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reductionism

Posted by Phil Henshaw-2 on Jun 19, 2007; 2:54am
URL: http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/Seminal-Papers-in-Complexity-tp524047p524073.html

Glen,
I think that's a very consistent argument, and very similar to the one
Bohr used as the basis for the Copenhagen convention and dumping
Einstein's idea of the physical world.  As I recall, the argument was
that science is information and so nothing exists for science except
what exists as scientific information, and so uncertainties that define
a limit to scientific knowledge also define a limit to any meaningful
scientific reality.  So as scientists, reality does not exist beyond
what is knowable.  I think it was that slim logical thread that kept the
otherwise very unsatisfying assertion that phenomena are created by our
observations from being tossed out as ridiculous.  

For most people the question comes down to which way they *like*
thinking about the world, since either one can be made satisfying if
that's what you like...  I prefer, and find more productive, thinking
that I'm exploring a world that exists without my knowledge of it, and
is built in such a complicated way that my descriptions will inevitably
be flawed.   That's the 'bad' part of it I suppose.   It also leaves me
always beginning my learning rather than trying to end it, and open to
being surprised.  


Phil Henshaw                       ????.?? ? `?.????
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: friam-bounces at redfish.com
> [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] On Behalf Of Glen E. P. Ropella
> Sent: Monday, June 18, 2007 11:41 AM
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> Subject: [FRIAM] reductionism
>
>
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> Hash: SHA1
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> I submit the following for criticism:
>
> It's always seemed to me that reductionism and the use of
> "nonlinearity" as a pretentious and hermetic placeholder for
> synergy has its roots in characterizing the expectations of
> the observer.
>
> Anti-reductionists are just as silly as reductionists when
> they assert that they have or manipulate some deep
> understanding of what's out there (onto-).  We can't _reduce_
> the actual world anymore than the actual world is "summed" or
> composed of actual components.  It's _all_ in your head.  
> None of this is real or concrete.
>
> Interactions with the world happen in the medium of actions.  
> Hence, the extent to which any mechanism or phenomenon is
> reducible is identical to the extent to which the mechanism
> or phenomenon can be discretely acted upon.  Likewise, the
> extent to which any mechanism or phenomenon is emergent is
> identical to the extent to which it can be discretely acted
> upon (or to which it discretely acts).
>
> And that begs the question of discretion.  I don't think one
> can construct a bullet-proof argument that reality is either
> purely continuous or purely discrete.  One is limited to
> approximations and estimating within some tolerance.  So, it
> all boils down to whether you believe reality is continuous
> or discrete.  Those who believe it is continuous tend to be
> anti-reductionists and submit that every action affects (to
> whatever tiny degree) all mechanisms and phenomena in the
> universe.  Those who believe it is discrete tend to be
> reductionist and submit that the effect of (at least some)
> actions are purely local and don't affect distant mechanisms
> or phenomena.
>
> The trick is that those who advocate for emergence face
> consistency problems.  On the one hand, they want to suggest
> that a) causes are indiscrete/inseparable/nonanalytic (or at
> least occult) and b) the _thing_ that emerges is, somehow,
> discrete/separable/identifiable from its environment.  (a) =><= (b).
>
> Reductionists don't have this problem.  They have a different
> one: namely that they cannot demonstrate that reality is
> completely discrete.  And that means that they're forever
> wandering around cutting things up in different ways and
> hoping that this cut or that cut will stick and prove true.
>
> Michael Agar wrote:
> > So I just wrote that story and all of a sudden wondered,
> what the hell
> > is reductionism anyway? Cheated by looking it up in
> Wikipedia and of
> > course there's many different kinds. The old philosophy
> joke is, when
> > faced with a contradiction, make a distinction. The first
> line of the
> > major Wikipedia entry is, "In philosophy, reductionism is a theory
> > that asserts that the nature of complex things is reduced to the
> > nature of sums of simpler or more fundamental things."
> >
> > Sums. So is nonlinearity the key to the kingdom? Are we
> really looking
> > for germinal papers in nonlinearity?
>
> Phil Henshaw wrote:
> > Assigning numbers to things is what I always thought of as being the
> > 'reduction' part of reductionism.
>
> Russell Standish wrote:
> > No, its the analytical part in expressions like analytical
> geometry.
> > One can be analytical without being reductionist, but it
> helps to have
> > a computer :) [...] "Sum of the parts" is more metaphoric than
> > literal. IMHO, the key to the kingdom is emergence, and
> nonlinearity
> > is only necessary to distinguish between simple or "resultant"
> > emergence, and the more general kind.
>
> - --
> glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com
> When buying and selling are controlled by legislation, the
> first things to be bought and sold are legislators. -- P.J. O'Rourke
>
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