All, particularly, George—
In an earlier larding, I argued that Peirce’s idea of truth is essentially a statistical one. So:
Is it true that the coin I hold in my hand is a fair coin?
Let the coin be flipped once, and it comes out heads, what do you think? No way of telling, right? OK. Flip it again. Heads again. Two heads in a row. P=0.25. Sure, I guess so. It could be fair. Flip it again. Hmmm. Three heads in a row………Five heads in a row. P= 03125. You know? I think that coin is probably not fair. “Fair” in this formulation means the infinite distribution of H and T coinflips is .5. “Probably not” means, the chances that this coin’s flips are drawn from a .5 distribution is less than 0.0312 and my threshold of dis belief is 0.05. Thus, when I say that the coin is not fair, that inference is in part a statement about me, and the truth of the matter, the limit of the distribution of flips, is prospective. But the notion that there can be some truths of some matters is absolutely essential to science. Why else would we flip the coin?
Now George: why am I bothering you about this. Three questions:
[signed]
TLOLTT*
* The Little Old Lady Tasting Tea
** RIP, Rheem Jarrett
Nicholas Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
Clark University
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/
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