Re: In the theater of consciousness

Posted by Nick Thompson on
URL: http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/In-the-theater-of-consciousness-tp3875347p3888403.html

Jochen, et al,
 
I have now read Baars, as best I can, and he seems to be headed in
precisely the direction you suggest. Stages within stages; theatres all the
way down.
 
Nick
 
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
 
 
 
 

> [Original Message]
> From: Jochen Fromm <[hidden email]>
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
> Date: 10/25/2009 5:53:58 AM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] In the theater of consciousness
>
> A thoughtful response. You are right,
> one inconsistency for the theater
> metaphor is the missing distinction
> between sensoric and motoric regions.
> The coupling between them is also
> completely neglected.
>
> Another one is the missing distinction
> between different levels of abstraction
> for the various actors on the stage,
> ranging from concrete perceptions to
> abstract perception and beliefs, and
> from concrete actions to abstract actions
> and intentions.
>
> Perhaps one could imagine a theater
> with multiple stages, like a disco or club
> with multiple dance floors. Theaters and
> clubs are similar, in both of them there are
> always a lot of people watching (the
> unconscious elements), and only a
> few are moving around in the spotlight
> (the conscious ones).
>
> -J.
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "ERIC P. CHARLES" <[hidden email]>
> To: "Jochen Fromm" <[hidden email]>
> Cc: "The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group"
<[hidden email]>

> Sent: Sunday, October 25, 2009 12:52 AM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] In the theater of consciousness
>
>
> > I have not read Baars, but... One of the problems with the cognitive
> > theatre
> > metaphor (and most other dualistic metaphors) is that it makes the
> > modeler's
> > life harder NOT easier.
> >
> > Let us assume that, at the most fundamental level, my consciousness is
> > about my
> > keeping in touch with the world (i.e., my consciousness might well do
> > other
> > things, but for now we will stick with a presumably primitive function).
> >
> > It is very hard to model exactly how this works, but psychologists and
> > systems
> > biologists are making good headway. Sensory information (spread over
space
> > and
> > time) is quite complex, but does specify a significant amount of
> > world-properties we are interested in. A sensory system, properly
> > integrated
> > with an action system, can therefore allow us to act intelligently
towards

> > the
> > world. That coupling, through complex/dynamic physiological systems,
> > should
> > form the heart of any model of consciousness. For simplicity, lets call
> > that
> > the "realist's model".
> >
> > Many people think we can simplify the problem by going inside the
> > Cartesian
> > theartre. That is, maybe things will be simpler if we only worry about
how
> > mental images relate to intended actions. The problem is that such a
model
> > has
> > to be just about as complicated as the realist's model. Then, even once
> > you
> > have a completely satisfactory model, you will still find that you have
> > two
> > mysteries to solve: First, how physical interaction with the world forms
> > the
> > mental ideas. Second, how intended actions "in the mind" become physical
> > actions. This mysteries must be solved, because even if you are a
dualist,
> > it
> > is still the case that consciousness is about keeping in touch with the
> > world.
> > So, for the slight bit that the theatre metaphor simplifies your initial
> > problem, it greatly complicates the final solution, by requiring at
least
> > three
> > complex models where before you only needed one. Modifying my sentence
in
> > the
> > prior paragraph, in a satisfactory dualistic model: A sensory system
> > integrates
> > with the mind such that a complex/dynamic processes projects "ideas" on
a

> > stage
> > (only some of which correspond in anyway to the world); watching those
> > "ideas"
> > play out a complex/dynamic process leads us to form "hypotheses" both
> > about the
> > causes of those "ideas" and the consequences of our actions upon those
> > "ideas"
> > and whatever caused those ideas; then we must have a complex/dynamic
> > process
> > that leads from our hypotheses to action in a world, by which I mean
> > action of
> > the me on the stage and the me watching the stage and the me whose head
> > the
> > stage is in. Yuck!
> >
> > That's not the only problem with dualism, but from a modeling
perspective,

> > I
> > think it might be the main one.
> >
> > Eric
>
>
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