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The preoccupation with arguing over base ontological commitments reminds me
of the *existential detectives* and their nemesis in the movie *I <3 Huckabees*. Will demanding that the universe is determined, or almost as random as can be, or simulatable move any other conjectured model forward? I suspect that it has the effect of putting the discussion in a holding pattern. In each case, we are making unknown claims as to what the universe is, or at best wagering as to what we feel the universe will have turned out to be in some obnoxiously absolute way. Neutered from a motivating investigation and the development of a model, we may as well exclaim the names of numbers at one another. -- Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
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In reply to this post by Marcus G. Daniels
Jon Zingale wrote:
The preoccupation with arguing over base ontological commitments reminds me of the *existential detectives* and their nemesis in the movie *I <3 Huckabees*. Will demanding that the universe is determined, or almost as random as can be, or simulatable move any other conjectured model forward? I suspect that it has the effect of putting the discussion in a holding pattern. In each case, we are making unknown claims as to what the universe is, or at best wagering as to what we feel the universe will have turned out to be in some obnoxiously absolute way. Neutered from a motivating investigation and the development of a model, we may as well exclaim the names of numbers at one another. 42!
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Ha! 14648!
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In reply to this post by jon zingale
The point is to construct some explanation for how the concept of free will could possibly be meaningful by considering a range of commitments in turn (and then revoking them and trying something else until something works). I can't see there are any commitments that make the idea meaningful. Nonetheless, our legal system includes notions like intent and punishment like they are meaningful, and not just another social apparatus forced on non-believers by believers. Free will is a problem for believers in an omniscient god, because it gives and requires individuals to have the means to sin and the means to avoid sinning. But with that freedom, god is no longer omniscient.
On 6/17/20, 7:34 AM, "Friam on behalf of Jon Zingale" <[hidden email] on behalf of [hidden email]> wrote: The preoccupation with arguing over base ontological commitments reminds me of the *existential detectives* and their nemesis in the movie *I <3 Huckabees*. Will demanding that the universe is determined, or almost as random as can be, or simulatable move any other conjectured model forward? I suspect that it has the effect of putting the discussion in a holding pattern. In each case, we are making unknown claims as to what the universe is, or at best wagering as to what we feel the universe will have turned out to be in some obnoxiously absolute way. Neutered from a motivating investigation and the development of a model, we may as well exclaim the names of numbers at one another. -- Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
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In reply to this post by jon zingale
Ha! 14648! That explains a LOT.
A DOS attack against FriAM, leading to excess CPU
consumption...
I KNEW that the universe ran on Ubuntu or is this just another one-to-many conflation? -- Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
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In reply to this post by Marcus G. Daniels
Marcus, et al.
I do hope to some extent that the others agree with you about what is *the point*. Though I am not sure with what certainty or authority one can make such a claim. The concept of *meaning* arises from ontological commitments. When the legal system includes notions like intent and punishment, they are *exactly* making the ontological commitment to *free will*. It is within this scope that any meaning for intent and punishment is accessible. You speak of *believers* as if they *must* be troubled by inconsistency. I suspect, like applied mathematicians, they need not be. Further, those *believers* may not require an *all-knowing* condition to conflict with choice, you would have to know what commitments they have already made. The immediate commitments I may import when a *believer* describes choice under an omniscient god, result in god predetermining sinners going to hell. The *believer*, however, may make other commitments that escape this predetermining. Making judicious choices of ontological commitment happen everywhere in the sciences. If someone decides that they are going to make a commitment to the aether, I think it is polite to see what model they make and what they wish to describe before jumping on them about Michelson-Morley. Showing that an ontological commitment is not unique or necessary in some absolute sense need not invalidate a theory. SteveG and Nick go back and forth about this with respect to evolutionary theory. Nick points out how making a commitment to *selection* produces fruit. SteveG argues that evolution is all *Lagrangians*. Whichever commitment is made, I beg we use it to identify further entailments. If we attempt to invalidate another's entailment by switching the ontological grounds by which they were made, we act in bad faith. -- Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
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Jon writes:
< If we attempt to invalidate another's entailment by switching the ontological grounds by which they were made, we act in bad faith. > I just want to hear any falsifiable grounding in a commitment. I'm not asking for a lot here. Marcus - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
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Ha! same.
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Marcus,
Perhaps a starting point could be to investigate to what extent are intent and punishment are falsifiable or inconsistent with respect to *free will*, or to what extent are they verifiable and consistent? -- Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
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In reply to this post by Marcus G. Daniels
All of this depends fundamentally on people being willing to play games, rather than make commitments in the first place. Jon's identification of "arguing over base ontological commitments" is simply a symptom of the unwillingness to play games. Everyone takes ideas too seriously. And more importantly, everyone takes their OWN ideas too seriously.
On 6/17/20 8:46 AM, Marcus Daniels wrote: > Jon writes: > > < If we attempt to invalidate another's entailment by > switching the ontological grounds by which they were made, we act in bad > faith. > > > I just want to hear any falsifiable grounding in a commitment. I'm not asking for a lot here. -- ☣ uǝlƃ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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Well said, Glen. From what I glean from Marcus' comment, understanding
another's commitments helps to prevent a game of Monopoly from deteriorating into a squabble over the meaning of money or property, or a game of poker from deteriorating into a squabble over the atomic structure of a playing card. That the dungeon master relies on magic to settle questions of physics is a commitment we make to the game. -- Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
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In reply to this post by Marcus G. Daniels
I disagree. I think we are making claims about how best to think, if we
ever hope to get anywhere. But I can see that these might seem like "old man's arguments" and that the world of software engineering is "no place for old men." Nick Nicholas Thompson Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology Clark University [hidden email] https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ -----Original Message----- From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Jon Zingale Sent: Wednesday, June 17, 2020 8:33 AM To: [hidden email] Subject: Re: [FRIAM] alternative response The preoccupation with arguing over base ontological commitments reminds me of the *existential detectives* and their nemesis in the movie *I <3 Huckabees*. Will demanding that the universe is determined, or almost as random as can be, or simulatable move any other conjectured model forward? I suspect that it has the effect of putting the discussion in a holding pattern. In each case, we are making unknown claims as to what the universe is, or at best wagering as to what we feel the universe will have turned out to be in some obnoxiously absolute way. Neutered from a motivating investigation and the development of a model, we may as well exclaim the names of numbers at one another. -- Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
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In reply to this post by Marcus G. Daniels
Thanks, Marcus. Exactly the project I thought we were engaged in. I still do no grasp Glen's rendition but I have yet to re-find the post in which he lays it out amongst the splatter.
N Nicholas Thompson Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology Clark University [hidden email] https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ -----Original Message----- From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Marcus Daniels Sent: Wednesday, June 17, 2020 9:03 AM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] alternative response The point is to construct some explanation for how the concept of free will could possibly be meaningful by considering a range of commitments in turn (and then revoking them and trying something else until something works). I can't see there are any commitments that make the idea meaningful. Nonetheless, our legal system includes notions like intent and punishment like they are meaningful, and not just another social apparatus forced on non-believers by believers. Free will is a problem for believers in an omniscient god, because it gives and requires individuals to have the means to sin and the means to avoid sinning. But with that freedom, god is no longer omniscient. On 6/17/20, 7:34 AM, "Friam on behalf of Jon Zingale" <[hidden email] on behalf of [hidden email]> wrote: The preoccupation with arguing over base ontological commitments reminds me of the *existential detectives* and their nemesis in the movie *I <3 Huckabees*. Will demanding that the universe is determined, or almost as random as can be, or simulatable move any other conjectured model forward? I suspect that it has the effect of putting the discussion in a holding pattern. In each case, we are making unknown claims as to what the universe is, or at best wagering as to what we feel the universe will have turned out to be in some obnoxiously absolute way. Neutered from a motivating investigation and the development of a model, we may as well exclaim the names of numbers at one another. -- Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
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In reply to this post by jon zingale
Dear Splatterers,
And what commitments did we make when we all agreed to play the "game" game?? I think Glen will say (has said?) a commitment to non-commitment, to not taking our ideas TOO seriously, or perhaps, seriously at all. But I think the game metaphor fails just because actual games can take on only those implications that we care to give them whereas "games" like the "free will game" have negative consequences both in the field of psychology and in our every day lives. For one thing, the "free will" game is the key to a lot of vengeance. Now Bruce and Frank, with their transcendentalist leanings, might say that the idea of free will, of a private place from which all our decisions as humans come that is ineffably and essentially our own and dignifies our actions as humans, is essential to the respect we show one another. To deny it is to deny our humanity. Well, I deny it. In the first place, I don't find humans to be all that special. I still have yet to understand Glen's idea of free will, which, on his last account, seemed to involve an application of the notion of levels of organization, which, as a student of natural design, I found very tempting, even as I didn't understand it. Got to find that post. Nick Nicholas Thompson Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology Clark University [hidden email] https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ -----Original Message----- From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of Jon Zingale Sent: Wednesday, June 17, 2020 10:28 AM To: [hidden email] Subject: Re: [FRIAM] alternative response Well said, Glen. From what I glean from Marcus' comment, understanding another's commitments helps to prevent a game of Monopoly from deteriorating into a squabble over the meaning of money or property, or a game of poker from deteriorating into a squabble over the atomic structure of a playing card. That the dungeon master relies on magic to settle questions of physics is a commitment we make to the game. -- Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
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In reply to this post by thompnickson2
Nick,
Spoiler alert, there is no *how best to think*. You say random, Gary says determined. Until you investigate the consequences of each you can't even know whether or not you are actually developing the same model ( like with the Church-Turing thesis). At the end of the day, deciding whether or not the universe is determined, indeterminate, random, etc.. is decidedly uninteresting. I try to hold 50 conflicting ontological commitments before breakfast. Alas, it appears that we have no interest in working with the commitments others make. In an effort to contribute to the banality I propose 2401 or perhaps whatever number you would construct the fifth time you follow Cantor's diagonal argument! -- Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
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In reply to this post by jon zingale
I have not followed the whole "free will" discussion, but among the JHU books I stumbled upon one "free will" book as well. Might contain some new ideas and informations: Sinnott-Armstrong - Moral Psychology: Free Will and Moral Responsibility https://muse.jhu.edu/book/28917 This one looked interesting too Thagard - The Brain and the Meaning of Life https://muse.jhu.edu/book/31135 -J. -------- Original message -------- From: Jon Zingale <[hidden email]> Date: 6/17/20 18:02 (GMT+01:00) To: [hidden email] Subject: Re: [FRIAM] alternative response Perhaps a starting point could be to investigate to what extent are intent and punishment are falsifiable or inconsistent with respect to *free will*, or to what extent are they verifiable and consistent? -- Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
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In reply to this post by jon zingale
If I am honest, which I at least usually try to be, most beliefs that I have are only supported by the amount of effort I'm willing to put into the endeavor of supporting them. I can rationalize this by saying that nobody's brain, not even Einstein's, has (or had) the capacity to calculate and keep track of all the assumptions necessary to support our beliefs. I do believe this is true, even though it is more the result of my simply getting tired of or bored with trying to do so. Maybe this has a lot to do with why people have "faith", they just get tired of trying to figure it all out, and it is so much easier to accept what a large group of your peers tells you. I think true wisdom starts when one realizes those limitations. On Wed, Jun 17, 2020 at 12:44 PM Jon Zingale <[hidden email]> wrote: Nick, - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
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In reply to this post by jon zingale
Exactly. Maybe this is one of the important points Nick has been asking for regarding computational thinking or "software engineering"? One of the lessons I have to teach the youngsters unfortunate enough to require my teaching is that they absolutely have to READ THE CODE. They come into a project reading the words in published papers, or thinking about some architecture they infer from diagrams or lists of file names, or wherever their brain farts come from. But I shout again and again, from day one, read the code. Read the code! READ THE DAMNED CODE! It can take months to years to get them to actually read the code ... even if I refuse to talk to them until they point to a line of code we can talk about.
In essence, "read the code" means you have to play someone else's game. The rules are all set up there in the code. The trouble is always that the youngsters have trouble playing someone else's game, thinking like someone else, working within a system designed by someone else. Maybe this is an insight Nick is asking for? Professional programmers spend their entire careers dealing with others' garbage code. And it's largely irrelevant whether that code *could* be made better, more this, more that. Even if you write from scratch, have strict standards and everyone on the team uses the same patterns, you pair program, yaddayadda. There's always someone else's game you'll eventually have to play, even if only to decide that it's garbage and rewrite it according to your rules. On 6/17/20 10:38 AM, Jon Zingale wrote: > At the end of the day, deciding whether or not > the universe is determined, indeterminate, random, etc.. is decidedly > uninteresting. I try to hold 50 conflicting ontological commitments before > breakfast. Alas, it appears that we have no interest in working with the > commitments others make. -- ☣ uǝlƃ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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In reply to this post by Gary Schiltz-4
Yes! That's an excellent example of when faith is useful. I've argued that that particular usage isn't canonical, though. The canon I learned was that faith is a truncation of inference useful in many types of circumstance. In the end, it boils down to let's just get on with it and see what happens ... as opposed to hand-wringing and worrying - analysis paralysis. I also think it plays an important role in hypothesis formation. E.g. if we take physics *seriously*, there must be some thing, XYZ, that plays the role of a magnetic monopole. Such "taking seriously" is an act of (revocable) faith. I.e. you don't have to stop the presses and derive everything from first principles ever day all day, arguing about fundamental concepts ... you just get on with it and see what happens. Relatedly, the "shut up and calculate" accusation is really a strawman. Everyone *wants* to go deeper. But many of us have jobs, and grass to mow, and children to raise, etc. We can't spend all our time thinking about the One True Meaning of "free will".
On 6/17/20 11:09 AM, Gary Schiltz wrote: > Maybe this has a lot to do with why people have "faith", they just get tired of trying to figure it all out, and it is so much easier to accept what a large group of your peers tells you. I think true wisdom starts when one realizes those limitations. -- ☣ uǝlƃ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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Gary,
Perhaps more interesting about Einstein's *brain* is that it may have been able to die not *believing* in the theory it developed. This is only possible if we can accept ontological grounds different from habit. Glen, You said: "Maybe this is an insight Nick is asking for?" Nick *should* understand this. He demands that *we* makeup a council and that it might be *our jobs* to redirect SteveG into using a different word than god. That it might save him the trouble to play another's game, to realize the inertia of legacy code. Nick, et al. Glen says: "I highlight 'as if' above because it's that truncation error that might be overlooked. However, just because I think these interface mismatches cause the overwhelming MAJORITY of what we might call 'free will', it's not necessarily the case that there is no freedom somewhere deep down. Maybe 'below Fermi', there is a tiny bit of wiggle room that then *cascades* (purely reactively) through the system." - From page 3 Nick says: "To deny it is to deny our humanity. Well, I deny it. In the first place, I don't find humans to be all that special...I still have yet to understand Glen's idea of free will..." Ok, you make an unwavering ontological commitment, *all is effable*. Glen begins by imagining that we limit the scope to allow for ineffable. You act as if you are probing his thesis on his terms, but then you home-in on the ineffability property which is entailed by scoping, only to claim that you don't understand. I judge this as boring. Nick says: " But I think the game metaphor fails just because actual games can take on only those implications that we care to give them whereas 'games' like the 'free will game' have negative consequences both in the field of psychology and in our every day lives." Next, you make an appeal to *flesh in the game* by becoming a staunch defender of the universal application of our game to its consequences with respect to moral(?) responsibility (negative consequences). Now, I feel that you requiring responsibility to the consequences of universal applicability as an ontological commitment. This reminds me of when a band attempts to work out their royalty structure and where they will stand on stage, ad infinitum before they bother to write a song. Have no fear, of course, you will look good in sunglasses. Further down on page 3, Glen asserts: "And when we use the phrase 'free will' in our everyday conversation, we're really talking about that loss, the information lost when we truncate others or others truncate us. The existence of the lossy, truncating collective doesn't preclude the existence of the tiny, tiny impact randomness." This seems like an ontological commitment. On page 4 he continues to fend off attempts to move the grounding by emphasizing scope and the conversation's origin. Glen says: "I agree. I doubt it would display free will, too. But it's an interesting question whether it would or not. It's an even more interesting question whether it would *look* like it exhibited free will, which is the question RussA asked." Opening the floor to constructing models of what it could mean to *look like* this or that. By page 5, Glen literally lays out some kind of mesh model, talks about memory, and the path not taken. There are again, all kinds of places to play the game. OTOH, maybe it *is* more fun to fraggle the doozer by ignoring the model and trolling the foundations. Personally, I have written too many bots to think about doing that manually as being any fun. -- Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
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