Posted by
glen ep ropella on
May 07, 2013; 9:19pm
URL: http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/Woo-Peddlers-Visionaries-and-Cranks-tp7583094p7583103.html
It's unclear to me whether you want dialogue with the Q:A thing, or just
to compare unadulterated answers (or not even that). But what I did was
try to couch my answers so that they generated the parts of your answers
I agree with and contradict the parts of your answers with which I disagree.
Steve Smith wrote at 05/07/2013 12:42 PM:
> Maybe taking a fresh run will be better?
>
> Q. Can Science be done without language?
> A(smith). Some, almost for sure.
A(gepr): No, probably not. Language is an denser/compressed replacement
for other behaviors (e.g. grooming) and serves to bring about behavioral
coherence in a group. Behavioral coherence is necessary for science.
(Thought coherence is irrelevant to science except when/where it
facilitates behavioral coherence.)
> Q. Can Science be done more easily/effectively with language?
> A(smith). It seems as if this is the case.
A(gepr): Yes, which seems like a natural consequence of my answer to the
first question.
> Q. Is Science a "collective thing"
> A(smith). Some uses of the term Science are specifically a
> collective thing. To wit, the collection of all artifacts of a
> specific methodology including the hypotheses (tested or not), the
> methods and apparatus for testing them, the resulting data gathered
> during the testing, the logic and mathematics used to analyze the
> data, and most familiarly, the conclusions drawn (scientific theories).
A(gepr): By definition, science consists of testable conjecture. In
order to be tested, the conjecture has to be reified, embedded into a
context collectively constructed by a population (even if that
population is 1 human and 100,000 rodents). Hence, testing requires the
artifact be part of, fit in with, a collectively co-evolved context.
There is no instantaneous or infinitesimal science, i.e. all science has
spatial and temporal extent. If the conjecture cannot be reified,
instantiated into the external world, then it is not science.
> Q. Is Science created *by a collective*
> A(smith). Individual elements in the collective thing we call
> Science can be created by very small collectives. When an
> individual generates hypotheses, contrives experiments, executes
> them, gathers data and draws conclusions, this is an important
> *part* of science and will be included in the collective artifact.
> Without independent verification (and nobody seems to agree on just
> how much independence and how much verification is sufficient), the
> artifacts are not yet fully vetted and I suppose not "quite"
> science. In this sense, Science requires a collective.
A(gepr): Yes. By definition, science consists of testable conjecture.
Testability implies multiple individuals willing to share enough
similarity to engage in the testing. So, that's a slam dunk. Shared
conjecture requires sharing in one (or both) of two forms: 1) shared
anatomical or physiological structure or 2) shared mental constructs.
Hence, complete orthogonality (or autonomy) would prevent the production
of science. However, the existence of collectives does not necessarily
imply their produce is science. Collectives are necessary but not
sufficient.
> And I think you will agree that anthropomorphism is a form of figurative
> thinking as much as the use of metaphor. In fact it seems like a
> special kind of metaphor (where the metaphorical source domain is
> humanity which is ultimately sourced from one's sense of one's self)?
I just can't get beyond this. I try, but I can't. Anthropomorphing
(-izing?) is not figurative or metaphor. I may be mincing words, here.
But I believe these physiological processes are NOT representative.
They aren't symbolic. When I refer to a robot (or a tree sapling or my
cat) as _he_ or _him_, I'm not thinking of the robot as a _symbol_ for
anything. I'm imputing that robot (or sapling or cat) with its own
first class presence. It's an "end in itself" a "person", as it were,
with as high an ontological reality as my self.
To think of them figuratively or metaphorically would be an entirely
different thing. In fact, if I were to think of, say, my cat as merely
a _symbol_, I'd be more psychopathic than I already am. ;-)
Now, I admit that when I use the tagline "putting oneself in the other's
shoes", that has an element of the figurative or metaphorical, in the
sense that it requires an abstracted "replacement". The idea requires a
sense of being able to pluck one's self out of its context, pluck the
other out of its context, and do a switcheroo.
I admit that. But it's a failing of language and not indicative of real
figurative thinking. When I empathize with my robot, I don't really
replace the robot with my self. Instead, I promote the robot to
personhood status. And that's not using the robot as a symbol at all.
It's a completely different way of thinking about the world.
So, anthropomorphism is _not_ figurative or metaphor, it's an
ontological commitment (or delusion).
> I'm not sure that I can say that my "thoughts are not real". I can
> agree for the sake of arguement that they are *different* than my
> immediate sensations, but then my immediate sensations (go experience
> one of many perceptual illusions) are not *real* either. We fit our
> *raw* perceptions (whatever that means) onto some series of layers of
> models. I would contend that at some point those models are entirely
> linguistic/abstract/symbolic (for humans) and that wherever that divide
> lies might be an important one.
OK. Maybe I'm just not saying this correctly. I disagree and
counter-contend that at NO point are our models entirely
linguistic/abstract/symbolic. There is no divide. Everything in our
heads _is_ biochemical.
What I mean by "thoughts are not real" is that our word "thought" is
short-hand for the wildly complex and feedback rich biochemical
processes inside us. It's fantasy to think that thoughts are somehow
separate or separable from the wet stuff inside us.
> But I would claim that what I am doing (whilst manipulating said
> objects) is manipulating abstractions... in particular, I am using the
> (relatively accurate) physical conservation of length in these
> objects/materials to "add" and then using the *abstraction* of
> exponential notations and arithmetic to then *multiply* and/or to simply
> *look up* other functions (e.g. trigonometric) using the device of marks
> on a movable pair of objects with an (also) moveable reticule.
>
> When I do "simple" arithmetic in my head, I use a combination of
> conventional symbols (0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9) and rules (decimal positional
> numbers) and more rules (addition, multiplication, division, etc) to
> achieve these answers. I happen *also* to have a strong intuition about
> much arithmetic/mathematics which I not as obviously symbolic. But I
> would claim this intuitive calculation is more like a sloppy version of
> the slide rule described above. I may do long division in my head
> using some short-cuts, but it is entirely symbolic, and I may check my
> answer using various intuitive tricks (including visualizing the number
> as a rectangular area and the divisor and result as the length of the
> sides).
Sorry about the willy-nilly snipping. But I get irritated when others
quote too much. So I may quote too little (though I'll never be as
zealous as Marcus at snipping down the quote ;-).
I recall an accusation leveled at list participants awhile back when we
were talking about the definition of math and what mathematicians do.
It went something like: "those who talk a lot about math don't tend to
be very good at math" or something like that.
The point, I think, is that _doing_ math is what makes one comfortable
with it, whether one is an engineer, an artisan, or a pure
mathematician, the only thing that can make one good at it is to do it.
Now, that says nothing about what those symbols mean while you're doing
it. But the consensus seems to be that most people who are good at math
tend toward a Platonic understanding of math. The "symbols" are more
than just symbols, whose meaning can be applied, unapplied, and
re-applied willy nilly. To people who are good at math, the "symbols"
are less symbolic than they might be to those of us who are only
adequate at math. Good mathematicians aren't just manipulating symbols,
they're discovering reality.
This means, I think, that we animals are less capable of abstraction
than I think you assert. When you do that "higher" more abstract math,
you're doing the _exact_ same thing as manipulating the slide rule, or
matching the length of your string to marks on a board ... exactly, not
nearly, not figuratively.
> Ok... I think I agree that Science (as opposed to mathematics) requires
> an embedding in the (real, messy, wet, etc.) world. What I'm not clear
> on is whether the abstractions we have developed (linguistic in general
> and mathematical in particular) are not neccesary (or at least very
> useful?).
>
> [...] If a person (or culture) had
> the stamina/capacity to store all such examples and index them
> effectively, I suppose the abstractions of algebra would be irrelevant
> or unneccesary and maybe even considered a "cheap trick" by those who
> had the capacity to hold these problems in their heads?
If you don't regard the conceptual/linguistic objects as abstractions,
but instead regard them as compressions, then we can agree that they are
necessary. Whether the compressions are lossy or lossless depends, I
think on the biochemical structures involved. For example, the
autonomic wiggling of our eyes or fingers when we look at or manipulate
an object filters out some concrete detail so that the compressed
version of it in our heads has less detail than the uncompressed version
impinging on our outer senses. Similarly, we can be tricked (by a
prestidigitator) into faulty compressions. (I.e. when we decompress it,
it looks nothing like the original.)
But the skill being developed by compressing and decompressing a LOT is
not an abstracted thinking-in-isolation skill. It's a filtering skill,
determining signal from noise, what to include in the compression and
what to leave out. That's the key skill, not manipulating the
abstractions/compressions inside our heads. The key to being a good
scientist, doing science, lies in the embedding into or out of the
environment, not the thinking/manipulating abstractions in one's head.
Preserving the applicability or embeddability of what's in your head is
the most important part, no matter how you manipulate thing in your head.
> PostScript:
>
> THIS is why I shot my TV! I also stay away from Youtube except for
> instructional videos for tearing down, repairing (and most importantly)
> re-assembling my complex devices (pieces of my Digital as well as my
> Analog ecology (aka Swamp)).
And it's precisely why I will never willingly get rid of my TV, any more
than I'd get rid of my scissors ... or my books ... or my belt, shoes,
pencils, hammer, etc. It amazes me when people purposefully handicap
themselves by refusing to use a tool. We have lots of self-described TV
murderers here in Portland. I do turn off the TV just as often as I
turn it on, though ... more, actually, since Renee' tends to leave it
on. All tools need on-off buttons. ;-) I also reserve the right to
pray to my imaginary friends and change my mind on a regular basis.
--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-255-2847,
http://tempusdictum.comPower never takes a back step - only in the face of more power. -- Malcolm X
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