Re: Faith and Science (was comm.)

Posted by Miles Parker on
URL: http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/Re-comm-was-Re-FW-Re-Emergence-Seminar-BritishEmergence-tp3654051p3670990.html


On Sep 17, 2009, at 10:46 PM, russell standish wrote:

> On Thu, Sep 17, 2009 at 10:53:19PM -0600, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
>> Wait a minute!  They cannot call it a dilusion because "dilusion"
>> presupposes a state of affairs that IS -- i.e., a reality.
>
> Yes, I would imagine that the people shouting illusion or delusion  
> do assume
> some different sort of reality. That was mostly my point - the term is
> ill defined, and not of much practical use AFAICS, except for fueling
> endless philosophical debates like this one.

Right. I realized that as Glen points out this discussion -- as so  
many do -- got side-tracked into the narrow alley of defending or  
"attacking" a single rather silly claim "reality exists". Here is how  
I would put my claim:

"Reality is not -- and cannot be -- what people take to be real."

On Sep 17, 2009, at 10:06 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:

> Well, I think so (emoticon for nervous smile).
>
> How can you even write to me without presupposing my existence.  And  
> as Holt points out, the route to pointing out that I am just a  
> figment of your imagination requires the reality of something called  
> an imagination.  Holt argued "Mind here" was a more complex  
> statement than "world there" because the former presupposes the  
> latter but not the reverse.  Contra Descartes, I am not aware of a  
> mind, I am aware of a world.  Only after some heavy lifting can I  
> separate a mind out from the rest of the world.  I mean, which do  
> you think a baby discovers first: his world or his mind?

This all seems like so much dualistic flabber-jabber to me. i.e. these  
folks presuppose an objective material world and then count it as an  
argument in their favor that "you" can't have an disagreement with  
"them" without entering into such a world. As the baby example  
reveals. What does it say about the underlying point of view that one  
presumes that it is possible for one to be discovered before the  
other. In fact, interdependence -- characterized as dependent arising  
-- is the only explanation that makes any sense at all to me.

On Sep 17, 2009, at 9:57 PM, Russ Abbott wrote:

> Well, you already know my position on reducibility, namely that it's  
> a mistaken quest. Everything -- other than whatever turns out to be  
> primitive, if indeed anything turns out to be primitive -- is  
> explainable. That is, we will eventually figure out how it is  
> implemented.

How can you explain something without taking into account everything  
that might affect it? And as things are affected (cause happens)  
across scales and types, how could you hope to isolate "anything"? The  
only way that this reading could be correct is if there indeed did  
turn out to be a primitive, which is impossible. So, we'll never  
figure any of this out to complete satisfaction-- thank god.

-Miles


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