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Marcus G. Daniels

Re: death

Roger writes:

“It seems that this sort of dead code, undead code, zombie code problem is fairly ubiquitous in information processing systems. No matter whose system, there are always things around that don't go away because nobody cared to do anything about them. They always need a clean reboot eventually, or a clean reinstall, or some kind of purge to clear the inevitable cruft of just running too long.”

This is the sort of thing I’d expect to see in a naïve approach to a spatially extended UTM. Without some process to clean it up, like dreaming, there would be more and more agents coming to contradictory conclusions. When a call is made to vote on a decision there would much wasted motion in the cancellations where the heat of many weak learners might overwhelm the light from a few strong learners.

Marcus

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Steve Smith

Re: death

In reply to this post by gepr

> That was a lot, forcing me to cherry-pick. 8^) I disagree with the *fairly* quickly part. The time scales being traversed are huge, as you point out. When you make the argument that death happens fairly abruptly you bias that comment towards a few scales, namely the ones related to consciousness, identity, self and the foci of human awareness. But when compared to the time scales of cellular processes or chemical reactions versus life spans of (eg) elephants, or even generational evolution, those time scales are not considered. In this larger context death Doesn't Really Happen abruptly at all. It can be an extremely long process.
>
> To go back to the thin veneer between the living and the dead theme of Samhain, it seems to me that most of us *begin* our death around age 40 or so. I'm sure the peak of "the hill" is different for everyone, shows sensitivity to demographics/lifestyle/resources, and changes with technology and things like global climate, population, etc. But the key point, which you refer to as well, seems to be a native sense of senescence ... a kind of programmed death, like apoptosis at the cellular layer and loss of mitochondria, or reduction in hormone production, etc. at the organism layer. The vampires (like Thiel) seem to believe this is avoidable with trickery ... the classic cautionary tales apply. Even when I finally crash my bike into an oncoming truck at 70 mph, my death will be nothing like instantaneous. Even if it's too quick for my "mind" wouldn't imply it's too quick for ... like every other process in the universe. 8^) In fact, one of my favorite arguments against atheists is to claim the afterlife is that (within epsilon) period from when you see the oncoming truck and the last few ion channels in the various and distributed (all over the grill) parts of your brain shut down. Like Lorentz expansion of space or contraction of time, perhaps that period seems, subjectively, to stretch to eternity?
>
> So, clearly, I don't think death is at all abrupt ... mostly because I don't believe there is such a thing as a temporally extended self. You are merely *similar* to yourself 10 minutes ago.
     "History doesn't repeat itself, it rhymes, and so do I" (apologies
to S. Clemens)!

When you first brought up death, I immediately went to the very narrow
definition you reference... that of the (apparent) permanent dissolution
of personal consciousness, of mind, etc.   Having watched *that* proceed
over a space of roughly 10 years, or most acutely 2-3 years, in
Alzheimer's sufferers, and having enjoyed the earlier phases of mental
senescence (fading of proper nouns going first, or most notably), even
THIS definition of "death" can be fairly long and slow from the
timescale/perspective of the mind/consciousness experiencing it.

Your "over the hill" reference is another example, I believe, of
relative point of view. Most people I know over about 25 seem to notice
*how* they are over the hill.   The extreme elasticity of the body and
mind of children (through puberty and into young adulthood?) is the
first to go (from an adult perspective) it would seem. By middle age
(sometime in our 40s?) we start to notice that our bodies (and sometimes
wits) really don't have all the pizazz they once did, but if we are
lucky, we have developed a lot of skills and knowledge and habits that
not only make up for that loss, but in fact make our net effectivity
higher for most things than when we were young: "work smarter, not
harder", etc.   By the onset of old age (I feel I am just teetering on
that threshold at 60), we are lucky if we've established enough momentum
intellectually, economically and maybe even physically (e.g. good
habits) to begin to really "coast".   Each of these shifts is an
inflection point in this long, slow curve of "death" that is reputed to
begin at "birth"...

I'm curious about your reference to "the temporally extended self".   If
it isn't *real* it certainly is a very strong illusion that my
*instantaneous self* often indulges in.   Flow states, peak awareness,
enlightenment, etc. all DO seem to point or trend toward "being in the
instant"... but nevertheless, there is also a persistent illusion of a
continuous fluid self that IS temporally extended.   In fact, by the
some measure, it would seem that is the very definition of Objectness
which I believe Selfness inherits from. Perhaps Brian Cantwell Smith
has had something to say about all of this? It has been decades since I
read him... maybe I can find my copy of "Origin of Objects"? Or maybe
it is just a faulty memory of an illusory temporally extended self?

Interesting thread as always,
  - Steve

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Steve Smith

Re: death

In reply to this post by gepr

I'm wondering if pupating isn't more relevant to the topic than moulting?

As for molting, I was surprised to learn that lobsters (and other
decapods?) appear to avoid/eschew cellular senescence... and their
apparent increase in sexual reproductivity with age...   death seems to
come (if not from accident or predation) from literally out growing some
square-cube law that means the demands of molting exceeds their
resources?   There are also accumulated diseases/parasites that
aggravate this over time/age, but not senescense at the cellular level
as most multicellular life seems to have.

I suggest pupating to reference going from specialized to general. I
*think* of the larval stage of any insectoid as being more specialized
than the mature version (mostly good at just burrowing through
(hopefully) nutrient-dense material near where they were hatched)...
especially in some beetles which seem very generalized (compared to the
average larvae).   Other creatures (lipidoptera?) might seem to be going
to *more* specialized in some sense?

Do humans become more specialized with age? I propose that we go
through cycles of specialization/generalization. Babies are optimized
for two things, ingesting and metabolizing nourishment (eliminating
waste is a sub-process this) and triggering adults to provide
nourishment and protection from predators and the elements.   As
vertebrates go, we spend a LONG time in this specialization (until
weaned and diaper trained?).   As babies become ambulatory and then
learn language, they become generalists.   At some point in their growth
into adults, they may at least dabble at specialization... picking a
sport or a topic of study to excel at.   If they don't manage to arrest
their development by becoming professional athletes, soldiers, or
perennial students, adulthood returns them toward being generalists...
not just getting good at physical or intellectual excercises within the
confines of a set of rules (a sport, a game, a class, a field of study)
but in more "real world" settings as well as perhaps (also) excelling at
non-team sports, or mechanical skills or gardening or building or
cooking or... . Of course, the confines of a career in (big) academia
or government or industry can provide a narrowing, as can the
conveniences of modern (professional) living where one needn't repair
their own vehicles (flat tire? call AAA! oil change light? Stop at
Jiffy Lube!) or grow their own food (that is what supermarkets are for)
or cook (prepared packaged meals, microwaves, fast-food and other
restaurants!) or build/repair/maintain their home (there are service
industries galore as well as handymen to do that for us), etc.   But
even if during the power-band of our professional careers, we give up
all extraneous activities/skills, we might return to (discover) them in
retirement, either as "hobbies" or out of financial opportunity (I can
retire early if I quit eating out, paying others to do my
maintenance/repair, etc.) In olden times, our elder years might
represent an opportunity to pass on the wisdom/skills gained in a
lifetime... which could be very generalized (ask old Jake, he knows
more than a bit about just about everything!) , or very specialized
(Sally can put the finest edge on your blade with her files and stones
like nobody's business!). Today, it is somewhat rare... cultural
shifts?   Or the details of life change so quickly that a lifetime of
"specialized skill development" is often irrelevant (how many
carburators need rebuilding when all modern engines are fuel injected)?
> Molting is a fantastic metaphor. But do we have any species to look to that molts for greater generality instead of greater specialty? I suppose we could argue that some species jump from one specialty to another via molting. But that passes the buck to some set of processes that hold the program for specialty selection.
>
> On 10/30/2017 01:52 PM, Roger Critchlow wrote:
>> So maybe AIs will have molting stages?

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Steve Smith

Re: death

In reply to this post by Marcus G. Daniels

Roger writes:

“It seems that this sort of dead code, undead code, zombie code problem is fairly ubiquitous in information processing systems. No matter whose system, there are always things around that don't go away because nobody cared to do anything about them. They always need a clean reboot eventually, or a clean reinstall, or some kind of purge to clear the inevitable cruft of just running too long.”

This is the sort of thing I’d expect to see in a naïve approach to a spatially extended UTM. Without some process to clean it up, like dreaming, there would be more and more agents coming to contradictory conclusions. When a call is made to vote on a decision there would much wasted motion in the cancellations where the heat of many weak learners might overwhelm the light from a few strong learners.

Gee that sounds a bit like the d(r)eadlock of our polarized two-party system today?

Marcus

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Marcus G. Daniels

Re: death

In reply to this post by Steve Smith

Steve writes:

< Of course, the confines of a career in (big) academia
or government or industry can provide a narrowing, as can the
conveniences of modern (professional) living where one needn't repair
their own vehicles (flat tire? call AAA! oil change light? Stop at
Jiffy Lube!) or grow their own food (that is what supermarkets are for)
or cook (prepared packaged meals, microwaves, fast-food and other
restaurants!) or build/repair/maintain their home (there are service
industries galore as well as handymen to do that for us), etc. But
even if during the power-band of our professional careers, we give up
all extraneous activities/skills, we might return to (discover) them in
retirement, either as "hobbies" or out of financial opportunity (I can
retire early if I quit eating out, paying others to do my
maintenance/repair, etc.) >

There's another intermediate phase that can occur, namely tenure.

Not everyone that gets that opportunity recognizes they can ease-off on the narrowing.

Instead some (many?) prefer to keep their focus but at a slower metabolism, ending at retirement at a metabolism near zero. I don't see the appeal of that approach, myself. It seems tragic, almost.

Marcus

From: Friam <[hidden email]> on behalf of Steven A Smith <[hidden email]>
Sent: Monday, October 30, 2017 9:34:57 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] death

Marcus G. Daniels

Re: death

In reply to this post by gepr

Glen writes:

"The trick is, as you point out, we don't need so many from the same gene pool(s)! Again, perhaps my Bastard status biases me. The (socialist?) idea that we all end up rearing the kids the breeders produce was built in from the start. What we need are large incentives to steer the coming generations according to policy. If we want more STEM, then encourage more STEM couples to have more babies."

I think the computers and/or neural links will have the STEM thing covered. Need something more like tabu search to explore the space of weird cyborg tricks -- less of anything that has been seen before.

Marcus

From: Friam <[hidden email]> on behalf of gⅼеɳ ☣ <[hidden email]>
Sent: Monday, October 30, 2017 1:55:35 PM
To: FriAM
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] death

On 10/30/2017 12:01 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> Odd that some conservatives give embedded worth to lives that have demonstrated none yet (pro-lifers), and change the rules as life progresses. Why the act of faith in the first place? Why no conservatives advocating one-child-per-family, or income requirements for reproduction?

Our universality depends fundamentally on babies. In order for progress to be made, the old farts, with all their outdated ideas, must die so the young turds can do things their way. Sure, we want to keep the old farts around and exploit them as best we can. But at some point, those fossilized thoughts need to be forgotten. We need those babies. Pro-lifers never seem to be reflective enough to make this sort of argument against abortion. They're so strangled by their individualism.

The trick is, as you point out, we don't need so many from the same gene pool(s)! Again, perhaps my Bastard status biases me. The (socialist?) idea that we all end up rearing the kids the breeders produce was built in from the start. What we need are large incentives to steer the coming generations according to policy. If we want more STEM, then encourage more STEM couples to have more babies. Never mind the income requirements, split things like the SAT (or IQ) tests into variously weighted incentive programs. If you (and your mate) score in the top quartile in analogical thinking, you get 7 baby vouchers. Good math scores gets you 5 vouchers. Good language scores get you 3. 8^) And vouchers are non-transferable and temporally limited. If you have more than 7 babies, then you're on your own for the remainder.

Of course, it has to be incentive based, or we'll retread some of our past mistakes.

--
☣ gⅼеɳ

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gepr

Re: death

In reply to this post by Steve Smith

Yes, you're right to classify the illusion of self along with Smith's preemptive registration, more insidious, I think, than premature registration. Identifying an object as atomic lies at the heart of a lot of our problems. We could just as easily call it a discretization artifact. Here, the "continuous fluid self" shines the light on the fact that discretization problems arise in both time and space. Unless you're willing to admit that, for example, your ancestors from 10 generations ago and 10 generations hence are *also* part of your self, then you've got to discretize "self" in time. And unless you're willing to allow some anonymous African or Alpha Centaurian to also be part of your self, then you've got to discretize in space.

Such discretization is a great method *if* you've got a well-formed set of use cases to engineer toward. But most conversations where "self" is bandied about willy nilly, a) the use cases aren't particular cases, at all, they're more like usage patterns, if they're well-formed at all, and b) conversations tend to wander and "self" under one usage pattern is magically translated into another usage pattern, making the whole conversation into nonsense.

So, practicality demands we abandon the stupid word "self" entirely. If you want to extend that practicality into your metaphysics, then so be it. But the metaphysics is irrelevant because practically, there is no self.

On 10/30/2017 07:42 PM, Steven A Smith wrote:
> I'm curious about your reference to "the temporally extended self". If it isn't *real* it certainly is a very strong illusion that my *instantaneous self* often indulges in. Flow states, peak awareness, enlightenment, etc. all DO seem to point or trend toward "being in the instant"... but nevertheless, there is also a persistent illusion of a continuous fluid self that IS temporally extended. In fact, by the some measure, it would seem that is the very definition of Objectness which I believe Selfness inherits from. Perhaps Brian Cantwell Smith has had something to say about all of this? It has been decades since I read him... maybe I can find my copy of "Origin of Objects"? Or maybe it is just a faulty memory of an illusory temporally extended self?

--
☣ gⅼеɳ

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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen

Steve Smith

Re: death

Glen ☣ -

This is a very sophisticated argument YOU make. *I* can't tell, however if *YOU* believe it, at least right this instant... perhaps *YOU* believed it when you wrote it, but does that belief persist from the former now to the current now?

Smart-asserry aside... Trying to take your point for what it is intended (or useful for?)... I believe that "atomicity" and "identity" in both space and time are simultaneously deep illusions and highly utilitarian, at least in the service of the is "illusory self" that appears to have memory, intention, and will to action. With that in mind:

I am about to go to my boneyard and search for two specific concrete blocks which I remember to have put there when I took the large woodstove out of my sunroom, and trust they are still there (or wherever I actually put them) and that when I find them and brush off any accumulated detritus and load them on my garden cart, I can haul them back to my house where I will use them in the same mode as I did last year, only in a different location. This all depends on a strong illusion of my "self", on the objectness of said blocks and woodstove and garden cart, and a continuity of "self" roughly ranging back to the time when I dismantled to the present as I plan and scheme to the future when, in fact, I am pretty confident I will find the woodstove perched on top of those very same blocks again. Of course, I may change plans mid-course if I find another set of blocks with more appropriate or promising qualities for the purpose..

- Stove

On 11/2/17 10:26 AM, gⅼеɳ ☣ wrote:

Yes, you're right to classify the illusion of self along with Smith's preemptive registration, more insidious, I think, than premature registration.  Identifying an object as atomic lies at the heart of a lot of our problems.  We could just as easily call it a discretization artifact.  Here, the "continuous fluid self" shines the light on the fact that discretization problems arise in both time and space.  Unless you're willing to admit that, for example, your ancestors from 10 generations ago and 10 generations hence are *also* part of your self, then you've got to discretize "self" in time.  And unless you're willing to allow some anonymous African or Alpha Centaurian to also be part of your self, then you've got to discretize in space.

Such discretization is a great method *if* you've got a well-formed set of use cases to engineer toward.  But most conversations where "self" is bandied about willy nilly, a) the use cases aren't particular cases, at all, they're more like usage patterns, if they're well-formed at all, and b) conversations tend to wander and "self" under one usage pattern is magically translated into another usage pattern, making the whole conversation into nonsense.

So, practicality demands we abandon the stupid word "self" entirely.  If you want to extend that practicality into your metaphysics, then so be it.  But the metaphysics is irrelevant because practically, there is no self.


On 10/30/2017 07:42 PM, Steven A Smith wrote:

I'm curious about your reference to "the temporally extended self".   If it isn't *real* it certainly is a very strong illusion that my *instantaneous self* often indulges in.   Flow states, peak awareness, enlightenment, etc.  all DO seem to point or trend toward "being in the instant"... but nevertheless, there is also a persistent illusion of  a continuous fluid self that IS temporally extended.   In fact, by the some measure, it would seem that is the very definition of Objectness which I believe Selfness inherits from.  Perhaps Brian Cantwell Smith has had something to say about all of this?  It has been decades since I read him... maybe I can find my copy of "Origin of Objects"?  Or maybe it is just a faulty memory of an illusory temporally extended self?

gepr

Re: death

In reply to this post by Steve Smith

On 10/30/2017 08:34 PM, Steven A Smith wrote:
> Do humans become more specialized with age? I propose that we go through cycles of specialization/generalization. Babies are optimized for two things, ingesting and metabolizing nourishment (eliminating waste is a sub-process this) and triggering adults to provide nourishment and protection from predators and the elements. As vertebrates go, we spend a LONG time in this specialization (until weaned and diaper trained?).

Although this may sound like hair-splitting, I don't think it is. I don't think babies are AT ALL specialized to ingesting, metabolism, and manipulation of their adults. I think babies are maximally generalized. They're not good at *any* particular thing. Their feces isn't well processed. They don't easily focus on things (faces being a well documented exception). They can't really grasp things well. Etc. So, if they're specialized at anything, I'd say they're only specialists at specializing. Why spend so long in that specializing phase? (And why do we have babies that are so generalized and vulnerable?) Because the specialties they must learn are HARD to learn.

The semi-universality of the constructors that are humans is very difficult to wander into and navigate once almost-there. When a kid finally *does* learn to do some particular thing, they milk it for all it's worth! When you finally learn to manipulate your mom into feeding you, you'll do it as often as you can ... because it feels good. It doesn't just feel good to eat. It also feels good to exercise your new specialty.

> As babies become ambulatory and then learn language, they become generalists. At some point in their growth into adults, they may at least dabble at specialization... picking a sport or a topic of study to excel at.

Everything you say below the above (snipped) was way too focused on the (illusory) *mind* and *thought*. Yes, you mention lots of specialties that involve motor skills and subsumption of conscious to unconscious tasks. But you're talking/writing as if the mind controls the body, which is clearly not the case. So my argument above, that babies are more general than toddlers are more general than teens are more general than adults allows a body-centric conception of specialization. That mind-centric stuff is nonsense.

But that doesn't mean your main objection isn't valid. Yes, we can, to greater or lesser extent, re-generalize, re-specialize, etc. That's the essence of the claim that humans are the most universal of the animals as constructors. Some ways this can happen are psychedelic drugs, meditation, new exercise regimens, as well as the typical (traumatic) events like divorce, losing a job, moving to a foreign land, significant illness, etc.

However, my claim would be that the universality is weakened as we age, not that we can't (somewhat) re-generalize at any point in our path to death, only that the extent to which we re-generalize lessens.

--
☣ gⅼеɳ

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uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen

Frank Wimberly-2

Re: death

In reply to this post by Steve Smith

You guys might be interested in the Psychoanalytic concept of object constancy.

See

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margaret_Mahler

Many philosophical discussions are explained by psychoanalysts in terms of object constancy. And the self is also an object Psychoanalytic speaking. The old Chestnut about whether a tree falling in a forest makes a sound is an example.

Frank

Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918

On Nov 2, 2017 11:21 AM, "Steven A Smith" <[hidden email]> wrote:

Glen ☣ -

This is a very sophisticated argument YOU make. *I* can't tell, however if *YOU* believe it, at least right this instant... perhaps *YOU* believed it when you wrote it, but does that belief persist from the former now to the current now?

Smart-asserry aside... Trying to take your point for what it is intended (or useful for?)...   I believe that "atomicity" and "identity" in both space and time are simultaneously deep illusions and highly utilitarian, at least in the service of the is "illusory self" that appears to have memory, intention, and will to action.   With that in mind:

I am about to go to my boneyard and search for two specific concrete blocks which I remember to have put there when I took the large woodstove out of my sunroom, and trust they are still there (or wherever I actually put them) and that when I find them and brush off any accumulated detritus and load them on my garden cart, I can haul them back to my house where I will use them in the same mode as I did last year, only in a different location. This all depends on a strong illusion of my "self", on the objectness of said blocks and woodstove and garden cart, and a continuity of "self" roughly ranging back to the time when I dismantled to the present as I plan and scheme to the future when, in fact, I am pretty confident I will find the woodstove perched on top of those very same blocks again.   Of course, I may change plans mid-course if I find another set of blocks with more appropriate or promising qualities for the purpose..

- Stove
On 11/2/17 10:26 AM, gⅼеɳ ☣ wrote:
Yes, you're right to classify the illusion of self along with Smith's preemptive registration, more insidious, I think, than premature registration.  Identifying an object as atomic lies at the heart of a lot of our problems.  We could just as easily call it a discretization artifact.  Here, the "continuous fluid self" shines the light on the fact that discretization problems arise in both time and space.  Unless you're willing to admit that, for example, your ancestors from 10 generations ago and 10 generations hence are *also* part of your self, then you've got to discretize "self" in time.  And unless you're willing to allow some anonymous African or Alpha Centaurian to also be part of your self, then you've got to discretize in space.

Such discretization is a great method *if* you've got a well-formed set of use cases to engineer toward.  But most conversations where "self" is bandied about willy nilly, a) the use cases aren't particular cases, at all, they're more like usage patterns, if they're well-formed at all, and b) conversations tend to wander and "self" under one usage pattern is magically translated into another usage pattern, making the whole conversation into nonsense.

So, practicality demands we abandon the stupid word "self" entirely.  If you want to extend that practicality into your metaphysics, then so be it.  But the metaphysics is irrelevant because practically, there is no self.


On 10/30/2017 07:42 PM, Steven A Smith wrote:
I'm curious about your reference to "the temporally extended self".   If it isn't *real* it certainly is a very strong illusion that my *instantaneous self* often indulges in.   Flow states, peak awareness, enlightenment, etc.  all DO seem to point or trend toward "being in the instant"... but nevertheless, there is also a persistent illusion of  a continuous fluid self that IS temporally extended.   In fact, by the some measure, it would seem that is the very definition of Objectness which I believe Selfness inherits from.  Perhaps Brian Cantwell Smith has had something to say about all of this?  It has been decades since I read him... maybe I can find my copy of "Origin of Objects"?  Or maybe it is just a faulty memory of an illusory temporally extended self?
============================================================
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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gepr

Re: death

In reply to this post by Steve Smith

Right. Of course. But it's very telling that you put the word *purpose* last. It is that purpose that sets the entire context, including the appropriateness of any definition in the lexicon used while engaged in the project. You seem to have ignored my point about use cases and how they set the tolerances on discretization error.

On 11/02/2017 10:21 AM, Steven A Smith wrote:
> I am about to go to my boneyard and search for two specific concrete blocks which I remember to have put there when I took the large woodstove out of my sunroom, and trust they are still there (or wherever I actually put them) and that when I find them and brush off any accumulated detritus and load them on my garden cart, I can haul them back to my house where I will use them in the same mode as I did last year, only in a different location. This all depends on a strong illusion of my "self", on the objectness of said blocks and woodstove and garden cart, and a continuity of "self" roughly ranging back to the time when I dismantled to the present as I plan and scheme to the future when, in fact, I am pretty confident I will find the woodstove perched on top of those very same blocks again. Of course, I may change plans mid-course if I find another set of blocks with more appropriate or promising qualities for the purpose..

--
☣ gⅼеɳ

============================================================
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen

gepr

Re: death

In reply to this post by Frank Wimberly-2

I am (or thought I was) familiar with the idea. But it should be clear that the wikipedia entry is GUILTY of the exact problem I'm trying to point out. So, it's not only not helpful, but perpetuates the problem. Witness:

"Object constancy, similar to Jean Piaget's object permanence, describes the phase when the child understands that the mother has a separate identity and is truly a separate individual."

In other words, object constancy is precisely the false conclusion. Perhaps there's other literature that talks specifically about how the *fiction* of object constancy affects/retards future development? If you know of that literature, perhaps you could point to it? Or, better yet, explain it in your own words ... which I enjoy more and find much more useful. 8^)

On 11/02/2017 10:32 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> You guys might be interested in the Psychoanalytic concept of object constancy.
>
> See
> https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margaret_Mahler
>
> Many philosophical discussions are explained by psychoanalysts in terms of object constancy. And the self is also an object Psychoanalytic speaking. The old Chestnut about whether a tree falling in a forest makes a sound is an example.

--
☣ gⅼеɳ

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FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen

Frank Wimberly-2

Re: death

Lack of object constancy after childhood is definitely considered to be symptomatic. If you don't believe something exists unless you are experiencing it, including yourself, you will have a difficult time.

Here is a link:

http://borderlinepersonality.typepad.com/my_weblog/2008/06/lack-of-object.html

I believe this is psychoanalytic orthodoxy.

Frank

Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918

On Nov 2, 2017 12:01 PM, "gⅼеɳ ☣" <[hidden email]> wrote:

I am (or thought I was) familiar with the idea. But it should be clear that the wikipedia entry is GUILTY of the exact problem I'm trying to point out. So, it's not only not helpful, but perpetuates the problem. Witness:

"Object constancy, similar to Jean Piaget's object permanence, describes the phase when the child understands that the mother has a separate identity and is truly a separate individual."

In other words, object constancy is precisely the false conclusion. Perhaps there's other literature that talks specifically about how the *fiction* of object constancy affects/retards future development? If you know of that literature, perhaps you could point to it? Or, better yet, explain it in your own words ... which I enjoy more and find much more useful. 8^)

On 11/02/2017 10:32 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> You guys might be interested in the Psychoanalytic concept of object constancy.
>
> See
> https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margaret_Mahler
>
> Many philosophical discussions are explained by psychoanalysts in terms of object constancy. And the self is also an object Psychoanalytic speaking. The old Chestnut about whether a tree falling in a forest makes a sound is an example.

--
☣ gⅼеɳ

============================================================
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Frank Wimberly-2

Re: death

Hmm. In my own words: perhaps you've known people who "fall to pieces" when the object of their attachment isn't present. This often causes that "object" to flee. Think of boy-girl relationships in adolescence which sometimes are messed up because of the imprint of the past.

Frank

Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918

On Nov 2, 2017 12:09 PM, "Frank Wimberly" <[hidden email]> wrote:

Lack of object constancy after childhood is definitely considered to be symptomatic. If you don't believe something exists unless you are experiencing it, including yourself, you will have a difficult time.

Here is a link:

http://borderlinepersonality.typepad.com/my_weblog/2008/06/lack-of-object.html

I believe this is psychoanalytic orthodoxy.

Frank

Frank Wimberly
Phone <a href="tel:(505)%20670-9918" value="+15056709918" target="_blank">(505) 670-9918

On Nov 2, 2017 12:01 PM, "gⅼеɳ ☣" <[hidden email]> wrote:
I am (or thought I was) familiar with the idea. But it should be clear that the wikipedia entry is GUILTY of the exact problem I'm trying to point out. So, it's not only not helpful, but perpetuates the problem. Witness:

"Object constancy, similar to Jean Piaget's object permanence, describes the phase when the child understands that the mother has a separate identity and is truly a separate individual."

In other words, object constancy is precisely the false conclusion. Perhaps there's other literature that talks specifically about how the *fiction* of object constancy affects/retards future development? If you know of that literature, perhaps you could point to it? Or, better yet, explain it in your own words ... which I enjoy more and find much more useful. 8^)

On 11/02/2017 10:32 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> You guys might be interested in the Psychoanalytic concept of object constancy.
>
> See
> https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margaret_Mahler
>
> Many philosophical discussions are explained by psychoanalysts in terms of object constancy. And the self is also an object Psychoanalytic speaking. The old Chestnut about whether a tree falling in a forest makes a sound is an example.

--
☣ gⅼеɳ

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

gepr

Re: death

Awesome! I appreciate the link, though reading my DSM V entry on BPD muddies my water. 8^) From your words and those of the link (Mahari), I can't help but think about patterns of sensory stimuli, as opposed to "objects", per se. While I completely reject the imputing of object-hood onto the repeating patterns, I do *not* reject the idea that those who have trouble inducing patterns from their experiences would have trouble developing appropriate to their environment.

In other words, I would reword what you say to something like "... when the familiar patterns of stimulus are not present." I think it's useful to reword it that way because it would allow similar reactions to, e.g. a loved one's traumatic brain injury, where their personality changes in a fundamental way. Although not that similar, I'm reminded of Shannon Allen's testimony in the Bowe Bergdahl trial:

> "Instead of being his wife, I‘m his caregiver," Reuters reported she testified. "Which doesn’t mean I love him any less, but it’s a very different dynamic. We can’t even hold hands anymore without me prying open his hand and putting mine in."

If we could abandon or soften this silly atomicity fiction, we might get a better handle on subtle dynamics like that.

On 11/02/2017 11:16 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote:

> Hmm. In my own words: perhaps you've known people who "fall to pieces" when the object of their attachment isn't present. This often causes that "object" to flee. Think of boy-girl relationships in adolescence which sometimes are messed up because of the imprint of the past.
>
> Frank
>
> Frank Wimberly
> Phone (505) 670-9918
>
> On Nov 2, 2017 12:09 PM, "Frank Wimberly" <[hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>> wrote:
>
> Lack of object constancy after childhood is definitely considered to be symptomatic. If you don't believe something exists unless you are experiencing it, including yourself, you will have a difficult time.
>
> Here is a link:
>
> http://borderlinepersonality.typepad.com/my_weblog/2008/06/lack-of-object.html <http://borderlinepersonality.typepad.com/my_weblog/2008/06/lack-of-object.html>

--
☣ gⅼеɳ

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen

Frank Wimberly-2

Re: death

Another thing that helps me with Friam disagreements is to think in terms of "both-and" rather than "either-or". In Fiddler on the Roof, Tevya says to A, "you're right". B objects and Tevya says again, "You're right". C says that they can't both be right and Tevya says, "You're also right".

Frank

Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918

On Nov 2, 2017 12:31 PM, "gⅼеɳ ☣" <[hidden email]> wrote:

Awesome! I appreciate the link, though reading my DSM V entry on BPD muddies my water. 8^) From your words and those of the link (Mahari), I can't help but think about patterns of sensory stimuli, as opposed to "objects", per se. While I completely reject the imputing of object-hood onto the repeating patterns, I do *not* reject the idea that those who have trouble inducing patterns from their experiences would have trouble developing appropriate to their environment.

In other words, I would reword what you say to something like "... when the familiar patterns of stimulus are not present." I think it's useful to reword it that way because it would allow similar reactions to, e.g. a loved one's traumatic brain injury, where their personality changes in a fundamental way. Although not that similar, I'm reminded of Shannon Allen's testimony in the Bowe Bergdahl trial:

> "Instead of being his wife, I‘m his caregiver," Reuters reported she testified. "Which doesn’t mean I love him any less, but it’s a very different dynamic. We can’t even hold hands anymore without me prying open his hand and putting mine in."

If we could abandon or soften this silly atomicity fiction, we might get a better handle on subtle dynamics like that.

On 11/02/2017 11:16 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> Hmm. In my own words: perhaps you've known people who "fall to pieces" when the object of their attachment isn't present. This often causes that "object" to flee. Think of boy-girl relationships in adolescence which sometimes are messed up because of the imprint of the past.
>
> Frank
>
> Frank Wimberly
> Phone <a href="tel:%28505%29%20670-9918" value="+15056709918">(505) 670-9918
>
> On Nov 2, 2017 12:09 PM, "Frank Wimberly" <[hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>> wrote:
>
> Lack of object constancy after childhood is definitely considered to be symptomatic. If you don't believe something exists unless you are experiencing it, including yourself, you will have a difficult time.
>
> Here is a link:
>
> http://borderlinepersonality.typepad.com/my_weblog/2008/06/lack-of-object.html <http://borderlinepersonality.typepad.com/my_weblog/2008/06/lack-of-object.html>

--
☣ gⅼеɳ

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

gepr

Re: death

Heh, as long as you identify the particulars of the use case, then "both-and" is intuitive and correct. But when someone makes an ambiguous statement with no particulars and makes no serious attempt to describe the context in which their statement is supposed to be understood, then it's definitely NOT "both-and". Without the particulars, it becomes nonsense and one can only answer "Mu".

On 11/02/2017 11:47 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> Another thing that helps me with Friam disagreements is to think in terms of "both-and" rather than "either-or". In Fiddler on the Roof, Tevya says to A, "you're right". B objects and Tevya says again, "You're right". C says that they can't both be right and Tevya says, "You're also right".

--
☣ gⅼеɳ

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen