Owen,
I think a loose set theoretic approach would actually be helpful -
especially as it is compatible with a "level of analysis" approach. Also, as
this is a new approach to the subject matter, rather than a rehash, even the
negative
"voters" might grant some leeway.
As a rough draft of that: One of (the New Realist guy)
Holt's fundamental assertions is that "reflex arcs", which we today might call
"simple neuronal chains", can be combined together into sets that are
"behavior". Not all such sets will be behaviors, only those that result in
goal directed action. For example, some primitive swimmers have a
simple neuronal chain that connects an eye spot to the muscle that
contracts the opposite side of the tail, so that when light strikes the
right eyespot the left side of the tail contracts and turns the fish right.
Holt would
say that this is not yet behavior, but merely a reflex (i.e. a lower
level set). If you have two of these reflexes, however, one on each
side, something new emerges. The animal still twitches based on which
spot receives the most light, but the net result is that
the animal swims towards the light source! Thus the combination of
reflexes can be objectively DESCRIBED as "moving towards the light
source", and that extero-reference is the sin qua non of behavior. Because the
behavior has an "objective referent", it is "about" something outside the
organism.
Moving up another level, different sets of behaviors combine to form the
things we refer to as "mental traits".* That is, mental traits are just
a higher level of analysis of physical happenings. For example, to
observe that the animal "intends to swim" towards the light source is
merely to observe that the behavior can be accurately DESCRIBED as directed
towards that end, i.e. that when the organism's progress towards its objective
referent is perturbed, it acts in a way that right
itself. That is, the critical feature of "intending to swim to the light"
is whether or not you do things that continue your movement towards the light
if an obstacle appears.
Hence, for example, if Steve was lying on his back with people holding him
down, and we saw that Steve was doing actions directed at
standing up without success -- THEN we might believe Steve when he says
that he was intending to get up but could not. That is, even though Steve never
got up, we could accept
Steve's intentional claim as an objective description of his behavior relative
to
the unfourtunate circumstances. Without no such barrier existed. Thus, this
position asserts that
Steve's claim was in error. That is, we submit that an objective
description of Steve's behavior does not include "intending to stand
up". Now, we might at a later time have a long back and forth about what
exactly it
means to "think one intends something", but I assure everyone that is just a
distraction at this point.
Did that satisfy the set-theoretic request
at all?
Eric
*We might need to have an intermediate step in which "circumstances"
enter our sets. Mental traits are not just macro-patterns of behavior,
but macro-patterns of behaviors relative to circumstance. The requirement that
sets constituting behaviors contain "goal
directedness" might
already cover that requirement, but I'm not positive.
On Thu, Jul 2, 2009 11:46 AM,
Owen Densmore
<[hidden email]> wrote:
Thank you Nick, good explanation. And Steve -- we actually started
down
this road on the thermodynamic formulation of ABM .. Guerin-
Speak .. with
some success.
Much more generally: There is a rift between the formal
and
philosophic that I have a partial solution for. Both are VSI (Very
Short Introduction) books.
http://www.amazon.com/dp/0192853619/
http://www.amazon.com/dp/0192854119/
The first is the Mathematics VSI.
It is written by Timothy Gowers and
really does get the reader into the
mind of mathematics folks. Gowers
is a Fields Medalist -- the Nobel for
math. And he is driven by a
Wittgenstein understanding of abstraction.
Gowers' discussion of a
5th dimensional cube is a wonderful example. He
constantly comes back
to the type of abstraction he prefers: very clean
and focused on the
properties under discussion.
The second is the
Wittgenstein VSI, to bind Gowers' math with his
inspiration, Wittgenstein.
I've not finished this one (I've got a
digital version and have just sent
for the paper one) but there is
hope we might actually find a connection
between the more
philosophical discussions and a formalism for
them.
I'd be very interested in this endeavor.
--
Owen
On Jul 2, 2009, at 9:14 AM, Nicholas Thompson
wrote:
> Owen,
>
> (1)Yes, I do assume that most people
delete these messages and
> press on,
> as I delete most (but
not all) messages about ... say ... the
the
> latest
>
4.0.17a.alpha version of Groovy on Rails.
>
> Different stroke for
different folks.
>
> (2)Lord we tried on the summaries.
Unfortunately we couldnt
agree
> sufficiently to produce a
synopsis.
>
> (3) I am aware that you believe the
following:
>
> Most philosophical discussions of this ilk simply
end in semantic
> deadly embrace. They are eventually resolved, if ever,
at great cost
> of word length. The Kolmodorov complexity is quite
low:
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolmogorov_complexity
> in
that much compression could be attained.
>
> And, accordingly, our
inabiliity to produce such a summary
> distressed me
> deeply.
This I take to be not as a failiure of philosphy but a
> failure
on
> my (our) part to do it right, but I fear you will draw another
> conclusion.
> .
>
> all the best,
>
>
nick
On Jul 2, 2009, at 9:27 AM, Steve Smith wrote:
> Owen
-
> Most philosophical discussions of this ilk simply end in semantic
> deadly embrace. They are eventually resolved, if ever, at great
> cost of word length.
> I agree with the sentiment, but if we
were to caste this into a set-
> theoretic (or algebraic) framework, I
think we would find some
> interesting features. I'm not sure,
however, that such discussions
> can truly be placed into a formalism.
I would find it interesting
> (entertaining, instructive) if you could
elaborate how you think
> such a mapping would be done. I believe
these discussions to
> (naturally, inherently) transcend formal
logic.
> The Kolmodorov complexity is quite low:
>
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolmogorov_complexity
> in that much
compression could be attained.
> I think someone did try to formulate an
algorithmic description of
> the discussion:
>
> •
Read everything written in the Western Philosophical Tradition
> •
Focus on Kant
> • Focus on the New Realists
> • Think
real hard about all of the above
> • Lay in the grass and intend
to get up without doing so (my
> contribution)
> • Discuss
your interpretation of 3, 2, 1
> • Go to 4
> But methinks
this is tantamount to getting several large carpets to
> cover up the
many small ones already hiding large piles of dust and
> litter swept
under them.
>
> Apologies to Nick, Russ, Eric, et al. for
(perhaps) being too
flip
> here. I respect the earnestness and the
information content that
> is in the discussion, despite the difficulty
in finding any
> convergence.
>
> Carry On!
>
>
-
Steve
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
Eric Charles
Professional Student and
Assistant Professor of Psychology
Penn State University
Altoona, PA 16601
Please understand that the majority of FRIAM folks simply delete these
and press on.
Please understand that one or more FRIAMers politely asked for
summaries and did not receive them.
Please understand that "Please God no" is a form of netiquette. It
is
a vote, not a censure.
I for one would expect more formalism in this discussion. I believe
most of your discussion could be placed in a set-theoretic framework
and I would prefer that.
Most philosophical discussions of this ilk simply end in semantic
deadly embrace. They are eventually resolved, if ever, at great cost
of word length. The Kolmodorov complexity is quite low:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolmogorov_complexity
in that much compression could be attained.
That said, you must understand that "Please God no" is a very high
information content string that should be considered, not as censure,
but as information.
Do with it what you will.
-- Owen
On Jul 2, 2009, at 7:07 AM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
> Dear List,
>
> Does one grumpy comment a consensus make?
>
> I can see how the philosophy of mind, a qualia, etc., might not be
> everybody's cup of tea, but certainly it's well within FRIAM's
> domain and the discussion has drawn out some new and interesting
> folks. Eh? (As we Canadians say?).
>
> Back in a week.
>
> N
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
> Clark University ([hidden email])
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Robert Holmes
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> Sent: 7/1/2009 5:42:59 PM
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation - 1st vs 3rd person
>
>
> On Wed, Jul 1, 2009 at 5:35 PM, Russ Abbott <[hidden email]>
> wrote:
> <snip>
>
> P.S. Since this is heating up again, I've added the list back to the
> addressees.
>
>
> Please God no.
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org