UCSF is running an online game to explore possible avenues of development for medical research, education, and practice, from 8AM Sep 11 to 8PM Sep 12 at http://www.ucsf2025.org/. There are some interesting ideas in the promotional video already, such as open sourcing the biomedical research literature and getting insurance companies to microfund medical research.
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Dear Roger, This would be so interesting for the peace building we've talked about for so long. I gave a TEDx talk Saturday. It will be up on the TED site next week. On Tue, Sep 10, 2013 at 10:12 AM, Roger Critchlow <[hidden email]> wrote:
Merle Lefkoff, Ph.D. President, Center for Emergent Diplomacy Santa Fe, New Mexico, USA [hidden email] mobile: (303) 859-5609 skype: merlelefkoff ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
In reply to this post by Roger Critchlow-2
On 9/10/13 10:12 AM, Roger Critchlow wrote:
> UCSF is running an online game to explore possible avenues of > development for medical research, education, and practice, from 8AM > Sep 11 to 8PM Sep 12 at http://www.ucsf2025.org/. There are some > interesting ideas in the promotional video already, such as open > sourcing the biomedical research literature and getting insurance > companies to microfund medical research. Roger - This is a very slick vision-caste/vision-quest worthy of the best "day after tomorrow" piece of fiction. Each of the elements they identify: New models of education with ad-hoc components built in; Crowd sourced data, research, and funding; Viz - Big as well as ubiquitous; etc. are very compelling. I could take a curmudgeon stance on all of these elements and poke holes in them based on existing "tried and true" paradigms, and I'm sure many will, just as others will grasp at the shiny new toys and hope-triggers implied by it all and declare a premature "success". This vision is probably familiar to many of us in technology as we have probably helped in small ways to build the collective consciousness of the possibilities suggested here. In some sense, it is a "ripe" future. The only fundamental criticism I have of the vision involves *further* speeding up and fragmenting human attention and awareness. It suggests something like becoming part of a hive mind. The vision as caste here, suggests that we would only experience the benefits of such. If Utopian literature is of any use, it illustrates for us how Utopias and Dystopias are duals. Fortunately I trust the young (and not so) people in my life to be able to both embrace the possibilities suggested here and consider the downsides of what this type of vision offers them for their careers, their health, and the very qualitative quality of life that is being suggested. If we thought texting while driving was unsafe, just imagine "doing research while driving"... - Steve ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
Steve --
No worry, we'll do the research while riding in driverless cars, and the cars will monitor the eyeballs of the pedestrians for inattention to surroundings. All the eyeballs in parallel and all the driverless cars in the intersection pooling their views.
Yes, they've bundled up all that futurama into the promo video, but the idea of using a game to sort things out sounds intriguing. I wonder if I get to express my feelings about insurance companies ala GTA.
-- rec -- On Tue, Sep 10, 2013 at 11:28 AM, Steve Smith <[hidden email]> wrote:
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Hi Roger and Steve,
After using games to make decisions, may as well use them to define truth values: I got led into this connection through pointers to Jaakko HIntikka's game theoretic semantics (pointed out to me by Cosma Shalizi many years ago), but he is introduced rather late (Sec.3) of the link above, so clearly I have missed most of the iceberg. All best, Eric On Sep 10, 2013, at 2:44 PM, Roger Critchlow wrote:
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In reply to this post by Roger Critchlow-2
REC --
But of course... and the higher functioning (meaning more highly attuned/resonant with the systems of the moment) will be tapped in to those feeds, seeing the world as if through the many faceted eyes of many insects. As the motorcycle discussions here a while back attest, well practiced (old, or bold, but not old and bold?) riders already do something (more mamallian, however) like this. I suggest hexahedral shaped cars that pack perfectly into long range (trains, plains and ferries) transporters... the passengers hardly need know when their car moves from roadway to dirigible... (nod to Bucky's Dymaxion Car). This would all be moot if the conspiratorial auto makers hadn't bought up all the patents on flying cars and burned them... they just don't want us having 3 dimensions to navigate in... they want us to have more accidents... put in more road miles... more wear and tear... all so they can make more money </faux conspiratorial rant> Yes, I'm completely hooked on most if not all of the concepts presented here. I'm just the choir mumbling to itself between stanzas of "Hallelujiah! Hallelujiah! Hallelujiah!". <mumble> The Amish are reputed to ask "who will we become if we use this (or that) technology"... while they are definitely anachronistic kooks in many ways, I think it is a legitimate question. For example, if everyone owns a smart phone, will we all be found texting while driving, squinting at our screen to read the newspaper, jacked in (ears) staring at a screen (oblivious to the humans and other dangers around us), unable to read a map or find our way without GPS, unable to schedule a meeting without 6 or 8 txt messages back and forth, including several to fine-tune the actual arrival times ("I'll be 7 minutes late"... "that's ok, it will give me time to finish the vibration analysis on the quadcopter drone I'm deploying to Syria later today") </mumble> One thing I think that can come out of these radicalized (and I mean "radicalized" in the best way) perspectives is possible phase transitions of entire systems. While I have plenty of issues with Obamacare in it's details, I'm all for the kind of "annealing" of perspective that is caused by looking at things in a radically (by some standards) new way. Why not go all the way with crowd sourcing and allow us all to "invest" in our future "dis-ease", not just by funding research into it's mitigation, but also funding it's amelioration. By the time you need to be in a dementia ward (or alzheimers or "memory care" unit), maybe you (and your heirs) will own a big stake in it and can, in fact, have a say in it's policies and employees, etc. ? Why buy insurance when you could be 'investing' instead? Once was a time when slick insurance salesmen sold "insurance" as "investment", maybe it is time the tables were turned? The new "investment fund" will be backing research into all the dis-ease-es indicated in your genetic and personality profile and the new "hedge fund" will be buying in to the many ways to reduce the personal misery you will experience if/when some of the more pro-active solutions fail (yes, we'll all now live past 120 but we will suffer 20 years of one form of dementia on the way out?) I'm very good with the idea of returning to work as play and play as work (I think this was deeply designed by Darwin's Daemon into mammalian genetics, primates very likely, hominids for sure). As snarky as I am about all this, it fascinates me a great deal... it can't be all bad (one woman's Dystopia is another orca's Utopia). (I'll now return to binging on Terry Gilliam movies ... e.g. Brazil) -- sas --
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In reply to this post by David Eric Smith
Eric -
Hi Roger and Steve,Thanks for leading me back on topic <careening through the intersection of applied complexity and wild rambling raves about life, the universe and anything>... I am amazed at how late formal game theory came to the table... there is such a long and rich history of problem characterization and problem solving through techniques containing many of the same attributes (sumerian mathematics, socratic dialogue, medieval techniques for logicla reasoning-e.g. Obligationes , Victorian "logic puzzles", etc.). Modern game theory is a hallmark of the age of most of us on this list. We either "came of age" as it was evolving (Gale, von Nuemann, et al) during the 1950's or were born into it's first generation of existence (the millenials and XYgen here grew up with it in their water along with flouride, chlorine, and NIH-approved levels heavy metal salts, hormones, and pharmaceuticals). While I'm (always?) very interested in the formal underpinnings (in this case formal Game Theory), I'm also interested in the social/sentient phenomena of play (and work?), and in the philosophical (OMG!) perspectives such as offered by James Carse in his "Finite and Infinite Games". Oops... I think I'm back off topic again. Can you say a little more about your application/interest in GTS? Does it apply to the emergence of metabolic networks? - Steve ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
In reply to this post by Steve Smith
Hi Steve,
Thanks for this. Where I got into this was actually the problem of the excluded middle. I was cringing that I had committed a rude thread hijack, since the use of "game" on the thread had emphasized the interface and the method for pooling participant inputs. I was using the notion of "game" more in the sense of a defined interaction in which the structure is designed to solve a certain problem in a way that the designer hopes he has some theory of. I did a little reading of Hintikka a long time ago, and will try to say something correct, but caveat lector, because I get a lot of stuff wrong. It is obvious (meaning, I think) that most of the struggle in saying anything is not even to be right, but to say something that has enough meaning to admit a right/wrong distinction. Hence, while in di-lemma logic, it is fine to say that statements which are not true are thereby false, that seems to do very little good for a lot of what I find confusing and seek clarity on, in the world. (Here I hope there is at least a peripheral relevance to the problem of pooling inputs). Hence, you can make Godel-like claims about unprovable but true assertions, but they rely on assumptions that a suitable notion of meaning must be assignable to any syntactically valid construction, which then has an excluded middle. Whether one is to worry about that or not is a matter of what you like to worry about, but clearly it is far from the kinds of uses of truth values that I mostly worry about in practical work. Hintikka's approach was to define "that which is true" by claiming it must have a mapping to a strategy that is sure to win in some appropriately defined game. "that which is false" is a strategy that can surely be beaten by some other strategy. All the other stuff, which can neither surely win nor surely be beaten, is the middle, now not excluded. The pleasing thing about this would be that, for large games, the middle will probably grow combinatorially a lot faster than the things that are either true or false. So I was hoping that learning something about that in the context of designed games might address some subset of the ways in which it is possible to generate statements that seem to satisfy various rules of syntax, but should not be presumed to have any associated truth values (but best to show that if one _can_ give them a proper semantics as strategies, in which nonsense has a defined status). This was peripheral to a different topic about the relation of the formal status of syntax and semantics as referees for the content of expressions, where Jay Garfield from Smith College pointed me at Montague Grammar, an attempt to define a syntax for natural language that would be ensured of a self-assigned semantics. Jay said it was a spectacular and informative failure, and from what was learned, people could finally relax and acknowledge that the syntax and the semantics of natural language have different and at-least-in-part independent origins. I think I was pestering Cosma about how to think about that when he (who has read all things and understands most of them) pointed me at Hintikka as a place to look for something else interesting. All best, Eric On Sep 10, 2013, at 3:28 PM, Steve Smith wrote:
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Eric -
Where I got into this was actually the problem of the excluded middle.When I was first introduced to this di-lemma (self-reference intended) through the limitations of Aristotelian logic, I simply dismissed A logic as an incomplete model of semantics. Either all questions can be answered true or false or they cannot: true, or false? This just primed me for Tarski and eventually Zadeh on infinite valued logics and "fuzzy set/logic" and then yet more fun things like Dempster-Shafer and the Yager-Liu variants. I was cringing that I had committed a rude thread hijack,As someone who hijacks his own sentences within a thread, it didn't offend me, it represented an interesting (to me) tangent. The pivot was the subtle homonym "game" as you point out. since the use of "game" on the thread had emphasized the interface and the method for pooling participant inputs. I was using the notion of "game" more in the sense of a defined interaction in which the structure is designed to solve a certain problem in a way that the designer hopes he has some theory of.I would claim the two are tied in the sense that the point of pooling participant inputs and engaging a large pool through a "playful" interface were used specifically to try to solve a "certain problem in a way that the designer hopes he has some theory of." Aside from the superficial motivations for making "everything into a game", I think that the game theoretic (and other formal) underpinnings are useful. In the vision cast by the SFSU teaser, one would imagine that there *might very well be* an underlying game theoretic abstraction of problem solving which structures the interactions between the various players in the drama to help direct their efforts toward actual problem solving, keep them out of cycles and even "obvious dead ends"? Welcome to the club. I even get called on mine from time to time! Yes, very much so. Crowd sourcing (pooling inputs?) problem solving is more than eliciting a million thumbs-up/down like/dislike votes... especially if you want to solve real world problems such as "deciding what the real problem is and how it relates to the real world, independent of any specific answer to the problem/question." Or maybe more to the point, the generalized "law of excluded n+1th" . I twigged early in life to the realization that yes/no true/false tests/questions were often designed to reframe the test-taker answerer's perspective ("do you still beat your wife?") and by extension, the multiple choice tests tend to have the same flaw. Hmm... I felt I was tracking you right up until this one... I do agree with the spirit of "we worry about what we choose to worry about"... but are you saying that Godel's incompleteness is sort of a parlor trick or that it just defers the real question to a higher level of abstraction, not really settling (or unsettling) anything? (this is my suspicion and I do have some hope that the line of inquiry/discussion you allude to here might help sort that a bit?) Smacks of Wolfram's Class I-IV cellular automata. All CA are either A) uninteresting because they achieve a steady (Class I) or cyclic state (Class II) in finite time or B) uninteresting because they are chaotic and random (Class III)... *EXCEPT* those which magically appear to be actually *interesting* (Class IV), whatever that (actually interesting) means. Interesting... when you use the term "designed games" I think of "evolved design of games". While there is a lot of intentionality in those who seem to design the games (e.g. social customs, political, religious, legal systems) we play within, it seems as if the actual "large games" are evolved with a combination of something like "natural selection" and very "directed selection" at play. I like the phrase here "in which nonsense has a defined status". I would claim that there is a meta-game in play where this is literally and obviously the truth... it is why we have so many words for "bullshit" to refer to utterances deliberately crafted to sound meaningful while being meaningless. I *think* this is the bread and butter of marketing and of politics (which contemporarily is significantly driven by marketing?) All I can think to say about this is "Lambdas really changed my life" ... I didn't realize it was considered (by the community?) a spectacular failure: Although I can believe that the following " Montague held the view that natural language was a formal language very much in the same sense as predicate logic was a formal language." has been demonstrated to undervalue the richness of natural language. I personally don't believe that natural language can be separated from A) Culture and B) Embodiment. That does not mean, however, that Montague's (and that derived from his) work isn't very useful and important. As a side note, my daughters and I collectively enjoy variations on the traditional game of Scrabble, some of which allow the use of proper names with the added benefit of being able to lay down tiles such as " Jaakko Hintikka"... makes me want to pour a shot of Koskenkorva Viina with an Absinthe chaser. And some of the mediocre, not to allow the law of the excluded middle to overdefine us! - Steve ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
Thanks Steve,
Many good things, and clearly this is an area where you have worked much harder and better to understand than I have, so I am happy to follow you. >> Whether one is to worry about that or not is a matter of what you like to worry about, but clearly it is far from the kinds of uses of truth values that I mostly worry about in practical work. > Hmm... I felt I was tracking you right up until this one... I do agree with the spirit of "we worry about what we choose to worry about"... but are you saying that Godel's incompleteness is sort of a parlor trick or that it just defers the real question to a higher level of abstraction, not really settling (or unsettling) anything? (this is my suspicion and I do have some hope that the line of inquiry/discussion you allude to here might help sort that a bit?) This was a self-preserving gambit of email, with apologies. I know that any mention of Godel can tend to spin a thread with a _very_ long ring-down time by people who really care about this topic and have put a lot of time into it. Since I haven't done that, and since I am not able even to keep up with such a thread should it start, I wanted to avoid seeming to make any claim about any technical aspect of this question. As an _outsider_ to very heavy formalisms, I have still been bothered by the status of axioms that seem to assign semantic content from syntactic constructions, without doing any actual work of denotation. Not bothered that the axioms exist, but bothered because I don't know how to think about their status. The notion that statements which cannot consistently be called false must thereby be true for a system to be defined is one such. Another (which I will also only claim to be able to parrot as an outsider) is the notion that all well-formed predicates must be regarded as referring to entities, which gets you into set-theoretic paradoxes. It would not be not my intention to assert that there is anything "wrong" with such constructions. Rather, that they require a use of notions of truth or existence that is largely excluded by the activity of constructing denotations for real things. My interest is then to get some window on what else contributes to constructing denotations in a reliable way. (Confessed bias here on various science problems: most notions start out in common language, and are taken as having some meaning -- examples: particle in physics; individual in evolutionary dynamics -- and only on the far side of learning how to do technical calculations for some more mundane reason do we learn that the words may still be usable, but that to be used reliably vis a vis the world, they can require some rather elaborate construction to attach a definition to. So I am interested in that anyway for material things, and it is some extension of that interest to wonder about sources of confidence or content in expressions.) >> Hintikka's approach was to define "that which is true" by claiming it must have a mapping to a strategy that is sure to win in some appropriately defined game. "that which is false" is a strategy that can surely be beaten by some other strategy. All the other stuff, which can neither surely win nor surely be beaten, is the middle, now not excluded. > Smacks of Wolfram's Class I-IV cellular automata. All CA are either A) uninteresting because they achieve a steady (Class I) or cyclic state (Class II) in finite time or B) uninteresting because they are chaotic and random (Class III)... *EXCEPT* those which magically appear to be actually *interesting* (Class IV), whatever that (actually interesting) means. Let me propose (though this will be the last, because I am now on the border of making things up) that there is a better reading than that. One could view it as something like the effort to make precise the rules of debate, for application to real settings rather than overly simplified trumped-up ones. A debate should be like a game, in that there should be recognized moves and rules for judging how the state of the argument changes as a result of them. That problem is easy for chess; harder for football because of the scope for innovation and the hidden variables of physical athletics, even harder for gymnastics where artistic merit is part of the competitive goal, and very hard for debate. An argument in a debate that can be said to win against any other argument seems a reasonable formalization of the practical notion of truth that we think of as "having the strength of evidence on that argument's side" by whatever rules govern the debate. It is a virtue to recognize that the debate itself is a component of this judgment, meaning that different rules are possible. Hence the problem of arriving at desired truth-values consists both of designing good rules of debate, and then also searching for good arguments within those rules. I wouldn't assert that some provable optimum in that problem is visible from here (or perhaps ever will be), but it does seem to me that thinking about the structure underlying such problems may be clarifying sometimes. >> The pleasing thing about this would be that, for large games, the middle will probably grow combinatorially a lot faster than the things that are either true or false. So I was hoping that learning something about that in the context of designed games might address some subset of the ways in which it is possible to generate statements that seem to satisfy various rules of syntax, but should not be presumed to have any associated truth values (but best to show that if one _can_ give them a proper semantics as strategies, in which nonsense has a defined status). > Interesting... when you use the term "designed games" I think of "evolved design of games". While there is a lot of intentionality in those who seem to design the games (e.g. social customs, political, religious, legal systems) we play within, it seems as if the actual "large games" are evolved with a combination of something like "natural selection" and very "directed selection" at play. Yes, sorry; arbitrary phrase. Of course I agree with you. Lots of built stuff is organic, and even if it makes use of cognitive intentionality, one would not say its design was contained within any such intention. Indeed, my interest is mostly in systems where we encounter the phenomenon-in-process, and need to determine even what mode of description is admissible for it. My only intention here was to say that one does need to do _some_ work to speak about a definite thing. In principle, any interaction sequence with some regularities might be called a game, but a word so liberally used is an uncarved pig, in which one has not even tried to look for the joints. When I think about "large" games, I implicitly carry the image of the extensive form in mind, rather than just the normal form. The extensive form is not only large, but is also structured, from the sequence and dependencies of moves. Therefore one can do combinatorics on it. One can speak of how rare subsets of leaves on the tree are, and how hard it is to arrive at them reliably, etc. I can show what this looks like for evolutionary games, where it provides a nice way to get at neutrality, but I am sure the same combinatorics can be made useful in many domains. > I like the phrase here "in which nonsense has a defined status". I would claim that there is a meta-game in play where this is literally and obviously the truth... it is why we have so many words for "bullshit" to refer to utterances deliberately crafted to sound meaningful while being meaningless. I *think* this is the bread and butter of marketing and of politics (which contemporarily is significantly driven by marketing?) Maybe one can go further though, and recognize that politics and marketing are simply exaptations of what is resident in communication at all levels. This is probably at some level what I am after. Communication is a coordinating activity. That happens at a lot of levels, and it is a science problem (to be contrasted with a theological one, which is my snide way of referring to discussions based on fixed beliefs and adherence to traditional usages which are not subject to conceptual overturning) to say what is being coordinated. Getting clear formalizations of systems and seeing what they leave out can be a good way to look for the other relevant dynamical systems in play. This need not be a matter for cynicism, even if in actual life it is very frustrating. The question of understanding how things work can remain interesting apart from our need to make use of it, which can have emotional valence. > I didn't realize it was considered (by the community?) a spectacular failure: Although I can believe that the following " Montague held the view that natural language was a formal language very much in the same sense as predicate logic was a formal language." has been demonstrated to undervalue the richness of natural language. Yes, the way you say it is the right one. Here I have a bad habit of speaking. Often I can very much like "failures", which don't do what they were hoped to do, but which are clear enough and solid enough that we learn from them. They may even be so well done that they furnish really interesting and valuable edifices for other things. I don't know how the community regards Montague Grammar, but I would guess it is in some respectful way like the latter sense. > I personally don't believe that natural language can be separated from A) Culture and B) Embodiment. One can try to be more model specific. I think i have referred to Ray Jackendoff's "three systems" view in threads before, in his lectures Language, Consciousness, Culture, available in book form. It is semi-concrete enough that one could think of making models. Thank you for this conversation. I have to run. I have people on me telling me I am late for stuff I owe them. Eric ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
Eric -
All very well described... thank you... I feel you have given me a round half-bakers-dozen new things to think about in these matters. > .... can tend to spin a thread with a _very_ long ring-down time by > people who really care about this topic and have put a lot of time > into it. Nice description of an (all too) common phenomenon. Even though my tendency is to drive such ringing, I will try to damp instead. > ... Confessed bias here on various science problems: most notions > start out in common language, and are taken as having some meaning -- > examples: particle in physics; individual in evolutionary dynamics -- > and only on the far side of learning how to do technical calculations > for some more mundane reason do we learn that the words may still be > usable, but that to be used reliably vis a vis the world, they can > require some rather elaborate construction to attach a definition to. > So I am interested in that anyway for material things, and it is some > extension of that interest to wonder about sources of confidence or > conten! t in expressions.) > ... The extensive form is not only large, but is also structured, from > the sequence and dependencies of moves. Therefore one can do > combinatorics on it. One can speak of how rare subsets of leaves on > the tree are, and how hard it is to arrive at them reliably, etc. I > can show what this looks like for evolutionary games, where it > provides a nice way to get at neutrality, but I am sure the same > combinatorics can be made useful in many domains. Very interesting... thanks... >> I like the phrase here "in which nonsense has a defined status". I would claim that there is a meta-game in play where this is literally and obviously the truth... it is why we have so many words for "bullshit" to refer to utterances deliberately crafted to sound meaningful while being meaningless. I *think* this is the bread and butter of marketing and of politics (which contemporarily is significantly driven by marketing?) > Maybe one can go further though, and recognize that politics and marketing are simply exaptations of what is resident in communication at all levels. yes... and I suspect Glen's assertion that communication is a form of grooming has some validity to it... something about the object of communication being (also) about refining the social order. > The question of understanding how things work can remain interesting apart from our need to make use of it, which can have emotional valence. Well said! > One can try to be more model specific. I think i have referred to Ray > Jackendoff's "three systems" view in threads before, in his lectures > Language, Consciousness, Culture, available in book form. It is > semi-concrete enough that one could think of making models. Thank you > for this conversation. Ditto... I will try to follow up on Jackendoff (again?) and be more prepared for this type of conversation when it arises. - Steve ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com |
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