply to this post by Steve Smith
Glen,
Thanks for all of the below. For an evolutionary psychologist, "narcissism" is not a term of art, so far as I know. There is a category, roughly equivalent to "dionysions" and "apollonians" of people who are differentiated by whether they act in the short term or long term interest, and "narcissism" might correspond to the former, but I don't really know. Remember that, in evolutionary psychology, "seeking celebrity status" need not be a conscious or explicit goal; it can be, just the fact that when you are doing something, and adoring strangers start gethering around, you are inclined to do more of it, rather than less. But elsewise, I can pretty much concur with what you say, here. Nick Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ http://www.cusf.org [City University of Santa Fe] > [Original Message] > From: glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]> > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 11/25/2009 11:13:54 AM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Dunbar numbers and distributions > > > We're not quite in agreement. Tweeting and updating your facebook page > is not an attempt to "become a celebrity". That's where I'm disagreeing > with you. Such behavior is no more an attempt to become a celebrity > than, say, telling a joke to 5 friends in a pub or, say, giving a toast > at a wedding ... or organizing a local seminar on emergence. > > True, for _some_ people, people we might diagnose as narcissists, EVERY > opportunity to take the stage might be a form of trying to "become a > celebrity". But normal people don't do that. And Facebook consists > primarily of _normal_ people. > > Now, there are corporate facebook pages and corporate twitter feeds > (including people who've become "institutions" like John Cleese or Guy > Kawasaki) and those people use these media as public relations outlets > or even to deliver their product. But even in those cases, they're not > using the media to become celebrities or exploit a weakness. For the > most part, they're merely doing what their fans/customers ask of them. > > As to the behavior of some celebrities and why they do what they do, > there can be an infinite number of reasons. And I caution you against > over simplifying those reasons in the same way I caution you against > oversimplifying trust relationships. For example, we have a local bread > maker named Dave. Dave was a criminal. Then he learned to make bread > and that others liked his bread. Now he uses his celebrity status in an > attempt to demonstrate that criminals can redirect their energy into > productive behavior that benefits those around them. Is Dave a > narcissist? Is he exploiting his fans? I don't know. And, frankly, I > don't care. The fact is that such behavior is much more complex than > you portray. > > Quoting Nicholas Thompson circa 09-11-25 09:28 AM: > > We have only to explain the behavior of the celebrity her- or himself: > > anybody might be tempted to try to put ourselves in the celebrity position? > > Here, multilevel selection comes into play. While the routine function of > > fan clubs might be to make groups out of strangers, for the celebrity > > herself, it becomes an chance to exploit that weakness in human nature for > > her own individual gain. Any one of us who sees a chance at that > > opportunity would be a fool not to try and exploit it. Hence facebook and > > "friends". > > -- > glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions
|
|
In reply to this post by Steve Smith
Glen,
A village is not an extant thing? Let's assume it is. Then could it not serve as a model for a larger social organization? A model to me is a concrete process or object that we think we understand so well that it can stand in for a similar process or objedt that we understand less well. My favorite example of a model is "natural selection" which takes as its model, the creation of specific breeds of domestic stock by a breeder and applies that model to explain how different species have arisen. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ http://www.cusf.org [City University of Santa Fe] > [Original Message] > From: glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]> > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 11/25/2009 11:13:54 AM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Dunbar numbers and distributions > > > We're not quite in agreement. Tweeting and updating your facebook page > is not an attempt to "become a celebrity". That's where I'm disagreeing > with you. Such behavior is no more an attempt to become a celebrity > than, say, telling a joke to 5 friends in a pub or, say, giving a toast > at a wedding ... or organizing a local seminar on emergence. > > True, for _some_ people, people we might diagnose as narcissists, EVERY > opportunity to take the stage might be a form of trying to "become a > celebrity". But normal people don't do that. And Facebook consists > primarily of _normal_ people. > > Now, there are corporate facebook pages and corporate twitter feeds > (including people who've become "institutions" like John Cleese or Guy > Kawasaki) and those people use these media as public relations outlets > or even to deliver their product. But even in those cases, they're not > using the media to become celebrities or exploit a weakness. For the > most part, they're merely doing what their fans/customers ask of them. > > As to the behavior of some celebrities and why they do what they do, > there can be an infinite number of reasons. And I caution you against > over simplifying those reasons in the same way I caution you against > oversimplifying trust relationships. For example, we have a local bread > maker named Dave. Dave was a criminal. Then he learned to make bread > and that others liked his bread. Now he uses his celebrity status in an > attempt to demonstrate that criminals can redirect their energy into > productive behavior that benefits those around them. Is Dave a > narcissist? Is he exploiting his fans? I don't know. And, frankly, I > don't care. The fact is that such behavior is much more complex than > you portray. > > Quoting Nicholas Thompson circa 09-11-25 09:28 AM: > > We have only to explain the behavior of the celebrity her- or himself: > > anybody might be tempted to try to put ourselves in the celebrity position? > > Here, multilevel selection comes into play. While the routine function of > > fan clubs might be to make groups out of strangers, for the celebrity > > herself, it becomes an chance to exploit that weakness in human nature for > > her own individual gain. Any one of us who sees a chance at that > > opportunity would be a fool not to try and exploit it. Hence facebook and > > "friends". > > -- > glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: "model" ( was Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions)
|
|
In reply to this post by Steve Smith
Quoting Steve Smith circa 09-11-25 01:50 PM:
> It is even less surprising > that those whose rhetoric is in opposition to that rhetoric would attempt to > justify their *own* rhetoric based on this failure on the part of the > individuals/institutions in question to be entirely unbiased in every way. First, I have to say that I actually laughed out loud at that one. Thanks. > glen e. p. ropella wrote: >> >> "Model" is a much abused word. Models (and simulations) are a sub-type >> of rhetoric. > > I would counter that models are often *expressed* in rhetoric, not sub-types of > rhetoric. > > Just as models are sometimes *implemented* in simulations rather than > simulations being types of models. > > Can you give us more justification for subsuming modeling into rhetoric? Let's look at some examples of what a model can be. A model can be 1) a stick upon which many regular marks are made is a model of length or extent, the referent can be the real line or another object with extent, 2) a crystal or coiled spring (once wound up) that steadily ticks away is a model of time, 3) a human/manikin dressed in clothes intended to be worn by another human is a model of that other human, 4) a schematic where various relations between markings (symbols) on the vellum model those relations between corresponding objects (the symbols' referents) elsewhere, 5) a blueprint (a schematic that attempts to describe _all_ the salient relations), including textual specifications for non-spatial relations, is a model for some as yet unconstructed thing, 6) a language and a collection of axioms and theorems is a model for any process that starts with initial and ends with final conditions. Now, all these examples have an existence of their own, outside any _modeling_ context. For example, (1) is just a stick that you can poke someone's eye out with or burn for heat. You can make a paper airplane out of (5) and fly it across the room, etc. Examples of (6) are currently driving the heater for my office. ;-) When they're not being USED to model something else, they are just whatever they are. In order for them to be models, they must be _used_ to express something. Usually, they are used to make a persuasive argument for or against something. For example, I may use (1) to show you that my computer is wider than yours. Or I may use (4) to show you that some crazy idea I have about the Higgs boson isn't all that crazy. In other words, a model isn't a model until it is _used_ rhetorically. Now, you might say that these models are used non-rhetorically when, say, a furniture maker constructs a chair or somesuch. But, I would counter that the furniture maker is engaged in a never-ending dialogue with herself _while_ they're making the chair. The dialogue consists of a kind of primitive rhetoric where the brain persuades the fingers and the fingers persuade the brain, or one part of the brain persuades another, etc. Most especially, however, the chair designer persuades the chair maker via models like rulers and schematics. And that's true even if the designer and the maker are the same person separated by time. All models are always rhetorical devices. An object can be a rhetorical device without being a model (like when I use a yard stick to slap you for not paying attention to my rhetoric). > Can one write a simulation without a > model? Yes. Simulations can come into being in all sorts of ways, including randomly. However, a simulation isn't a simulation unless it's also a model. You can't mimic something unless ... well, unless you're mimicking something. > In my lexicon, a model is presumed to have a referent but there are many, many, > many unvalidated models in the world (perhaps you call these theories, > hypotheses, etc.) whose referent's qualities and perhaps even existence is still > in question. I do not know what a theory or even hypothesis is, if not a > model. Perhaps without "proof" or "validation" it is a proto-model? Right. There is no such thing as an unvalidated model. If you can't validate, then you're just speculating (or theorizing). Now, validation can be achieved in a _huge_ number of ways, including qualitatively. So, you have to think carefully before you claim a body of rhetoric is NOT a model. The main method for determining this is asking the question: "What could I measure with that rhetoric?" If you can't measure anything with it, then it's not a model. A model can be a theory or a thesis because a model can contain theorems and sentences. (And the way we use the term "hypothesis" in science, a model can also be a hypothesis... In fact, the way both words model and hypothesis are used in science, all models are hypotheses because some parts of every model are _always_ unjustified.) But not all theories or theses are models (though the pretense is that scientific theories and theses _are_ all models... otherwise they aren't "scientific"). > For the most part, those who fund modeling (and simulation) are seeking to > justify their own rhetoric, not inform it. I've been lucky to a certain extent because I've been able to turn down projects where the client seems like they want only rhetoric and no models. So, in most cases, I make it clear to my clients that there's no (ethical) point in building the rhetoric unless you have data with which to falsify the model. I don't make that much money, though. And I don't have many clients. [sigh] I like to think I could have made much more money and landed many more clients had I been willing to generate non-model rhetoric. > My own rhetoric (used mostly in the privacy of my own head) is that I knowingly > model in support of other's rhetoric to obtain the funds to allow me to do my > own model development in the pursuit of a higher truth. It's perfectly reasonable to build models that support a client's rhetoric as long as the client is willing to change their rhetoric when all the models built in support of the old rhetoric are falsified. The goal of modeling is to _reify_ the rhetoric... to make it real enough so that it can be used to measure reality. Usually, during the process, what actually happens is that reality is used to measure the model. Then the model (and the rhetoric) is changed so that it matches up with reality. At that point, you have a good enough basis flip it around and start using the model to measure reality. > My model of "a higher > truth" includes objective reality and does not admit to supernatural beings or > forces. It has been proven to my satisfaction that I cannot validate this > model. e.g. I cannot prove that there is an objective reality. Therefore > *all* of my models are ultimately grounded in a model which I cannot prove a > valid referent. That only slows me down when I'm in a particularly > philosophical mood. The rest of the time I proceed blithely. I'm in complete agreement, here. If this post weren't already too long, though, I'd pick at the one nit you left. Your models _are_ grounded in a model you can prove. You just don't take the time to use that model (i.e. sensory motor processes in your fingers, ears, eyes, etc.). Instead you use an abstraction of that model that shunts out all that nitty gritty detail. Hm. I guess I picked at the nit anyway. Sorry. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions
|
|
In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Quoting Nicholas Thompson circa 09-11-25 02:12 PM:
> Thanks for all of the below. For an evolutionary psychologist, > "narcissism" is not a term of art, so far as I know. There is a category, > roughly equivalent to "dionysions" and "apollonians" of people who are > differentiated by whether they act in the short term or long term > interest, and "narcissism" might correspond to the former, but I don't > really know. Very interesting. Thanks! Now I'll have to see if I can configure that dichotomy to fit into my world view. > A village is not an extant thing? Let's assume it is. Then could it not > serve as a model for a larger social organization? Yes, of course it can be used that way. But just because it _can_ be used that way does NOT mean that fans of celebrities or facebook users are using it that way. It only means that _you_, as an outside observer of the process, are using it that way to support your rhetoric. And it's not the village as model that's wrong. It's the other parts of your rhetoric, namely the trust relationships built up within a village. Who's to say that Ug trusted Oog just because they lived in the same village? Perhaps Ug and Oog would easily trust a stranger over each other? I don't know because I don't have any data showing me that, in all cases, Ug and Oog trust each other more than they trust strangers. I.e. you don't have (or haven't presented here) a _model_ of trust relationships in villages. You've only slapped up a coarse piece of rhetoric using villages. Fans of celebrities, as far as I can tell, definitely do not treat their celebrities as if they're part of their immediate family or circle of friends. They _cannot_ treat them that way because they idolize the celebrity and they do not (if they're healthy) idolize their immediate family and friends. And, also as far as I can tell, most celebrities get pretty irritated when their "private" lives are invaded by paparazzi or overly adoring fans. True, there are some who love the attention more than normal people would love it; but I suspect that most celebrities come to hate it. Hence, celebrity is NOT a confusion between "village" and "world" trust on the part of the fans or the celebrities, as you originally argued. And, hence, the village/stranger model is NOT a good model for the trust relationships we've built up with our extended neocortices like TV, magazines, and facebook. (Sorry, is that horse dead? ;-) > A model to me is a concrete process or object that we think we understand > so well that it can stand in for a similar process or objedt that we > understand less well. Agreed and well said. Replacement is another good way to test for modelness (modelhood?). > My favorite example of a model is "natural > selection" which takes as its model, the creation of specific breeds of > domestic stock by a breeder and applies that model to explain how different > species have arisen. Disagreed! [grin] I don't see how "natural selection" is a model. But I admit that I'm not an expert on natural selection or evolution or biology or ... well anything, really. If anything, I'd be more inclined to say that animal breeding (as a concrete method using real stuff (animals, semen, fences, long latex gloves, etc.) is the model and "natural selection" is the referent, the thing being measured. We individual humans can't _replace_ genetic engineering with natural selection. We don't have control over natural selection (which is why we call it natural). But we do have control over our _modeling_ device... breeding. So, we can replace natural selection with breeding, but not vice versa. Hence, the model is the breeding method and the referent is whatever nature does to change animals over generations. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions
|
|
In reply to this post by Steve Smith
I owe the short-term long-term thing to Jim Chisholm's DEATH HOPE AND
SEX.The Dionysian-Apollonian thing came from Ruth Benedict, originally from Hegel, I think, who made a distinction between Dionysian and Apollonian SOCIETIES. I dont know whether you have children or not, but in case you have young ones in the house, you shoiuld be warned that all adolescents are dionysians. They cannot think into the future worth a damn. N Nicholas S. Thompson Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology, Clark University ([hidden email]) http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/ http://www.cusf.org [City University of Santa Fe] > [Original Message] > From: glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]> > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Date: 11/25/2009 4:35:26 PM > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Dunbar numbers and distributions > > Quoting Nicholas Thompson circa 09-11-25 02:12 PM: > > Thanks for all of the below. For an evolutionary psychologist, > > "narcissism" is not a term of art, so far as I know. There is a category, > > roughly equivalent to "dionysions" and "apollonians" of people who are > > differentiated by whether they act in the short term or long term > > interest, and "narcissism" might correspond to the former, but I don't > > really know. > > Very interesting. Thanks! Now I'll have to see if I can configure that > dichotomy to fit into my world view. > > > A village is not an extant thing? Let's assume it is. Then could it not > > serve as a model for a larger social organization? > > Yes, of course it can be used that way. But just because it _can_ be > used that way does NOT mean that fans of celebrities or facebook users > are using it that way. It only means that _you_, as an outside observer > of the process, are using it that way to support your rhetoric. And > it's not the village as model that's wrong. It's the other parts of > your rhetoric, namely the trust relationships built up within a village. > Who's to say that Ug trusted Oog just because they lived in the same > village? Perhaps Ug and Oog would easily trust a stranger over each > other? I don't know because I don't have any data showing me that, in > all cases, Ug and Oog trust each other more than they trust strangers. > I.e. you don't have (or haven't presented here) a _model_ of trust > relationships in villages. You've only slapped up a coarse piece of > rhetoric using villages. > > Fans of celebrities, as far as I can tell, definitely do not treat their > celebrities as if they're part of their immediate family or circle of > friends. They _cannot_ treat them that way because they idolize the > celebrity and they do not (if they're healthy) idolize their immediate > family and friends. And, also as far as I can tell, most celebrities > get pretty irritated when their "private" lives are invaded by paparazzi > or overly adoring fans. True, there are some who love the attention > more than normal people would love it; but I suspect that most > celebrities come to hate it. > > Hence, celebrity is NOT a confusion between "village" and "world" trust > on the part of the fans or the celebrities, as you originally argued. > > And, hence, the village/stranger model is NOT a good model for the trust > relationships we've built up with our extended neocortices like TV, > magazines, and facebook. (Sorry, is that horse dead? ;-) > > > A model to me is a concrete process or object that we think we > > so well that it can stand in for a similar process or objedt that we > > understand less well. > > Agreed and well said. Replacement is another good way to test for > modelness (modelhood?). > > > My favorite example of a model is "natural > > selection" which takes as its model, the creation of specific breeds of > > domestic stock by a breeder and applies that model to explain how different > > species have arisen. > > Disagreed! [grin] I don't see how "natural selection" is a model. But > I admit that I'm not an expert on natural selection or evolution or > biology or ... well anything, really. > > If anything, I'd be more inclined to say that animal breeding (as a > concrete method using real stuff (animals, semen, fences, long latex > gloves, etc.) is the model and "natural selection" is the referent, the > thing being measured. We individual humans can't _replace_ genetic > engineering with natural selection. We don't have control over natural > selection (which is why we call it natural). But we do have control > over our _modeling_ device... breeding. So, we can replace natural > selection with breeding, but not vice versa. Hence, the model is the > breeding method and the referent is whatever nature does to change > animals over generations. > > -- > glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions
|
|
Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> I dont know whether you have children or not, but in case you have young > ones in the house, you shoiuld be warned that all adolescents are > dionysians. > Wait a second. What's that IRA and 401k *for* after all? ;-) ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
|
Administrator
|
In reply to this post by Robert Holmes
I'm surprised at the creative uses made of the various new "Public
Services" like Facebook, Wave, Twitter, Google Apps/Docs/Calendar, Blogger/Wordpress.com, Wikis, .. and so on. One instance is in mathematics. Sagemath: http://www.sagemath.org/ uses several: http://www.facebook.com/pages/Sage-Math/26593144945 http://twitter.com/sagemath http://www.linkedin.com/groups?gid=2010654 http://planet.sagemath.org/ http://trac.sagemath.org/sage_trac http://wiki.sagemath.org/ Each has a different focus, yet the total ecology seems coherent. There are even tools available to integrate one "post" into several of the sites. A tweet can appear in linked in and in facebook with little difficulty. Sure gonna make my homework easier come next semester! -- Owen ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: "model" ( was Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions)
|
|
In reply to this post by glen e. p. ropella-2
Apologies for another long thread... thanks to Glen for a well written
response to my original... and apologies to Owen (and others) if this
thread divergence represents a "hijacking" of the original thread.
Happy to entertain! I don't remember if it was you or another who suggested that a great deal of what transpires on this list is "all in fun". I'm pretty sure most of us engage here for one type of entertainment or another. Mine is usually rooted in my finely honed sense of morbid fascination alongside my general appreciation for the very sharp wits (whits?) here.Quoting Steve Smith circa 09-11-25 01:50 PM: examples elided for brevity Agreed, though I depend more on things like 5) to drive my woodstoNow, all these examples have an existence of their own, outside any _modeling_ context. For example, (1) is just a stick that you can poke someone's eye out with or burn for heat. You can make a paper airplane out of (5) and fly it across the room, etc. Examples of (6) are currently driving the heater for my office. ;-) This is where we still differ. In 30 years of modeling and visualization work, I have found that very few models, simulations or visualizations of the results (visualizations often embedding their own models and simulation to fill in for the incompleteness of the models/simulations they are (re)presenting) get by without being used _rhetorically_ but more often than not they were conceived or built with a much more _analytic_ intent and their major *value* often turns out to be _synthetic_. That is to say, a well conceived/designed/built model (especially those with a strong visual representation component) often end up exposing knew knowledge to the creators of the model. New relationships are discovered that were obscured by the obscurity of the system being modeled or formal language of the expression of the model.When they're not being USED to model something else, they are just whatever they are. In order for them to be models, they must be _used_ to express something. Usually, they are used to make a persuasive argument for or against something. For example, I may use (1) to show you that my computer is wider than yours. Or I may use (4) to show you that some crazy idea I have about the Higgs boson isn't all that crazy. In other words, a model isn't a model until it is _used_ rhetorically. I'm still not clear that all models *must be* rhetorical devices, though I do concede (again) that they are generally useful (and therefore used) for that. Can you make the case that analysis and synthesis are also forms of rhetoric? I don't know that I'm justified in this, but I think of rhetoric as being an intentional act of persuasion by a sentient being. If we expand rhetoric to include the case where the _model_ persuades the _modeler_ to believe something formerly not understood (or believed) about the system _modeles_ then I would concede. But otherwise, I think claiming that modeling is always a form of rhetoric hides that fact that most of (real) science is not about persuasion but rather discovery. Persuasion comes after discovery in *good science* methinksNow, you might say that these models are used non-rhetorically when, say, a furniture maker constructs a chair or somesuch. But, I would counter that the furniture maker is engaged in a never-ending dialogue with herself _while_ they're making the chair. The dialogue consists of a kind of primitive rhetoric where the brain persuades the fingers and the fingers persuade the brain, or one part of the brain persuades another, etc. Most especially, however, the chair designer persuades the chair maker via models like rulers and schematics. And that's true even if the designer and the maker are the same person separated by time. All models are always rhetorical devices. An object can be a rhetorical device without being a model (like when I use a yard stick to slap you for not paying attention to my rhetoric). I do think that evolutionary programming could be claimed to fit this somewhat, but in the interest of splitting hairs, I would suggest that there is a "meta model" involved... a model of what a "generic" simulation is, including some kind of MOE to help guide the selection of the simulation. When real world systems appear to mimic eachother, I would not call one a simulation of the other but rather more like convergent or parallel evolution or more often, systems whose underlying dynamics are constrained/informed (whatever that means) by the same mathematics. It is *we*, the sentient beings who impose on the two systems some kind of model that we then attribute according to our points of view, etc. Don't you think? Yes, it is built into the definition of simulation I suppose.However, a simulation isn't a simulation unless it's also a model. You can't mimic something unless ... well, unless you're mimicking something. OK... so we agree that a model without *any* form of validation can be no more than rhetoric... but I still don't agree that it *has to be* rhetorical... though that is the obvious motivation behind creating a (psuedo) model... to be persuasive. And all models are always only partially validated? So there is some imaginary threshold of validation where you would call a model "mere rhetoric"? Much rhetoric is grounded in anecdotal evidence and can even have *scads* of anecdotal evidence (high quantity, very low quality). DA model can be a theory or a thesis because a model can contain theorems and sentences. (And the way we use the term "hypothesis" in science, a model can also be a hypothesis... In fact, the way both words model and hypothesis are used in science, all models are hypotheses because some parts of every model are _always_ unjustified.) And in my experience, the evidence that the client is more interested in rhetoric than in the data or a valid model comes out near the end of the project, not at the beginning. With suitable cynicism, it is easy to anticipate this, but hard to anticipate the opposite (recognize a righteous client when you see one).But not all theories or theses are models (though the pretense is that scientific theories and theses _are_ all models... otherwise they aren't "scientific"). Yeah... imagine that. It's a good idea and I suppose I've seen it happen now and again, but usually something almost *more* nefarious happens... instead of abandoning the old tired (and clearly misbegotten) rhetoric for something more well justified in the light of the data and the models (and.. and... and...) I often have found that the client simply adopts an even more bizzarre rhetoric that isn't contradicted by the data/model but isn't necessarily well supported by it either. I agree that *a* goal of modeling can be to reify the rhetoric. I suppose I'm coming around (a little) to your use of the term rhetoric... in that I appreciate that well accepted and highly supported (by data and models) theories start out as pretty unsupported theories which start out as almost completely unsupported hypothesis which are pretty much "rhetoric" even if the only one being persuaded is the person creating the hypothesis and seeking a model that helps fit the data to it which in turn helps too shape where one should seek more data.The goal of modeling is to _reify_ the rhetoric... to make it real enough so that it can be used to measure reality. I'll have to think on this more, as I want to argue that the act of using reality to measure the model involves inserting "yet another model" into the game which is roughly what validation is all about anyway... stacking a series of more and more sophisticated models up from ones that seem to be so brutally simple that they cannot be argued.Usually, during the process, what actually happens is that reality is used to measure the model. Then the model (and the rhetoric) is changed so that it matches up with reality. At that point, you have a good enough basis flip it around and start using the model to measure reality. We should spawn a separate thread on this (or not). My point is that my sensory-motor processes (or more aptly the abstract model I hold of them) is an unvalidatable model. I cannot prove that there is an objective reality in which my body (and it's sensory-motor apparatus) is physical object, etc... I take it as a contingent truth, not expecting to ever have it confronted (this model of my experience is supported by huge amounts of what amounts to anecdotal evidence, but there is no experiment I can execute or data I can gather that will differentiate objective reality from subjective illusion/simulation/???)... - Steve ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: "model" ( was Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions)
|
|
Thus spake Steve Smith circa 11/27/2009 01:01 PM:
>> In other words, a model isn't a model until it is _used_ rhetorically. >> > This is where we still differ. In 30 years of modeling and visualization work, > I have found that very few models, simulations or visualizations of the results > (visualizations often embedding their own models and simulation to fill in for > the incompleteness of the models/simulations they are (re)presenting) get by > without being used _rhetorically_ but more often than not they were conceived or > built with a much more _analytic_ intent and their major *value* often turns out > to be _synthetic_. That is to say, a well conceived/designed/built model > (especially those with a strong visual representation component) often end up > exposing knew knowledge to the creators of the model. New relationships are > discovered that were obscured by the obscurity of the system being modeled or > formal language of the expression of the model. Well said and I agree except that I believe _none_ of those models have gotten by without being used rhetorically. My guess is that if you identify the ones you think have gotten by without being used rhetorically, we could trace their lifetimes and find that they have at some point. > I'm still not clear that all models *must be* rhetorical devices, though I do > concede (again) that they are generally useful (and therefore used) for that. > Can you make the case that analysis and synthesis are also forms of rhetoric? No. Analysis and synthesis are generic methods. They can be _used_ in any number of ways. And they happen spontaneously, as well as intentionally. So, while they are common tools in rhetoric, they are not always rhetorical. > I don't know that I'm justified in this, but I think of rhetoric as being an > intentional act of persuasion by a sentient being. If we expand rhetoric to > include the case where the _model_ persuades the _modeler_ to believe something > formerly not understood (or believed) about the system _modeles_ then I would > concede. First, we do NOT need to expand the definition of "rhetoric". Yours suffices: an intentional act of a sentient being to persuade a sentient being. Second, let me restate my previous criteria: 1) models are extant objects with purposes and/or causes and effects of their own, independent of any referent and 2) they have a referent. So, given that, (1) is trivial to deal with because if we just assume realism, all "things" satisfy that. (2) is more difficult. _How_ does "referral" come about? Can an extant object, without any sentient beings involved, have a referent? Can one thing, objectively, "out there", _refer_ to something else? My claim is No. In order for something to be a model, there must be an intentional, sentient being that assigns the object to its referent. Now, why would a sentient being assign meaning (referent) to a symbol (model)? My answer is "to reason", to parse and understand the world. Here is where your methods of analysis and synthesis enter. But what does it really mean "to reason"? If you're a solipsist, then you can get away with saying something like: "to satisfy one's own sentient self". But if you admit that other sentient beings exist and, to an overwhelming degree, form and maintain your sentience, then it all boils down to communication and a kind of shared understanding of the world. I.e. you can't understand some thing unless other sentient beings also understand that thing (obviously to varying degrees). Hence, "to reason" requires sharing your understanding with your fellow sentient beings. You got your mind from others and they got their mind from you. This is true even if you're launched out into space right after you're born, because your life-support capsule has our mental constructs inscribed into it. Every object in the life-support capsule has a meaning, an intentionally designed in purpose, put there by us to keep you alive. Now, if "to reason" is an act of communication (where modeling is a specific type of communication), then all we need to establish is that _all_ communication is a type of rhetoric. What does it mean "to communicate"? When one sentient being tries to transduce the contents of their mind into signals and send them across various media so that they can be received and understood by another sentient being, what is the purpose? What is the intention of the sender? Is the sender's purpose to totally _brainwash_ the receiver so that the receiver can think no other thoughts than those thought by the sender? My claim is No. The sender's purpose is to do a good enough job explaining their thoughts so that the receiver can, at least, ... somewhat sympathize or empathize with the sender. The receiver need not agree in total, but just enough for the sender to feel like the message got through. So, if you buy that, then we have to talk about "persuasion". When you persuade someone, is it your intention to _brainwash_ the other person? Do you intend to take over their mind and make them think precisely the same way you do? Well, my answer is No. When we persuade, we attempt to use the receiver's mental conditions to find some common ground and just get them to move a little bit toward our mental conditions. We don't engage in mind control. We engage in persuasion. It's not coercion, but persuasion. That is rhetoric. And we do it, intentionally, every time we communicate. Hence, we do it every time we model. And, in fact, you cannot avoid rhetoric without also avoiding modeling. > But otherwise, I think claiming that modeling is always a form of > rhetoric hides that fact that most of (real) science is not about persuasion but > rather discovery. Persuasion comes after discovery in *good science* methinks Hm. This would require a new thread that I don't want to start. But in short, I can say that science isn't about discovery, it's about the elimination of _false_ rhetoric. That means, that science is about a) generating rhetoric and then b) falsifying as much of it as possible. The idea is, then, that what's left over is somewhat true. >>> Can one write a simulation without a >>> model? >>> >> >> Yes. Simulations can come into being in all sorts of ways, including >> randomly. > > I do think that evolutionary programming could be claimed to fit this somewhat, > but in the interest of splitting hairs, I would suggest that there is a "meta > model" involved... a model of what a "generic" simulation is, including some > kind of MOE to help guide the selection of the simulation. Although I sympathize with your approach, there are 2 strong arguments against this: 1) You've set things up so that you have an infinite progression (and, hence, regression). In order to use evolutionary programming so that a model arises with less intention, one needs meta-intention. Then, of course, we could construct a system that didn't create models, but creates modelers. Then we could construct modeler-constructors rather than modelers. Etc. It's better not to define words like "write" in this recursive way if we want to be able to distinguish between things like naturally occurring versus synthetic or artificially constructed. 2) One can accidentally write a simulation for something totally unrelated to what they intended to write. Or, which is more common, one can intend the simulation to be used for one thing; but it turns out to be much more useful to simulate another thing. Neither of these cases adhere to the "meta model" concept in the intentional sense you describe above. It's better to allow that any thing can be used to simulate any other thing, as long as we can acceptably ascribe (and circumscribe) the same attributes to both, regardless of the origins of either object. > When real world systems appear to mimic eachother, I would not call one a > simulation of the other but rather more like convergent or parallel evolution or > more often, systems whose underlying dynamics are constrained/informed (whatever > that means) by the same mathematics. It is *we*, the sentient beings who > impose on the two systems some kind of model that we then attribute according to > our points of view, etc. Don't you think? Yes, most definitely. We agree completely, here. The sentient beings do the modeling using simulations. >> A model can be a theory or a thesis because a model can contain theorems >> and sentences. (And the way we use the term "hypothesis" in science, a >> model can also be a hypothesis... In fact, the way both words model and >> hypothesis are used in science, all models are hypotheses because some >> parts of every model are _always_ unjustified.) >> > And all models are always only partially validated? So there is some imaginary > threshold of validation where you would call a model "mere rhetoric"? Much > rhetoric is grounded in anecdotal evidence and can even have *scads* of > anecdotal evidence (high quantity, very low quality). D Absolutely! Rhetoric is persuasion, not mind control. Models, as rhetorical devices, require _some_ validation; but it is context dependent as to how much and what type of validation is required to persuade. Perhaps when we have two physicists trying to persuade each other, the degree of validation is higher than when we have, say, two theologists trying to persuade each other. But just because the extent and type of validation required is context sensitive, doesn't mean the threshold is "imaginary". > And in my experience, the evidence that the client is more interested in > rhetoric than in the data or a valid model comes out near the end of the > project, not at the beginning. With suitable cynicism, it is easy to > anticipate this, but hard to anticipate the opposite (recognize a righteous > client when you see one). That's wise, and probably a lesson I haven't mastered. >> It's perfectly reasonable to build models that support a client's >> rhetoric as long as the client is willing to change their rhetoric when >> all the models built in support of the old rhetoric are falsified. > > Yeah... imagine that. It's a good idea and I suppose I've seen it happen now > and again, but usually something almost *more* nefarious happens... instead of > abandoning the old tired (and clearly misbegotten) rhetoric for something more > well justified in the light of the data and the models (and.. and... and...) I > often have found that the client simply adopts an even more bizzarre rhetoric > that isn't contradicted by the data/model but isn't necessarily well supported > by it either. I have seen this to some extent. But with a clear research method, it's usually easy to minimize the bizarreness of the new rhetoric. In industry, we have the universal metric of money. If your bizarre rhetoric can't save you money, then albeit true, it's useless. And in science, we have the publication gauntlet. If you can't persuade at least a few people that your bizarre rhetoric is worth propagating, then albeit true, it's useless. So, bizarre rhetoric can only survive if it can be reified at least well enough to pass some fairly stringent testing. > I agree that *a* goal of modeling can be to reify the rhetoric. I suppose I'm > coming around (a little) to your use of the term rhetoric... in that I > appreciate that well accepted and highly supported (by data and models) theories > start out as pretty unsupported theories which start out as almost completely > unsupported hypothesis which are pretty much "rhetoric" even if the only one > being persuaded is the person creating the hypothesis and seeking a model that > helps fit the data to it which in turn helps too shape where one should seek > more data. Yes. That's the gist, all hair splitting aside. >> Usually, during the process, >> what actually happens is that reality is used to measure the model. >> Then the model (and the rhetoric) is changed so that it matches up with >> reality. At that point, you have a good enough basis flip it around and >> start using the model to measure reality. >> > I'll have to think on this more, as I want to argue that the act of using > reality to measure the model involves inserting "yet another model" into the > game which is roughly what validation is all about anyway... stacking a series > of more and more sophisticated models up from ones that seem to be so brutally > simple that they cannot be argued. If you free yourself from the concept of "levels" and "stacking", then you'll have a much easier time. [grin] It's not stacking model upon model. It's an endless rhizomic bath where models (including sophisticated hierarchies, but not requiring them) form and dissolve, are compared and contrasted. Some cohere and stabilize for long times and wide extent. Most dissolve quickly. "Brutal simplicity" is an illusion, I think. I read what you're saying as "long times and wide extent". Some models are so widely applicable, and seem to always be true, that we just can't puncture them no matter what we try. > We should spawn a separate thread on this (or not). I choose "not". [grin] I've waxed filosofickle too much lately. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
Re: "model" ( was Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions)
|
|
Glen -
Thank you for a very eloquent argument relating modeling to rhetoric. And thanks to the FRIAMers who have tolerated our long filosophistical exchange here so far. Rather than respond point by point (as is my usual style and preference), I will try to summarize. Must a model be rhetorical?
While I agree that rhetoric is *not* equivalent to coercion, it can be used for that purpose. In my own experience, there is a fine line between persuasion and coercion. When trying to communicate, I find that it is sometimes motivated to convince someone of something *for the sake of the rest of the argument*. On a good day, once the agreement for the sake of argument is achieved and the argument is made, then the arguer can (and should) go back and acknowledge the flaws in the original concession gained (for the sake of the argument). As creatures of the worldly sphere, many of us are tempted to replace effective rhetoric for effective fact gathering and logic. If only we can convince enough others of our beliefs (or a lie that supports some agenda of ours), then that is in many ways *better* than actually being (more) correct about our beliefs. This is why so many of our peers have traded in their technical doctorates for PhDs in PowerPointOlogy... it pays better, is in many ways much easier, and perhaps in some ways much more satisfying (to some part of the ego). In any case, Glen has illuminated very nicely how modeling and rhetoric dovetail and it enrichens me... thanks... - Steve Thus spake Steve Smith circa 11/27/2009 01:01 PM: ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
«
Return to Friam
|
1 view|%1 views
| Free forum by Nabble | Edit this page |
Enemies stab you in the back
Friends stab you in the front
Best friends poke you with bendy straws