http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/Re-Friam-Digest-Vol-61-Issue-16-tp530192.html
opportunity to spurn my packing and go on a behaviorist rant. OUCH!
Unfair tactic.
and I are having. I would say that the following passage contains a
category error.
> inner selves. <==
agreed to in your understanding of mind.
To speak of a self as being IN something is logically incoherent. As
these premises, doing it is absurd.
Ok. Now I am going away. You and Robert can have your way with me.
Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Message: 22
> Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2008 16:11:05 -0700
> From: "glen e. p. ropella" <
[hidden email]>
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Mathematics and Music
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> <
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>
> Mikhail Gorelkin wrote:
> > >>Glen<<
> >
> > 1) >>But, one has to realize that the latter me is just as
> > "real" as the former me.<<
> >
> > Probably, from a point of view of an
> > authentic self, a degree of such "real-ness" is not very significant
> > - zero probability - and may be ignored almost completely. I think it
> > is "real" because this authentic self exists behind it.
>
> Perhaps. But there is a consensus reality argument that our conception
> of self (and hence our whole behavioral repertoire) is a function of our
> inner selves. The argument basically relies on the idea that our inner
> self co-emerges ontogenically right along with our physical self. And
> to change either one at any stage in ontogenesis is to change the other
> in deep and fundamental ways.
>
> There's also an extension of that argument that says a person's identity
> is as much a function of their peers as it is of their self.
>
> I'm not saying that these are rock solid arguments. But, to claim that
> the inner self's "real-ness" is insignificant is a denial of those
> arguments and, to defend the claim properly, you'd have to find some
> important fault with those arguments.
>
> > 2) >>But I
> > have to punctuate this argument again with the fact that the
> > constructed reality, those thoughts inside someone's brain, are just
> > as real as the a priori reality<< Yes, but it's very limited and low
> > reality. We try to think about something, but our Selves know it as
> > it is. This difference is what matters.
>
> I agree that the difference is what matters. But I disagree that our
> constructed inner self is "very limited". In fact, I'd say that the
> plasticity of our inner self is much greater in some ways than that of
> our physical selves precisely because it sits on a (perhaps imperfect)
> logical layer of abstraction above the physical self.
>
> In other words, our inner self can contemplate obviously fictitious
> things like unicorns and human-traversable wormholes without immediately
> being shot down by reality. Our physical selves are "trapped" within
> the tight, immediate constraints of physical reality.
>
> But to go back to the main point, those obviously fictitious
> constructions we imagine are still _real_ in that they have a
> perceptible (sometimes immense) impact on the physical world. (Just
> take a look at all the glittery unicorns on pastel colored notebooks in
> the school supplies section of your local box store. ;-)
>
> > 3)
> >>> Those things like G?del's result and Lie groups are just as real
> >>> as apples, chairs, and the grand canyon.<< apples,... are a
> > result of our perception (interpretation) of reality. They are
> > symbols, constructs like Lie groups. But constructs may be also
> > phantoms (illusions) - without a correlation (a kind of an
> > "isomorphism") with something in reality (or bigger reality) and
> > don't "work" in our practical life. They eventually will disappear.
>
> I agree with the gist of what you're saying. The fictitious constructs
> of no use to the physical self will die off. However, we can't be too
> draconian about the word "use". For example glittery, rainbow-colored
> unicorns serve no apparent purpose (except to young people and wind-bags
> trying to build straw-men ;-), yet they continue unabated. The reverse
> logic is that all these constructs, fictitious or not, that currently
> exist _must_ be serving some purpose to the physical selves of those who
> hold them.
>
> > 4) >>Feynman said better: What I cannot create, I do not
> > understand.<< In his Nobel lesson, Feynman said that nobody
> > understands quantum mechanic :-) The key word here is "create" and
> > people mostly misuse it. I think that this phrase should sound like
> > this: what I cannot make, I do not understand (algorithmical
> > understanding). Yes, I agree that the inverse phrase is correct as
> > well... The ability to *make* is an attribute of our rational mind.
> > If one person can make something like a chair, than another one can
> > steal his plan (algorithm, understanding), copy it and sell on the
> > market with a price of *commodity*. But a rational mind cannot
> > *create*. Such ability is an attribute of our Genius. We read poetry
> > for only two reasons: to get a glimpse of its original author - this
> > authentic self, and to enjoy his *creation* - art. We cannot sell to
> > a museum our makes but arts. And the Boston Symphony Orchestra will
> > not perform even a technically sophisticated make... Creation of a
> > genius is mysterious for a rational mind of the "author" as for
> > others. It's why "authors" usually withdraw their interpretations and
> > comments or make (invent) them after all. --Mikhail
>
> Hmmm. [grin] You _almost_ convince me! But, I don't hold this
> Cartesian Partition so strongly. I believe the activity in the brain is
> real activity and can create (by itself) just as mysteriously as the
> interplay between hands and brain can create. In fact, it's not clear
> to me that the brain, by itself, can _make_ anything in your sense. It
> is not regular enough. Perhaps the more autonomic parts of the brain
> can act so regular. But, the higher functions seem more artistic than
> methodological.
>
> Whether or not such brain activity is "rational" or not is, I think, a
> red herring. Rationality is probably a convenient fiction.
>
> Going back to the original point, I maintain that both the act of
> creation and the act of making occur within what I call sensory-motor
> interactions, not somehow "beyond" or behind them.
>
> --
> glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846,
http://tempusdictum.com>
>
>
>
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> End of Friam Digest, Vol 61, Issue 16
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