http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/In-the-theater-of-consciousness-tp3875347p3885945.html
Jochen,
I have not read Baars, but... One of the problems with the
cognitive theatre metaphor (and most other dualistic metaphors) is that it
makes the modeler's life harder NOT easier.
Let us assume that, at the
most fundamental level, my consciousness is about my keeping in touch with the
world (i.e., my consciousness might well do other things, but for now we will
stick with a presumably primitive function).
It is very hard to model
exactly how this works, but psychologists and systems biologists are making
good headway. Sensory information (spread over space and time) is quite
complex, but does specify a significant amount of world-properties we are
interested in. A sensory system, properly integrated with an action system, can
therefore allow us to act intelligently towards the world. That coupling,
through complex/dynamic physiological systems, should form the heart of any
model of consciousness. For simplicity, lets call that the "realist's model".
Many people think we can simplify the problem by going inside the
Cartesian theartre. That is, maybe things will be simpler if we only worry
about how mental images relate to intended actions. The problem is that such a
model has to be just about as complicated as the realist's model. Then, even
once you have a completely satisfactory model, you will still find that you
have two mysteries to solve: First, how physical interaction with the world
forms the mental ideas. Second, how intended actions "in the mind" become
physical actions. This mysteries must be solved, because even if you are a
dualist, it is still the case that consciousness is about keeping in touch with
the world. So, for the slight bit that the theatre metaphor simplifies your
initial problem, it greatly complicates the final solution, by requiring at
least three complex models where before you only needed one. Modifying my
sentence in the prior paragraph, in a satisfactory dualistic model: A sensory
system integrates with the mind such that a complex/dynamic processes projects
"ideas" on a stage (only some of which correspond in anyway to the world);
watching those "ideas" play out a complex/dynamic process leads us to form
"hypotheses" both about the causes of those "ideas" and the consequences of our
actions upon those "ideas" and whatever caused those ideas; then we must
have a complex/dynamic process that leads from our hypotheses to action in a
world, by which I mean action of the me on the stage and the me watching the
stage and the me whose head the stage is in. Yuck!
That's not the only
problem with dualism, but from a modeling perspective, I think it might be the
main one.
Eric
On Sat, Oct 24, 2009 04:42 PM,
"Jochen
Fromm" <[hidden email]> wrote:
Yes. You can find the text of his 1988 book
"A cognitive theory of consciousness" there.
I borrowed it this week from the university
library (we have got a new one here in Berlin,
see here http://bit.ly/2ELIaK ).
The theory seems to be rather weak,
I think the best thing in his "theory" is the theater
metaphor. But if you want to model consciousness
and self-awareness by an ABM, then this
seems to be the starting line, as Dennett says.
-J.
----- Original Message -----
From: Roger Critchlow
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Sent: Saturday, October 24, 2009 9:06 PM
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] In the theater of consciousness
So, this Baars fellow who you're discussing, this is the Bernard J Baars
whose home page at http://vesicle.nsi.edu/users/baars/ links to copies of
all the books and papers under discussion?
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Eric Charles
Professional Student and
Assistant
Professor of Psychology
Penn State University
Altoona, PA
16601
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College