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A question for tomorrow

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Nick Thompson

A question for tomorrow

For those of you wise enough to skip reading my rant, here is the question I got to at the end. I would love some help with it tomorrow.

What does a Turing Machine know?

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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gepr

Re: A question for tomorrow

What was the result of this morning's conversation?

On 4/25/19 10:50 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> What does a Turing Machine know?

--
☣ uǝlƃ

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen

Russ Abbott

Re: A question for tomorrow

Nick, I can't believe you are asking such a question -- unless by "know" you mean something very different from the common understanding. No computer knows anything, although it may have lots of stored information. (Information is meant in the Shannon sense.)

For example, Oxford defines knowledge as "Facts, information, and skills acquired through experience or education; the theoretical or practical understanding of a subject." This is distinct from, for example, having access to an encyclopedia--or even having memorized the contents of one. Turing machines, and computers in general, do not have an understanding of anything--even though they may have lots of Shannon-style information (which we understand as) related to some subject.

(Like Glen, though, I am interested in the results, if any, of this morning's meeting.)

-- Russ Abbott
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 2:38 PM uǝlƃ ☣ <[hidden email]> wrote:

What was the result of this morning's conversation?

On 4/25/19 10:50 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> What does a Turing Machine know?

--
☣ uǝlƃ

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Frank Wimberly-2

Re: A question for tomorrow

On the way to Friam I said to Nick. Turing Machines don't know anything. They may store representations of knowledge. I further said that a photograph also represents knowledge. For example, the number of floors of a given building. Most people would be puzzled by the question, "What does a photo know?"

There were multiple parallel conversations after we arrived. I don't recall additional discussions about what Turing Machines know.

-----------------------------------
Frank Wimberly

My memoir:
https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly

My scientific publications:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2

Phone (505) 670-9918

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019, 8:06 PM Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote:

Nick, I can't believe you are asking such a question -- unless by "know" you mean something very different from the common understanding. No computer knows anything, although it may have lots of stored information. (Information is meant in the Shannon sense.)

For example, Oxford defines knowledge as "Facts, information, and skills acquired through experience or education; the theoretical or practical understanding of a subject." This is distinct from, for example, having access to an encyclopedia--or even having memorized the contents of one. Turing machines, and computers in general, do not have an understanding of anything--even though they may have lots of Shannon-style information (which we understand as) related to some subject.

(Like Glen, though, I am interested in the results, if any, of this morning's meeting.)

-- Russ Abbott
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 2:38 PM uǝlƃ ☣ <[hidden email]> wrote:
What was the result of this morning's conversation?

On 4/25/19 10:50 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> What does a Turing Machine know?

--
☣ uǝlƃ

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Marcus G. Daniels

Re: A question for tomorrow

Turing machines can perform an algorithm like an auto-encoding deep neural net, where a picture of a tree could be categorized as a tree in some internal node. Likewise activating that internal node might generate an image of a tree (when the Turing machine dreams).

From: Friam <[hidden email]> on behalf of Frank Wimberly <[hidden email]>
Reply-To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Date: Friday, April 26, 2019 at 8:19 PM
To: "[hidden email]" <[hidden email]>, The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow

There were multiple parallel conversations after we arrived. I don't recall additional discussions about what Turing Machines know.

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019, 8:06 PM Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote:

Nick, I can't believe you are asking such a question -- unless by "know" you mean something very different from the common understanding. No computer knows anything, although it may have lots of stored information. (Information is meant in the Shannon sense.)

For example, Oxford defines knowledge as "Facts, information, and skills acquired through experience or education; the theoretical or practical understanding of a subject." This is distinct from, for example, having access to an encyclopedia--or even having memorized the contents of one. Turing machines, and computers in general, do not have an understanding of anything--even though they may have lots of Shannon-style information (which we understand as) related to some subject.

(Like Glen, though, I am interested in the results, if any, of this morning's meeting.)

-- Russ Abbott
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 2:38 PM uǝlƃ ☣ <[hidden email]> wrote:

What was the result of this morning's conversation?

On 4/25/19 10:50 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> What does a Turing Machine know?

--
☣ uǝlƃ

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Nick Thompson

Re: A question for tomorrow

In reply to this post by Russ Abbott

Russ II,

Good to be back in touch with you.

The question is certainly naïve. So nobody other than me (John? Jon? David? Lee? Eric? HELP!) is willing to breath some life into it, then that IS its answer. But while awaiting Higher Authority, let me say a couple of things. See Larding.

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott
Sent: Friday, April 26, 2019 8:06 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow

Nick, I can't believe you are asking such a question -- unless by "know" you mean something very different from the common understanding.

[NST==> If I remember correctly our earlier argument, yours is an inprinciple argument against any claim that machines and humans are ever doing the same thing, right? So, I could imagine the most complicated computer imaginable … quantum computer, or whatever you guys would call it … and you would say that that computer cannot “know” or “think” or “feel” or “perceive”, etc. <==nst]

No computer knows anything, although it may have lots of stored information. (Information is meant in the Shannon sense.)

[NST==>So, there is no intentionality in Shannon Weaver “information”, right. SW information is not “information that …”. But SW information is a concept that grows out of communication theory, right? So, Dawes communicated one bit of information when he hung out the lanterns at the top of the Old North Church. (“One if by land and two if by sea, and I on the opposite shore shall be.”), if you take for granted that the British were coming, one way or the other. So the basic idea is that before the lanterns went up, Revere (on the other shore) had two possibilities, and after the lanterns went up, he had only one. His uncertainty, if you will was reduced by one bit by the information communicated by Dawes’s lanterns. I am not sure what it means to talk about SW information outside of a communication context. <==nst]

(Like Glen, though, I am interested in the results, if any, of this morning's meeting.)

[NST==>I think most people thought it was an ill-formed question, but were too polite to say so. <==nst]

I will lard Frank’s message in the next email.

Thanks, again,

-- Russ Abbott
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 2:38 PM uǝlƃ ☣ <[hidden email]> wrote:

What was the result of this morning's conversation?

On 4/25/19 10:50 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> What does a Turing Machine know?

--
☣ uǝlƃ

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Nick Thompson

Re: A question for tomorrow

In reply to this post by Frank Wimberly-2

Larding below.

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Friday, April 26, 2019 8:19 PM
To: [hidden email]; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow

On the way to Friam I said to Nick. Turing Machines don't know anything. They may store representations of knowledge. [NST==>Frank: This is how I understand you. The relation between a Turing Machine and knowledge is like the relation between Mathematics and the events or processes it models. All the knowledge is in the interpretation translate “life” into something that the Math or Machine can compute and in the interpretation that translate the results of the computation back into life. Let’s see. What am I accusing you of here. OH. I have it. I am accusing you of a mathematicians understanding of computation. Is that understanding of that relation canonical? <==nst] I further said that a photograph also represents knowledge. For example, the number of floors of a given building. Most people would be puzzled by the question, "What does a photo know?"[NST==>I think the metaphor is unfair. Nobody has ever accused a photograph of being able to play chess, or to engage in other tasks which are broadly seen (at least by defrocked English majors) as cognitive. <==nst]

There were multiple parallel conversations after we arrived. I don't recall additional discussions about what Turing Machines know.

[NST==>Except at the very end, after 3 hours of discussing other things. By that time I was exhausted, and I don’t remember what we said. We spent a lot of time exploring our attractions to unorthodox scientific opinion in such matters as MSG and headaches, auras, pigeon navigation, an even, by implication, the tin-hat stuff. It’s a question I would love to poll the FRIAM list on: How many of you engage in unproven health practices of various sorts, even though “science” tells you they are worthless? Why, exactly? How is that consistent with your criticisms of climate science deniers? <==nst]

Gotta go,

Thanks everybody,

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019, 8:06 PM Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote:

Nick, I can't believe you are asking such a question -- unless by "know" you mean something very different from the common understanding. No computer knows anything, although it may have lots of stored information. (Information is meant in the Shannon sense.)

For example, Oxford defines knowledge as "Facts, information, and skills acquired through experience or education; the theoretical or practical understanding of a subject." This is distinct from, for example, having access to an encyclopedia--or even having memorized the contents of one. Turing machines, and computers in general, do not have an understanding of anything--even though they may have lots of Shannon-style information (which we understand as) related to some subject.

(Like Glen, though, I am interested in the results, if any, of this morning's meeting.)

-- Russ Abbott
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 2:38 PM uǝlƃ ☣ <[hidden email]> wrote:
What was the result of this morning's conversation?

On 4/25/19 10:50 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> What does a Turing Machine know?

--
☣ uǝlƃ

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Russ Abbott

Re: A question for tomorrow

Good to talk to you again also, Nick.

You characterized me as saying, "yours is an in principle argument against any claim that machines and humans are ever doing the same thing, right?"

I wouldn't go that far. One might argue that as physical beings, we are machines of a sort, so there's not such a clear line between machines and humans. One of our current scientific challenges is to figure out how to characterize it and how to push entities across it.

But moving to shallower water, consider this example. Presumably, no one would say that a standard washing machine knows how to clean clothes. A washing machine is built to control the flow of water in and out of its tank, to rotate its agitator for given periods of time, etc. We then informally say that the washing machine is cleaning the clothes. But it's not. It just performing mechanical actions that result in what we think of as clean clothes.

Suppose we made the washing machine smarter. Suppose it had sensors that could sense the chemicals that we consider "dirt," and selected actions from its repertoire of actions that reduced the level of those chemicals below some minimal threshold. Would one say that it then knows how to clean clothes? I would say that it doesn't--except in an informal way of talking. The washing machine is built of physical components, sensors, etc. along with algorithms that (again) produce what we think of as clean clothes. But the washing machine doesn't think of them as clean clothes. It doesn't think of anything. It just does what it does.

Is there anything one might add to our washing machine so that we would want to say that it knows how to clean clothes. I can't think of any incremental steps. For me to attribute the washing machine with knowing how to clean clothes I would insist that it have consciousness and subjective experience. I know that's a big jump; it's the line between machines and humans that I would draw. I'm now recalling, Nick, that you don't believe in consciousness and subjective experience. Right? So we are probably at an impasse since we no longer have a common vocabulary. But even if the position I'm assuming you hold on consciousness and subjective experience were not a problem, I'd still be stuck. I have no idea how to build consciousness and subjective experience into a washing machine. This is probably where we got stuck the last time we talked about this. I guess we drifted back out to the deeper water anyway. Oh, well. Perhaps it was worth reviewing the issue. Perhaps not.

-- Russ

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 8:55 PM Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Larding below.

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Friday, April 26, 2019 8:19 PM
To: [hidden email]; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow

On the way to Friam I said to Nick. Turing Machines don't know anything. They may store representations of knowledge. [NST==>Frank: This is how I understand you. The relation between a Turing Machine and knowledge is like the relation between Mathematics and the events or processes it models. All the knowledge is in the interpretation translate “life” into something that the Math or Machine can compute and in the interpretation that translate the results of the computation back into life. Let’s see. What am I accusing you of here. OH. I have it. I am accusing you of a mathematicians understanding of computation. Is that understanding of that relation canonical? <==nst] I further said that a photograph also represents knowledge. For example, the number of floors of a given building. Most people would be puzzled by the question, "What does a photo know?"[NST==>I think the metaphor is unfair. Nobody has ever accused a photograph of being able to play chess, or to engage in other tasks which are broadly seen (at least by defrocked English majors) as cognitive. <==nst]

There were multiple parallel conversations after we arrived. I don't recall additional discussions about what Turing Machines know.
[NST==>Except at the very end, after 3 hours of discussing other things. By that time I was exhausted, and I don’t remember what we said. We spent a lot of time exploring our attractions to unorthodox scientific opinion in such matters as MSG and headaches, auras, pigeon navigation, an even, by implication, the tin-hat stuff. It’s a question I would love to poll the FRIAM list on: How many of you engage in unproven health practices of various sorts, even though “science” tells you they are worthless? Why, exactly? How is that consistent with your criticisms of climate science deniers? <==nst]
Gotta go,
Thanks everybody,

N
-----------------------------------
Frank Wimberly

My memoir:
https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly

My scientific publications:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2

Phone (505) 670-9918

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019, 8:06 PM Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote:
Nick, I can't believe you are asking such a question -- unless by "know" you mean something very different from the common understanding. No computer knows anything, although it may have lots of stored information. (Information is meant in the Shannon sense.)

For example, Oxford defines knowledge as "Facts, information, and skills acquired through experience or education; the theoretical or practical understanding of a subject." This is distinct from, for example, having access to an encyclopedia--or even having memorized the contents of one. Turing machines, and computers in general, do not have an understanding of anything--even though they may have lots of Shannon-style information (which we understand as) related to some subject.

(Like Glen, though, I am interested in the results, if any, of this morning's meeting.)

-- Russ Abbott
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 2:38 PM uǝlƃ ☣ <[hidden email]> wrote:
What was the result of this morning's conversation?

On 4/25/19 10:50 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> What does a Turing Machine know?

--
☣ uǝlƃ

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Nick Thompson

Re: A question for tomorrow

Russ,

Thanks for stating the issues so precisely.

You perhaps my side of the argument a tad too strongly. It’s not that I think that self-conscious (etc.) doesn’t exist; it’s that I think of it as a material relation. So anywhere, anytime, etc., that material relation can be generated, there consciousness exists. It’s sort of like what Christ said: “wherever any number shall come together in my name, there shall I be.” Sorry, I am probably being silly there, but I just love that quote.)

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott
Sent: Friday, April 26, 2019 10:44 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow

Good to talk to you again also, Nick.

You characterized me as saying, "yours is an in principle argument against any claim that machines and humans are ever doing the same thing, right?"

-- Russ

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 8:55 PM Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Larding below.

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Friday, April 26, 2019 8:19 PM
To: [hidden email]; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow

On the way to Friam I said to Nick. Turing Machines don't know anything. They may store representations of knowledge. [NST==>Frank: This is how I understand you. The relation between a Turing Machine and knowledge is like the relation between Mathematics and the events or processes it models. All the knowledge is in the interpretation translate “life” into something that the Math or Machine can compute and in the interpretation that translate the results of the computation back into life. Let’s see. What am I accusing you of here. OH. I have it. I am accusing you of a mathematicians understanding of computation. Is that understanding of that relation canonical? <==nst] I further said that a photograph also represents knowledge. For example, the number of floors of a given building. Most people would be puzzled by the question, "What does a photo know?"[NST==>I think the metaphor is unfair. Nobody has ever accused a photograph of being able to play chess, or to engage in other tasks which are broadly seen (at least by defrocked English majors) as cognitive. <==nst]

There were multiple parallel conversations after we arrived. I don't recall additional discussions about what Turing Machines know.
[NST==>Except at the very end, after 3 hours of discussing other things. By that time I was exhausted, and I don’t remember what we said. We spent a lot of time exploring our attractions to unorthodox scientific opinion in such matters as MSG and headaches, auras, pigeon navigation, an even, by implication, the tin-hat stuff. It’s a question I would love to poll the FRIAM list on: How many of you engage in unproven health practices of various sorts, even though “science” tells you they are worthless? Why, exactly? How is that consistent with your criticisms of climate science deniers? <==nst]
Gotta go,
Thanks everybody,

N
-----------------------------------
Frank Wimberly

My memoir:
https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly

My scientific publications:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2

Phone (505) 670-9918

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019, 8:06 PM Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote:
Nick, I can't believe you are asking such a question -- unless by "know" you mean something very different from the common understanding. No computer knows anything, although it may have lots of stored information. (Information is meant in the Shannon sense.)

For example, Oxford defines knowledge as "Facts, information, and skills acquired through experience or education; the theoretical or practical understanding of a subject." This is distinct from, for example, having access to an encyclopedia--or even having memorized the contents of one. Turing machines, and computers in general, do not have an understanding of anything--even though they may have lots of Shannon-style information (which we understand as) related to some subject.

(Like Glen, though, I am interested in the results, if any, of this morning's meeting.)

-- Russ Abbott
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 2:38 PM uǝlƃ ☣ <[hidden email]> wrote:
What was the result of this morning's conversation?

On 4/25/19 10:50 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> What does a Turing Machine know?

--
☣ uǝlƃ

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Frank Wimberly-2

Re: A question for tomorrow

That's the second time in a week that that quote from the Christian Scripture (aka New Testament) has come up in my online conversations. Is it a divine message for me?

Seriously, I think Russ and I have nearly the same view of consciousness. A view that I have been trying to describe to Nick for over a decade. Thanks for the clarification, Russ.

Frank

On Sat, Apr 27, 2019, 12:03 AM Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Russ,

Thanks for stating the issues so precisely.

You perhaps my side of the argument a tad too strongly. It’s not that I think that self-conscious (etc.) doesn’t exist; it’s that I think of it as a material relation. So anywhere, anytime, etc., that material relation can be generated, there consciousness exists. It’s sort of like what Christ said: “wherever any number shall come together in my name, there shall I be.” Sorry, I am probably being silly there, but I just love that quote.)

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Russ Abbott
Sent: Friday, April 26, 2019 10:44 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow

Good to talk to you again also, Nick.

You characterized me as saying, "yours is an in principle argument against any claim that machines and humans are ever doing the same thing, right?"
I wouldn't go that far. One might argue that as physical beings, we are machines of a sort, so there's not such a clear line between machines and humans. One of our current scientific challenges is to figure out how to characterize it and how to push entities across it.

But moving to shallower water, consider this example. Presumably, no one would say that a standard washing machine knows how to clean clothes. A washing machine is built to control the flow of water in and out of its tank, to rotate its agitator for given periods of time, etc. We then informally say that the washing machine is cleaning the clothes. But it's not. It just performing mechanical actions that result in what we think of as clean clothes.

Suppose we made the washing machine smarter. Suppose it had sensors that could sense the chemicals that we consider "dirt," and selected actions from its repertoire of actions that reduced the level of those chemicals below some minimal threshold. Would one say that it then knows how to clean clothes? I would say that it doesn't--except in an informal way of talking. The washing machine is built of physical components, sensors, etc. along with algorithms that (again) produce what we think of as clean clothes. But the washing machine doesn't think of them as clean clothes. It doesn't think of anything. It just does what it does.

Is there anything one might add to our washing machine so that we would want to say that it knows how to clean clothes. I can't think of any incremental steps. For me to attribute the washing machine with knowing how to clean clothes I would insist that it have consciousness and subjective experience. I know that's a big jump; it's the line between machines and humans that I would draw. I'm now recalling, Nick, that you don't believe in consciousness and subjective experience. Right? So we are probably at an impasse since we no longer have a common vocabulary. But even if the position I'm assuming you hold on consciousness and subjective experience were not a problem, I'd still be stuck. I have no idea how to build consciousness and subjective experience into a washing machine. This is probably where we got stuck the last time we talked about this. I guess we drifted back out to the deeper water anyway. Oh, well. Perhaps it was worth reviewing the issue. Perhaps not.

-- Russ

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 8:55 PM Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:
Larding below.

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Friday, April 26, 2019 8:19 PM
To: [hidden email]; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow

On the way to Friam I said to Nick. Turing Machines don't know anything. They may store representations of knowledge. [NST==>Frank: This is how I understand you. The relation between a Turing Machine and knowledge is like the relation between Mathematics and the events or processes it models. All the knowledge is in the interpretation translate “life” into something that the Math or Machine can compute and in the interpretation that translate the results of the computation back into life. Let’s see. What am I accusing you of here. OH. I have it. I am accusing you of a mathematicians understanding of computation. Is that understanding of that relation canonical? <==nst] I further said that a photograph also represents knowledge. For example, the number of floors of a given building. Most people would be puzzled by the question, "What does a photo know?"[NST==>I think the metaphor is unfair. Nobody has ever accused a photograph of being able to play chess, or to engage in other tasks which are broadly seen (at least by defrocked English majors) as cognitive. <==nst]

There were multiple parallel conversations after we arrived. I don't recall additional discussions about what Turing Machines know.
[NST==>Except at the very end, after 3 hours of discussing other things. By that time I was exhausted, and I don’t remember what we said. We spent a lot of time exploring our attractions to unorthodox scientific opinion in such matters as MSG and headaches, auras, pigeon navigation, an even, by implication, the tin-hat stuff. It’s a question I would love to poll the FRIAM list on: How many of you engage in unproven health practices of various sorts, even though “science” tells you they are worthless? Why, exactly? How is that consistent with your criticisms of climate science deniers? <==nst]
Gotta go,
Thanks everybody,

N
-----------------------------------
Frank Wimberly

My memoir:
https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly

My scientific publications:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2

Phone (505) 670-9918

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019, 8:06 PM Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote:
Nick, I can't believe you are asking such a question -- unless by "know" you mean something very different from the common understanding. No computer knows anything, although it may have lots of stored information. (Information is meant in the Shannon sense.)

For example, Oxford defines knowledge as "Facts, information, and skills acquired through experience or education; the theoretical or practical understanding of a subject." This is distinct from, for example, having access to an encyclopedia--or even having memorized the contents of one. Turing machines, and computers in general, do not have an understanding of anything--even though they may have lots of Shannon-style information (which we understand as) related to some subject.

(Like Glen, though, I am interested in the results, if any, of this morning's meeting.)

-- Russ Abbott
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 2:38 PM uǝlƃ ☣ <[hidden email]> wrote:
What was the result of this morning's conversation?

On 4/25/19 10:50 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> What does a Turing Machine know?

--
☣ uǝlƃ

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lrudolph

Re: A question for tomorrow

In reply to this post by Nick Thompson

Maybe I've missed it, but has no one pointed out that a "Turing Machine"
is a mathematical formalism? I may be a stick in the mud, but I refuse to
extend the definition of "know" so far as to make "A Turing Machine knows
[something]" a meaningful statement. You might as well ask what a Goedel
Enumeration knows, or what The Classification of Finite Simple Groups
knows. Hell, what does the integer 1 know???

Now maybe in you-alls' circles, "Turing Machine" is used to refer to some
kinds of physical implementations of particular Turing Machines. But
that's a pernicious identification that can only lead to tears.

============================================================
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Frank Wimberly-2

Re: A question for tomorrow

I will channel Nick based on our conversation yesterday. "A computer is a Turing machine and it can answer questions."* I apologize, Nick, if that's not your position.

*Alexa, Siri, Hey Google

On Sat, Apr 27, 2019, 7:22 AM <[hidden email]> wrote:

Maybe I've missed it, but has no one pointed out that a "Turing Machine"
is a mathematical formalism? I may be a stick in the mud, but I refuse to
extend the definition of "know" so far as to make "A Turing Machine knows
[something]" a meaningful statement. You might as well ask what a Goedel
Enumeration knows, or what The Classification of Finite Simple Groups
knows. Hell, what does the integer 1 know???

Now maybe in you-alls' circles, "Turing Machine" is used to refer to some
kinds of physical implementations of particular Turing Machines. But
that's a pernicious identification that can only lead to tears.

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
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Nick Thompson

Re: A question for tomorrow

In reply to this post by lrudolph

Lee,

Remember, I and only I, am to blame for raising this question. There ain't
no "circles" here.

Belelagued as I am, I migh persist and ask you, "Ok, what does an
"instantiation" of a Turing Machine Know?"

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of
[hidden email]
Sent: Saturday, April 27, 2019 7:22 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow

Maybe I've missed it, but has no one pointed out that a "Turing Machine"
is a mathematical formalism? I may be a stick in the mud, but I refuse to
extend the definition of "know" so far as to make "A Turing Machine knows
[something]" a meaningful statement. You might as well ask what a Goedel
Enumeration knows, or what The Classification of Finite Simple Groups knows.
Hell, what does the integer 1 know???

Now maybe in you-alls' circles, "Turing Machine" is used to refer to some
kinds of physical implementations of particular Turing Machines. But that's
a pernicious identification that can only lead to tears.

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe
http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
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============================================================
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Nick Thompson

Re: A question for tomorrow

In reply to this post by Frank Wimberly-2

Frank,

Well, that’s a little blunter than I feel comfortable with because it identifies “answering questions” with consciousness. I like better, “Imagine a computer, however complicated you care to make it, however skilled in its execution of human behaviors in human contexts, can such a computer be conscious?” I would assume from past conversations with you, you would say, “No.”

By the way: Am I using the language correctly if I say that a computer is an “instantiation” of a Turing Machine?

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Saturday, April 27, 2019 7:33 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow

I will channel Nick based on our conversation yesterday. "A computer is a Turing machine and it can answer questions."* I apologize, Nick, if that's not your position.

*Alexa, Siri, Hey Google

On Sat, Apr 27, 2019, 7:22 AM <[hidden email]> wrote:

Maybe I've missed it, but has no one pointed out that a "Turing Machine"
is a mathematical formalism? I may be a stick in the mud, but I refuse to
extend the definition of "know" so far as to make "A Turing Machine knows
[something]" a meaningful statement. You might as well ask what a Goedel
Enumeration knows, or what The Classification of Finite Simple Groups
knows. Hell, what does the integer 1 know???

Now maybe in you-alls' circles, "Turing Machine" is used to refer to some
kinds of physical implementations of particular Turing Machines. But
that's a pernicious identification that can only lead to tears.

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Frank Wimberly-2

Re: A question for tomorrow

I would hate to have to demonstrate that a modern computer is an instance of a Turing Machine. Among other things they usually have multiple processors as well as memory hierarchies. But I suppose it could be done, theoretically.

On Sat, Apr 27, 2019, 9:43 AM Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:

Frank,

Well, that’s a little blunter than I feel comfortable with because it identifies “answering questions” with consciousness. I like better, “Imagine a computer, however complicated you care to make it, however skilled in its execution of human behaviors in human contexts, can such a computer be conscious?” I would assume from past conversations with you, you would say, “No.”

By the way: Am I using the language correctly if I say that a computer is an “instantiation” of a Turing Machine?

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Saturday, April 27, 2019 7:33 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow

I will channel Nick based on our conversation yesterday. "A computer is a Turing machine and it can answer questions."* I apologize, Nick, if that's not your position.

*Alexa, Siri, Hey Google
-----------------------------------
Frank Wimberly

My memoir:
https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly

My scientific publications:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2

Phone (505) 670-9918

On Sat, Apr 27, 2019, 7:22 AM <[hidden email]> wrote:
Maybe I've missed it, but has no one pointed out that a "Turing Machine"
is a mathematical formalism? I may be a stick in the mud, but I refuse to
extend the definition of "know" so far as to make "A Turing Machine knows
[something]" a meaningful statement. You might as well ask what a Goedel
Enumeration knows, or what The Classification of Finite Simple Groups
knows. Hell, what does the integer 1 know???

Now maybe in you-alls' circles, "Turing Machine" is used to refer to some
kinds of physical implementations of particular Turing Machines. But
that's a pernicious identification that can only lead to tears.

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
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Nick Thompson

Re: A question for tomorrow

In reply to this post by gepr

Glen,

I missed this question the first time.

Mostly, we didn't discuss the "knowing" relation at all. There was (to me, anyway) a very interesting conversation about the importance of "stories" in scientific thought. It started when I got quite testy about the over-use of "story" or "narrative" to refer to "models" or "pictures of the world". Now I absolutely agree that "stories" can be models, but I don't think that all models are complete stories. A story has a beginning, a middle and an end, a tension that is set up, developed, and released. (In that regard, a story is a little like hunger, or fear, or sex.) Aesop's fables are examples of stories that are models. Sometimes it's hard to tell the difference: It's hard to separate Archimedes insight that his own body in the bathtub could be a model for the king's crown in a bucket of water (charity of classicists requested here) from the story, "Is this crown real or fake gold? If I dunk the crown in a bucket of water and measure the displaced water, I will discover the answer and find favor with the king." They are deeply entangled. And all experimental write-ups are, if well written, highly constrained stories. But by itself, "A crown in a bucket is the same thing as me in a bathtub" is just a model, with a story yet to be told about it.

The basic scientific story is to me a story about the resolution of doubt: "I learned some stuff that didn't square with what I knew, I did some stuff, and now that doubt is resolved." I think the scientific story is different from the religious story which I take to be, "I learned some stuff that didn't square with what I knew, I went to a guru, the guru set me straight, and now my doubt is resolved." (I hate it when people tell me stories of having gone to pray at the Temple of Feynman and returned with Wisdom.) Now the Congregation was INSTANTLY critical of this distinction, pointing out that the Guru might say, "I had the same doubt yesterday, and so I did some stuff, and my doubt was resolved: let me show you how to do it." Also, somebody pointed out that doubt in all matters is just impossible and science cannot be done without a reverential attitude with respect to SOME authorities. I take the point, but I don't like it. It pisses me off.

I also argued that there was a version of the scientific story that particularly captivated all of us around the table. The Emperor's New Clothes. I can imagine a FRIAM seal, with an image of the little boy, pointing at a naked king, before a crowd aghast.

Others will dispute that any of this happened.

Wish you had been there to validate my perception.

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of u?l? ?
Sent: Friday, April 26, 2019 3:38 PM
To: FriAM <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow

What was the result of this morning's conversation?

On 4/25/19 10:50 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> What does a Turing Machine know?

--
☣ uǝlƃ

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lrudolph

Re: A question for tomorrow

In reply to this post by Frank Wimberly-2

Frank writes:
> I would hate to have to demonstrate that a modern computer is an instance
> of a Turing Machine. Among other things they usually have multiple
> processors as well as memory hierarchies. But I suppose it could be done,
> theoretically.

First a passage from a chapter I contributed to a book edited by a
graduate student Nick knows (Zack Beckstead); I have cut out a bit in the
middle which aims at a different point not under consideration here.
===begin===
If talk of machines in the context of the human sciences seems out of
place, note that Turing (1936) actually introduces his automatic machine
as a formalization (thoroughly mathematical, though described in
suggestive mechanistic terms like tape and scanning) of an idealized
*human* calculating agent (Soare, 1996, p. 291; italics in the original),
called by Turing a computer. [...] As Turing remarks, It is always
possible for the computer to break off from his work, to go away and
forget all about it, and later to come back and go on with it (1936, p.
253). It seems to me that then it must also be always possible for the
computer to break off and never come back (in fact, this often happens
in the lives, and invariably upon the deaths, of non-idealized human
calculating agents).
===end===
Of course Turing's idealization of "an idealized *human* calculating
agent" also idealizes away the fact that human computers sometimes make
errors. A Turing machine doesn't make errors. But both the processors and
the memory of a modern computer can, and *must* make errors (however
rarely, and however good the error-detection). To at least that extent,
then, they are not *perfect* instantiations of Turing machines. On the
other hand, that very fact about them makes them (in some sense) *more*
like (actual) human calculating agents.

So, Nick, why are you asking what Turing machines think, instead of what
modern computers think? (Be careful how you answer that...)

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Russ Abbott

Re: A question for tomorrow

Nick,

One of the most attractive things about your posts is how charming they are. They are so well written! Thank you for keeping the discussion at such a civilized and enjoyable level -- even when I don't agree with you.

-- Russ Abbott
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

On Sat, Apr 27, 2019 at 9:44 AM <[hidden email]> wrote:

Frank writes:
> I would hate to have to demonstrate that a modern computer is an instance
> of a Turing Machine. Among other things they usually have multiple
> processors as well as memory hierarchies. But I suppose it could be done,
> theoretically.

First a passage from a chapter I contributed to a book edited by a
graduate student Nick knows (Zack Beckstead); I have cut out a bit in the
middle which aims at a different point not under consideration here.
===begin===
If talk of “machines” in the context of the human sciences seems out of
place, note that Turing (1936) actually introduces his “automatic machine”
as a formalization (thoroughly mathematical, though described in
suggestive mechanistic terms like “tape” and “scanning”) of “an idealized
*human* calculating agent” (Soare, 1996, p. 291; italics in the original),
called by Turing a “computer”. [...] As Turing remarks, “It is always
possible for the computer to break off from his work, to go away and
forget all about it, and later to come back and go on with it” (1936, p.
253). It seems to me that then it must also be “always possible for the
computer to break off” and never “come back” (in fact, this often happens
in the lives, and invariably upon the deaths, of non-idealized human
calculating agents).
===end===
Of course Turing's idealization of "an idealized *human* calculating
agent" also idealizes away the fact that human computers sometimes make
errors. A Turing machine doesn't make errors. But both the processors and
the memory of a modern computer can, and *must* make errors (however
rarely, and however good the error-detection). To at least that extent,
then, they are not *perfect* instantiations of Turing machines. On the
other hand, that very fact about them makes them (in some sense) *more*
like (actual) human calculating agents.

So, Nick, why are you asking what Turing machines think, instead of what
modern computers think? (Be careful how you answer that...)

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jon zingale

Re: A Question For Tomorrow

In reply to this post by Nick Thompson

Nick,

I love that the title of this thread is 'A question for tomorrow'.

My position continues to be that the label `conscious` is meaningful,

though along with you, I am not sure what language to use around it.

For instance, can something have consciousness? That said, a

conservative scoping of the phenomena I would wish to describe

with consciousness language begins with granting consciousness

to more than 7 billion things on this planet alone. Presently, for those

that agree thus far, it appears that the only way to synthesize new things

with consciousness is to have sex (up to some crude equivalence).

This constraint seems an unreasonable limitation and so the problem

of synthesizing consciousness strikes me as reasonably near, ie.

`a question for tomorrow` and not some distant future.

You begin by asking about the Turing machine, an abstraction which

summarizes what we can say about processing information. Here,

I am going to extend Lee's comment and ask that we consider

particular implementations or better particular embodiments.

Hopefully said without too much hubris, given enough time and

memory, I can compute anything that a Turing machine can compute.

The games `Magic the Gathering` and `Mine Craft` are Turing

complete. I would suspect that under some characterization, the

Mississippi river is Turing complete. It would be a real challenge

for me state what abstractions like `Mine Craft` experience, but

sometimes I can speak to my own experience. Oscar Hammerstein

mused about what Old Man River knows.

Naively, it seems to me that some kind of information processing,

though not sufficient, is necessary for experience and for a foundations

for consciousness. Whether the information processor needs to be

Turing complete is not immediately obvious to me, perhaps a finite-

state machine will do. Still, I do not think that a complete description of

consciousness (or whatever it means to experience) can exist without

speaking to how it is that a thing comes to sense its world.

For instance, in the heyday of analogue synthesizers, musicians

would slog these machines from city to city, altitude to altitude,

desert to rain-forested coast and these machines would notoriously

respond in kind. Their finicky capacitors would experience the

change and changes in micro-farads would ensue. What does an

analogue synthesizer know?

Cheers,

Jonathan Zingale

Frank Wimberly-2

Re: A question for tomorrow

In reply to this post by Russ Abbott

Lee, Surely someone has developed probabilistic Turing Machines which can, very rarely, make errors. I am ignorant of the field since 1972 when I took a course which used Hopcroft and Ullman as a text.

Nick, I agree that your questions are charming. Your humanity is clearly seen. By the way, it occurred to me this morning that the motto of behaviorists should be, "If it talks like a duck🦆...etc"

Frank

On Sat, Apr 27, 2019, 10:59 AM Russ Abbott <[hidden email]> wrote:

Nick,

One of the most attractive things about your posts is how charming they are. They are so well written! Thank you for keeping the discussion at such a civilized and enjoyable level -- even when I don't agree with you.

-- Russ Abbott
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

On Sat, Apr 27, 2019 at 9:44 AM <[hidden email]> wrote:
Frank writes:
> I would hate to have to demonstrate that a modern computer is an instance
> of a Turing Machine. Among other things they usually have multiple
> processors as well as memory hierarchies. But I suppose it could be done,
> theoretically.

First a passage from a chapter I contributed to a book edited by a
graduate student Nick knows (Zack Beckstead); I have cut out a bit in the
middle which aims at a different point not under consideration here.
===begin===
If talk of “machines” in the context of the human sciences seems out of
place, note that Turing (1936) actually introduces his “automatic machine”
as a formalization (thoroughly mathematical, though described in
suggestive mechanistic terms like “tape” and “scanning”) of “an idealized
*human* calculating agent” (Soare, 1996, p. 291; italics in the original),
called by Turing a “computer”. [...] As Turing remarks, “It is always
possible for the computer to break off from his work, to go away and
forget all about it, and later to come back and go on with it” (1936, p.
253). It seems to me that then it must also be “always possible for the
computer to break off” and never “come back” (in fact, this often happens
in the lives, and invariably upon the deaths, of non-idealized human
calculating agents).
===end===
Of course Turing's idealization of "an idealized *human* calculating
agent" also idealizes away the fact that human computers sometimes make
errors. A Turing machine doesn't make errors. But both the processors and
the memory of a modern computer can, and *must* make errors (however
rarely, and however good the error-detection). To at least that extent,
then, they are not *perfect* instantiations of Turing machines. On the
other hand, that very fact about them makes them (in some sense) *more*
like (actual) human calculating agents.

So, Nick, why are you asking what Turing machines think, instead of what
modern computers think? (Be careful how you answer that...)

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FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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