(no subject)
Posted by
Eric Charles on
Jun 27, 2009; 3:35am
URL: http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/no-subject-tp3165192.html
These thoughts are not as well formed as I would like, but I am
headed to
a conference this weekend, so here it goes:
The rules of the
dualistic game (or
the idealist game) require us to believe that tasting salt involves something
fundamentally beyond detecting a property of the salt. That additional thing,
the thing that is not a property of the salt, but that is present "within us"
when we taste salt, is labeled "qualia". I'm not sure if Nick would be fully on
board with this, but I think the logical response to this line of thinking is
denial of the problem: Tasting salt is nothing above and beyond detecting a
property of the
salt, and thus the entire category of phenomenon in question nonsensical. The
only reasonable course of investigation into "saltyness" is to try
to find out what specific property of salt was being detected when something
tasted salty. With that information in hand, you then say that "tasting salt"
IS being responsive to that
aspect of a material. Again, if you don't like the behaviorist stuff, just say
that "tasting salt" IS experiencing that aspect of the material.
As for
what seems to remain of the 1st person discussion... It must be admitted that
knowing requires a knower. However, a "first principle" of New Realism is that
no properties of the world get their essential nature from being part of the
knowledge relationship. Mountains are not made by being known as mountains, a
horse is exactly what it is whether or not someone knows it is a horse, etc.
Those examples (hopefully) seem straightforward and unproblematic. However, in
the same way, whatever it is to be angry, it is exactly what it is whether or
not someone knows they are angry, etc. Thus, in line with the above argument,
whatever it is to be salty, it must be something about the salty thing... or a
perhaps more properly, a property of the thing in relation to the taster... but
it is definitely not something uniquely about the "I" that is doing the tasting.
Have a fun and productive weekend all. When I return I will try to get
back to
Rikus's questions. This is indeed an excellent and stimulating conversation.
Thanks all,
Eric
On Fri, Jun 26,
2009 04:37 PM, Russ Abbott <[hidden email]>
wrote:
I was afraid you would say that. But a statement like that
raises the dishonest (disingenuous?) flag for me. If we focus on "salty"
you know what it's like to taste something that's salty. You said so yourself.
"Well it's ... salty." That's more than just doing salty or seeing salty.
You didn't say that it's not like anything. You said it's salty, implying that
you have an experience of saltiness when you taste salt. That's an
example of a qualia.
Furthermore (and I know I'm going to regret giving
you two things to reply to), even if you can say you know what it is to do
happy (or salty), that still implies a first person perspective. After
all, what is it like to know what something is in the sense that you just used
that phrase. That's the point I've been trying to make in last few messages. We
don't need to insist on qualia. Just the simple fact of knowing what
something is, implies a first person that is doing the knowing. We got stuck on
knowledge as true belief when I tried this tack before. Here I'm using know
in the sense that you intended it (whatever that sense is) in your
statement. Perhaps it would be useful for you to explain what you meant
by that statement. In other words, what is it to know what it is to do
happy?
-- Russ
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