Posted by
Jochen Fromm-4 on
URL: http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/In-the-theater-of-consciousness-tp3875347p3887036.html
A thoughtful response. You are right,
one inconsistency for the theater
metaphor is the missing distinction
between sensoric and motoric regions.
The coupling between them is also
completely neglected.
Another one is the missing distinction
between different levels of abstraction
for the various actors on the stage,
ranging from concrete perceptions to
abstract perception and beliefs, and
from concrete actions to abstract actions
and intentions.
Perhaps one could imagine a theater
with multiple stages, like a disco or club
with multiple dance floors. Theaters and
clubs are similar, in both of them there are
always a lot of people watching (the
unconscious elements), and only a
few are moving around in the spotlight
(the conscious ones).
-J.
----- Original Message -----
From: "ERIC P. CHARLES" <
[hidden email]>
To: "Jochen Fromm" <
[hidden email]>
Cc: "The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group" <
[hidden email]>
Sent: Sunday, October 25, 2009 12:52 AM
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] In the theater of consciousness
> I have not read Baars, but... One of the problems with the cognitive
> theatre
> metaphor (and most other dualistic metaphors) is that it makes the
> modeler's
> life harder NOT easier.
>
> Let us assume that, at the most fundamental level, my consciousness is
> about my
> keeping in touch with the world (i.e., my consciousness might well do
> other
> things, but for now we will stick with a presumably primitive function).
>
> It is very hard to model exactly how this works, but psychologists and
> systems
> biologists are making good headway. Sensory information (spread over space
> and
> time) is quite complex, but does specify a significant amount of
> world-properties we are interested in. A sensory system, properly
> integrated
> with an action system, can therefore allow us to act intelligently towards
> the
> world. That coupling, through complex/dynamic physiological systems,
> should
> form the heart of any model of consciousness. For simplicity, lets call
> that
> the "realist's model".
>
> Many people think we can simplify the problem by going inside the
> Cartesian
> theartre. That is, maybe things will be simpler if we only worry about how
> mental images relate to intended actions. The problem is that such a model
> has
> to be just about as complicated as the realist's model. Then, even once
> you
> have a completely satisfactory model, you will still find that you have
> two
> mysteries to solve: First, how physical interaction with the world forms
> the
> mental ideas. Second, how intended actions "in the mind" become physical
> actions. This mysteries must be solved, because even if you are a dualist,
> it
> is still the case that consciousness is about keeping in touch with the
> world.
> So, for the slight bit that the theatre metaphor simplifies your initial
> problem, it greatly complicates the final solution, by requiring at least
> three
> complex models where before you only needed one. Modifying my sentence in
> the
> prior paragraph, in a satisfactory dualistic model: A sensory system
> integrates
> with the mind such that a complex/dynamic processes projects "ideas" on a
> stage
> (only some of which correspond in anyway to the world); watching those
> "ideas"
> play out a complex/dynamic process leads us to form "hypotheses" both
> about the
> causes of those "ideas" and the consequences of our actions upon those
> "ideas"
> and whatever caused those ideas; then we must have a complex/dynamic
> process
> that leads from our hypotheses to action in a world, by which I mean
> action of
> the me on the stage and the me watching the stage and the me whose head
> the
> stage is in. Yuck!
>
> That's not the only problem with dualism, but from a modeling perspective,
> I
> think it might be the main one.
>
> Eric
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