clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

classic Classic list List threaded Threaded
48 messages Options
123
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: [ SPAM ] RE: clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

glen ropella

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tempest_%28codename%29

I don't disagree that low N studies are useful.  But high N studies are also useful.

On 12/22/2014 06:06 AM, Marcus G. Daniels wrote:

> Nick wrote:
>
> "Well, 30 or more tiny fm radios placed at strategic locations around the
> mother board, might be more like it.  No?"
>
> Like if a team of two or three aliens came to watch the Earth from orbit,
> before there was broadcasting.  Relatively speaking, that's how many
> individual things they'd have to understand if 1 person = 1 neuron (putting
> aside that each person has 10,000 friends/synapses in this analogy) .    I'm
> claiming it would be much more effective to take 30 people up in their
> spaceship and study them in detail.  Perhaps from orbit they could make a
> good guess at that, e.g. a president, a popular athlete, a celebrity,
> several randomly selected people of different races, etc.


--
⇒⇐ glen e. p. ropella
The shackles of automata will shatter like their bones.


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: [ SPAM ] RE: clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

Gillian Densmore
@Glen before diving to deep into it with numbers- do you have a
working defination of Agnostic vs Atheist?

On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 8:54 AM, glen <[hidden email]> wrote:

>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tempest_%28codename%29
>
> I don't disagree that low N studies are useful.  But high N studies are also useful.
>
> On 12/22/2014 06:06 AM, Marcus G. Daniels wrote:
>> Nick wrote:
>>
>> "Well, 30 or more tiny fm radios placed at strategic locations around the
>> mother board, might be more like it.  No?"
>>
>> Like if a team of two or three aliens came to watch the Earth from orbit,
>> before there was broadcasting.  Relatively speaking, that's how many
>> individual things they'd have to understand if 1 person = 1 neuron (putting
>> aside that each person has 10,000 friends/synapses in this analogy) .    I'm
>> claiming it would be much more effective to take 30 people up in their
>> spaceship and study them in detail.  Perhaps from orbit they could make a
>> good guess at that, e.g. a president, a popular athlete, a celebrity,
>> several randomly selected people of different races, etc.
>
>
> --
> ⇒⇐ glen e. p. ropella
> The shackles of automata will shatter like their bones.
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

glen ropella
On 12/22/2014 12:18 PM, Gillian Densmore wrote:
> @Glen before diving to deep into it with numbers- do you have a
> working defination of Agnostic vs Atheist?

Well, the standard definitions suffice, I think.  This one works just
fine for agnostic: "a person who believes that nothing is known or can
be known of the existence or nature of God or of anything beyond
material phenomena; a person who claims neither faith nor disbelief in
God."

And this one works for atheist: "a person who disbelieves or lacks
belief in the existence of God or gods."

Having argued about this sort of thing for decades, now, I find the
primary denotational sticking point to be the difference between
"belief" and "knowledge".  The primary connotational sticking points are
usually dogma and the ontological status of supernatural phenomena.
Agnostics and atheists align almost perfectly regarding the supernatural
stuff.  An atheist claims the supernatural does not exist, whereas an
agnostic claims that supernatural stuff is completely irrelevant.
Dogma, however, becomes very important.  Atheists tend to be more
dogmatic, particularly about the structure and interpretation of
evidence, whereas agnostics tend to be more willing to let the data lay
around without curating or interpreting it.

So, whether you consider the standard definitions "working" or not
depends on the actionable differences between a) "knowledge" vs.
"belief" and b) the tendency (or not) to triage data into evidence.

Re (a) I find it useful to ask questions like "Can you know something
you don't believe?" And "Can you believe something you don't know?"  Re
(b) it can be interesting to see how badly the social network mangles
scientific research results.  For whatever reason, despite most research
being published with lots of caveats and hedges, most people read it as
"scientific knowledge" or "proof".  The same can be said about the
"gossip game", where a statement at one end gets modified as it's
whispered from one person to the next.  There is a biological limit to
iterative depth.  You can't just wrap a statement inside
he-said(she-said(he-said(she-said(...)))) forever.  At some point you
have to put in a hard stop, a triage.

--
⇔ glen

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

Steve Smith
Glen -

Great "wordsmithery" as usual!

My first instinct was to hairsplit argumentatively and ask for more
fine-structure in the definition of "god or gods"... to start, we are
all progressive feminists here I am sure, so "god or gods" should be
taken as gender neutral such that the goddess or goddesses is entirely
implied here.  Then we might question if said god(ess)(es) need be fully
anthropomorphised (gendered humanoids) or if merely ascribing sentient
beingness is enough?

So I would contend that what is needed is NOT an "athiest detector" but
rather a religious belief classifier system designed around these other
finer structures.   Even more interesting would be a type of learning
classifier that could maybe be applied to individuals first by asking
their self-reporting on these matters, then perhaps based on various
behaviours (frequency and nature of prayer, attendance to other rituals,
adherence to golden and other rules or commandments, etc.), and finally
to the physiometric (brain only, or should the entire body be
included... on the off chance that belief in god(ess(es)) occurs in the
pancreas or in lymphatic system?

    I don't know how valuable it is to hairsplit to another level... but
the question of belief.

As far as physiometrics go, I suppose we could start as the Nazis did
and maybe the most fundamentalist Islamists do and check one's (male in
the first place, female in the second) circumcision status.   And for
Catholics, maybe the salivary response when presented with a communion
wafer?   Perhaps something equally obvious could be offered up for
members of the LDS church, or the Zoroastrians...

hmmm... interesting questions to contemplate on the first day of the
rest of the solar year!

Merry Solstice everyone!

>  Dogma, however, becomes very important.  Atheists tend to be more
> dogmatic, particularly about the structure and interpretation of
> evidence, whereas agnostics tend to be more willing to let the data
> lay around without curating or interpreting it.
>
> So, whether you consider the standard definitions "working" or not
> depends on the actionable differences between a) "knowledge" vs.
> "belief" and b) the tendency (or not) to triage data into evidence.
>
> Re (a) I find it useful to ask questions like "Can you know something
> you don't believe?" And "Can you believe something you don't know?"  
> Re (b) it can be interesting to see how badly the social network
> mangles scientific research results.  For whatever reason, despite
> most research being published with lots of caveats and hedges, most
> people read it as "scientific knowledge" or "proof".  The same can be
> said about the "gossip game", where a statement at one end gets
> modified as it's whispered from one person to the next.  There is a
> biological limit to iterative depth.  You can't just wrap a statement
> inside he-said(she-said(he-said(she-said(...)))) forever.  At some
> point you have to put in a hard stop, a triage.
>


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

glen ropella

Ha!  I am immune to your sarcasm! 8^)

It is _precisely_ agnostic to assert that the gender of the gods is
completely irrelevant, as is their hair color.  So, your hair splitting
simply provides us with, dare I say it, CERTAIN convincing evidence that
you are a paternalist!  And that you rely so heavily on rules like
adding -ess to names for females (e.g. actress) when the straightforward
word (e.g. actor) perfectly describes those of either gender, clearly
and unambiguously identifies you as a dogmatist.

Personally, I'm betting belief in the supernatural lies in the pineal
gland, the homunculus clock.  And what's this about an LSD church?  I
need to find one of those.


On 12/22/2014 02:24 PM, Steve Smith wrote:

> My first instinct was to hairsplit argumentatively and ask for more
> fine-structure in the definition of "god or gods"... to start, we are
> all progressive feminists here I am sure, so "god or gods" should be
> taken as gender neutral such that the goddess or goddesses is entirely
> implied here.  Then we might question if said god(ess)(es) need be fully
> anthropomorphised (gendered humanoids) or if merely ascribing sentient
> beingness is enough?
>
> So I would contend that what is needed is NOT an "athiest detector" but
> rather a religious belief classifier system designed around these other
> finer structures.   Even more interesting would be a type of learning
> classifier that could maybe be applied to individuals first by asking
> their self-reporting on these matters, then perhaps based on various
> behaviours (frequency and nature of prayer, attendance to other rituals,
> adherence to golden and other rules or commandments, etc.), and finally
> to the physiometric (brain only, or should the entire body be
> included... on the off chance that belief in god(ess(es)) occurs in the
> pancreas or in lymphatic system?
>
>     I don't know how valuable it is to hairsplit to another level... but
> the question of belief.
>
> As far as physiometrics go, I suppose we could start as the Nazis did
> and maybe the most fundamentalist Islamists do and check one's (male in
> the first place, female in the second) circumcision status.   And for
> Catholics, maybe the salivary response when presented with a communion
> wafer?   Perhaps something equally obvious could be offered up for
> members of the LDS church, or the Zoroastrians...
>
> hmmm... interesting questions to contemplate on the first day of the
> rest of the solar year!
>
> Merry Solstice everyone!
>
>>  Dogma, however, becomes very important.  Atheists tend to be more
>> dogmatic, particularly about the structure and interpretation of
>> evidence, whereas agnostics tend to be more willing to let the data
>> lay around without curating or interpreting it.
>>
>> So, whether you consider the standard definitions "working" or not
>> depends on the actionable differences between a) "knowledge" vs.
>> "belief" and b) the tendency (or not) to triage data into evidence.
>>
>> Re (a) I find it useful to ask questions like "Can you know something
>> you don't believe?" And "Can you believe something you don't know?" Re
>> (b) it can be interesting to see how badly the social network mangles
>> scientific research results.  For whatever reason, despite most
>> research being published with lots of caveats and hedges, most people
>> read it as "scientific knowledge" or "proof".  The same can be said
>> about the "gossip game", where a statement at one end gets modified as
>> it's whispered from one person to the next.  There is a biological
>> limit to iterative depth.  You can't just wrap a statement inside
>> he-said(she-said(he-said(she-said(...)))) forever.  At some point you
>> have to put in a hard stop, a triage.
>>
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com

--
⇔ glen

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

glen ropella
In reply to this post by Marcus G. Daniels
circa Mon Dec 22 18:10:45 EST 2014, mgd wrote:
> As I see it, the significant attention in that case in that example is putting together the joke.   For True Blood or Walking Dead, it's the screenwriters, actors, directors, consultants, and other creative individuals involved in making the shows.    For a video game, it's the artists and coders.
>
> I suppose I could say by paying my cable bill, I'm somehow a participant.    But that would be like saying because I voted I'm a leader.    I think that is absurd.   Maybe in the gaming example, there is a more overlap because experienced players would be able to give useful feedback to the game developers.
>
> If there is any point to our consumer culture, it's as a clumsy and inefficient tax to sustain the people that create.

Ahh, but you're forgetting that your payment includes not only your
money but also your eyeballs.  Thankfully, we're evolving away from the
more one-way transactions of content.  Network shows, including
nonalacart cable services, rely on more than how much money you pay for
each individual episode.  The continued existence of True Blood depends
on extrapolations into eyeballs.  By watching it you are participating.
  Even further, if you talk about it at the water cooler... if you
reference it in mailing list posts, if you wear costumes at halloween
parties based on it, etc, you are participating.  The same is true for
most video games, now, which track interest via varous "trophies" as
well as tracking social games (where people play together over the
internet), not to mention MMO games where the boundary between real
assets and game assets is blurred.

Even your oversimplification to "I voted, therefore I'm a leader" isn't
as absurd as you intend.  Voting isn't merely a purely private ink mark
on an anonymous ballot.  It's an identity for many people.  Do you split
your ticket?  Do you vote for candidates?  Do you talk about voting...
even in the abstract?  Hell, even non-voters like Russell Brand are
participants in our voting system.

--
⇔ glen

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

[ SPAM ] RE: clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

Marcus G. Daniels
Nick writes:

"What is the validator here, and against what is it validated."

Without the possibility of evidence to decide a question, an atheist is one example of a person that will reject it as being invalid.
So one thing I'd expect to find in the brain of an atheist is a mechanism to evaluate propositions.   Propositions need to be subdivided into smaller propositions until evidence supports them as being true or false.  Without evidence a proposition is both true and false, which is uninformative and means to look elsewhere.  

What makes a person take public positions on this particular thing (no deities) might be little more than personality.    An activist mentality, a desire to protect personal preferences from a group rather than the group imposing views on the individual.    It's of course possible for a person to pursue self-interest with discretion and without conflict.     I suppose these are the folks that sit quietly at meetings intended for brainstorming and at question/answer sessions.    Daringly protecting the principle of "Don't look ignorant" at all costs.  Working "behind the scenes" in a collegial way, etc.

Validation is not a question of beliefs being present or absent without delusion or misrepresentation,  it's a question of how active and obvious the resistance is to undecidable propositions.    The activism part of it could be the absence of an inhibitory mechanism or the presence of a social behavior.  

The motivation for a biomarker is that if there is a practiced capability there should be a pattern of connectivity to implement it.   In particular, if the topology of that connectivity had a strong hierarchical component to it, then there might be very high level locator neurons that identified weak parts of arguments.  For the atheist, one could imagine op-amp like neural circuits to increase sensitivity when coupled to an  "authority figure speaking" signal.
For the theist, the op-amp could be wired up to memory cells.  If a belief was established, the authority figure would further reinforce the memory.  If it was weakly established and there was no authority figure signal, then it would tend to zero out.  

Marcus





============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: [ SPAM ] RE: clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

Nick Thompson
Marcus,

Thanks for responding.  My bad.  I used "validator" in a narrow technical
sense, not in its more regular sense of a proof.   My use comes from
measurement theory in psychology.  I am not an expert in measurement theory,
but here goes:    A measure is "valid" when it can be shown to  correspond
to the thing being measured.  So to say that anything ... brain state,
verbal report, whatever ... is a measure of atheistic thinking is to imply
that there is something that there is, apart from the measures, that
constitutes atheistic thinking.   So, in my usage, the "validator" is the
thing you are trying to get at when you are trying to "diagnose" religiosity
or its absense.  A high sugar content in a single urine test is a somewhat
valid measure of some degree of diabetes, but several blood glucose tests is
a much better validator, and a hemoglobin A1C, which gives you a measure of
how high the glucose has been for the last 3 months, is even better.  The
best validator is, of course, kind of a conceptual notion, because it is the
thing itself, the thing that all of these measures are attempting to get at.
And you can NEVER get at it because you always have to be measuring it or
sampling it, etc.  Maybe that one-meter rod in Paris (or whatever) is a pure
validator, but if so, it is one of the few.  

It is one of the standard knee slappers in the history of psychology when we
begin to confuse the measure with the thing it is trying to measure.   So
when someone proposes a measure of something complicated such as "atheism",
it's fair to ask what the validator of that measure would be, what the
measure is actually intended to GET AT.   And one of the kind of standard
observations that my kind of psychologist often makes, is that validator of
something complex like atheism is actually a complex behavior pattern, not
lodged in an instant, but observable in a person over many circumstances and
over a sustained period of time.  

That's what that was all about.

Have a merry Christmas ... or ... (I guess) ... not?  

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Marcus G.
Daniels
Sent: Monday, December 22, 2014 10:08 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'
Subject: [FRIAM] [ SPAM ] RE: clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

Nick writes:

"What is the validator here, and against what is it validated."

Without the possibility of evidence to decide a question, an atheist is one
example of a person that will reject it as being invalid.
So one thing I'd expect to find in the brain of an atheist is a mechanism to
evaluate propositions.   Propositions need to be subdivided into smaller
propositions until evidence supports them as being true or false.  Without
evidence a proposition is both true and false, which is uninformative and
means to look elsewhere.  

What makes a person take public positions on this particular thing (no
deities) might be little more than personality.    An activist mentality, a
desire to protect personal preferences from a group rather than the group
imposing views on the individual.    It's of course possible for a person to
pursue self-interest with discretion and without conflict.     I suppose
these are the folks that sit quietly at meetings intended for brainstorming
and at question/answer sessions.    Daringly protecting the principle of
"Don't look ignorant" at all costs.  Working "behind the scenes" in a
collegial way, etc.

Validation is not a question of beliefs being present or absent without
delusion or misrepresentation,  it's a question of how active and obvious
the resistance is to undecidable propositions.    The activism part of it
could be the absence of an inhibitory mechanism or the presence of a social
behavior.  

The motivation for a biomarker is that if there is a practiced capability
there should be a pattern of connectivity to implement it.   In particular,
if the topology of that connectivity had a strong hierarchical component to
it, then there might be very high level locator neurons that identified weak
parts of arguments.  For the atheist, one could imagine op-amp like neural
circuits to increase sensitivity when coupled to an  "authority figure
speaking" signal.
For the theist, the op-amp could be wired up to memory cells.  If a belief
was established, the authority figure would further reinforce the memory.
If it was weakly established and there was no authority figure signal, then
it would tend to zero out.  

Marcus





FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe
http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: [ SPAM ] RE: clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

Marcus G. Daniels
Nick writes:

"So when someone proposes a measure of something complicated such as
"atheism", it's fair to ask what the validator of that measure would be,
what the measure is actually intended to GET AT.   And one of the kind of
standard observations that my kind of psychologist often makes, is that
validator of something complex like atheism is actually a complex behavior
pattern, not lodged in an instant, but observable in a person over many
circumstances and over a sustained period of time. "

Is it the complexity of the patterns of atheist approach itself, or the many
(competing) ontologies involved in evaluating situations in the real world?
I doubt metaphysics is an area that IBM will prioritize for Watson, but.. I
suspect it is likely they could fake an atheist, at least for
multiple-choice tests.

Marcus


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: [ SPAM ] RE: clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

Nick Thompson
Think of Tinbergen with his herring gulls, or Lorenz with his Jackdaws, or
Wilson with his ants,  etc.  That's how well you would have to know a person
before you could say whether that person was an atheist.  

At FRIAM last Friday we had a lovely argument, in which I argued that Taking
the Lord's Name in Vain makes you an atheist, while others argued that words
(like 'god", for instance) can become void of their meaning.  I have to say
that people like Dawkins, FEEL religious to me.  If, at some level, they did
not believe in God, how could it make such a difference to them.  They doth
protest too much.  

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Marcus G.
Daniels
Sent: Tuesday, December 23, 2014 12:27 AM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] [ SPAM ] RE: clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

Nick writes:

"So when someone proposes a measure of something complicated such as
"atheism", it's fair to ask what the validator of that measure would be,
what the measure is actually intended to GET AT.   And one of the kind of
standard observations that my kind of psychologist often makes, is that
validator of something complex like atheism is actually a complex behavior
pattern, not lodged in an instant, but observable in a person over many
circumstances and over a sustained period of time. "

Is it the complexity of the patterns of atheist approach itself, or the many
(competing) ontologies involved in evaluating situations in the real world?
I doubt metaphysics is an area that IBM will prioritize for Watson, but.. I
suspect it is likely they could fake an atheist, at least for
multiple-choice tests.

Marcus


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe
http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

RE: clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

glen ep ropella
In reply to this post by glen ropella

I don't understand that concept of "validator" at all. For glucose, you talk about multiple measures.  It sounds like you're saying a more accurate measure is the validator for a less accurate measure. These are all concrete things: urine, blood, etc. But then you go on to say a conceptual notion is the best validator.  Is a conceptual notion a more accurate measure than a concrete measure?  I don't get it.


circa Tue Dec 23 00:44:54 EST 2014 nick wrote:
> My bad.  I used "validator" in a narrow technical sense, not in its more regular sense of a proof. [...] A high sugar content in a single urine test is a somewhat valid measure of some degree of diabetes, but several blood glucose tests is a much better validator, and a hemoglobin A1C, which gives you a measure of how high the glucose has been for the last 3 months, is even better.  The best validator is, of course, kind of a conceptual notion, because it is the thing itself, the thing that all of these measures are attempting to get at. And you can NEVER get at it because you always have to be measuring it or sampling it, etc.  Maybe that one-meter rod in Paris (or whatever) is a pure validator, but if so, it is one of the few.


--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-255-2847, http://tempusdictum.com

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

glen ropella
In reply to this post by glen ropella

Very Nice!  So, the gods become reflective projections, much like
empathy or the (over hyped) mirror neurons.  I'd argue that's a
statement about both your 1st point (thinking about ourselves) and your
2nd (understanding our environment).  I'll read the Brague book.  But it
reminds me of the persistent anthropomorphized physics like that of
Smolin or even the consciousness-centric physics.

RE: re-ligiere -- Would it be appropriate to argue against Marcus's
alleged independence from his entertainment by asserting that things
like Harry Potter or Eat, Pray, Love are little religions?  Perhaps even
something like Dr. Oz or Oprah Winfrey ... or perhapse even the evening
news are little religions.  Obviously, something like futbol or football
fits even better.  These smaller coherences of thought/behavior tie
their subcultures together in much the same way as something like a
small Xtian denomination.

Science, I'd argue is a different beast, though, depending on whose
definition you use.  I try to be a critical rationalist and assume that
actual science (as opposed to any concept of "science" inside any
people's heads) doesn't tie us together at all.  It's an
observer-independent set of methods that could be carried out by someone
with 3 arms as well as someone made of pure energy (whatever that means)
as well as someone with hooks isntead of hands.  There need be no
relation between the "doers of science", whereas there must be some
relation between the "doers of religion".


circa Tue Dec 23 13:26:17 EST 2014 doug wrote:
> The theory that early humans projected their own powers on to events like lightening, war and such and called them gods seems compelling. What is less well known is that in our interaction with those gods, say through ritual and prayer, we learn about ourselves. In fact dealing with the projected gods may have been necessary for human enlightenment about its own powers.
>
> Also the very idea of god or gods may be important in telling us something about the awesome coherence of the universe. Are the gods necessary for this? Don’t know. We are on the edge of human cognition as it explores the very idea of uni-verse. A very interesting book on the long history of humanity getting to the concept and words for “world.” is Remi Brague’s The Wisdom of the World: the human experience of the universe in western thought.
>
> In the background of the god talk of course is the idea of religion. I prefer to take it at its root, re-ligiere, to re-tie together. Religion is a way of tying things together. In this sense science too is a religion, a way of tying things together. It appears to be different because of its stress on matter and to a slightly lesser degree mathematics. But that is a selection of out of experience of some aspects while leaving behind others. - that is, science is much more focused on stuff than on say love, passions, or the subtleties of human and animal  interactions. The things of novels are not the things of science (yet). The standard religions are just tying together a different set of experiences than science does, but all are motivated in part by explorations in understanding (and by careers, power, etc.) f aspects of our experience.




--
⇔ glen

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

glen ropella
In reply to this post by glen ep ropella

So, did Nick mean this: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Construct_validity ?

On 12/26/2014 11:35 AM, Marcus G. Daniels wrote:
> General relativity predicts gravitational waves.  A result of that
> prediction, elaborate measurement techniques have been devised like
> computational filtering of observatory data (Einstein @ Home) or
> superconducting devices to detect polarization of the cosmic microwave
> background (POLARBEAR 2).      It's not a single thing to measure , but also
> other measurements of related phenomena, like the perihelion precession of
> Mercury.

It sounds like you're describing parallax, the idea of approaching
something with many many meaures.  Or perhaps "robustness analysis", in
the sense that if a concept is modeled in many different ways and stays
consistent across models, then it's a robust concept.  I'm familiar with
those methods ... though I have some issues with the latter.

But none of this seems to fit with what Nick seemed to describe, the
idea that an experiment is validated by a (validator) concept.  That
just seems backwards to me... like some form of insidious
justificationism.  It would lead a researcher to conclude that if a test
(any test) failed, it would _not_ falsify the concept.  It would just
mean you didn't know the trait/person/species well enough.

> What sort of things does it make sense for [a]theists to say and do, and
> does these things occur (instead of the opposite) in a statistically
> significant way?

Well, my specific problem is that I think atheists and theists are
delusional.  They think they know things they cannot know.  So, if
Nick's point is that the concept of "theist" (or "atheist") is too muddy
to define validatable[*] tests for, then, as an agnostic, I would
completely agree.  In fact, such a result would bring me quite a bit of
joy!  In other words, there can be no test for [a]theism because it's an
incoherent concept.  In fact, we're all agnostics, we just don't realize it.


[*] I would just say "valid" ... but too few people read broad words
like that and work to find the submeaning appropriate to the context.

--
⇔ glen

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

Marcus G. Daniels
Glen writes:

``Well, my specific problem is that I think atheists and theists are delusional.  They think they know things they cannot know.  So, if Nick's point is that the concept of "theist" (or "atheist") is too muddy to define validatable[*] tests for, then, as an agnostic, I would completely agree.''

Let's say I have a program and it does something that I don't expect.   Someone says it is the witchcraft from a particular gal that works on the HVAC system.
I ask "Is it because the computer got too hot?   Did she fail to keep the air conditioning running properly?"   They respond, "No, it's not the temperature, it's the witchcraft."   I look in the index of the instruction set under W and under remote access protocols, interrupt mechanisms, etc.   Nothing.   I keep removing degrees of freedom from the code and environment and all of my suggestions are rejected by my peer as "Not an instance of witchcraft."   I ask for suggestions on how to prove that witchcraft is at work and they just show me pictures of their witch suspects and give me a pamphlet on building big fires.   Meanwhile, I discover a simple, mechanical, explanation for why the program isn't doing what I expect, fix it, and tell the growing mob of witch burners about what I discovered.   (Of course, their explanation is that they were successful in intimidating the witch and she was forced to release me from her spell.)

It should be possible to associate with any proposition a probability function that takes as arguments other routines that describe how to perform an experiment and the result of that experiment.   The details of the experiment routines should be provided and should not include "call a friend" or reference anything that is already known or obvious.    All functions and routines should be written down before doing the experiment.      It should be possible that by sweeping over the space of unknowns (potential inputs) in the experiment routines to get some probabilities near zero and some near one.  

The refusal or inability to write these functions and routines is an indicator that the speaker is full of it and would rather talk about witches.
When cornered on a question, can the believer justify or change their belief?

Marcus


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

Nick Thompson
In reply to this post by glen ropella
Glen,

Nice Wikipedia entry.  If that is not what I meant, it certainly is what I SHOULD have meant.  

I have been sufficiently distracted by family over the last two weeks that I don't know what is what with this discussion To recap: if I remember, I first tried to find out if we are talking about theism, or the wider category of metaphysical belief.  Somebody helped me clarify that.  But now, you, Glen, seem to be confusing them.  Or perhaps it's me that WANTS to confuse them.  Induction requires metaphysics.  There are some things  that you have to believe before you can start believing in FACTS.   So, if you think one can survive without metaphysics, I think you are wrong.

But does the metaphysics have to be theistic, in any sense.  Here is where my confusion begins.  In order to put my feet out of bed every morning, I have to believe there is still a floor under the bed.  That belief is clearly empirical but it is also based on a healthy dose of metaphysics that tells me that the world is not the sort of place where floors disappear without some sort of provocation.  Having no indications of such a provocation, I am justified in believing that the floor is there.  That belief takes the form of my unhesitatingly putting my feet out.  

So, I would say, I don't have to believe in God to get up every morning, but I do have to belief in The Floor.  Now, is my Belief in Floor a religious belief?  Speaking for myself:  I think my belief in Floor is religious.  It's hard for me to think of a belief in God as anything but a belief in that which endures, despite any reason to believe that it endures, and my Faith in Floor is an example of such a belief.  

Clear as mud,

Nick



Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of glen
Sent: Friday, December 26, 2014 1:28 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?


So, did Nick mean this: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Construct_validity ?

On 12/26/2014 11:35 AM, Marcus G. Daniels wrote:
> General relativity predicts gravitational waves.  A result of that
> prediction, elaborate measurement techniques have been devised like
> computational filtering of observatory data (Einstein @ Home) or
> superconducting devices to detect polarization of the cosmic microwave
> background (POLARBEAR 2).      It's not a single thing to measure , but also
> other measurements of related phenomena, like the perihelion
> precession of Mercury.

It sounds like you're describing parallax, the idea of approaching something with many many meaures.  Or perhaps "robustness analysis", in the sense that if a concept is modeled in many different ways and stays consistent across models, then it's a robust concept.  I'm familiar with those methods ... though I have some issues with the latter.

But none of this seems to fit with what Nick seemed to describe, the idea that an experiment is validated by a (validator) concept.  That just seems backwards to me... like some form of insidious justificationism.  It would lead a researcher to conclude that if a test (any test) failed, it would _not_ falsify the concept.  It would just mean you didn't know the trait/person/species well enough.

> What sort of things does it make sense for [a]theists to say and do,
> and does these things occur (instead of the opposite) in a
> statistically significant way?

Well, my specific problem is that I think atheists and theists are delusional.  They think they know things they cannot know.  So, if Nick's point is that the concept of "theist" (or "atheist") is too muddy to define validatable[*] tests for, then, as an agnostic, I would completely agree.  In fact, such a result would bring me quite a bit of joy!  In other words, there can be no test for [a]theism because it's an incoherent concept.  In fact, we're all agnostics, we just don't realize it.


[*] I would just say "valid" ... but too few people read broad words like that and work to find the submeaning appropriate to the context.

--
⇔ glen

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

Nick Thompson
In reply to this post by Marcus G. Daniels
Glen thinks that atheists and theists are delusional.  My claim is that
agnostics are non-existent.   From which it follows, I guess that all humans
are delusional.  

I am ok with that.  

N

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Marcus G.
Daniels
Sent: Friday, December 26, 2014 4:57 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

Glen writes:

``Well, my specific problem is that I think atheists and theists are
delusional.  They think they know things they cannot know.  So, if Nick's
point is that the concept of "theist" (or "atheist") is too muddy to define
validatable[*] tests for, then, as an agnostic, I would completely agree.''

Let's say I have a program and it does something that I don't expect.
Someone says it is the witchcraft from a particular gal that works on the
HVAC system.
I ask "Is it because the computer got too hot?   Did she fail to keep the
air conditioning running properly?"   They respond, "No, it's not the
temperature, it's the witchcraft."   I look in the index of the instruction
set under W and under remote access protocols, interrupt mechanisms, etc.
Nothing.   I keep removing degrees of freedom from the code and environment
and all of my suggestions are rejected by my peer as "Not an instance of
witchcraft."   I ask for suggestions on how to prove that witchcraft is at
work and they just show me pictures of their witch suspects and give me a
pamphlet on building big fires.   Meanwhile, I discover a simple,
mechanical, explanation for why the program isn't doing what I expect, fix
it, and tell the growing mob of witch burners about what I discovered.   (Of
course, their explanation is that they were successful in intimidating the
witch and she was forced to release me from her spell.)

It should be possible to associate with any proposition a probability
function that takes as arguments other routines that describe how to perform
an experiment and the result of that experiment.   The details of the
experiment routines should be provided and should not include "call a
friend" or reference anything that is already known or obvious.    All
functions and routines should be written down before doing the experiment.
It should be possible that by sweeping over the space of unknowns (potential
inputs) in the experiment routines to get some probabilities near zero and
some near one.  

The refusal or inability to write these functions and routines is an
indicator that the speaker is full of it and would rather talk about
witches.
When cornered on a question, can the believer justify or change their
belief?

Marcus


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe
http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

Gillian Densmore
Someone has to ask it:

Anyone else read the thread tittle as What's the diagnosis for asthma? 

On Fri, Dec 26, 2014 at 5:57 PM, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:
Glen thinks that atheists and theists are delusional.  My claim is that
agnostics are non-existent.   From which it follows, I guess that all humans
are delusional.

I am ok with that.

N

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Marcus G.
Daniels
Sent: Friday, December 26, 2014 4:57 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

Glen writes:

``Well, my specific problem is that I think atheists and theists are
delusional.  They think they know things they cannot know.  So, if Nick's
point is that the concept of "theist" (or "atheist") is too muddy to define
validatable[*] tests for, then, as an agnostic, I would completely agree.''

Let's say I have a program and it does something that I don't expect.
Someone says it is the witchcraft from a particular gal that works on the
HVAC system.
I ask "Is it because the computer got too hot?   Did she fail to keep the
air conditioning running properly?"   They respond, "No, it's not the
temperature, it's the witchcraft."   I look in the index of the instruction
set under W and under remote access protocols, interrupt mechanisms, etc.
Nothing.   I keep removing degrees of freedom from the code and environment
and all of my suggestions are rejected by my peer as "Not an instance of
witchcraft."   I ask for suggestions on how to prove that witchcraft is at
work and they just show me pictures of their witch suspects and give me a
pamphlet on building big fires.   Meanwhile, I discover a simple,
mechanical, explanation for why the program isn't doing what I expect, fix
it, and tell the growing mob of witch burners about what I discovered.   (Of
course, their explanation is that they were successful in intimidating the
witch and she was forced to release me from her spell.)

It should be possible to associate with any proposition a probability
function that takes as arguments other routines that describe how to perform
an experiment and the result of that experiment.   The details of the
experiment routines should be provided and should not include "call a
friend" or reference anything that is already known or obvious.    All
functions and routines should be written down before doing the experiment.
It should be possible that by sweeping over the space of unknowns (potential
inputs) in the experiment routines to get some probabilities near zero and
some near one.

The refusal or inability to write these functions and routines is an
indicator that the speaker is full of it and would rather talk about
witches.
When cornered on a question, can the believer justify or change their
belief?

Marcus


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe
http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

Alfredo Covaleda Vélez
Maybe some people is prone to the magical thinking more than others. Maybe is physic, maybe it is cultural. Maybe it is really related to mental processes biochemically mediated. Maybe there is a kind of enzyme of the faith. I lack of it, of course. Anyhow, God bless you.

2014-12-27 14:03 GMT-05:00 Gillian Densmore <[hidden email]>:
Someone has to ask it:

Anyone else read the thread tittle as What's the diagnosis for asthma? 

On Fri, Dec 26, 2014 at 5:57 PM, Nick Thompson <[hidden email]> wrote:
Glen thinks that atheists and theists are delusional.  My claim is that
agnostics are non-existent.   From which it follows, I guess that all humans
are delusional.

I am ok with that.

N

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Marcus G.
Daniels
Sent: Friday, December 26, 2014 4:57 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

Glen writes:

``Well, my specific problem is that I think atheists and theists are
delusional.  They think they know things they cannot know.  So, if Nick's
point is that the concept of "theist" (or "atheist") is too muddy to define
validatable[*] tests for, then, as an agnostic, I would completely agree.''

Let's say I have a program and it does something that I don't expect.
Someone says it is the witchcraft from a particular gal that works on the
HVAC system.
I ask "Is it because the computer got too hot?   Did she fail to keep the
air conditioning running properly?"   They respond, "No, it's not the
temperature, it's the witchcraft."   I look in the index of the instruction
set under W and under remote access protocols, interrupt mechanisms, etc.
Nothing.   I keep removing degrees of freedom from the code and environment
and all of my suggestions are rejected by my peer as "Not an instance of
witchcraft."   I ask for suggestions on how to prove that witchcraft is at
work and they just show me pictures of their witch suspects and give me a
pamphlet on building big fires.   Meanwhile, I discover a simple,
mechanical, explanation for why the program isn't doing what I expect, fix
it, and tell the growing mob of witch burners about what I discovered.   (Of
course, their explanation is that they were successful in intimidating the
witch and she was forced to release me from her spell.)

It should be possible to associate with any proposition a probability
function that takes as arguments other routines that describe how to perform
an experiment and the result of that experiment.   The details of the
experiment routines should be provided and should not include "call a
friend" or reference anything that is already known or obvious.    All
functions and routines should be written down before doing the experiment.
It should be possible that by sweeping over the space of unknowns (potential
inputs) in the experiment routines to get some probabilities near zero and
some near one.

The refusal or inability to write these functions and routines is an
indicator that the speaker is full of it and would rather talk about
witches.
When cornered on a question, can the believer justify or change their
belief?

Marcus


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe
http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com



--
Agrónomo, IT, Candidato a MSc en Desarrollo Sostenible y Medio Ambiente
+57 3154531383

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

glen ropella
In reply to this post by Marcus G. Daniels

I think probability is a red herring, as is high pop variation of any
kind.  It's more appropriate to consider serial experimentation.  If I
change the concept I'm testing for to, say, gullibility, I can practice
evaluating people without a high N trial. I can simply try to trick one
individual after another and, over time, even if my tests are somewhat
dynamic, I can evolve a collection of tricks that distinguish the
gullible from the ... risk averse.  Being gullible myself, I'm familiar
with the process ... I am serially foolish.  Sure, reduction to the
smallest possible set of traits that lead to gullibility would require
high N trials.  But that's not necessary for approaching the gist.

I can't help but think there is an equivalent method for [a]theism.
There must be gurus and evangelicals, especially those busted for
something but that then recover and start another congregation, who have
honed the craft.  Or, perhaps better examples would be people like Jack
Abramoff, Edward Snowden, or even ex-addict drug counselors.  These are
people who, I think, are in their situations because of _systemic_
pressures rather than some hypothetical internal mechanisms that
motivated them.  Or, perhaps it's analogous to the false dichotomy
between pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics.

It may well be a mistake to hunt for [a]theism in individual humans
(behavior- or molecule-based).  Perhaps it's actually a property of the
system in which the humans live, or, more likely, a result of the
coupling of the individual to the society.


On December 26, 2014 3:56:58 PM PST, "Marcus G. Daniels"
<[hidden email]> wrote:
>The refusal or inability to write these functions and routines is an
>indicator that the speaker is full of it and would rather talk about
>witches.

Or the refusal or inability to write the functions is a result of the
witch-hypothesizer's embeddedness in his culture?  This is something
many high N trials will not discover unless explicitly designed to
discover them.  And that can be very difficult.  How do we design a
trial across cultures that involve witch-hypotheses?  Is the bruja a
good analog for the voodoo priestess?  Is vishnu a good analog for
yaweh?  Can we really believe the alcoholics anonymous advocates that
you can adopt _whatever_ "something larger than yourself" is a synonym
for "God"?

>When cornered on a question, can the believer justify or change their belief?

Justification is always possible.  (Perhaps we could correlate
justificationism with the rise and fall of conspiracy theories, which
are simply tortuous justifications.)  And we can't quite rely on
tracking changes in belief, at least not directly.  We could rely
(somewhat) on changes to the self-reports of belief.  But, again, when
and in what context is the self-report trustworthy?

--
⇔ glen

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
Reply | Threaded
Open this post in threaded view
|

Re: clinical diagnosis of [a]theism?

Marcus G. Daniels
Glen writes:

"I think probability is a red herring, as is high pop variation of any kind."

I suppose so.   But there are situations, especially in biology, where some aspect of an experiment can be reproduced but only to put a confidence interval on a correlation.   Insisting on experiments that are strictly boolean valued is too harsh if there are other variables that are hard to measure, but don't completely destroy the correlation between things that can be measured.  

Marcus


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
123