falsifying the lost opportunity updating mechanism for free will

classic Classic list List threaded Threaded
41 messages Options
123
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: falsifying the lost opportunity updating mechanism for free will

thompnickson2

 

I think we have yet to agree on the phenomenon that we are explaining.  Is it a first person phenomenon or a third person one?

 

N

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

[hidden email]

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

 

 

From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Russ Abbott
Sent: Thursday, June 18, 2020 7:53 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] falsifying the lost opportunity updating mechanism for free will

 

 

On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 6:22 PM uǝlƃ <[hidden email]> wrote:

What I'm doing is defining a mechanism that *might* generate the phenomenon of interest. It's typical simulation. If it *cannot* generate the phenomenon, then that falsifies this mechanism, which is what we want, falsifiable hypotheses.

 

What do you mean by "generate the phenomenon"? If the phenomenon is non-existent, it can't be generated. Even if that weren't a problem, who is to judge whether "the phenomenon" had been generated? And how is that judgment made? 

 

On the other hand, how do you establish that "it *cannot* generate the phenomenon"?  That sounds like a pretty hard thing to establish on the basis of empirical evidence.

 

This all seems to be digging a deeper hole.


- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ 
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: falsifying the lost opportunity updating mechanism for free will

jon zingale
In reply to this post by jon zingale
https://www.physicscentral.com/explore/pictures/cup.cfm



--
Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/

- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ 
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: falsifying the lost opportunity updating mechanism for free will

gepr
In reply to this post by jon zingale
I think I can see that. The trick is that in this sort of mixing, the map between the underlying dynamics and the phenomenon (tendrils) is too thin. In order to control that mixing (that the mechanism I'm proposing [†] requires), the composer would need access to every tiny-fast interaction. I suppose one could argue that a system could be designed so that large-scale interference would be reasonable, e.g. sliding some sort of disc in front of a tendril or something. I think for LOUMFFW to generate anything that might look like "free will" would require a thicker composition, some fast-tiny processes, some slow-fat processes, and the ability to pick and choose how to update that composite.

But we also have the iteration problem. LOUMFFW *might* generate the interesting phenomenon through iteration, the 2nd time around, the 3rd time around, etc. So, it's unclear to me how to fit Rayleigh-Taylor in.


[†] I suppose I'll call it LOUMFFW ... pronounced loomfwah!

On 6/18/20 7:48 PM, Jon Zingale wrote:
> The image I am forming here is that of the bifurcating tendrils which form
> when lemon juice is added to water. At each moment, Rayleigh-Taylor
> instability generates new paths which further express instability in my
> glass.

--
☣ uǝlƃ

- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ 
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: falsifying the lost opportunity updating mechanism for free will

gepr
In reply to this post by thompnickson2
Whether it's 1st or 3rd person is irrelevant. As you should know by now, I subscribe to "reflectivity", the ability to treat oneself as you treat others and vice versa. I still haven't read "The Myth of Mirror Neurons". But I do believe we learn mostly through mimicry, by simulating the actions of others.

The phenomenon we're after is whatever the *thing* is we mean when we say "I'll go to the store tomorrow", as if you have any control over whether or not you'll actually go to the store tomorrow. It's a promise [†] based on some *thing*. It's that *thing* that I intend to simulate. If you deny that thing exists, then you're lying, full stop. Everyone acts/talks as if they have free will. And it's that acting/talking *as if* you have free will that is the target phenomenon.


[†] To shunt anticipated word-play, if someone is very fastidious, they may only ever say things like "I *might* go to the store tomorrow", allowing ambiguity in the agency. It's agnostic as to whether the cause/choice to go the store is within the person or elsewhere. But that's just word-play. The idea that you have any idea whatsoever whether you'll go to the store tomorrow speaks of an in-person agency. The only actually agnostic statement is "I have been to the store in the past for some unknown reason." And very few sane people talk that way.

On 6/18/20 7:52 PM, [hidden email] wrote:
> I think we have yet to agree on the phenomenon that we are explaining.  Is it a first person phenomenon or a third person one?

--
☣ uǝlƃ

- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ 
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: falsifying the lost opportunity updating mechanism for free will

jon zingale
In reply to this post by gepr
Glen says: "But we also have the iteration problem. LOUMFFW *might* generate
the interesting phenomenon through iteration, the 2nd time around, the 3rd
time around, etc. So, it's unclear to me how to fit Rayleigh-Taylor in".

I am imagining the bulb at the end of each tendril to be a
perhaps-not-quite-self-similar translation of the circumstances before. The
whole cascade then represents *choices revisited* but only in appearance
because each choice happens in time not revisited.




--
Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/

- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ 
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: falsifying the lost opportunity updating mechanism for free will

Steve Smith
In reply to this post by gepr

Glen -

While I share and applaud your subscription to "reflectivity",  I am not sure that this invalidates all distinctions between 1st and 3rd person (conceptual) perspective.  For many things I think it is *useful* to assume that this transformation of perspective can be achieved, even if in practice it may be impossible to achieve with perfect fidelity.   I'm not sure how it resolves (in it's absolute conception) opposite your idea that communication does not exist (is an illusion)?  

This may be reflected in your second point:  "I'll go to the store tomorrow" (or "might") differs from "she *might* go to the store tomorrow".    While we *do* generally talk as if we believe we have free will, and by "reflectivity" (if I understand) we ascribe other's actions to "free will" as well,  my own experience is that we tend to believe we *know* our own intentions, but only vaguely guess at anothers'.   

"I intend to go to the store tomorrow, because I am out of X, Y, Z things which I use daily"

"She will likely go to the store tomorrow because I observe that she goes every other day and she did not go today"

Or perhaps, I might say

"If I were her, I would go to the store tomorrow because I believe she is out of X, Y, Z and I believe she uses those daily"

with uncountable hidden equivocations such as

"she may have X, Y, or Z in her pantry"

"she may substitute A, B or C where I might not"

"she may prefer X, Y, Z daily but is disinclined to go for just 3 items"

...

et cet, ad inf.


I don't know if you register all of this as "word play" or not, but I think the equivocations in this example are qualitatively different.

I will grant that if we assume that we do not know our own mind, our own self, our own future-self any better than we know that of another, then our "future self" may be as distinct from our "present self" as our "present self" is from "another self".    Maybe this is the extreme form of your ideas on "episodic" vs "diachronic" perspectives?

Complementarily, I might also say:

"I think I will slip and fall if I try to cross that icy parking lot"

or

"I think she will slip and fall if she tries to cross that icy parking lot"

This example implies a more consonant "reflectivity" perhaps, though there is always room for more equivocation like:

 "She is more athletic than I and is wearing better shoes, so I think she may cross the icy parking lot without falling down"


"No man is an island.... but he might be an archipelago?
- Steve

Whether it's 1st or 3rd person is irrelevant. As you should know by now, I subscribe to "reflectivity", the ability to treat oneself as you treat others and vice versa. I still haven't read "The Myth of Mirror Neurons". But I do believe we learn mostly through mimicry, by simulating the actions of others.

The phenomenon we're after is whatever the *thing* is we mean when we say "I'll go to the store tomorrow", as if you have any control over whether or not you'll actually go to the store tomorrow. It's a promise [†] based on some *thing*. It's that *thing* that I intend to simulate. If you deny that thing exists, then you're lying, full stop. Everyone acts/talks as if they have free will. And it's that acting/talking *as if* you have free will that is the target phenomenon.


[†] To shunt anticipated word-play, if someone is very fastidious, they may only ever say things like "I *might* go to the store tomorrow", allowing ambiguity in the agency. It's agnostic as to whether the cause/choice to go the store is within the person or elsewhere. But that's just word-play. The idea that you have any idea whatsoever whether you'll go to the store tomorrow speaks of an in-person agency. The only actually agnostic statement is "I have been to the store in the past for some unknown reason." And very few sane people talk that way.

On 6/18/20 7:52 PM, [hidden email] wrote:
I think we have yet to agree on the phenomenon that we are explaining.  Is it a first person phenomenon or a third person one?

    

- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ 
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: falsifying the lost opportunity updating mechanism for free will

gepr
Well, in the context of LOUMFW, these distinctions are nits. If I allow myself to zoom out and talk about free will in the (largely useless) way everyone usually does, then I'm with you. But I'm not really interested in those conversations.

If, somehow, you could turn these distinctions into concrete use cases for LOUMFW, then they might be interesting. But the words you chose to use in laying them out don't imply to me that you (or anyone on the list, even) would be interested in having that concrete conversation.

In that larger zoomed out context, I'll simply retreat to my default position that free will is a stupid concept and the phrase should be deleted from the lexicon. >8^D

On 6/19/20 8:33 AM, Steve Smith wrote:
> I don't know if you register all of this as "word play" or not, but I think the equivocations in this example are qualitatively different.

--
☣ uǝlƃ

- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ 
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: falsifying the lost opportunity updating mechanism for free will

jon zingale
In reply to this post by gepr
Glen's Claim:
a) a mesh of parallel processes evolving in time
b) each process has a local branching structure
c) these branches (and the events that walk them) compose
d) that composition is monitored and remembered within some scope
e) that monitor/memory is used by a controller to edit the branching structures

Heraclitus says: "No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it's
not the same river and he's not the same man."

From the Eulerian perspective, fluid flowing through a river delta has
many of the characteristics of Glen's theory. We can imagine the river
delta as a mesh of composed local branching structures, whose events
are the ensemble particles of the flow (a,b,c). The flow monitors the
river delta directly, it experiences the changes in gradients and shear (d1).
The flow memories the river delta by acting on the delta directly, it frees
sediment at one stage only to deposit it at a further stage (d2). Through
time, the flow's monitoring and remembering edits the branching structure
of the river delta, giving rise to phenomena like distributaries and important
to our free will-discussion delta switching (e).

- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ 
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: falsifying the lost opportunity updating mechanism for free will

gepr
Well, first, I'm not making a claim, only tossing a wet noodle mechanism at the wall to see if it'll stick.

I think canalizing flow is missing 2 key components of the mechanism I proposed: 1) composition and 2) dampening edits or negative reinforcement. (1) is less important. I think I could steelman your weaker form of composition well enough say it's a member of this class of mechanisms. But (2) is important. Canalizing flow is positive reinforcing. But the point of a feedback loop (and iteration as opposed to instantaneous composition) trying to capture *lost opportunity* is to lower the chances of following the same path next time and raise the chances of following a different path next time.

To map back to a vernacular "free will", this mechanism implements it by *regret* and post-hoc rationalization. So, to coerce it into some kind of canalization, at a bare minimum, the mechanism would need some force for mixing or heat, some way to scramble *against* positive reinforcement. But that would only be a force for neutral distributions ... e.g. "If I had the chance to do it all over again FRESH". That doesn't go far enough. To capture lost opportunity and regret, we have to have "If I had the chance to do it all over again KNOWING WHAT I KNOW NOW".

This is why I included the scaffolding for pattern matching and iteration. The mechanism has to be able to exhibit negative feedback.

On 6/20/20 9:31 AM, Jon Zingale wrote:

> Glen's Claim:
> a) a mesh of parallel processes evolving in time
> b) each process has a local branching structure
> c) these branches (and the events that walk them) compose
> d) that composition is monitored and remembered within some scope
> e) that monitor/memory is used by a controller to edit the branching structures
>
> Heraclitus says: "No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it's
> not the same river and he's not the same man."
>
> From the Eulerian perspective, fluid flowing through a river delta has
> many of the characteristics of Glen's theory. We can imagine the river
> delta as a mesh of composed local branching structures, whose /events/
> are the ensemble particles of the flow (a,b,c). The flow /monitors/ the
> river delta directly, it experiences the changes in gradients and shear (d1).
> The flow /memories/ the river delta by acting on the delta directly, it frees
> sediment at one stage only to deposit it at a further stage (d2). Through
> time, the flow's monitoring and remembering /edits/ the branching structure
> of the river delta, giving rise to phenomena like distributaries and important
> to our /free will/-discussion delta switching (e).


--
☣ uǝlƃ

- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ 
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: falsifying the lost opportunity updating mechanism for free will

jon zingale
Glen: "2) dampening edits or negative reinforcement"

I am positing that negative feedback also exists in such a system and is
partly responsible for the phenomenon of delta switching. Different flows
in branches can be construed as probabilities, but with the additional
action
of sedimentary deposition, which can supply a dampening mechanism over
branches. Perhaps the key to completing the picture is to note the potential
between the source and mouth of the river is effectively constant.
The sedimentary deposition has a similar effect on the flow that memristors
have in physical neural nets. I guess my point is that *feedback loops*
need not be understood in the abstract as explicit loops on a graph.
The materials and the physics have the property without the river's flow
being explicitly a loop.

ps. I had considered changing the word claim to axiom or constraint or
something else but figured I was spending too much time stressing over
pedantry :)



--
Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/

- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ 
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: falsifying the lost opportunity updating mechanism for free will

gepr
OK. I agree that feedback need not always be higher order than the process being controlled. But that's what I was positing, that a composer and editor *are* higher order than the processes being composed and edited. For some reason I can't articulate, I don't think the *thin* mechanism you're providing will allow for the lost opportunity sense I'm targeting.

Your mechanism seems too thin, to me, because it relies mostly on stigmergy and a kindasorta Markov property. I think the memory and editing, to properly cover the as-yet-vague phenomenon we're targeting, needs a parameterization that allows for playing around with [in|de]creasing the memory and [in|de]creasing the composition scope (both [co]domain). E.g. I'd like to be able to set the memory size to something like 100 years ... so that an old person can consider the lost opportunities of, say, being born a bastard ... which would be something one has little control over. Then shorten the memory to, say, the last time you smoked weed and told your friend that they're an uptight priss and you hate hangin' out with them ... something you might [†] be able to modify in a week or two but is largely unrelated to how well you trade stocks at your day job.


[†] Again, no assumption of [non]determinism is being made, here.

p.s. And none of this need be abstract, either. Long-scope feedback loops can be concrete.

On 6/22/20 9:54 AM, Jon Zingale wrote:

> Glen: "2) dampening edits or negative reinforcement"
>
> I am positing that negative feedback also exists in such a system and is
> partly responsible for the phenomenon of delta switching. Different flows
> in branches can be construed as probabilities, but with the additional
> action
> of sedimentary deposition, which can supply a dampening mechanism over
> branches. Perhaps the key to completing the picture is to note the potential
> between the source and mouth of the river is effectively constant.
> The sedimentary deposition has a similar effect on the flow that memristors
> have in physical neural nets. I guess my point is that *feedback loops*
> need not be understood in the abstract as explicit loops on a graph.
> The materials and the physics have the property without the river's flow
> being explicitly a loop.


--
☣ uǝlƃ

- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ 
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: falsifying the lost opportunity updating mechanism for free will

jon zingale
This post was updated on .
I suppose I see changes in memory as being mediated by changes in the
properties of the sediment/stigmergy, and composition scope being a kind of
algebraic process over the model. Sub-branches can be selected and compared.
For instance, given a single binary tree with a Markov property specifying
downward transitions, the left branch at a node can be seen as an
alternative possibility to the right branch. Perhaps, there could exist some
kind of limiting *river delta* that all others can be mapped into. In any
case, I am unclear how the composition scope might need to be extraneous.

For the record, I am not married to the river delta model, but I see it as
being one of many that might meet your theory and so I will continue to
clarify where I can. I am attempting a model-theoretic perspective where:

1) There is some phenomena to explore, say symmetry.
2) We posit a theory, say the axioms of a group.
3) We create models of the theory: finite groups, Lie groups, topological
groups, etc...
4) We explore what the different models elucidate about our phenomena.


ps. I misrepresented my thoughts on abstract loops. Perhaps it would be
better to say that the loops need not be reified as explicit loops in the model.
We both seem to be in agreement about this, but figured I would clarify.


--
Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/

- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ 
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: falsifying the lost opportunity updating mechanism for free will

gepr
Do you mean "exogenous"? If so, I'm not asserting that it need be exogenous, only higher order. I.e. the composition of the distributions between 2 processes has to be a function of those distributions. In order for such a function to be a concrete mechanism, there has to be a mechanical memory of the entire distribution, which I think limits how Markovian it can be. This is part of why I talked about truncation in the original proposition. The scope of the composition function truncates the parts it ignores. And I can see how your river delta idea can be coerced to fit that. But I worry that it's too limiting and SteveS's comment about self-negating comes back into play. It's close to a strawman in that it'll obviously lack anything that even kindasorta looks like "free will".

On 6/22/20 12:46 PM, Jon Zingale wrote:
> In any
> case, I am unclear how the composition scope might need to be extraneous.

--
☣ uǝlƃ

- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ 
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: falsifying the lost opportunity updating mechanism for free will

jon zingale
This post was updated on .
Yes, exogenous is better. It seems like we are in agreement that something
higher-order is needed, an algebra or otherwise. In regards to truncation, I
am again thinking about the Gisin paper and staying open to the idea that we
wouldn't need to amend the model but rather the underlying logic to
accommodate. Whatever model we choose, a truncation property is likely to be
unsatisfying over a boolean topos and without developing a concept like
computational observability. For now, I am thinking of truncation
interpretation as a separate problem.

I will have to think more carefully about your point regarding distributions
and the Markov property. I am not sure that the model is Markovian in that
there is memory bound up in the dynamic stigmergy.



--
Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/

- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ 
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: falsifying the lost opportunity updating mechanism for free will

gepr
That's interesting. I thought, for sure, a river delta would be Markovian, but I'm a sloppy thinker. So if anyone has a strong opinion, I'd love to hear it.

On 6/22/20 2:22 PM, Jon Zingale wrote:
> I will have to think more carefully about your point regarding distributions
> and the Markov property. I am not sure that the model is Markovian in that
> there is memory bound up in the stigmergy.


--
☣ uǝlƃ

- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ 
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: falsifying the lost opportunity updating mechanism for free will

Frank Wimberly-2
In reply to this post by jon zingale
In causal reasoning a system has the Markov property if given that a->b->c->d you only need to know the value of c to know the probability density of the values of d.  x->y means that x is a cause of y.

On Mon, Jun 22, 2020 at 3:22 PM Jon Zingale <[hidden email]> wrote:
Yes, exogenous is better. It seems like we are in agreement that something
higher-order is needed, an algebra or otherwise. In regards to truncation, I
am again thinking about the Gisin paper and staying open to the idea that we
wouldn't need to amend the model but rather the underlying logic to
accommodate. Whatever model we choose, a truncation property is likely to be
unsatisfying over a boolean topos and without developing a concept like
computational observability. For now, I am thinking of truncation
interpretation as a separate problem.

I will have to think more carefully about your point regarding distributions
and the Markov property. I am not sure that the model is Markovian in that
there is memory bound up in the stigmergy.



--
Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/

- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/


--
Frank Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz
Santa Fe, NM 87505
505 670-9918

- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ 
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: falsifying the lost opportunity updating mechanism for free will

gepr
In reply to this post by gepr
Here's one:

Application of Markov Chain and Entropy Function for Cyclicity Analysis of a Lithostratigraphic Sequence - A Case History from the Kolhan Basin, Jharkhand, Eastern India
https://www.longdom.org/open-access/application-of-markov-chain-and-entropy-function-for-cyclicity-analysisof-a-lithostratigraphic-sequence--a-case-history-from-the-kolhan-basinjharkhand-eastern-india-jgg-1000224.pdf
> The computed values of chi-square is lower than the limiting values at the 0.5% significance level this means that the null hypothesis is false, suggesting  the  deposition  of  sediments  is  not  by  Markovian  process  and  non-cyclic  arrangement  of  facies  states  in  Chaibasa-Noamundi  basin  (Table  2g).  The  facies  relationship  diagram  is  constructed  from  the difference matrix results (Figure 3) (Table 2f).


On 6/22/20 2:28 PM, ∄ uǝlƃ wrote:
> That's interesting. I thought, for sure, a river delta would be Markovian, but I'm a sloppy thinker. So if anyone has a strong opinion, I'd love to hear it.
>
> On 6/22/20 2:22 PM, Jon Zingale wrote:
>> I will have to think more carefully about your point regarding distributions
>> and the Markov property. I am not sure that the model is Markovian in that
>> there is memory bound up in the stigmergy.
>
>

--
☣ uǝlƃ

- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ 
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: falsifying the lost opportunity updating mechanism for free will

jon zingale
In reply to this post by gepr
As I reflect, search, and read more on Markov processes I feel a need
to refine my earlier statements. The temptation is to short-circuit the
history doesn't matter quality of a Markov process[⚥]. Clearly, this
has it's own difficulties and misses Glen's intent, he is explicitly
desiring a non-Markovian model. It seems to me that being non-Markov
is baked into the underlying logic and manifests in concepts like
observability, uncertainty, etc...

To my mind, there is a possible correspondence between compressibility
as found in Chaitin-Kolmogorov complexity and the property of being
Markov. We determine the degree of randomness in a process by measuring
the distance a process is from being Markov (χ²). We determine the
degree of randomness in a sequence by measuring the distance a sequence
is from random (compressibility). In both cases, we rely on a notion of
observability, but perhaps in different ways.

For instance, in computational theory, recognition of a language by a
machine offers a means of computing statements in the language. Machines
are ordered by their capacity, and eventually, even Turing machines are
limited to what they can know. In the section of Gisin's paper entitled
"Non-deterministic Classical Physics", Gisin relies on a result from
symbolic dynamics that I am continuing to work through. Effectively,
the result can be summarized as saying that limited observability of
chaotic dynamics entails randomness[‡].

I feel a need to be cautious when asked whether a river delta is Markov.
I believe that it is worth arguing that the river delta itself is possibly
inaccessible and to decide whether it is Markov, we first need to fix a
model. If we bake determinism into the model, we will get determinism
from the model. On the other hand, we know that modeling systems of
incomplete information can be strikingly useful. By analogy, while the
gambler's ruin may have a positive expectation, the gambler may have
a finite budget.

So, back to the case of our river delta. If we want a non-Markov river
delta model, we can look to ways of limiting what can be known. There
can be limited knowledge in space, time, or process (say). For the
purpose of fleshing out these constraints, consider an analogy to Conway's
game. The whole river (the board-state) may be reasonably modeled such
that the n+1th state is determined by the nth state. Because a river
delta participates in distributary formation the underlying state space
is compelled to evolve. This evolution of the delta will depend on some
knowledge of the state of the ocean. Extending the model to include the
ocean may very well require revisiting the objective meaning of river
delta (relaxing spatial constraint).

Even while board-state is Markov, understanding the evolution of a given
neighborhood with imperfect information may not be Markov (Observing
the Mississipi river from Vicksburg, say). Determination of the future
state of this stretch of river will depend not only on history but on the
state of the flow/channel further upstream. In Conway's game, we may
wonder about the appearance of a glider within a specific region. Without
knowledge of adjacent neighborhoods and because of the non-uniqueness
of glider formation, we may see our glider at time k but know nothing
about future states of our neighborhood (time and space matter).

Lastly, and likely most obviously/controversially, when we go to
summarize our river delta we make a choice of model. Perhaps our river
delta is not obeying Conway's rules for all time. Perhaps it is a very
nice approximation for now, but will be horribly divergent in the long
run. Worst will be if the process giving rise to our river delta belongs
to the class of non-computables.

[⚥]van Kampen says: "But suppose the walker has a tendency to persist
in his direction: probability p to step in the same direction, and q to
return. Then X_t is no longer Markovian since the probability of X_t
depends not just on x_t1 but also on x_t2. This may be remedied by
introducing the two-component variable {X_t, X_t-1}. This joint variable
is again Markovian, with transition probability..."
- Remarks on Non-Markov Processes

[‡] The clearest source I have for this at present is article 5, section 3
of Conceptual Mathematics by Lawvere and Schanuel. If anyone on the
list has further expertise or reference for this concept, your input will be appreciated.

- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ 
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: falsifying the lost opportunity updating mechanism for free will

jon zingale
Jon says: "Worst will be if the process giving rise to our river delta
belongs to the class of non-computables."

whatever that can mean.




--
Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/

- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ 
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: falsifying the lost opportunity updating mechanism for free will

thompnickson2
In reply to this post by gepr
Sometimes I feel, for a moment, that I understand some aspect of the argument you-guys are having and then I want to participate.  Without knowing jack-squat about neural networks, it just seems to me that coherence is something that a neural-net could be designed to care about.  And so, if I do something, and, as a consequence, learn something about contingencies I did not know before, it would seem to me that a network might go about reorganizing in terms of the new information and that THAT is what we might mean by "regret."  "Did that once; ain;t going to do it again."

N

Nicholas Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
Clark University
[hidden email]
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/
 


-----Original Message-----
From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of ? u?l?
Sent: Monday, June 22, 2020 8:37 AM
To: FriAM <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] falsifying the lost opportunity updating mechanism for free will

Well, first, I'm not making a claim, only tossing a wet noodle mechanism at the wall to see if it'll stick.

I think canalizing flow is missing 2 key components of the mechanism I proposed: 1) composition and 2) dampening edits or negative reinforcement. (1) is less important. I think I could steelman your weaker form of composition well enough say it's a member of this class of mechanisms. But (2) is important. Canalizing flow is positive reinforcing. But the point of a feedback loop (and iteration as opposed to instantaneous composition) trying to capture *lost opportunity* is to lower the chances of following the same path next time and raise the chances of following a different path next time.

To map back to a vernacular "free will", this mechanism implements it by *regret* and post-hoc rationalization. So, to coerce it into some kind of canalization, at a bare minimum, the mechanism would need some force for mixing or heat, some way to scramble *against* positive reinforcement. But that would only be a force for neutral distributions ... e.g. "If I had the chance to do it all over again FRESH". That doesn't go far enough. To capture lost opportunity and regret, we have to have "If I had the chance to do it all over again KNOWING WHAT I KNOW NOW".

This is why I included the scaffolding for pattern matching and iteration. The mechanism has to be able to exhibit negative feedback.

On 6/20/20 9:31 AM, Jon Zingale wrote:

> Glen's Claim:
> a) a mesh of parallel processes evolving in time
> b) each process has a local branching structure
> c) these branches (and the events that walk them) compose
> d) that composition is monitored and remembered within some scope
> e) that monitor/memory is used by a controller to edit the branching
> structures
>
> Heraclitus says: "No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it's
> not the same river and he's not the same man."
>
> From the Eulerian perspective, fluid flowing through a river delta has
> many of the characteristics of Glen's theory. We can imagine the river
> delta as a mesh of composed local branching structures, whose /events/
> are the ensemble particles of the flow (a,b,c). The flow /monitors/
> the river delta directly, it experiences the changes in gradients and shear (d1).
> The flow /memories/ the river delta by acting on the delta directly,
> it frees sediment at one stage only to deposit it at a further stage
> (d2). Through time, the flow's monitoring and remembering /edits/ the
> branching structure of the river delta, giving rise to phenomena like
> distributaries and important to our /free will/-discussion delta switching (e).


--
☣ uǝlƃ

- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ 


- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ 
123