http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/Fwd-America-and-the-Middle-East-Murder-in-Libya-The-Economist-tp7580497p7580632.html
Glen says:
"I have to admit, this seems like a really difficult
multi-objective
selection method. "
Yes, yes, yes! But, to stick with the analogy, it
is not in-principle more difficult than distinguishing chemical compounds.
Admittedly, Chemistry had quite a head start as a formal science. However, if
psychologists had their heads out of the rears, and had put in as much effort
over the last 100 years into classifying the ways people interact with the
world as chemists had put into classifying the ways chemicals interact with the
world, the question wouldn't seem so intimidating. We would have achieved, or
be close to, whatever psychology's version of the periodic table is (which I
know is itself continuously up for re-conceptualization, but the basic one is
still incredibly helpful).
As for your more specific question, it is
pretty easy to tell believers from fakers... so long as we exclude
faker-recursion. That is, it is possible for a human to be a believer faking
being a non-believer, etc. If we stick to the original two-option case, it is
pretty easy - I submit - because we do it all the time. Specifying exactly how
we do it is tricky only because the research hasn't been done. Check out any
Daily Show coverage of the presidential debates. One of the best bits so far is
the Fox News commentator who, after Romney's speech goes on for quite a while
about how great it is that there were so many details, how this will really
connect with voters and answer their questions, etc. Then, immediately after
Obama's speech he goes off about how the speech included a lot of details, and
that is sure to alienate voters. If we only saw the first speech, we might
think that the commentator believes details are good, or at least that he
believes viewers want details. After seeing the clips next to each other, it is
clear that he was merely faking that belief as part of a larger pattern serving
some other purpose.
What are the varieties of ways in which we make
these distinctions? It is a tremendously complicated, but ultimately tractable
question.
Eric
P.S. This problem is of particular interest to
one of the topologists on the list - Lee Rudolph - who just had a book on the
subject release. I haven't read it yet, but I know it is (among other things)
an attempt to apply modern, non-statistical, mathematics to this problem. That
would include math that can adequately deal with discrete and non-discrete
aspects, etc., which you point out we would need. Lee, can you give a more
skilled plug?
On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 06:29 PM,
glen
<[hidden email]> wrote:
ERIC P. CHARLES wrote at 09/19/2012 02:54 PM:
> But Glen, when you talk about the infiltrator, or the person
> "paying lip-service", you are just appealing to a larger pattern
of
> behavior.
Aha!! Excellent! So, tell me how to classify the patterns so that one
pattern is just lip service and the other is belief! If you do that,
then we'll have our objective function. I can develop an algorithm for
that and we'll be able to automatically distinguish zombies from actors.
Then we can begin building machines that try to satisfy it.
> Agreeing with your assertion, "faking belief" looks different
> than "belief"... if you can see enough of the person's behavior
and/or see a
> close enough level of detail.
The former, again, sounds like memory. The latter is something else.
It implies something about scale. We know actions are multi-scale
(anatomy, physiology, chemistry, physics). Is there a cut-off below
which we need not go? Genes? Chemicals? Or does the multiscalar
requirements for measuring belief extend all the way down?
> a person who believes X
> and a person faking belief in X are distinguished by observing a wide
variety
> of ways in which the people interact with the world.
So, in addition to memory and crossing scales, the measures are also
multivalent at any one instant or any one scale.
> Also, for the record, one of the problems with using "moles" is
that it is very
> difficult to get people capable of participating in cultural practices of
these
> sorts over extended periods without becoming believers. The practices
become
> normal to you, the group becomes "your group", and even if you
can still turn
> them in/report on them/whatever you are supposed to do, you become
sympathetic.
Uh-oh. This makes it sound like not only is there a multi-scale
problem, but there may also be a hybrid requirement. The mole either
continuously transitions from non-belief to belief or there's a
threshold. I.e. some parts of our classifying predicate will be
continuous and some will be discrete.
I have to admit, this seems like a really difficult multi-objective
selection method. Building a machine that generates belief from a
collection of mechanisms, thereby satisfying the criteria, will be
exceedingly difficult, at least as difficult as artificial life and
intelligence. But this is what we have to do if we're going to continue
claiming that beliefs reduce to actions.
--
glen
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Eric Charles
Assistant Professor
of Psychology
Penn State University
Altoona, PA 16601
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College