better simulating actual FriAM
Locked
123
123
 
|
Excellent! Thanks for the link to Weismann's doctrine.
As for the 4-5 sticks, I don't at all like calling "sturdiness" an emergent property. In fact, I don't really like the phrase "emergent property" at all. And I resist using the word "emergent". I'm OK with the word "attribute" because that word can imply an observer that *ascribes* the quality to the collection of things. And then that ascriber of the attribute is the source of any ignorance or (faulty) abstraction that allows us to believe in non-reducible phenomona. As for the particular of the 4-5 sticks, I'd argue that sturdiness is completely reducible to the *angles* and the arrangement of the sticks. You can take 4 sticks, put one to the side, and make a triangle out of the other 3 and you get "sturdiness". It's still a graph, just not a fully connected graph. So, the 5th stick isn't all that important. What's important is the graph. To apply downward causation to an arrangement of sticks, you'd have to identify what variable was being constrained. If the variable is some form of "connectivity" or arrangement, then it's VERY easy to go from 0 sticks to 1 stick. Then it's easy to add a 2nd stick. Then it gets a little tougher to add a 3rd stick ... e.g. does it have to line up? Can it just touch on the ends? In the middle? Does it have to connect with both the other 2 sticks. Etc. Then adding the 4th stick is more constrained. Etc. That is what I mean by downward causation. There's got to be a controlling variable limiting what the sticks can do and the collective, the present arrangement of sticks, then defines that limitation. On 7/20/20 9:26 AM, [hidden email] wrote: > Yes. And that is why reverse transcription was such a big deal -- Because it violates Weismann's Doctrine <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00114-014-1164-4>. I think most contemporary biologists still think that those violations are the province of the very small, but with all we know about epigenetics these days, the whole argument is starting to feel cranky and old-fashioned. > > > > When I try to think about “downward-causation” my imagination always fails. Think of four sticks, arranged in a square. They are very flimsy. Now add a fifth stick, a diagonal. The whole becomes much more sturdy, right Now, this is a clear instance of an emergent property, no? And the freedom of motion of the other four sticks has been constrained by the configuration of the whole, right? But where is “downward-causation”, here? Or choose your own example. How exactly does “downward causation” work? It puts my mental knickers in a twist. -- ↙↙↙ uǝlƃ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
|
|
|
In reply to this post by jon zingale
Right. I'm ignorant of Weismann's doctrine. But it does seem to imply purely bottom-up causation. We *could*, I suppose talk of hierarchical systems where the causal flow only went upward ... maybe a bit like the causal cone defined by the speed of light in space-time. Everything within the cone is "same layer causation" and cross-cone relations might be the only time you'd need large-scale, collective effects. [⛧]
The only way I can see to get any kind of downward causation in that case is through iteration, as I mentioned with the sticks (1st stick is completely free, 2nd stick is more constrained, ...). But you can remove time and replace it with some other requirement, like no/minimal space between tiles for sphere packing or, say, aperiodic tilings. In that case, it's not only the tile shapes, but also *how many* of each shape you have that impinges on their (micro) placement. [⛧] This popped up this morning: https://uwaterloo.ca/astrophysics-centre/news/astrophysicists-release-largest-3d-map-universe-ever-created On 7/20/20 10:07 AM, Jon Zingale wrote: > Maybe I am misremembering (which clearly happens), but didn't the discussion > of gen-phen-like maps arise in the context of goal-function distinctions? In > this latter class, we included the thermostat system where constraining > systems to Weismann's doctrine would not be meaningful. Clearly, in the > goal-function system, an individual that changes the thermostat dial because > they prefer the house to be at 60 degrees rather than 80 degrees (a > variation on function) performs downwardly to affect the tolerance of the > piece of metal or mercury switch (a variation on goal). Are we breaking the > semantic game by now demanding that our admissable gen-phen-like maps > preserve Weismann's doctrine? I understood Glen's evocation to not be so > constrained. -- ↙↙↙ uǝlƃ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
|
Re: better simulating actual FriAM
|
I'm not reading this carefully enough. I am selling my car which involves paperwork. There are many systems with causal graphs with feedback loops. In genetic regulatory networks, for example. Is that downward causation? A classic example is the case if two ladders leaning against each other so that neither one falls. Each causes the other not to fall. Frank --- Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, Santa Fe, NM 87505 505 670-9918 Santa Fe, NM On Mon, Jul 20, 2020, 11:26 AM uǝlƃ ↙↙↙ <[hidden email]> wrote: Right. I'm ignorant of Weismann's doctrine. But it does seem to imply purely bottom-up causation. We *could*, I suppose talk of hierarchical systems where the causal flow only went upward ... maybe a bit like the causal cone defined by the speed of light in space-time. Everything within the cone is "same layer causation" and cross-cone relations might be the only time you'd need large-scale, collective effects. [⛧] - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
|
|
In the 2-ladder system, if there's downward causation, I would not say "each causes the other not to fall". But I would say something like "the attribute of non-falling constrains the valid arrangements of the ladders". The point of rewording it like that is to remove the emergentism woo and talk more closely about the freedom of 2-ladder arrangements. As with the sticks, it's easier to place 1 ladder than it is 2 ladders. The requirements to be met circumscribe a space of possible arrangements. And if you cherry-pick some special set of constraints, then it can *seem* magical that, in some arrangements, some requirements can be met that no/few other arrangements meet.
But objectively, all we're talking about is the space of possible ways to place ladders, given some set of requirements. Obviously, if you inscribe the conclusion into the premises by setting your requirement to be "the ladders must extend by their lengths up into the air", then the set of arrangements of 1 ladder that meet that requirement will be smaller than the set of arrangements of 2 ladders that will meet it. But if you pick *another* requirement, say, "all ladders must be perpendicular to all other ladders", then laying the 1st ladder is trivial and the 2nd becomes more difficult. A minimal conception of downward causation is *only* that the collective constrains the space of arrangements of the parts. There is a debate we could have whether *some* systems (parts and the ways they compose) about whether or not collectives can *facilitate* (enlarge) the space of possible arrangements. I call that concept "scaffolding". Your ladder example is a good foil because it allows us to argue that the *size* of the valid 1-ladder arrangements that meet the criterion is 0. But the size of the 2-ladder arrangements that meet it is larger (2 or 3 ways to arrange the ladders such that they stick up into the air). But I'd argue it's an imputation. That cherry-picked arrangement (so that they don't fall) is NOT downward causation because that requirement was installed from the outside, imputed, not an inherent property of ladders and their possible arrangements. (I.e. 2 ladders leaning against each other is not a special state of 2-ladder arrangements.) We might be able to argue that EricS' and Morowitz' hierarchy of matter phases might qualify as scaffolding, too ... a little bit of freezing might facilitate regions of the space so that we can get weirdo things like fish or plants. Remove any of the prior freezing layers and life may not "emerge" at all. But none of this extra conversation is necessary to get that minimal conception of downward causation. On 7/20/20 10:32 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote: > There are many systems with causal graphs with feedback loops. In genetic regulatory networks, for example. Is that downward causation? > > A classic example is the case if two ladders leaning against each other so that neither one falls. Each causes the other not to fall. -- ↙↙↙ uǝlƃ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
|
Re: better simulating actual FriAM
|
|
In reply to this post by jon zingale
Nick (to Jon) Re Gen Phen: That's the Whole Point, here. There are two different distinctions, here, one apparently arising form computation (?) and one arising from biology. Glen originally mentioned a GENerator/ PHENomenon distinction which seems to be the broader of the two and does not forbid downward causation. More recently we have been talking about the GENotype/PHENotype distinction which is narrower and does - historically-forbid downward causation. So, I think we need to spell the words out completely from now on, so we know which game we are playing. Your reference to language games raises the question of what sort of "game" are we playing when we talk about causation. One rule of that game, I think, which I may have violated myself in this discussion, is that things cannot cause things. Only events can cause events. The reason is that the notion of cause involves temporal order and things (as opposed to the arrival of things or the placement of things or the removal things) cannot be in a temporal order. I am wondering if adherence to this discipline might make the whole problem of downward causation disappear? So, the addition of the 5th stick (an event) to previous four sticks CAUSES the other 4 sticks not to rotate (an event) and CAUSES the structure to be strong (another event). Notice that this formulation appears to forbid us to say that the constraints on the rotation of the other four sticks provided by the fifth stick CAUSES the strengthening of the structure because those two events are temporally inextricable. What IS the relation between those two facts if not a causal one? I think I would argue that it's a constitutive relation; ie, the rotational constraints constitute the greater strength of the square with the fifth stick. Nick [hidden email] https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ Jon to Nick -----Original Message----- From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Jon Zingale Sent: Monday, July 20, 2020 11:07 AM To: [hidden email] Subject: Re: [FRIAM] better simulating actual FriAM Maybe I am misremembering (which clearly happens), but didn't the discussion of gen-phen-like maps arise in the context of goal-function distinctions? In this latter class, we included the thermostat system where constraining systems to Weismann's doctrine would not be meaningful. Clearly, in the goal-function system, an individual that changes the thermostat dial because they prefer the house to be at 60 degrees rather than 80 degrees (a variation on function) performs downwardly to affect the tolerance of the piece of metal or mercury switch (a variation on goal). Are we breaking the semantic game by now demanding that our admissable gen-phen-like maps preserve Weismann's doctrine? I understood Glen's evocation to not be so constrained. -- Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
Re: better simulating actual FriAM
|
|
Nick, you are correct in saying that causation is a relation between events. The most useful definition of causation that we found in our statistical causal reasoning research (viz Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines) was event A is a cause of event B if the occurrence of A is followed by a change in the probability density over the possible values of B. Modulo obsessional tweaking. Frank --- Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, Santa Fe, NM 87505 505 670-9918 Santa Fe, NM On Mon, Jul 20, 2020, 1:39 PM <[hidden email]> wrote:
- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
Re: better simulating actual FriAM
|
|
Thanks, frank, for that affirmation. I am sitting here, on this hot day, looking at the tree across the street, and saying to myself (The Behaviorist) am I REALLY going to get away with telling Glen he cannot say, “That tree is causing the yard to be shaded.” Something not right about that. Modulo obsessive thinking. Nicholas Thompson Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology Clark University https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly Nick, you are correct in saying that causation is a relation between events. The most useful definition of causation that we found in our statistical causal reasoning research (viz Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines) was event A is a cause of event B if the occurrence of A is followed by a change in the probability density over the possible values of B. Modulo obsessional tweaking. Frank --- On Mon, Jul 20, 2020, 1:39 PM <[hidden email]> wrote:
- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
Re: better simulating actual FriAM
|
|
Well, most people say that the moon is the prime cause of the tides. --- Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, Santa Fe, NM 87505 505 670-9918 Santa Fe, NM On Mon, Jul 20, 2020, 2:05 PM <[hidden email]> wrote:
- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
|
|
In reply to this post by thompnickson2
Ha! Well, anyone can say anything they want. What matters is how coherent you can make what you say. I don't think there's any coherent way of (universally) distinguishing a thing from an event. An event is a thing and a thing can be an event. Perhaps some things are collections of events. Or, perhaps some events are composites. But either way, to be coherent in such talk, you'd have to describe how events and things compose. Without saying how they compose, all you're doing is relying on the vernacular and its attendant ambiguity.
In any case, I believe my *minimal* description of downward causation as quantification over the collective *constraining* the options for individual composition is (or can be made) coherent. But we may not get to that point with your talk of sticks and ladders because there's too much excess meaning there. You'd be better off talking about letters (like how many ways can we arrange 10 zeros and 5 ones) or square tiles in Euclidean space. Or, how about this setup: Your components (micro) are an egg crate and 12 eggs. How many ways can you compose 12 eggs with an egg crate? You have to include *not* putting any of the eggs in the crate as a valid arrangement. But if you do put 1 egg in the crate, then how many ways can you arrange 1egg+crate with 11 eggs? I argue that the number of ways you can arrange 1egg+crate with 11 eggs is *lower* than the number of ways you can arrange crate with 12 eggs. I.e. an attribute of the collective ({crate,12 eggs}) limits the possible arrangements. On 7/20/20 1:05 PM, [hidden email] wrote: > I am sitting here, on this hot day, looking at the tree across the street, and saying to myself (The Behaviorist) am I REALLY going to get away with telling Glen he cannot say, “That tree is causing the yard to be shaded.” Something not right about that. Modulo obsessive thinking. -- ↙↙↙ uǝlƃ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
|
Re: better simulating actual FriAM
|
This post was updated on .
In reply to this post by thompnickson2
Nick,
You say: 'Glen originally mentioned a GENerator/ PHENomenon distinction which seems to be the broader of the two and does not forbid downward causation.' I feel comfortable saying gen-phen-like maps. I am in the investigative modality at present and have not yet nailed down for myself the precise meanings of any chosen lexicon. I am proceeding by allowing the scope of definition, of a notion, to vary indirectly over the course of the discussion, to the extent that I am able. Our discussion covered a lot of ground with a lot of ideas coming from each of us, adopting and integrating the batch comes with no obvious algorithm. In the end, I may abandon gen-phen-like in favor of another signifier or it may come to mean something significant based on the context of this conversation. Who knows? In vFriam discussion, I mostly remember us talking about the function-goal distinction and thermostats. You conjectured that the two collections are exclusive, and I spent time thinking about what this could mean. I am thinking about the collection of functions being of a different type than the collection of goals, and there possibly being construals of goals into the collection of functions. Conceptually, this makes room to consider the difference between a goal and a goal wrapped in functions clothing. The particular project I am engaged in here is to flesh this concept out a bit more. I haven't yet gotten down into the 'sticks' weeds and certainly am not yet able to work easily with emergence in this framework. More to come, to the extent that this stays interesting to me. You say: 'One rule of that game, I think, which I may have violated myself in this discussion, is that things cannot cause things. Only events can cause events.' Along with Glen, I am not sure I have decided to limit the scope of definition around causation. That as Frank points out, "causation is a relation between events", does not preclude there being other relations between events nor causation being a relation between other things, does it? If our conversations were intended to be type-safe, I could perhaps be persuaded the other way. You say: 'The reason is that the notion of cause involves temporal order' What about something being logically prior rather than just temporally prior? Perhaps, we would use a different word than cause? |
Re: better simulating actual FriAM
|
|
J
"entails" N Nicholas Thompson Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology Clark University [hidden email] https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ -----Original Message----- From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Jon Zingale Sent: Monday, July 20, 2020 5:11 PM To: [hidden email] Subject: Re: [FRIAM] better simulating actual FriAM Nick, You say: 'Glen originally mentioned a GENerator/ PHENomenon distinction which seems to be the broader of the two and does not forbid downward causation.' I feel comfortable saying gen-phen-like maps. I am in the investigative modality at present and have not yet nailed down for myself the precise meanings of any chosen lexicon. I am proceeding by allowing the scope of definition, of a notion, to vary indirectly over the course of the discussion, to the extent that I am able. Our discussion covered a lot of ground with a lot of ideas coming from each of us, adopting and integrating the batch comes with no obvious algorithm. In the end, I may abandon gen-phen-like in favor of another signifier or it may come to mean something significant based on the context of this conversation. Who knows? In vFriam discussion, I mostly remember us talking about the function-goal distinction and thermostats. You conjectured that the two collections are exclusive, and I spent time thinking about what this could mean. I am thinking about the collection of functions being of a different type than the collection of goals, and there possibly being construals of goals into the collection of functions. Conceptually, this makes room to consider the difference between a goal and a goal wrapped in functions clothing. The particular project I am engaged in here is to flesh this concept out a bit more. I haven't yet gotten down into the sticks weeds and certainly am not yet able to work easily with emergence in this framework. More to come, to the extent that this stays interesting to me. You say: 'One rule of that game, I think, which I may have violated myself in this discussion, is that things cannot cause things. Only events can cause events.' Along with Glen, I am not sure I have decided to limit the scope of definition around causation. That as Frank points out, "causation is a relation between events", does not preclude there being other relations between events nor causation being a relation between other things, does it? If our conversations were intended to be type-safe, I could perhaps be persuaded the other way. You say: 'The reason is that the notion of cause involves temporal order' What about something being logically prior rather than just temporally prior? Perhaps, we would use a different word than cause? -- Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
Re: better simulating actual FriAM
|
|
Thanks, that sounds right. Are we interested in similar relations like
entailment? -- Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
Re: better simulating actual FriAM
|
|
Nick,
So to continue this construal talk, would you allow things wrapped in events clothing to have causal relations? -- Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
Re: better simulating actual FriAM
|
|
In reply to this post by jon zingale
I think the relation between cause and entailment goes something like this:
If cause means, event A is always followed by event B and B never occurs in the absence of A (for instance) Then the statement that A causes B, taken with the statement "A has occurred", entails the occurrence of B. But boy, howdy, am I NOT a logician! N Nicholas Thompson Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology Clark University [hidden email] https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ -----Original Message----- From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Jon Zingale Sent: Monday, July 20, 2020 5:20 PM To: [hidden email] Subject: Re: [FRIAM] better simulating actual FriAM Thanks, that sounds right. Are we interested in similar relations like entailment? -- Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
Re: better simulating actual FriAM
|
|
Right, but are we concerned with the class of entailment-like/causation-like
relations? -- Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
Re: better simulating actual FriAM
|
|
In reply to this post by thompnickson2
The counterfactual definition of cause that you offer has been widely discussed and has been found to be inadequate. Jon, give me an "other thing" that may be a cause and I'll bet that I can explain how it's an event. Or how you can construe it as one. There is a book called "Entailment" by Anderson and Belnap that I think Glen should read. I haven't read it but I think causes and logical implications are examples. Frank --- Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, Santa Fe, NM 87505 505 670-9918 Santa Fe, NM On Mon, Jul 20, 2020, 5:26 PM <[hidden email]> wrote: I think the relation between cause and entailment goes something like this: - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
Re: better simulating actual FriAM
|
|
In reply to this post by gepr
Hi All,
Two quick comments (two emails). I think the way Glen has this set up below does all the main work Nick wants done. The idea is that state spaces of different dimensions are different kinds of settings. A state space for one ladder is one kind of setting. A state space for two ladders is a higher-dimensional and different kind of setting. 2-sticks 3-sticks 4-sticks 5-sticks likewise. There can be regions in these state spaces where properties are found that simply are not found in other regions. Here I think the word “irreducible” often does better service to the idea Nick wants than the word “emergent” that he has used historically in reference to the sticks. The property of two ladders’ holding each other up is an irreducible property of some configurations, which is not a property of other configurations. Consider that even being in the off-diagonal quadrant of a square is a property of the square that cannot be “reduced” to a property of either of its edge-axes, because “off-diagonalness” is defined through a relation. The reducible/irreducible dichotomy that we are using here in a somewhat informal way shares an umbrella with a variety of more technical uses that are very similar in spirit, such as reducibility or irreducibility of representations of groups in algebra, and those kinds of ideas. I have on this list referred to Tononi’s Phi as being mainly an attempt to quantify the irreducibility of an information-transmitting pipeline made of events on some network. Best, Eric > On Jul 21, 2020, at 3:05 AM, uǝlƃ ↙↙↙ <[hidden email]> wrote: > > In the 2-ladder system, if there's downward causation, I would not say "each causes the other not to fall". But I would say something like "the attribute of non-falling constrains the valid arrangements of the ladders". The point of rewording it like that is to remove the emergentism woo and talk more closely about the freedom of 2-ladder arrangements. As with the sticks, it's easier to place 1 ladder than it is 2 ladders. The requirements to be met circumscribe a space of possible arrangements. And if you cherry-pick some special set of constraints, then it can *seem* magical that, in some arrangements, some requirements can be met that no/few other arrangements meet. > > But objectively, all we're talking about is the space of possible ways to place ladders, given some set of requirements. Obviously, if you inscribe the conclusion into the premises by setting your requirement to be "the ladders must extend by their lengths up into the air", then the set of arrangements of 1 ladder that meet that requirement will be smaller than the set of arrangements of 2 ladders that will meet it. But if you pick *another* requirement, say, "all ladders must be perpendicular to all other ladders", then laying the 1st ladder is trivial and the 2nd becomes more difficult. > > A minimal conception of downward causation is *only* that the collective constrains the space of arrangements of the parts. > > There is a debate we could have whether *some* systems (parts and the ways they compose) about whether or not collectives can *facilitate* (enlarge) the space of possible arrangements. I call that concept "scaffolding". Your ladder example is a good foil because it allows us to argue that the *size* of the valid 1-ladder arrangements that meet the criterion is 0. But the size of the 2-ladder arrangements that meet it is larger (2 or 3 ways to arrange the ladders such that they stick up into the air). But I'd argue it's an imputation. That cherry-picked arrangement (so that they don't fall) is NOT downward causation because that requirement was installed from the outside, imputed, not an inherent property of ladders and their possible arrangements. (I.e. 2 ladders leaning against each other is not a special state of 2-ladder arrangements.) > > We might be able to argue that EricS' and Morowitz' hierarchy of matter phases might qualify as scaffolding, too ... a little bit of freezing might facilitate regions of the space so that we can get weirdo things like fish or plants. Remove any of the prior freezing layers and life may not "emerge" at all. > > But none of this extra conversation is necessary to get that minimal conception of downward causation. > > On 7/20/20 10:32 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote: >> There are many systems with causal graphs with feedback loops. In genetic regulatory networks, for example. Is that downward causation? >> >> A classic example is the case if two ladders leaning against each other so that neither one falls. Each causes the other not to fall. > > -- > ↙↙↙ uǝlƃ > > - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > un/subscribe https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2ffriam_redfish.com&c=E,1,CxfH1wKwKGMOeiKFJzWCU0K1rWmo8s0JRhJfdpW9zTIXeC2kJ6F2zBDBl8TwABstatV3tls8yk7vsoo1K9PfsrfFID_AkXRK-qRjryL5PcunxTlQYpxSxMw,&typo=1 > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2ffriam-comic.blogspot.com%2f&c=E,1,QWJWueFEylVLFHMUanuYhE1Bz9SvaDuRXU-g6bY0xqiVXSGd-wIAZU-u06O80HFeUDpRasLWacMBBLlivDmQxqTtFSlAE82cwwvojVgM&typo=1 - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
Re: better simulating actual FriAM
|
|
In reply to this post by gepr
Wanted to reply to Glen’s reading below, which is also the way I see it.
I don’t worry about keeping track of signs and factors of 2 in drafting-stages of these conversations; that is a tedious chore to be done later if one thinks there is something to say that warrants it. But if one did want to keep track of signs, I think in several sentences below where Glen is talking about the presence of limitations’ reducing the allowed variability in some distribution, we could say we use one or another _entropy_ measure to quantify the reduction in likely variability. To the extent that one tries to characterize _information_ as Shannon did — a measure of how much ambiguity in a sample is reduced by having some bit of knowledge that rules out variations — then the reductions in entropy of the constrained ensemble relative to its prior would be called a gain of information in moving to the posterior from the prior. So without worrying about the zero-point for either of these measures, or their resulting absolute signs, in many settings one would talk of the change of information’s being positive when the change of the corresponding entropy is negative. Best, Eric > On Jul 21, 2020, at 12:32 AM, uǝlƃ ↙↙↙ <[hidden email]> wrote: > > I don't know quite how to parse this. By "original gen-phen distinction", do you simply mean DNA->RNA? What do you mean by "original"? And would reverse transcription imply information flow from phen to gen? > > FWIW, when I talk about downward causation, I'm not assuming irreducible phenomena (strong emergentism). Mostly, I think of landscape change. Just to prove I am reading it [⍢], I'll cite EricS' (and Morowitz') hierarchy of matter phases, wherein as the temperature goes down, prior freezes set the context for what *could* be the case for future freezes. That's a macro thing constraining the micro thing. It doesn't seem so much to me like "information traveling" as limited freedom ... a weak kind of forcing structure. But if we talk in terms of variability/uncertainty/wiggle, then it sounds a bit like a *loss* of information. Downward causation from macro to micro might map well to a reduction in the information content of the micro. There would have to be some transient, though. Before the macro constraints were strong enough, the information content was high. After they are strong enough, the micro content is lower. Is a reduction in information, itself, information? 2nd order information? > > > [⍢] [In]Comprehension notwithstanding. > > On 7/17/20 5:35 PM, [hidden email] wrote: >> Notice, FWIW, that the original gen-phen distinction was understood to forbid any information traveling from phen to gen. > > -- > ↙↙↙ uǝlƃ > - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > un/subscribe https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2ffriam_redfish.com&c=E,1,ZNP1tz-0Z0qfd4-CCh71GqWpYp61K4uZ8t9wpGe-Uc-LQeoM_4mIX2IyLW4b4mGRkXxkMgW1syTOt9AimS_o1KUwB4uGP52fbZjjAPPyEhQQ90p1G5pW6DhXMAA,&typo=1 > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2ffriam-comic.blogspot.com%2f&c=E,1,E4pFyMPspcF2ph5UrxoU61AuOpepqpChIhN0GRI9eik3tgvZI5jbRAqf8DeXGmzzDkBEzKFMYWOhkzb1C7c2dBg_81_GFdx2F84i_tJAilwrlkYhx5s,&typo=1 - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
Re: better simulating actual FriAM
|
|
In reply to this post by Frank Wimberly-2
Anderson and Belnap Entailment --- Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, Santa Fe, NM 87505 505 670-9918 Santa Fe, NM On Mon, Jul 20, 2020, 6:03 PM Frank Wimberly <[hidden email]> wrote:
- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
Re: better simulating actual FriAM
|
|
In reply to this post by thompnickson2
What about something being believably prior rather than just temporally
prior? Perhaps, we would use a different word than cause? -- Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
«
Return to Friam
|
1 view|%1 views
| Free forum by Nabble | Edit this page |