Posted by
glen ropella on
URL: http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/Fwd-America-and-the-Middle-East-Murder-in-Libya-The-Economist-tp7580497p7580636.html
But, if this synthetic task is so difficult, what makes the
reductionists believe they're right? If nobody can actually build a
belief from a collection of actions, what trickiness or delusion allows
them to confidently assert that beliefs are actions? What (premature?)
conviction allows you to say that this task is no more difficult, in
principle, than distinguishing chemical compounds?
Even worse, if the research has NOT been done, then you're making this
claim without any scientific evidence.
I truly don't understand the conviction. It seems very much like an
untested ideology.
Re: Lee's book: There are lots of frameworks for dealing with hybrid
systems. I'd be interested to see the new approach.
ERIC P. CHARLES wrote at 09/20/2012 05:31 AM:
> Yes, yes, yes! But, to stick with the analogy, it is not in-principle more
> difficult than distinguishing chemical compounds. Admittedly, Chemistry had
> quite a head start as a formal science. However, if psychologists had their
> heads out of the rears, and had put in as much effort over the last 100 years
> into classifying the ways people interact with the world as chemists had put
> into classifying the ways chemicals interact with the world, the question
> wouldn't seem so intimidating. We would have achieved, or be close to, whatever
> psychology's version of the periodic table is (which I know is itself
> continuously up for re-conceptualization, but the basic one is still incredibly
> helpful).
>
> As for your more specific question, it is pretty easy to tell believers from
> fakers... so long as we exclude faker-recursion. That is, it is possible for a
> human to be a believer faking being a non-believer, etc. If we stick to the
> original two-option case, it is pretty easy - I submit - because we do it all
> the time. Specifying exactly how we do it is tricky only because the research
> hasn't been done. Check out any Daily Show coverage of the presidential
> debates. One of the best bits so far is the Fox News commentator who, after
> Romney's speech goes on for quite a while about how great it is that there were
> so many details, how this will really connect with voters and answer their
> questions, etc. Then, immediately after Obama's speech he goes off about how
> the speech included a lot of details, and that is sure to alienate voters. If
> we only saw the first speech, we might think that the commentator believes
> details are good, or at least that he believes viewers want details. After
> seeing the clips next to each other, it is clear that he was merely faking that
> belief as part of a larger pattern serving some other purpose.
>
> What are the varieties of ways in which we make these distinctions? It is a
> tremendously complicated, but ultimately tractable question.
>
> Eric
>
> P.S. This problem is of particular interest to one of the topologists on the
> list - Lee Rudolph - who just had a book on the subject release. I haven't read
> it yet, but I know it is (among other things) an attempt to apply modern,
> non-statistical, mathematics to this problem. That would include math that can
> adequately deal with discrete and non-discrete aspects, etc., which you point
> out we would need. Lee, can you give a more skilled plug?
--
glen
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