Martin,
> Hey Phil, > > If I understand you correctly, I think you're very right. The > information we have about the world is behavior and > appearances, and for > most interesting things the mechanism is completely hidden > from us. We > can observe inputs and outputs, but not the source code. We can see > fuel go in and motion come out, but can't see the engine, let alone > anything else. The trickiest piece is proving in a comprehendable and comprehensive way that anything has any actual inside structure, largely invisible from the outside. Science is built on the ideas of control, after all, and it almost asks science to violate its own principles to discover it. It's a genuine conundrum, and my original path to figuring it out, TMS (to my satisfaction) was by trying to make sense of all the stuff approximation leaves out, among other things. Now I take it simply that loops of intermittent relationships are largely invisible except to dogged cross checking, and to be found ALL over the place. All kinds of real things seem to grow from them, and you can circumscribe their growth with a boundary you can be confident their event horizon lies within, QED 'built and run from inside'. Now there are perhaps lots of things that a computer environment might allow to be built from the inside... even if there are deep differences in the interactions of numbers and things... I think it's early yet to say whether autonomous things growing in computers will be of any use, but that's how nature seems to do it. That's part of what I was suggesting a while ago, asking if anyone had tried 'composting' as part of artificial environments. > Perhaps the core of intelligence is coming up with models of > the world > and exploiting them. That's a view that's right up my alley. > > But say that to most AI researchers, and they'll stare at you > uncomprehendingly. They want a well defined problem, such as > using all > users purchases at Amazon to suggest other purchases for a > single user. > And they'll come up with an algorithm that makes good suggestions > most of the time. The idea that the computer should be > trying to make > sense of the world -- eh? What are you talking about? Or maybe "oh, > that's that flakey research from the 60s and 70s. We've moved beyond > that." I have a friend who does research in believable virtual > characters, and he gets that. > > Best, > Martin > > Phil Henshaw wrote: > > Got it! But it's like making your way through a maze by > running into > > walls. There's no point in being disappointed and just sitting down > > when confronted by them. I think locating the walls helps, i.e. > > finding the barriers and disconnects in our thinking. I've been > > focused on one in particular, the lack of any working theoretical > > model of things organized from the inside. I think that's > where the > > start may be. We all suffer from a core intellectual > deficit on that > > account, to quote another post: > > > > "I think it's comes from the biological human view of the > world. The > > basic structure of thinking comes from our being > 'observers', locked > > up inside a brain, each of us reconstructing an imaginary > model of the > > world around us from our own observations and experiences. > That's a > > problematic viewpoint for relating to any other thing built > the same > > way, i.e. organized from the inside. What's going on inside other > > things is invisible from the outside, and our [brain] > builds its whole > > world view from an outside perspective!! Given that handicap, it's > > quite natural for there to be more than one might guess > missing from > > our awareness." > > > > "...The theoretical sciences don't even have an image of anything > > organized from the inside! That part of the world is > invisible to us > > and so we're structurally unaware of the internally > organized systems > > we're part of and surround us. It's ridiculous to work > with a world > > composed of several billion original, different and faulty > universes, > > but I think we're stuck with it and should try poking around to see > > what other surprises there may be! :)" > > > > make any sense? > > > >> Phil Henshaw wrote: > >>> I was curious about the film you were talking about, "Mind in the > >>> Machine", and Googled it, coming across several things > >> including its > >>> origin and a simple statement by an Australian journalist (quoted > >>> below) of Turing's idea of the test one would apply to > >> measure success > >>> in reproducing intelligence. > >>> > >>> I read the statement as saying if you're able to imitate > >> something by > >>> some other means (say behaviors of people by computers), in > >> a way that > >>> an observer doesn't notice the discrepancy, you've made the real > >>> thing. I expect that's not quite accurate, and the current > >> thinking has > >>> evolved. Can anyone say where the concept is headed? > >> The field of Artificial Intelligence no longer talks at all about > >> general intelligence, the human mind, or anything like that. > >> The lone > >> exception might the the natural language community, who of > course are > >> try to replicate something human specific. But they still > don't talk > >> about "human equivalence" or anything like that. > >> > >> After the hype for AI in the 60s and 70s, there was a > backlash in the > >> 80s. Kind of what happened to ideas like "virtual > reality" or "dot > >> com." In search of respectability, AI has become largely applied > >> statistics and focused on near term results. > >> > >> For someone like me who wants to explore principles and > methods that > >> point the way to full intelligence, this is all very > >> depressing. Like > >> wanting to study cognitive psychology during behaviorism. > >> > >> Best, > >> Martin > >> > >> > > > > > > |
Artificial intelligence as a field "talks about" just about
everything. We mustn't confuse what the funding agencies demand (who, after all, call the tune in most instances, about what direction research will take) and what the scientists would wish, or even talk about quite publicly. If you read the presidential essays of each new president of the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, the main professional society of AI, you will see wonderful proposals for what the field might be and how it might be done. DARPA wants reliable robot cars, thanks anyway. There's a melancholy moment at the end of the film where Marvin Minsky talks about the grand ideas of the founding fathers of AI, and the way the field has instead become fixated on incremental improvements in performance--owing to that's where the money is. I've noticed that people often scoff because the game of Go has never had a real AI challenge. I agree that Go is wonderfully complex, difficult, a tough nut to crack. But research toward an automatic Go machine has been the sole province of non-funded amateurs for sweet forever. It's possible--not necessarily guaranteed--that a major, well-funded effort might crack the problem. Nobody who has any money could imagine what use it would be, unfortunately. So for big ideas: for the first fifty years of AI, the dream was to build a killer chess machine. Why? Because this was considered the sine qua non of intelligent behavior. Never mind that you wouldn't particularly want a chess master as your dinner partner; this reflected our view of what intelligence was at the time. We have our killer chess machine and we (and the chess players, Kasparov says) have learned a lot from the effort. But the grand goal for the next fifty years is a robot soccer team that will defeat a human team in the World's Cup. Think of what this means: planning, cooperating with other autonomies, kinetic intelligence, real-time calculations, and so forth. It seems to me a worthy successor to the chess champion. If I'm lucky, it will happen sooner than fifty years, and I'll get to see it for myself. If not, not. And, FWIW, this idea for a grand challenge bubbled up from workers-- young workers--in the field, and was not proposed by a funding agency. Other grand ideas are being pursued on a shoestring by other young researchers. I can talk about them, OR--you can buy the new edition of my Machines Who Think, which addresses some of these contemporary issues. There will be more to talk about when I show the film in December. Pamela "For some reason the most vocal Christians among us never mention the Beatitudes. But with tears in their eyes they demand that the Ten Commandments be posted in public places. And of course that's Moses, not Jesus. I haven't heard one of them demand that the Sermon on the Mount, the Beatitudes, be posted anywhere." Kurt Vonnegut, "A Man Without A Country" -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: /pipermail/friam_redfish.com/attachments/20060902/2ab7c6e4/attachment.html |
Right, funding makes a big difference, but ever if we spend part of our
days serving bean counters does it control the direction of scientific thought? I think it's often the other way around too, that what scientists find interesting to explore is what they're able to sell. In that regard, helping Government, and others, learn what to expect from uncontrolled systems could be just as interesting and marketable as offering limited ways to control them. You could present it as advances in 'steering', like how to read ahead on the curves so your mid-course corrections can be early, small and graceful rather than late, large and clumsy... but then, government does seem to enjoy the latter so very much, perhaps we couldn't persuade them to give it up! :) Artificial intelligence as a field "talks about" just about everything. We mustn't confuse what the funding agencies demand (who, after all, call the tune in most instances, about what direction research will take) and what the scientists would wish, or even talk about quite publicly. If you read the presidential essays of each new president of the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, the main professional society of AI, you will see wonderful proposals for what the field might be and how it might be done. DARPA wants reliable robot cars, thanks anyway. There's a melancholy moment at the end of the film where Marvin Minsky talks about the grand ideas of the founding fathers of AI, and the way the field has instead become fixated on incremental improvements in performance--owing to that's where the money is. I've noticed that people often scoff because the game of Go has never had a real AI challenge. I agree that Go is wonderfully complex, difficult, a tough nut to crack. But research toward an automatic Go machine has been the sole province of non-funded amateurs for sweet forever. It's possible--not necessarily guaranteed--that a major, well-funded effort might crack the problem. Nobody who has any money could imagine what use it would be, unfortunately. So for big ideas: for the first fifty years of AI, the dream was to build a killer chess machine. Why? Because this was considered the sine qua non of intelligent behavior. Never mind that you wouldn't particularly want a chess master as your dinner partner; this reflected our view of what intelligence was at the time. We have our killer chess machine and we (and the chess players, Kasparov says) have learned a lot from the effort. But the grand goal for the next fifty years is a robot soccer team that will defeat a human team in the World's Cup. Think of what this means: planning, cooperating with other autonomies, kinetic intelligence, real-time calculations, and so forth. It seems to me a worthy successor to the chess champion. If I'm lucky, it will happen sooner than fifty years, and I'll get to see it for myself. If not, not. And, FWIW, this idea for a grand challenge bubbled up from workers--young workers--in the field, and was not proposed by a funding agency. Other grand ideas are being pursued on a shoestring by other young researchers. I can talk about them, OR--you can buy the new edition of my Machines Who Think, which addresses some of these contemporary issues. There will be more to talk about when I show the film in December. Pamela "For some reason the most vocal Christians among us never mention the Beatitudes. But with tears in their eyes they demand that the Ten Commandments be posted in public places. And of course that's Moses, not Jesus. I haven't heard one of them demand that the Sermon on the Mount, the Beatitudes, be posted anywhere." Kurt Vonnegut, "A Man Without A Country" -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: /pipermail/friam_redfish.com/attachments/20060902/e7b9bb13/attachment.html |
In reply to this post by Phil Henshaw-2
Hey Phil,
Phil Henshaw wrote: > Martin, >> Hey Phil, >> >> If I understand you correctly, I think you're very right. The >> information we have about the world is behavior and >> appearances, and for >> most interesting things the mechanism is completely hidden >> from us. We >> can observe inputs and outputs, but not the source code. We can see >> fuel go in and motion come out, but can't see the engine, let alone >> anything else. > > The trickiest piece is proving in a comprehendable and comprehensive way > that anything has any actual inside structure, largely invisible from > the outside. Well, I'd argue something slightly different. We need a model of what's going on inside, but that's not the same as recovering what's actually going on inside. In fact, a high level model may be more useful and important than a low level one. For example, I can come up with the concept of pressure, temperature and volume for a gas without discovering molecules. I can do all kinds of useful and interesting things knowing only about pressure, temperature and volume, like make air conditioners and refrigerators, and have no idea whether gas is continuous or made of molecules. As another example, there tends to be more traffic on the roads during morning and evening rush hour. This is an emergent phenomenon, and would be hard to prove starting from a wiring diagram of the human brain, plus whatever else about the environment you'd need to know. So I don't see the job so much as recovering the actual structure that's inside, but discovering regularities in the observables. - Martin |
Martin,
> > Hey Phil, > > Phil Henshaw wrote: > > Martin, > >> Hey Phil, > >> > >> If I understand you correctly, I think you're very right. The > >> information we have about the world is behavior and > >> appearances, and for > >> most interesting things the mechanism is completely hidden > >> from us. We > >> can observe inputs and outputs, but not the source code. > >> We can see > >> fuel go in and motion come out, but can't see the engine, > >> let alone > >> anything else. > > > > The trickiest piece is proving in a comprehendable and > > comprehensive > > way that anything has any actual inside structure, largely > > invisible > > from the outside. > > Well, I'd argue something slightly different. We need a > model of what's > going on inside, but that's not the same as recovering what's > actually > going on inside. In fact, a high level model may be more useful and > important than a low level one. For example, I can come up with the > concept of pressure, temperature and volume for a gas without > discovering molecules. I can do all kinds of useful and interesting > things knowing only about pressure, temperature and volume, like make > air conditioners and refrigerators, and have no idea whether gas is > continuous or made of molecules. > > As another example, there tends to be more traffic on the > roads during > morning and evening rush hour. This is an emergent phenomenon, and > would be hard to prove starting from a wiring diagram of the human > brain, plus whatever else about the environment you'd need to know. > > So I don't see the job so much as recovering the actual > structure that's > inside, but discovering regularities in the observables. Well, that's what people have always done, of course, not bothered with the details that are hard or impossible to consider and made up something else that serves a current purpose. I call it 'approximation', and it's what science is mostly made of. It can be extremely useful. There are also times when overlooking the fuzzy or unavailable bits actually does matter and approximations don't help. One example would be a passive system, behaving in response to external controls, which is highly sensitive to initial conditions. Another is a natural system that isn't passive and has an independent internal behavior and design. That includes living things, and many other kinds of growth systems. There are several kinds of good proof. Where you have an active system with an interior, the loops of relationships it's built from are especially hard to see, inherently hidden as a consequence of only directly connecting to themselves, internally. They also tend to be too complicated, immeasurable and intermittent and original to figure out by indirect means. That also makes them 'approximately' non-existent if that's how you choose to interpret the hopelessness of your data on them. That a great many things highly important to us in the world are systems with active interior behavior and design is not yet something physics seems quite willing to admit, which makes it even more difficult to study them. Still, you can prove it by watching them build. Of course, we've also been told never to study individual things, since whatever they do that's interesting doesn't apply anyway. I'm coming at this from having focused on trying to understand what approximation leaves out. I found quite a lot, including that closely watching things that grow will usually expose classic individually unique developmental processes. There's only one place to say that's happening, i.e. inside. Approximation helped show me where to look, but only when I looked for what was left out and missing... There's obviously more to this, but the point is that the first step in learning about something deeply hidden is not building a model that looks familiar. It's figuring out how to watch the detailed workings of what you presently can't see. Phil > - Martin > > |
Free forum by Nabble | Edit this page |