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Emergence Seminar II, British Emergence

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Nick Thompson

Emergence Seminar II, British Emergence

The seminar met this afternoon, now eight in number.

I would like to think that I were the sort of person who could summarize what we accomplished, but alas, I am not, so let me share what was accomplished for me. I hope others in the group will correct me, particularly any who are not in Santa FE but who have joined us in our reading from afar.

McLaughlin asserts that B.E. was a possible scientific position in the 19 century but came to an end because quantum mechanics, quantum chemistry, etc., demonstrated that there were no configurational forces. When we explain the properties of H20 on the basis of the properties of the molecules, electrons etc. that make it up we need invoke no new FORCES that arise from the configuration of the particles. Elementary Newtonian forces are all we need. But I ended up wondering if all of this was fair to the Emergentists. After all, Mill spoke not of the composition of forces but of the composition of causes. Presumably all forces are in some sense causes, but nobody has yet asserted that all causes are forces. Returning to my example of the triangle made of hinges and one-by-two's, to explain the strength of the triangle (by comparison with the relative weakness of the parallelogram), we need not appeal to any special forces, no "triangular stubbornness" or "elan triangulaire". On the other hand, if you would make a structure with hinges and one-by-twos that is strong, you better get at least one triangle into it. In that sense, the triangular configuration of the wood pieces is a necessary condition of the structural rigidity (and perhaps a sufficient one as well?) and hence a CAUSE of the rigidity., in any sense that I understand cause. In short, McLaughlin does not deny the existence of configurational CAUSES and such causes are all that is needed for a robust emergentism.

Again, I long for comments from others who have read this article.

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Russ Abbott

Re: Emergence Seminar II, British Emergence

It seems to me that "cause" is an extraordinarily slippery word. I'm involved with a group of people who are looking into "Causality in Complex Systems." One of the things I did while in Australia this summer was attend one or our workshops. After thinking quite a bit about causality and after arguing with a professional Philosopher about what philosophers mean by causality, I've decided to give up using that term. Instead, what I'm interested in are explanations. Even that is a difficult term to define clearly. But it seems a lot less dangerous than causality.

Nick can explain why a triangle is rigid -- although I am taken by the notion of an "elan triangulaire". But to come up with a "cause" for the rigidity of a triangle? In my view that's just asking for trouble.

It's important to acknowledge, though, that Nick's explanation will presumably be predicated on the presumption that the each of the one-by-two sides is itself rigid. What about explaining that? (That's another example of how levevls of abstraction build on other levels of abstraction.)

-- Russ_A

On Thu, Sep 17, 2009 at 9:02 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

The seminar met this afternoon, now eight in number.

I would like to think that I were the sort of person who could summarize what we accomplished, but alas, I am not, so let me share what was accomplished for me. I hope others in the group will correct me, particularly any who are not in Santa FE but who have joined us in our reading from afar.

McLaughlin asserts that B.E. was a possible scientific position in the 19 century but came to an end because quantum mechanics, quantum chemistry, etc., demonstrated that there were no configurational forces.   When we explain the properties of H20 on the basis of the properties of the molecules, electrons etc. that make it up we need invoke no new FORCES that arise from the configuration of the particles. Elementary Newtonian forces are all we need. But I ended up wondering if all of this was fair to the Emergentists. After all, Mill spoke not of the composition of forces but of the composition of causes. Presumably all forces are in some sense causes, but nobody has yet asserted that all causes are forces.   Returning to my example of the triangle made of hinges and one-by-two's, to explain the strength of the triangle (by comparison with the relative weakness of the parallelogram), we need not appeal to any special forces, no "triangular stubbornness" or "elan triangulaire". On the other hand, if you would make a structure with hinges and one-by-twos that is strong, you better get at least one triangle into it. In that sense, the triangular configuration of the wood pieces is a necessary condition of the structural rigidity (and perhaps a sufficient one as well?) and hence a CAUSE of the rigidity., in any sense that I understand cause. In short, McLaughlin does not deny the existence of configurational CAUSES and such causes are all that is needed for a robust emergentism.

Again, I long for comments from others who have read this article.

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Nick Thompson

Re: Emergence Seminar II, British Emergence

In reply to this post by Nick Thompson

Russ, inter alia,

The emergentists liked, we are told, to rail against the reification of causes. Cause is, after all, just a name for the fact that y usually follows x AND that contingency fits with some ontology we share about how the world works. I have been punished for thinking in my [metaphorical] head whenever people say x causes y that x forces y, so I am feeling cautious about causality right now.

But still, what words are we going to substitute? That wasnt a rhetorical question. What words ARE we going to substitute?

thanks for your comments,

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email];[hidden email]

Sent: 9/17/2009 10:27:51 PM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Emergence Seminar II, British Emergence

It seems to me that "cause" is an extraordinarily slippery word. I'm involved with a group of people who are looking into "Causality in Complex Systems." One of the things I did while in Australia this summer was attend one or our workshops. After thinking quite a bit about causality and after arguing with a professional Philosopher about what philosophers mean by causality, I've decided to give up using that term. Instead, what I'm interested in are explanations. Even that is a difficult term to define clearly. But it seems a lot less dangerous than causality.

Nick can explain why a triangle is rigid -- although I am taken by the notion of an "elan triangulaire". But to come up with a "cause" for the rigidity of a triangle? In my view that's just asking for trouble.

It's important to acknowledge, though, that Nick's explanation will presumably be predicated on the presumption that the each of the one-by-two sides is itself rigid. What about explaining that? (That's another example of how levevls of abstraction build on other levels of abstraction.)

-- Russ_A

On Thu, Sep 17, 2009 at 9:02 PM, Nicholas Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

The seminar met this afternoon, now eight in number.

I would like to think that I were the sort of person who could summarize what we accomplished, but alas, I am not, so let me share what was accomplished for me. I hope others in the group will correct me, particularly any who are not in Santa FE but who have joined us in our reading from afar.

McLaughlin asserts that B.E. was a possible scientific position in the 19 century but came to an end because quantum mechanics, quantum chemistry, etc., demonstrated that there were no configurational forces.   When we explain the properties of H20 on the basis of the properties of the molecules, electrons etc. that make it up we need invoke no new FORCES that arise from the configuration of the particles. Elementary Newtonian forces are all we need. But I ended up wondering if all of this was fair to the Emergentists. After all, Mill spoke not of the composition of forces but of the composition of causes. Presumably all forces are in some sense causes, but nobody has yet asserted that all causes are forces.   Returning to my example of the triangle made of hinges and one-by-two's, to explain the strength of the triangle (by comparison with the relative weakness of the parallelogram), we need not appeal to any special forces, no "triangular stubbornness" or "elan triangulaire". On the other hand, if you would make a structure with hinges and one-by-twos that is strong, you better get at least one triangle into it. In that sense, the triangular configuration of the wood pieces is a necessary condition of the structural rigidity (and perhaps a sufficient one as well?) and hence a CAUSE of the rigidity., in any sense that I understand cause. In short, McLaughlin does not deny the existence of configurational CAUSES and such causes are all that is needed for a robust emergentism.

Again, I long for comments from others who have read this article.

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,

Clark University ([hidden email])

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Roger Critchlow-2

Re: Emergence Seminar II, British Emergence

In reply to this post by Nick Thompson

Maybe we should read Mill, the chapter on the composition of causes is
only 5 pages:

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/27942/27942-h/27942-h.html#toc53

-- rec --

On Thu, Sep 17, 2009 at 10:02 PM, Nicholas Thompson
<[hidden email]> wrote:

> The seminar met this afternoon, now eight in number.
>
> I would like to think that I were the sort of person who could summarize
> what we accomplished, but alas, I am not, so let me share what was
> accomplished for me. I hope others in the group will correct me,
> particularly any who are not in Santa FE but who have joined us in our
> reading from afar.
>
> McLaughlin asserts that B.E. was a possible scientific position in the 19
> century but came to an end because quantum mechanics, quantum chemistry,
> etc., demonstrated that there were no configurational forces. When we
> explain the properties of H20 on the basis of the properties of the
> molecules, electrons etc. that make it up we need invoke no new FORCES that
> arise from the configuration of the particles. Elementary Newtonian forces
> are all we need. But I ended up wondering if all of this was fair to the
> Emergentists. After all, Mill spoke not of the composition of forces but of
> the composition of causes. Presumably all forces are in some sense causes,
> but nobody has yet asserted that all causes are forces. Returning to my
> example of the triangle made of hinges and one-by-two's, to explain the
> strength of the triangle (by comparison with the relative weakness of the
> parallelogram), we need not appeal to any special forces,&n bsp; no
> "triangular stubbornness" or "elan triangulaire". On the other hand, if you
> would make a structure with hinges and one-by-twos that is strong, you
> better get at least one triangle into it. In that sense, the triangular
> configuration of the wood pieces is a necessary condition of the structural
> rigidity (and perhaps a sufficient one as well?) and hence a CAUSE of the
> rigidity., in any sense that I understand cause. In short, McLaughlin does
> not deny the existence of configurational CAUSES and such causes are all
> that is needed for a robust emergentism.
>
> Again, I long for comments from others who have read this article.
>
> Nick
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
> Clark University ([hidden email])
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
>