Facebook: OK, now what!?

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Re: Facebook: OK, now what!?

Robert Holmes
So does the content of this thread provide convincing evidence that the Dunbar number is not a constant but is in fact a monotonically decreasing function of age?

-- Robert

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Dunbar numbers and distributions

Steve Smith
I would propose that the Dunbar Number is a function of many things. 

My wife, for instance, was oldest of 8 and is very adept at managing a much larger and more diverse social network than I am although I (youngest of 2) am nearly 10 years her junior... early boomer to my late boomer.   I suspect she will maintain this well into Alzheimer's... even if she can't remember their names, they will still be an important and  meaningful part of her circle.

My parents are now suffering from loss through attrition, but they have maintained (mostly via letter) more friendships/connections throughout their history than I have.   They still keep in touch with second cousins and people they went to college with or early-career peers or neighbors from the same era (40's, 50's).   Or they would if most of them were not dead.

I, on the other hand, am much more likely to maintain significant social contacts digitally, not because of age differences but rather choice of vocation (computer-centric) and a work-centric approach to social networking (most of my "friends" are in some way colleagues or people who I share work with - e.g. do building projects, gather firewood, etc.).

I believe that  there may be a strong correlation between the Dunbar Number (as some variation on an upper limit) and the viable "band" size of early hunter gatherers.   I am not sure if the limitation is that such bands are limited by the cognitive capability or if the limits are more resource-centric (how much human-attributed attrition can the reindeer herd stand?).

The clan structures of many aboriginal peoples also seems to be designed to help manage such numbers... a sort of enforced segmentation of the population (though not neccesarily a limit on group size, but some mixing and social rules and maybe meta-rules about when a clan fissions).

I grew up in small towns where in principle, everyone "knew" everyone else...   There were no strangers.   I think this is a "natural" upper limit for a Dunbar Number...   if you literally can't engage meaningfully ( more than a nod and a wave) with more than (say) 200 people, then (perhaps) a qualitative shift in the social context happens when you exceed the number.   There would also seem to be hierarchical effects (how many heads-of-household or how many patriarchs ... extended families) too.

And yes, as I age, I think I might just get more and more curmudgeonly and my Dunbar number is probably going down as a consequence.

I wonder what the age distribution of the FRIAM list is?  I'm guessing that at nearly 53 I'm somewhere near the median.   I know of 2 or 3 folks as young as 18, 19 who might be on this list (though I'm not sure) and believe there is a big hump populated by retirees (nominally 55-80).  I'm guessing 40-70 is where the big hump is.

- Steve


So does the content of this thread provide convincing evidence that the Dunbar number is not a constant but is in fact a monotonically decreasing function of age?

-- Robert

============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org


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Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions

glen e. p. ropella-2

>From the wikipedia article: "Thus, the 150-member group would occur only
because of absolute necessity — i.e., due to intense environmental and
economic pressures."

So, if we run with this speculation, we could further speculate that:

1) those of us with the smallest tribes are the most well off (i.e. not
under intense pressures) or insulated, and

2) hyper-connected cultural trends like those involving facebook and
twitter and perhaps even the group identification surrounding
"superstars", highly popular novels, movies, clothing, etc. are all a
response to some as yet unidentified survival pressure.

If you put (1) and (2) together, you can infer that those of us with
small tribes will soon be catastrophically eliminated by this as yet
unidentified pressure because we're insulated from and can't intuitively
sense the eminent survival pressure.

Hence, the message is:

    Join Facebook or DIE!

;-)


--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com


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Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions

Nick Thompson
In reply to this post by Steve Smith
Glen,  

FWIW, the evolutionary psychological take on this is that we are designed
to live in groiups of 40 to 60 or so.  But human beings, in their more
recent evolutionary history, last milllion years or so, have been forced
into larger associations.  But, as MacLuhan (?) pointed out, this has been
accomplished by granting to total strangers the same sorts of trust that we
properly grant to our village mates, creating situations in which poor
rural southerners defended slave owning with their lives and the
trailer-living tea-baggers defend the rights of the rich to make
unreasonable amounts of money .  The concept of celebrity is just this
confusion between village and mass culture.    The next step is to make
everybody a celebrity, and that, of course, is what facebook is about.
Whoopee! We can all have the experience of having strangers think they know
us.  

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
http://www.cusf.org [City University of Santa Fe]




> [Original Message]
> From: glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]>
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
> Date: 11/24/2009 7:31:04 AM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Dunbar numbers and distributions
>
>
> >From the wikipedia article: "Thus, the 150-member group would occur only
> because of absolute necessity — i.e., due to intense environmental and
> economic pressures."
>
> So, if we run with this speculation, we could further speculate that:
>
> 1) those of us with the smallest tribes are the most well off (i.e. not
> under intense pressures) or insulated, and
>
> 2) hyper-connected cultural trends like those involving facebook and
> twitter and perhaps even the group identification surrounding
> "superstars", highly popular novels, movies, clothing, etc. are all a
> response to some as yet unidentified survival pressure.
>
> If you put (1) and (2) together, you can infer that those of us with
> small tribes will soon be catastrophically eliminated by this as yet
> unidentified pressure because we're insulated from and can't intuitively
> sense the eminent survival pressure.
>
> Hence, the message is:
>
>     Join Facebook or DIE!
>
> ;-)
>
>
> --
> glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org



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Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions

Pamela McCorduck

On Nov 24, 2009, at 11:17 AM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:

The concept of celebrity is just this

confusion between village and mass culture. 


Brilliant, Nick. Never thought of it that way, but it feels right.




"Whatever happens. Whatever what is, is what I want. Only that. But that."

Galway Kinnell


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Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions

glen e. p. ropella-2
In reply to this post by Nick Thompson

Well, my post was supposed to be a joke.  Obviously, I have to work on
my delivery. ;-)

But, also fwiw, I totally reject this rhetoric.  I don't think there's
confusion between "village" and "world" trust at all, at least not in
healthy people (which is, by definition, _most_ people).  I DO think
that trust relationships are occluded behind an impenetrable
observational wall.  And I also think that the fundamental ways trust is
formed in the 1st world countries are rapidly changing... changing much
faster than they ever have in the past.  So, our antiquated methods for
measuring trust relationships are at least partially, if not completely,
invalid, nowadays.

In fact, I'd even go so far as to speculate that trust is now _complex_
rather than simple.  (Perhaps it was complex in the past, too; but our
measurement tools were too coarse to respond to that complexity.)  It's
probably fractured into many different types of trust, probably
dependent on the particular medium facilitating that particular trust
relationship.


Quoting Nicholas Thompson circa 09-11-24 10:17 AM:

> FWIW, the evolutionary psychological take on this is that we are designed
> to live in groiups of 40 to 60 or so.  But human beings, in their more
> recent evolutionary history, last milllion years or so, have been forced
> into larger associations.  But, as MacLuhan (?) pointed out, this has been
> accomplished by granting to total strangers the same sorts of trust that we
> properly grant to our village mates, creating situations in which poor
> rural southerners defended slave owning with their lives and the
> trailer-living tea-baggers defend the rights of the rich to make
> unreasonable amounts of money .  The concept of celebrity is just this
> confusion between village and mass culture.    The next step is to make
> everybody a celebrity, and that, of course, is what facebook is about.
> Whoopee! We can all have the experience of having strangers think they know
> us.  


--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com


============================================================
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Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions

Nick Thompson
In reply to this post by Steve Smith
Glen,

I am not at all sure what it means to have my rhetoric rejected.  My facts,
yes; my logic, sure.  But my RHETORIC?  

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
http://www.cusf.org [City University of Santa Fe]




> [Original Message]
> From: glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]>
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
> Date: 11/24/2009 1:16:53 PM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Dunbar numbers and distributions
>
>
> Well, my post was supposed to be a joke.  Obviously, I have to work on
> my delivery. ;-)
>
> But, also fwiw, I totally reject this rhetoric.  I don't think there's
> confusion between "village" and "world" trust at all, at least not in
> healthy people (which is, by definition, _most_ people).  I DO think
> that trust relationships are occluded behind an impenetrable
> observational wall.  And I also think that the fundamental ways trust is
> formed in the 1st world countries are rapidly changing... changing much
> faster than they ever have in the past.  So, our antiquated methods for
> measuring trust relationships are at least partially, if not completely,
> invalid, nowadays.
>
> In fact, I'd even go so far as to speculate that trust is now _complex_
> rather than simple.  (Perhaps it was complex in the past, too; but our
> measurement tools were too coarse to respond to that complexity.)  It's
> probably fractured into many different types of trust, probably
> dependent on the particular medium facilitating that particular trust
> relationship.
>
>
> Quoting Nicholas Thompson circa 09-11-24 10:17 AM:
> > FWIW, the evolutionary psychological take on this is that we are
designed
> > to live in groiups of 40 to 60 or so.  But human beings, in their more
> > recent evolutionary history, last milllion years or so, have been forced
> > into larger associations.  But, as MacLuhan (?) pointed out, this has
been
> > accomplished by granting to total strangers the same sorts of trust
that we
> > properly grant to our village mates, creating situations in which poor
> > rural southerners defended slave owning with their lives and the
> > trailer-living tea-baggers defend the rights of the rich to make
> > unreasonable amounts of money .  The concept of celebrity is just this
> > confusion between village and mass culture.    The next step is to make
> > everybody a celebrity, and that, of course, is what facebook is about.
> > Whoopee! We can all have the experience of having strangers think they
know

> > us.  
>
>
> --
> glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org



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Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions

glen e. p. ropella-2
Thus spake Nicholas Thompson circa 11/24/2009 09:10 PM:
> I am not at all sure what it means to have my rhetoric rejected.  My facts,
> yes; my logic, sure.  But my RHETORIC?  

Rhetoric is the language we build up around and/or to explain facts.
Logic is merely a formal type of rhetoric.  The implicit persuasive
attempts in what you said earlier about a confusion of trust, is
rhetoric, not fact (or logic).

I reject rhetoric when i can imagine other, different rhetoric built up
around the same facts.  I think it would be trivially easy to build up a
different structure of language around the facts you (and MacLuhan(?))
are building yours around.

My rhetoric is that we need not extend, ham-handedly, the coarse trust
relationships wielded by our ancestors.  Trust relationships can become
articulated and more fine grained (and can also become thicker and more
coarse grained) if the need arises.  So, my rhetoric is that we haven't
been _forced_ into more associations.  We've actually _grown_ more
associative power in the form of an extended physiology.  Prior to
technologies like sophisticated language, the telegraph, air travel,
cell phones, and facebook, our "dunbar number" may well have been
limited to the size of our neocortex.  Nowadays, though, we've
outsourced part of our neocortex to the tools around us and, hence, have
a much larger "dunbar number".  After society collapses again, trust
will coarsen.  But for now, it's very fine-grained and includes a bushy
extension into Facebook "[un]friending".  Those of us who know how to
use the technology have more associative power than those of us who don't.

Celebrity is NOT, then a confusion between "village" trust and "world"
trust.  It's a mechanism for categorizing the larger population of
people with which we associate.  E.g. Do you like Country & Western
music?  No?  You don't LUUUV Garth Brooks!?!?  OK then, that helps me
determine where you lie in my (complex) trust matrix.

Of course, by saying it this way, I make it very clear that you are
equally capable and justified in rejecting my rhetoric, because there
are no facts in the rhetoric itself.  The rhetoric is built up around
the facts.  And you don't have to reject the facts in order to reject
the rhetoric.

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com


============================================================
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions

Eric Charles
Glen,
I think there is confusion over the thing to be explained. The question of celebrity in this case is not "why should you trust someone who loves Garth Brooks?" but "why should you trust Garth Brooks?" Why do we treat these people as if they are part of our extended family? What do you really know about Garth Brooks that makes you think you should buy a car he recommends? Why would you care who he is married to? Surely this type of interest and trust used to be limited to village members. Surely then, that type of interest and trust is being extended to a group other than the one it evolved to extend to.

I'm not really sure how the argument goes from there, but that part seemed relatively straightforward.

Eric



On Wed, Nov 25, 2009 08:52 AM, "glen e. p. ropella" <[hidden email]> wrote:
Thus spake Nicholas Thompson circa 11/24/2009 09:10 PM:
> I am not at all sure what it means to have my rhetoric rejected. My facts,
> yes; my logic, sure. But my RHETORIC?

Rhetoric is the language we build up around and/or to explain facts.
Logic is merely a formal type of rhetoric. The implicit persuasive
attempts in what you said earlier about a confusion of trust, is
rhetoric, not fact (or logic).

I reject rhetoric when i can imagine other, different rhetoric built up
around the same facts. I think it would be trivially easy to build up a
different structure of language around the facts you (and
MacLuhan(?)
are building yours around.

My rhetoric is that we need not extend, ham-handedly, the coarse trust
relationships wielded by our ancestors. Trust relationships can become
articulated and more fine grained (and can also become thicker and more
coarse grained) if the need arises. So, my rhetoric is that we haven't
been _forced_ into more associations. We've actually _grown_ more
associative power in the form of an extended physiology. Prior to
technologies like sophisticated language, the telegraph, air travel,
cell phones, and facebook, our "dunbar number" may well have been
limited to the size of our neocortex. Nowadays, though, we've
outsourced part of our neocortex to the tools around us and, hence, have
a much larger "dunbar number". After society collapses again, trust
will coarsen. But for now, it's very fine-grained and includes a bushy
extension into Facebook "[un]friending". Those of us who know how to
use the technology have more associative power than those of us who don't.

Celebrity is NOT, then a confusion between "village" trust and
"world"
trust. It's a mechanism for categorizing the larger population of
people with which we associate. E.g. Do you like Country & Western
music? No? You don't LUUUV Garth Brooks!?!? OK then, that helps me
determine where you lie in my (complex) trust matrix.

Of course, by saying it this way, I make it very clear that you are
equally capable and justified in rejecting my rhetoric, because there
are no facts in the rhetoric itself. The rhetoric is built up around
the facts. And you don't have to reject the facts in order to reject
the rhetoric.

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org


Eric Charles

Professional Student and
Assistant Professor of Psychology
Penn State University
Altoona, PA 16601



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Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions

glen e. p. ropella-2
Thus spake ERIC P. CHARLES circa 11/25/2009 06:14 AM:
> I think there is confusion over the thing to be explained. The question of
> celebrity in this case is not "why should you trust someone who loves Garth
> Brooks?" but "why should you trust Garth Brooks?"

That's not what celebrity is about, though.  Celebrity has nothing to do
with trusting the celebrity.  It has to do with trusting the people
around you, some of whom know things about the celebrity and some who
don't.  It's easier if you think about things like sports stats.  Just
because you argue that one team should win the next game or that
so-and-so is a better quarter back than some other guy doesn't mean you
trust that guy.  It means you have some leverage for a trust
relationship between various friends.

> Why do we treat these people
> as if they are part of our extended family?

We don't.  Just because I talk a lot about who Brad Pitt is married to
doesn't mean I treat Brad Pitt as if he's part of my family.  It _does_
mean that I have things to talk about with my friends who also talk a
lot about who Brad Pitt is married to.

> What do you really know about Garth
> Brooks that makes you think you should buy a car he recommends?

If Garth Brooks recommends we buy a car, we buy that car because it
gives us leverage with our social clique (presumably orbiting details
about Garth Brooks).

> Why would you
> care who he is married to?

Because knowing that gives me leverage with my social clique.

> Surely this type of interest and trust used to be
> limited to village members. Surely then, that type of interest and trust is
> being extended to a group other than the one it evolved to extend to.

The trust is built up within and around the social clique, not with
Garth Brooks.  The celebrity is merely the fulcrum, the _category_ that
makes trust a fine-grained thing.

> I'm not really sure how the argument goes from there, but that part seemed
> relatively straightforward.

[grin]  Yeah, people tell me that I've totally missed the point ALL THE
TIME.  So, it doesn't bother me to be way off base, here, too.  I claim
that it's not that straightforward at all.  We are _not_ confusing
"village" trust with "world" trust, as Nick argued.  We are exercising a
part of our extended physiology, namely the TV/Magazine media, in order
to exercise/maintain a complex trust matrix.

That's my story (aka rhetoric) and I'm sticking to it. ;-)

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com


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Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions

Nick Thompson
In reply to this post by Steve Smith
Eric,
 
Thanks for laying this out so clearly. 
 
I have not participated in "social media" (other than this one) yet, but, from what I hear, they involve the same sort of confusion.  Nobody has a hundred friends, so the word, friend,  is being extended  in a creepy Orwellian way to include strangers.   When I take an interest in the status of Angelina Jolie's marriage (at the Dentist's Office), I am taking a neighborly (or a carnal*) interest in a person I will NEVER, EVER MEET.  It represents a deployment of effort** from which there is no feedback.  The only way in which this sort of confusion could function in human evolution is in the formation of "fan clubs" ie, groups of people who are brought into coordination by their allegiance to mythical, unattainable figures ... you know .... like, "god".   Our shared 'friendship" with Angelina Jolie makes us easier to organize for war against the fans of Brad Pitt.  It's a group selection thing;  group selection for individual gullilbility.  
 
Nick
 
PS:   * and **: Only an evolutionary psychologist could think of lust as a deployment of effort, but in fact it is, and in fact, we do. 
 
 
 
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://www.cusf.org [City University of Santa Fe]
 
 
 
 
----- Original Message -----
To: [hidden email]
Sent: 11/25/2009 7:15:59 AM
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Dunbar numbers and distributions

Glen,
I think there is confusion over the thing to be explained. The question of celebrity in this case is not "why should you trust someone who loves Garth Brooks?" but "why should you trust Garth Brooks?" Why do we treat these people as if they are part of our extended family? What do you really know about Garth Brooks that makes you think you should buy a car he recommends? Why would you care who he is married to? Surely this type of interest and trust used to be limited to village members. Surely then, that type of interest and trust is being extended to a group other than the one it evolved to extend to.

I'm not really sure how the argument goes from there, but that part seemed relatively straightforward.

Eric



On Wed, Nov 25, 2009 08:52 AM, "glen e. p. ropella" <[hidden email]> wrote:
Thus spake Nicholas Thompson circa 11/24/2009 09:10 PM:
> I am not at all sure what it means to have my rhetoric rejected. My facts,
> yes; my logic, sure. But my RHETORIC?

Rhetoric is the language we build up around and/or to explain facts.
Logic is merely a formal type of rhetoric. The implicit persuasive
attempts in what you said earlier about a confusion of trust, is
rhetoric, not fact (or logic).

I reject rhetoric when i can imagine other, different rhetoric built up
around the same facts. I think it would be trivially easy to build up a
different structure of language around the facts you (and
MacLuhan(?)
are building yours around.

My rhetoric is that we need not extend, ham-handedly, the coarse trust
relationships wielded by our ancestors. Trust relationships can become
articulated and more fine grained (and can also become thicker and more
coarse grained) if the need arises. So, my rhetoric is that we haven't
been _forced_ into more associations. We've actually _grown_ more
associative power in the form of an extended physiology. Prior to
technologies like sophisticated language, the telegraph, air travel,
cell phones, and facebook, our "dunbar number" may well have been
limited to the size of our neocortex. Nowadays, though, we've
outsourced part of our neocortex to the tools around us and, hence, have
a much larger "dunbar number". After society collapses again, trust
will coarsen. But for now, it's very fine-grained and includes a bushy
extension into Facebook "[un]friending". Those of us who know how to
use the technology have more associative power than those of us who don't.

Celebrity is NOT, then a confusion between "village" trust and
"world"
trust. It's a mechanism for categorizing the larger population of
people with which we associate. E.g. Do you like Country & Western
music? No? You don't LUUUV Garth Brooks!?!? OK then, that helps me
determine where you lie in my (complex) trust matrix.

Of course, by saying it this way, I make it very clear that you are
equally capable and justified in rejecting my rhetoric, because there
are no facts in the rhetoric itself. The rhetoric is built up around
the facts. And you don't have to reject the facts in order to reject
the rhetoric.

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org


Eric Charles

Professional Student and
Assistant Professor of Psychology
Penn State University
Altoona, PA 16601



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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions

Owen Densmore
Administrator
On Nov 25, 2009, at 10:17 AM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> <snip>
> Nobody has a hundred friends, so the word, friend,  is being  
> extended  in a creepy Orwellian way to include strangers.

I disagree.  I was surprised to find just how many work, family,  
school, church, complexity, .. friends I *do* have.

I just started facebook a few days ago, and I'm finding a huge number  
of non-stranger, non-virtual acquaintances I have.  I'm trying to keep  
the list "quality" high .. i.e. only include folks who I really do  
know and enjoy being in touch with.

I'll easily top 200.  So would anyone I think who's got diverse  
contexts mentioned above.  No strangers.  And not including everyone I  
do know just to keep the list tight.

    -- Owen


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Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions

Nick Thompson
In reply to this post by Steve Smith
Glen, Eric,

This is what I get for working backwards through my email messages.  

We are all in agreement, here.  The psychological vulnerability to "fan
clubs"  has come about in human evolution because they employ psychological
structures which functioned at the individual level in village life but
which now create new social structures that function at the group level in
our larger societies.  

We have only to explain the behavior of the celebrity her- or himself: why
anybody might be tempted to try to put ourselves in the celebrity position?
Here, multilevel selection comes into play.  While the routine function of
fan clubs might be to make groups out of strangers, for the celebrity
herself, it becomes an chance to exploit that weakness in human nature for
her own individual gain.  Any one of us who sees a chance at that
opportunity would be a fool not to try and exploit it.  Hence facebook and
"friends".  

NIck

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
http://www.cusf.org [City University of Santa Fe]




> [Original Message]
> From: glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]>
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
> Date: 11/25/2009 8:01:45 AM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Dunbar numbers and distributions
>
> Thus spake ERIC P. CHARLES circa 11/25/2009 06:14 AM:
> > I think there is confusion over the thing to be explained. The question
of
> > celebrity in this case is not "why should you trust someone who loves
Garth

> > Brooks?" but "why should you trust Garth Brooks?"
>
> That's not what celebrity is about, though.  Celebrity has nothing to do
> with trusting the celebrity.  It has to do with trusting the people
> around you, some of whom know things about the celebrity and some who
> don't.  It's easier if you think about things like sports stats.  Just
> because you argue that one team should win the next game or that
> so-and-so is a better quarter back than some other guy doesn't mean you
> trust that guy.  It means you have some leverage for a trust
> relationship between various friends.
>
> > Why do we treat these people
> > as if they are part of our extended family?
>
> We don't.  Just because I talk a lot about who Brad Pitt is married to
> doesn't mean I treat Brad Pitt as if he's part of my family.  It _does_
> mean that I have things to talk about with my friends who also talk a
> lot about who Brad Pitt is married to.
>
> > What do you really know about Garth
> > Brooks that makes you think you should buy a car he recommends?
>
> If Garth Brooks recommends we buy a car, we buy that car because it
> gives us leverage with our social clique (presumably orbiting details
> about Garth Brooks).
>
> > Why would you
> > care who he is married to?
>
> Because knowing that gives me leverage with my social clique.
>
> > Surely this type of interest and trust used to be
> > limited to village members. Surely then, that type of interest and
trust is
> > being extended to a group other than the one it evolved to extend to.
>
> The trust is built up within and around the social clique, not with
> Garth Brooks.  The celebrity is merely the fulcrum, the _category_ that
> makes trust a fine-grained thing.
>
> > I'm not really sure how the argument goes from there, but that part
seemed

> > relatively straightforward.
>
> [grin]  Yeah, people tell me that I've totally missed the point ALL THE
> TIME.  So, it doesn't bother me to be way off base, here, too.  I claim
> that it's not that straightforward at all.  We are _not_ confusing
> "village" trust with "world" trust, as Nick argued.  We are exercising a
> part of our extended physiology, namely the TV/Magazine media, in order
> to exercise/maintain a complex trust matrix.
>
> That's my story (aka rhetoric) and I'm sticking to it. ;-)
>
> --
> glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org



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Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions

Nick Thompson
In reply to this post by Steve Smith
Glen,

I hope you dont replicate my sin of reading your messages backwards by
reading mine frontwards.

Yes, you are correct:  Logic or the lack thereof is a part of rhetoric.  

But I would use a different language to describe your objection.  I would
say that you object to my MODEL of the evolution of human society and wish
to substitute a different MODEL.  My Model is based on David Sloan Wilson's
Multi-Level Selection Theory, which argues that our individual behavior is
the result of selection at many levels of organization.  Thus behavior
which is puzzling from the point of view of individual selection (which I
still think Face book behavior is) is readily explained as a weakness in
the ability to calculate our individual interests arising from selection at
the group level.  

You doubtless disagree, but at least now, our views are articulated.

N



Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
http://www.cusf.org [City University of Santa Fe]




> [Original Message]
> From: glen e. p. ropella <[hidden email]>
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
> Date: 11/25/2009 6:53:34 AM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Dunbar numbers and distributions
>
> Thus spake Nicholas Thompson circa 11/24/2009 09:10 PM:
> > I am not at all sure what it means to have my rhetoric rejected.  My
facts,

> > yes; my logic, sure.  But my RHETORIC?  
>
> Rhetoric is the language we build up around and/or to explain facts.
> Logic is merely a formal type of rhetoric.  The implicit persuasive
> attempts in what you said earlier about a confusion of trust, is
> rhetoric, not fact (or logic).
>
> I reject rhetoric when i can imagine other, different rhetoric built up
> around the same facts.  I think it would be trivially easy to build up a
> different structure of language around the facts you (and MacLuhan(?))
> are building yours around.
>
> My rhetoric is that we need not extend, ham-handedly, the coarse trust
> relationships wielded by our ancestors.  Trust relationships can become
> articulated and more fine grained (and can also become thicker and more
> coarse grained) if the need arises.  So, my rhetoric is that we haven't
> been _forced_ into more associations.  We've actually _grown_ more
> associative power in the form of an extended physiology.  Prior to
> technologies like sophisticated language, the telegraph, air travel,
> cell phones, and facebook, our "dunbar number" may well have been
> limited to the size of our neocortex.  Nowadays, though, we've
> outsourced part of our neocortex to the tools around us and, hence, have
> a much larger "dunbar number".  After society collapses again, trust
> will coarsen.  But for now, it's very fine-grained and includes a bushy
> extension into Facebook "[un]friending".  Those of us who know how to
> use the technology have more associative power than those of us who don't.
>
> Celebrity is NOT, then a confusion between "village" trust and "world"
> trust.  It's a mechanism for categorizing the larger population of
> people with which we associate.  E.g. Do you like Country & Western
> music?  No?  You don't LUUUV Garth Brooks!?!?  OK then, that helps me
> determine where you lie in my (complex) trust matrix.
>
> Of course, by saying it this way, I make it very clear that you are
> equally capable and justified in rejecting my rhetoric, because there
> are no facts in the rhetoric itself.  The rhetoric is built up around
> the facts.  And you don't have to reject the facts in order to reject
> the rhetoric.
>
> --
> glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org



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Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions

Nick Thompson
In reply to this post by Steve Smith
Owen,

Not convinced. I think you are describing "buddies," "colleagues",
"acquaintances", ie, people with whom you share an interests in a
relatively narrow context.

A friend, on my account, is a person with whom one shares committment to
one another's mutual well-being, as well as many common interests, a
division of labor, and means of solving interpersonal problems that arise.  

I certainly don't have 200 friends.

N

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
http://www.cusf.org [City University of Santa Fe]




> [Original Message]
> From: Owen Densmore <[hidden email]>
> To: <[hidden email]>; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity
Coffee Group <[hidden email]>

> Date: 11/25/2009 10:26:49 AM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Dunbar numbers and distributions
>
> On Nov 25, 2009, at 10:17 AM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> > <snip>
> > Nobody has a hundred friends, so the word, friend,  is being  
> > extended  in a creepy Orwellian way to include strangers.
>
> I disagree.  I was surprised to find just how many work, family,  
> school, church, complexity, .. friends I *do* have.
>
> I just started facebook a few days ago, and I'm finding a huge number  
> of non-stranger, non-virtual acquaintances I have.  I'm trying to keep  
> the list "quality" high .. i.e. only include folks who I really do  
> know and enjoy being in touch with.
>
> I'll easily top 200.  So would anyone I think who's got diverse  
> contexts mentioned above.  No strangers.  And not including everyone I  
> do know just to keep the list tight.
>
>     -- Owen



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Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions

Douglas Roberts-2

A good friend will lie for you in court if you committed murder.

A true friend will help you bury the body.

--Doug

On Wed, Nov 25, 2009 at 10:42 AM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:
Owen,

Not convinced. I think you are describing "buddies," "colleagues",
"acquaintances", ie, people with whom you share an interests in a
relatively narrow context.

A friend, on my account, is a person with whom one shares committment to
one another's mutual well-being, as well as many common interests, a
division of labor, and means of solving interpersonal problems that arise.

I certainly don't have 200 friends.

N

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
http://www.cusf.org [City University of Santa Fe]




> [Original Message]
> From: Owen Densmore <[hidden email]>
> To: <[hidden email]>; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity
Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
> Date: 11/25/2009 10:26:49 AM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Dunbar numbers and distributions
>
> On Nov 25, 2009, at 10:17 AM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> > <snip>
> > Nobody has a hundred friends, so the word, friend,  is being
> > extended  in a creepy Orwellian way to include strangers.
>
> I disagree.  I was surprised to find just how many work, family,
> school, church, complexity, .. friends I *do* have.
>
> I just started facebook a few days ago, and I'm finding a huge number
> of non-stranger, non-virtual acquaintances I have.  I'm trying to keep
> the list "quality" high .. i.e. only include folks who I really do
> know and enjoy being in touch with.
>
> I'll easily top 200.  So would anyone I think who's got diverse
> contexts mentioned above.  No strangers.  And not including everyone I
> do know just to keep the list tight.
>
>     -- Owen





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Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions

glen e. p. ropella-2
In reply to this post by Nick Thompson

We're not quite in agreement.  Tweeting and updating your facebook page
is not an attempt to "become a celebrity".  That's where I'm disagreeing
with you.  Such behavior is no more an attempt to become a celebrity
than, say, telling a joke to 5 friends in a pub or, say, giving a toast
at a wedding ... or organizing a local seminar on emergence.

True, for _some_ people, people we might diagnose as narcissists, EVERY
opportunity to take the stage might be a form of trying to "become a
celebrity".  But normal people don't do that.  And Facebook consists
primarily of _normal_ people.

Now, there are corporate facebook pages and corporate twitter feeds
(including people who've become "institutions" like John Cleese or Guy
Kawasaki) and those people use these media as public relations outlets
or even to deliver their product.  But even in those cases, they're not
using the media to become celebrities or exploit a weakness.  For the
most part, they're merely doing what their fans/customers ask of them.

As to the behavior of some celebrities and why they do what they do,
there can be an infinite number of reasons.  And I caution you against
over simplifying those reasons in the same way I caution you against
oversimplifying trust relationships.  For example, we have a local bread
maker named Dave.  Dave was a criminal.  Then he learned to make bread
and that others liked his bread.  Now he uses his celebrity status in an
attempt to demonstrate that criminals can redirect their energy into
productive behavior that benefits those around them.  Is Dave a
narcissist?  Is he exploiting his fans?  I don't know.  And, frankly, I
don't care.  The fact is that such behavior is much more complex than
you portray.

Quoting Nicholas Thompson circa 09-11-25 09:28 AM:
> We have only to explain the behavior of the celebrity her- or himself: why
> anybody might be tempted to try to put ourselves in the celebrity position?
> Here, multilevel selection comes into play.  While the routine function of
> fan clubs might be to make groups out of strangers, for the celebrity
> herself, it becomes an chance to exploit that weakness in human nature for
> her own individual gain.  Any one of us who sees a chance at that
> opportunity would be a fool not to try and exploit it.  Hence facebook and
> "friends".  

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com


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"model" ( was Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions)

glen e. p. ropella-2
In reply to this post by Nick Thompson
Quoting Nicholas Thompson circa 09-11-25 09:36 AM:
> I hope you dont replicate my sin of reading your messages backwards by
> reading mine frontwards.

It's not a big deal.  Real discussions don't happen on mailing lists,
facebook, twitter, or even via e-mail or phone.  So, feel free to read
these posts and respond in any order, and with any content you wish.
It's all in good fun, as far as I'm concerned.  Any actual benefit the
participants and lurkers receive is gravy.

> But I would use a different language to describe your objection.  I would
> say that you object to my MODEL of the evolution of human society and wish
> to substitute a different MODEL.  My Model is based on David Sloan Wilson's
> Multi-Level Selection Theory, which argues that our individual behavior is
> the result of selection at many levels of organization.  Thus behavior
> which is puzzling from the point of view of individual selection (which I
> still think Face book behavior is) is readily explained as a weakness in
> the ability to calculate our individual interests arising from selection at
> the group level.  

"Model" is a much abused word.  Models (and simulations) are a sub-type
of rhetoric.  Not all rhetoric constitutes a model.  I'd call your (very
brief and largely detail-free) rhetoric that celebrity is an effect of
being forced to handle a large # of associations and, hence a confusion
between "village" and "world" trust is NOT a model.  If we include David
Sloan Wilson's Multi-Level Selection Theory and inference made from that
theory including the above, then I still don't call that a model.  I
call it one of a theory, thesis, hypothesis, conjecture, or speculation.

A model, in my lexicon, must have at least 2 attributes:  1) it must be
an extant thing in and of itself and 2) it must have a referent.  Your
rhetoric has (2) but not (1).  And even so, your rhetoric is way too
abstract to measure actual human evolution.  (Remember that "model" is
derived from the same root as "measure"... e.g. a balsa wood airplane is
used to measure a real airplane.)  You can't measure human evolution
with your rhetoric; so, even if you claim it is extant (e.g. in the form
of books, video or audio recordings of lectures, etc), it's still quite
a stretch to call it a model.

p.s. And YES, I know lots of people will claim that lots of people will
disagree with my use of the word "model", here.  But I hope you realize
now that it doesn't much matter to me whether lots of people disagree
with my use of the word model, especially if those disagreeing people
aren't professional modelers.  And don't expect me to believe that pro
persuaders (who make their living building rhetoric) are pro modelers.
While pro modelers _are_ pro persuaders, pro persuaders are not
necessarily pro modelers. ;-)

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://agent-based-modeling.com


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Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions

Marcus G. Daniels
In reply to this post by Douglas Roberts-2
Douglas Roberts wrote:
>
> A good friend will lie for you in court if you committed murder.
>
> A true friend will help you bury the body.
>
There's "I trust your judgment" which could mean (say, in an academic
setting) that one is capable in some domain or even `thinks right'
(capable in many domains), and also the special case of "I trust your
judgment" in the social (a.k.a. mafia) sense which means that one
understands the relevant social constraints within the clique and
relative to other cliques.    Friends/enemies may fail to provide
good/bad outcomes when they operate outside certain constrained contexts
(fail in the first sense).  The idea of being `trustworthy' implies a
social clique with arbitrary values and investments, but also capability.

Marcus

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Re: Dunbar numbers and distributions

Douglas Roberts-2
More in the philosophical flow:

Enemies stab you in the back

Friends stab you in the front

Best friends poke you with bendy straws



On Wed, Nov 25, 2009 at 11:34 AM, Marcus G. Daniels <[hidden email]> wrote:
Douglas Roberts wrote:

A good friend will lie for you in court if you committed murder.

A true friend will help you bury the body.

There's "I trust your judgment" which could mean (say, in an academic setting) that one is capable in some domain or even `thinks right' (capable in many domains), and also the special case of "I trust your judgment" in the social (a.k.a. mafia) sense which means that one understands the relevant social constraints within the clique and relative to other cliques.    Friends/enemies may fail to provide good/bad outcomes when they operate outside certain constrained contexts (fail in the first sense).  The idea of being `trustworthy' implies a social clique with arbitrary values and investments, but also capability.

Marcus




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123