Posted by
Steve Smith on
Nov 29, 2013; 1:54pm
URL: http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/RE-HPSCI-Seeks-a-Continuous-Evaluationa-of-Security-Cleared-Employees-tp7584392p7584399.html
> On 11/27/2013 03:13 PM,
[hidden email] wrote:
>> Another point of view is that whatever box one lives in, that box has
>> norms
>> and a lot of them are more-or-less arbitrary and imposed. For example,
>> there's no opt-in for where you grow-up. Having multiple boxes can
>> be as
>> much change of scenery as it is a source of stress. Familiarity breeds
>> contempt.
>
> True. I guess that's an optimistic way of looking at it. If
> continuous evaluation/monitoring helps the intelligence overlords to
> judge people on current behavior rather than past or anticipated
> behavior, then it frees them and their subjects up a little. When you
> get the clearance, you're not claiming you've _never_ done
> questionable things or that you will never do them in the future. But
> you're committing to not doing them _while_ you have your clearance. 8^)
>
> It will be more believable once we invent the
>
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuralyzer.
I wondered why they insisted on my taking my sunglasses off for the
readout process when I gave up my clearances! All the talk about having
my "memoirs" reviewed by them before submitting to publication was for
show... distraction while they flashed that light in my eyes.
Just a tiny point... nothing I ever saw in the clearance investigation
or maintenance or training process was likely to be effective against
"smarmy". While I do see a positive correlation between those who have
been willing to break laws, to expose themselves to *obvious* blackmail
risk, or to members of known terrorist or US-antagonistic groups and
the possibility of breaching security, it does not really test for the
full spectrum of character.
I think there is a fundamental flaw in the model used for "secrets". I
think that "technical secrets" such as the majority involved in DOE
clearances are easier to commit to protecting before you even know what
they are. But what if one of those "secrets" is also procedural and is
counter to a sense of humanity. What if, for example (and I can deny
this because if it has any more basis than in my own fiction, I have
never learned of such a thing) that there were properties of the
materials or processes used in nuclear weapons manufacture which were
*much more dangerous* than anyone could ever have imagined... would
*that* be a secret you would keep on oath, despite the presumed
inhumanity of the fact and it's being held secret? I think this is
roughly the situation the likes of Karen Silkwood was in (if you
believe the stories).
I think Wikileaks and Snowden's disclosures (their content, if not the
process that lead to them) have been met with a significant amount of
approval. Citizens of this country and the world have generally been
appalled at what was being protected as "a state secret". Certainly
there are "hawks" (and some here no doubt) who believe that A) uncleared
citizens simply don't have enough context to know the import of
seemingly innocent or even hurtful to the interests of their country
factoids; and B) if there is a limit to what is acceptable for our
executive branch/security apparatus should do to protect our interests,
that threshold is much higher than the general doveish population could
ever stomach and "needs to be protected" from their own squeamishness.
"Waterboarding hell, let's pluck some fingernails, drill some teeth,
irrigate some colons under high pressure, maybe flay some skin or eyeballs!"
One thing I think conservatives and liberals alike agree on regarding
many if not most of the leaks involved is "rule of law". To have a
clearly stated law on the books about how our security apparatus (or
diplomatic staff in the case of Manning/Wikileaks content) will behave
and to find out said law is blatantly being disregarded is a huge deal
to all. I am not an expert on Fascism, but I suspect that even the
strongest forms of Fascism (formally) have these same checks and
balances... their scariness (to most of us) is the extreme bias they put
toward the power of the state over the individual, not an implicit rule
that "anything goes" trumps the explicit rules.
I will give those who want to vilify Manning and Snowden (two very
different situations, but with vaguely similar results) the right to
condemn their failure to uphold a critical trust. But I will give
those who want to exalt them, at the same time, that oath and fealty do
not come before honesty and loyalty. I find Snowden's affect and
actions more righteous and sincere than I do smarmy... though I do see
how one might see some of that in his affect and a few details of his
execution of his plan. Once again, I'm just more generous I think. I
also could condemn his specific motivations while being thankful for the
results of his actions. While the police are held to a high standard
of evidence gathering, there is good reason it does not extend to
"whistleblowers" or "snitches" as the case may be.
- Steve
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe
http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com