http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/asymmetric-snooping-tp7583857p7583876.html
Marcus -
I'll concede (welcome it!) your point about a composite channel...
I think the more apt description is a (not necessarily
orthogonal) basis set? In your example, the "product feature
description" component would *ideally* be maxed while the
"technical details required to reverse-engineer/compete" would be
minimized. These happen to seem to have discrete values (1 and
0) but in fact, due to implementation (and maybe strategic?)
issues, they may take on a continuum of values.
I still maintain that within one component (to whatever degree one
can actually identify a single component that isn't subdivided
into yet more refined components) the quality is somewhat
continuous and often relative rather than absolute?
In the Snowden/NSA example, there are questions such as "does the
NSA charter include monitoring digital communications" and "is it
appropriate/legal for the NSA to collect *all* electronic/digital
communications" and "what are the implications of an individual
obfuscating the nature of their communications through encryption,
steganography, proxy servers, anonymous relays, etc."
I think it is pretty much accepted that the NSA *exists* to
monitor communications which in this era implies quite heavily,
digital/electronic communications, but they are specifically
excluded from applying this to US Citizens on domestic soil. I'm
not up on how it applies to US Citizens on foreign soil (without a
warrant), but the grey starts when someone on US soil (ISP on US
soil?) communicates with someone *not* on US Soil (ISP outside US
soil?).
I think there are clear imperatives in the Fourth Amendment,
expanded or illuminated in the
1967
Katz V US ruling which establish that any Gov't agency
collecting *all* communications is totally out of line. There
is, however, a grey continuum it seems in practice. Since the
nationality of any given user of Google or Yahoo is quite vague
(associated primarily with an IP address and maybe secondarily
with a registered user identity) it can (and apparently has been)
argued that *any* communication possibly includes a non-US-Citizen
and possibly someone residing outside the borders of the US and
it's territories.
Most/All states have rules about how dark-tinted one's windows in
one's vehicle can be. In the real, physical world, a LEO may, for
example, see something appearing illegal (a clear plastic bag
containing a white, powdery substance!!!!) through a vehicle
window during a routine traffic stop which gives him the "probable
cause" to go further, search the vehicle, seize the contents,
etc... but it is much more grey as to whether the application of
high-opacity film to one's windows of one's vehicle, making it
very difficult for such casual observations to be made is legal or
not... obviously panel-vans obscure vision more effectively than
vans with dark windows... however... the same arguments banning
darkened windows in a vehicle might apply to encrypting one's
e-mail. but perhaps the same argument of a panel-van vs a
darkened-window van may apply in turn?
The basis of window-tint legislation implies that drivers need to
be able to see clearly out the front and sides (plus rear via
window and/or mirrors). This does NOT explain why most laws
include "one-way" glass... where the driver can see *out* fine,
but someone outside (to wit, LEO) can't see inside.
There is no similar basis for encrypted data... the only reason
to insist on the ability to read the data is the presumed *right*
to do so.
- Steve
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College