Posted by
glen ep ropella on
Jul 15, 2008; 11:11pm
URL: http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/Mathematics-and-Music-tp527826p530037.html
Mikhail Gorelkin wrote:
> >>Glen<<
>
> 1) >>But, one has to realize that the latter me is just as
> "real" as the former me.<<
>
> Probably, from a point of view of an
> authentic self, a degree of such "real-ness" is not very significant
> - zero probability - and may be ignored almost completely. I think it
> is "real" because this authentic self exists behind it.
Perhaps. But there is a consensus reality argument that our conception
of self (and hence our whole behavioral repertoire) is a function of our
inner selves. The argument basically relies on the idea that our inner
self co-emerges ontogenically right along with our physical self. And
to change either one at any stage in ontogenesis is to change the other
in deep and fundamental ways.
There's also an extension of that argument that says a person's identity
is as much a function of their peers as it is of their self.
I'm not saying that these are rock solid arguments. But, to claim that
the inner self's "real-ness" is insignificant is a denial of those
arguments and, to defend the claim properly, you'd have to find some
important fault with those arguments.
> 2) >>But I
> have to punctuate this argument again with the fact that the
> constructed reality, those thoughts inside someone's brain, are just
> as real as the a priori reality<< Yes, but it's very limited and low
> reality. We try to think about something, but our Selves know it as
> it is. This difference is what matters.
I agree that the difference is what matters. But I disagree that our
constructed inner self is "very limited". In fact, I'd say that the
plasticity of our inner self is much greater in some ways than that of
our physical selves precisely because it sits on a (perhaps imperfect)
logical layer of abstraction above the physical self.
In other words, our inner self can contemplate obviously fictitious
things like unicorns and human-traversable wormholes without immediately
being shot down by reality. Our physical selves are "trapped" within
the tight, immediate constraints of physical reality.
But to go back to the main point, those obviously fictitious
constructions we imagine are still _real_ in that they have a
perceptible (sometimes immense) impact on the physical world. (Just
take a look at all the glittery unicorns on pastel colored notebooks in
the school supplies section of your local box store. ;-)
> 3)
>>> Those things like Gödel's result and Lie groups are just as real
>>> as apples, chairs, and the grand canyon.<< apples,... are a
> result of our perception (interpretation) of reality. They are
> symbols, constructs like Lie groups. But constructs may be also
> phantoms (illusions) - without a correlation (a kind of an
> "isomorphism") with something in reality (or bigger reality) and
> don't "work" in our practical life. They eventually will disappear.
I agree with the gist of what you're saying. The fictitious constructs
of no use to the physical self will die off. However, we can't be too
draconian about the word "use". For example glittery, rainbow-colored
unicorns serve no apparent purpose (except to young people and wind-bags
trying to build straw-men ;-), yet they continue unabated. The reverse
logic is that all these constructs, fictitious or not, that currently
exist _must_ be serving some purpose to the physical selves of those who
hold them.
> 4) >>Feynman said better: What I cannot create, I do not
> understand.<< In his Nobel lesson, Feynman said that nobody
> understands quantum mechanic :-) The key word here is "create" and
> people mostly misuse it. I think that this phrase should sound like
> this: what I cannot make, I do not understand (algorithmical
> understanding). Yes, I agree that the inverse phrase is correct as
> well... The ability to *make* is an attribute of our rational mind.
> If one person can make something like a chair, than another one can
> steal his plan (algorithm, understanding), copy it and sell on the
> market with a price of *commodity*. But a rational mind cannot
> *create*. Such ability is an attribute of our Genius. We read poetry
> for only two reasons: to get a glimpse of its original author - this
> authentic self, and to enjoy his *creation* - art. We cannot sell to
> a museum our makes but arts. And the Boston Symphony Orchestra will
> not perform even a technically sophisticated make... Creation of a
> genius is mysterious for a rational mind of the "author" as for
> others. It's why "authors" usually withdraw their interpretations and
> comments or make (invent) them after all. --Mikhail
Hmmm. [grin] You _almost_ convince me! But, I don't hold this
Cartesian Partition so strongly. I believe the activity in the brain is
real activity and can create (by itself) just as mysteriously as the
interplay between hands and brain can create. In fact, it's not clear
to me that the brain, by itself, can _make_ anything in your sense. It
is not regular enough. Perhaps the more autonomic parts of the brain
can act so regular. But, the higher functions seem more artistic than
methodological.
Whether or not such brain activity is "rational" or not is, I think, a
red herring. Rationality is probably a convenient fiction.
Going back to the original point, I maintain that both the act of
creation and the act of making occur within what I call sensory-motor
interactions, not somehow "beyond" or behind them.
--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846,
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