Computer by Grim, Mar and St. Denis. An interesting book in general.
> On the contrary: Axelrod (1984) or Axelrod and Hamilton(1981) is
> referenced in most, if not all, of Nowak's work on the evolution of
> cooperation in the Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma(IPD) and can be
> viewed as
> an extension of Axelrod's work. Nowak has pointed out that mistake-
> free
> play is an artifact of Axelrod's tournament. Nowak claims that when
> mistakes such as a "trembling hand," which is an incorrect
> implementation
> of one's own strategy, or a "fuzzy mind," which is a
> misinterpretation of
> one's partner's strategy, are introduced Tit-For-Tat does no better
> than a
> mixed strategy that cooperates or defects at the flip of a coin.
> Therefore, Nowak has reduced TFT to "the pivot rather than the aim
> of an
> evolution towards cooperation" (Nowak and Sigmund, 1992). Nowak
> instead
> maintains that natural selection favors a strategy called win-stay,
> lose-shift or Pavlov. Pavlov cooperates only if the response of both
> players was the same in the previous round. Pavlov's response in the
> first round is considered to be negligible because it is tested in an
> infinitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma.
>
> In addition, the following link is to one of Nowak's lectures on the
> evolution of cooperation:
>
http://athome.harvard.edu/programs/evd/index.html.
> And, Nowak's most recent book Evolutionary Dynamics
> (
http://www.ped.fas.harvard.edu/people/faculty/Books.html) gives a
> fairly
> detailed overview of his areas of research: cooperation,
> evolutionary game
> theory, evolutionary graph theory, and their applications to virus,
> cancer
> and disease. I would be happy to lend it to anyone at FriAM.
>
> sb
>