Re: Direct conversation

Posted by Nick Thompson on
URL: http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/Re-Direct-conversation-tp3137870p3139838.html

<BASE href="file://C:\Users\Rikus\Documents\My Stationery\">
thanks, Rikus, for your thoughts.
 
I find myself in agreement with a lot that you say.  It is not controversial to me to say that the viewpoint that is you has your body within its field of view, and that you can "see" some things about you that I cannot see.  .  I only want to insist that your experience of your "inner mind" is arrived at by the same cognitive means as your experience of my "inner mind".   It is less a direct experience than a cognitive achievement.  I ask you only to recmember that I can "see" many things about you that you cannot see.  One aspect of you that (when I am in the room with you) I can see better than you is the arrangement of your body with respect to people and objects in the room.  Your deployment of your body, so to speak.  Your staging is something much better seen by the audience than by the actor himself.  
 
Most of psychology has been taken up with understanding the contradiction between our understandings of what a person is about that we can derived from what they say about themselves, and our understanding of what a person is about derived from our own observation of him.
 
It is wonderful to hear from you.
 
Nick
 
Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
 
 
 
 
----- Original Message -----
From: [hidden email]
To: [hidden email]
Sent: 6/22/2009 3:14:42 PM
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Direct conversation

I've been following the thoughts on conscious experience of self and have nearly dipped in a couple of times, but lack of clarity on my own thoughts keeps on preventing me.  (And Russ, I do love clarity and direct communication.)
 
I'm still torn between various aspects of the points of view that, mostly, Nick and Russ presented.  Though clarity still eludes me, I would like to share the following before it just slips away unused again.
 
I think things pretty much work as Nick painted them.  Still, this set of interacting structures and processes that I think of as myself, can't quite banish from it's processing space the nagging awareness of something like the experiencer that Russ argues for.  I wonder if it might arise in the manner outlined below.
 
I'll start from Nick's model.  My brain has learned to turn back it's third-person perception and modelling functionality on a subset of the environment that is always present, i.e. self.
 
Semi-aside: there is something added in the case of self -- richer sensory data that is not available on other people: touch, pressure, pain, temperature from skin, breathing and heart rate, proprioception, stress and pain in joints, vestibular sense, stretch receptors in the gastrointestinal tract, etc.  I do think all of this enriches the model of self to the point where the experience might be qualitatively different from the models of other people.
 
But more significant is the fact that I can create an abstracted model of myself (i.e. imagine myself) and that the model can be made to interact with a model of the environment, other people, and even internally created models with no counterpart in direct experience.  Consider that usually this model's usefulness is in projecting it into the future (and, I think, into the past, when we reconstruct events from memory).
 
Now, what happens when that model is dragged back into real-time, and held right next to the more direct perceptual awareness of self?  It seems like one might end up with two selves, and I'm wondering if that experience might not account for that elusive experience that Russ is referring to.
 
Regards,
Rikus

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