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Young but distant gallaxies

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Steve Smith

Re: ductionist Doug

Douglas Roberts wrote:
> Steve,
>
> I think there would be a certain reductionist symmetry if you were to
> use one of my own guns to shoot me, don't you?
The Reductionist in me does find that satisfying.

Emergent Complexicists, however, believe in symmetry-breaking at the
onset of a phase-change.

I would think that the shooting of one knee would suffice for symmetry
breaking and inducing a properly interesting phase change.

Which chirality would you prefer in your resulting gait? I myself tend
to in leftward leaning spirals, but suspect you might prefer something
more to the right.

Are you watching the fascinating sunset over the Jemez?

- Steve

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Douglas Roberts-2

Re: ductionist Doug

Enjoying it with a nice glass of wine. The wine should produce all the spiraling I can foresee needed for the near term, thanks.

--Doug

On Sun, Sep 7, 2008 at 7:33 PM, Steve Smith <[hidden email]> wrote:

Douglas Roberts wrote:
> Steve,
>
> I think there would be a certain reductionist symmetry if you were to
> use one of my own guns to shoot me, don't you?

The Reductionist in me does find that satisfying.

Emergent Complexicists, however, believe in symmetry-breaking at the
onset of a phase-change.

I would think that the shooting of one knee would suffice for symmetry
breaking and inducing a properly interesting phase change.

Which chirality would you prefer in your resulting gait? I myself tend
to in leftward leaning spirals, but suspect you might prefer something
more to the right.

Are you watching the fascinating sunset over the Jemez?

- Steve

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

--
Doug Roberts, RTI International
[hidden email]
[hidden email]
505-455-7333 - Office
505-670-8195 - Cell

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Orlando Leibovitz

Re: Reductionism - was: Young but distant gallaxies

In reply to this post by Steve Smith

Thanks Steve. O

Steve Smith wrote:

Orlando-

You can find good references in Wikipedia on this topic, including the Descartes references.

Reductionism
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Descartes held that non-human animals could be reductively explained as automata — De homines 1662.

Reductionism can either mean (a) an approach to understanding the nature of complex things by reducing them to the interactions of their parts, or to simpler or more fundamental things or (b) a philosophical position that a complex system is nothing but the sum of its parts, and that an account of it can be reduced to accounts of individual constituents.[1] This can be said of objects, phenomena, explanations, theories, and meanings.

All -

IMO,
Reductionism(a) is a highly utilitarian approach to understanding complex problems, but in some important cases insufficient. It applies well to easily observable systems of distinct elements with obvious relations operating within the regime they were designed, evolved, or selected for. It applies even better to engineered systems which were designed, built and tested using reductionist principles.   I'm not sure how useful or apt it is beyond that. Some might argue, that this covers so much, who cares about what is left over?... and this might distinguish the rest of us from hard-core reductionists... we are interested in the phenomena, systems, and regimes where such does not apply. This is perhaps what defines Complexity Scientists and Practitioners.

Reductionism(b) is a philosophical extension of (a) which has a nice feel to it for those who operate in the regime where (a) holds well. To the extent that most of the (non-social) problems we encounter in our man-made world tend to lie (by design) in this regime, this is not a bad approach. To the extent that much of science is done in the service of some kind of engineering (ultimately to yield a better material, process or product), it also works well.

Reductionism(b) might be directly confronted by the "Halting Problem" in computability theory.   Reductionism in it's strongest form would suggest that the behaviour of any given system could ultimately be predicted by studying the behaviour of it's parts.   There are certainly large numbers of examples where this is at least approximately true (and useful), otherwise we wouldn't have unit-testing in our software systems, we wouldn't have interchangeable parts, we wouldn't be able to make any useful predictions whatsoever about anything. But if it were fully and literally true, it could be applied to programs in Turing-Complete systems.   My own argument here leads me to ponder what (if any) range of interesting problems lie in the regime between the embarrassingly reduceable and the (non)-halting program.

But to suggest (insist) that *all* systems and *all* phenomenology can be understood (and predicted) simply by reductionism seems to have been dismissed by most serious scientists some while ago.   Complexity Science and those who study Emergent Phenomena implicitly leave Reductionism behind once they get into "truly" complex systems and emergent phenomena.

I, myself, prefer (simple) reductionistic simplifications over (complex) handwaving ones (see Occam's Razor) most of the time, but when the going gets tough (or the systems get complex), reductionism *becomes* nothing more than handwaving in my experience.

- Steve
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Orlando Leibovitz

[hidden email]

www.orlandoleibovitz.com

Studio Telephone: 505-820-6183

Orlando Leibovitz

Re: Young but distant gallaxies

In reply to this post by Orlando Leibovitz

Doug,

Maybe Bush was elected in 2004, so that is once. He was selected in 2000.

O

Douglas Roberts wrote:
Günther,

One of the foremost historical reductionists (Descarte) twice demonstrated blind egotism in his "Reductionist Duck" postulate, as follows:

1) that reductionism did not apply to humans, and
2) that when applied to non-humans, the non-human could be reduced to an automata.

I'm not sure which I find most disappointing: the fact of the egoism amply demonstrated by this postulate, or the blind acceptance of it by so many other modern "reductionists".

I suppose I shouldn't be surprised, though. I mean after all, this is the same gene pool (evolved 360 years) that elected George W. Bush as our United States president.

Twice.

As to your question regarding a non-egoistic explanation: recognition of the fact that we simply do not yet understand enough about the complexities of organic intelligence to be making stupid, simplistic reductionist claims about its nature would be a good start...

Cheers,

--Doug
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org
--

Orlando Leibovitz

[hidden email]

www.orlandoleibovitz.com

Studio Telephone: 505-820-6183
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Orlando Leibovitz

[hidden email]

www.orlandoleibovitz.com

Studio Telephone: 505-820-6183

Kenneth Lloyd

Re: Reductionism - was: Young but distant gallaxies

In reply to this post by Steve Smith

Steve,

Good job on the defense of a reductionist position. I utilize a five phase approach to the study of complex systems.

Definition - Analysis - Normalization - Synthesis - Realization (DANSR)

Reductionism has its place in the analytical phase at equilibrium. Analysis is normally a study of integrable, often linear systems, but it can be accomplished on non-linear, feed-forward systems as well. The synthesis phase puts information re: complex behavior and emergence back into the integrated mix and may be "analyzed" in non-linear, recurrent networks. This is actually a probabilistic inversion of analysis as described in Inverse Theory.

Bayesian refinement cycles (forward <-> inverse) are applied to new information as one progresses through the DANSR cycle. This refines the effect of new information on prior information - which I hope folks see is not simply additive - and which may be entirely disruptive (see evolution of science itself) .

The fact this seems to work for complex systems is philosophically uninteresting, and may ignored - so the discussion can continue.

Final point: Descartes ultimately rejected the concept of zero because of historical religious orthodoxy - so he personally never applied it to the continuum extension of negative numbers. All his original Cartesian coordinates started with 1 on a finite bottom, left-hand boundary - according to Zero, The Biography of a Dangerous Idea, by Charles Seife.

Ken

From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Steve Smith
Sent: Sunday, September 07, 2008 6:42 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Cc: Aku
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Reductionism - was: Young but distant gallaxies

Orlando-

You can find good references in Wikipedia on this topic, including the Descartes references.

Reductionism
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Descartes held that non-human animals could be reductively explained as automata — De homines 1662.

Reductionism can either mean (a) an approach to understanding the nature of complex things by reducing them to the interactions of their parts, or to simpler or more fundamental things or (b) a philosophical position that a complex system is nothing but the sum of its parts, and that an account of it can be reduced to accounts of individual constituents.[1] This can be said of objects, phenomena, explanations, theories, and meanings.

All -

IMO,
Reductionism(a) is a highly utilitarian approach to understanding complex problems, but in some important cases insufficient. It applies well to easily observable systems of distinct elements with obvious relations operating within the regime they were designed, evolved, or selected for. It applies even better to engineered systems which were designed, built and tested using reductionist principles.   I'm not sure how useful or apt it is beyond that. Some might argue, that this covers so much, who cares about what is left over?... and this might distinguish the rest of us from hard-core reductionists... we are interested in the phenomena, systems, and regimes where such does not apply. This is perhaps what defines Complexity Scientists and Practitioners.

Reductionism(b) is a philosophical extension of (a) which has a nice feel to it for those who operate in the regime where (a) holds well. To the extent that most of the (non-social) problems we encounter in our man-made world tend to lie (by design) in this regime, this is not a bad approach. To the extent that much of science is done in the service of some kind of engineering (ultimately to yield a better material, process or product), it also works well.

Reductionism(b) might be directly confronted by the "Halting Problem" in computability theory.   Reductionism in it's strongest form would suggest that the behaviour of any given system could ultimately be predicted by studying the behaviour of it's parts.   There are certainly large numbers of examples where this is at least approximately true (and useful), otherwise we wouldn't have unit-testing in our software systems, we wouldn't have interchangeable parts, we wouldn't be able to make any useful predictions whatsoever about anything. But if it were fully and literally true, it could be applied to programs in Turing-Complete systems.   My own argument here leads me to ponder what (if any) range of interesting problems lie in the regime between the embarrassingly reduceable and the (non)-halting program.

But to suggest (insist) that *all* systems and *all* phenomenology can be understood (and predicted) simply by reductionism seems to have been dismissed by most serious scientists some while ago.   Complexity Science and those who study Emergent Phenomena implicitly leave Reductionism behind once they get into "truly" complex systems and emergent phenomena.

I, myself, prefer (simple) reductionistic simplifications over (complex) handwaving ones (see Occam's Razor) most of the time, but when the going gets tough (or the systems get complex), reductionism *becomes* nothing more than handwaving in my experience.

- Steve

glen ep ropella

Re: Reductionism - was: Young but distant gallaxies

In reply to this post by Steve Smith

Steve Smith wrote:
> I, myself, prefer (simple) reductionistic simplifications over (complex)
> handwaving ones (see Occam's Razor) most of the time, but when the going gets
> tough (or the systems get complex), reductionism *becomes* nothing more than
> handwaving in my experience.

That's a perfect way of saying it, I think. All zealotry is hand-waving.

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-219-3846, http://tempusdictum.com

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Steve Smith

Re: Reductionism - was: Young but distant gallaxies

In reply to this post by Kenneth Lloyd

Ken -

Reductionism has its place in the analytical phase at equilibrium. Analysis is normally a study of integrable, often linear systems, but it can be accomplished on non-linear, feed-forward systems as well.

Well said...

The synthesis phase puts information re: complex behavior and emergence back into the integrated mix and may be "analyzed" in non-linear, recurrent networks.

It is the synthesis/analysis duality that always (often) gets lost in arguments about Reductionism. There are very many useful things (e.g. linear and near-equilibrium systems) to be studied analytically, but there are many *more* interesting and often useful things (non linear, far-from-equilibrium, complex systems with emergent behaviour) which also beg for synthesis.

This is actually a probabilistic inversion of analysis as described in Inverse Theory.

I'll have to look this up.

Bayesian refinement cycles (forward <-> inverse) are applied to new information as one progresses through the DANSR cycle. This refines the effect of new information on prior information - which I hope folks see is not simply additive - and which may be entirely disruptive (see evolution of science itself) .

Do find this applies as well in non-probabalistic models?

The fact this seems to work for complex systems is philosophically uninteresting, and may ignored - so the discussion can continue.

"seems to work" sends up red flags, as does "philosophically uninteresting". I could use some refinement on what you mean here.

Final point: Descartes ultimately rejected the concept of zero because of historical religious orthodoxy - so he personally never applied it to the continuum extension of negative numbers. All his original Cartesian coordinates started with 1 on a finite bottom, left-hand boundary - according to Zero, The Biography of a Dangerous Idea, by Charles Seife.

And didn't Shakespeare dramatize this in his famous work "Much Ado about Nothing"? (bad literary pun, sorry).


============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Robert J. Cordingley

Re: Reductionism - was: Young but distant gallaxies

In reply to this post by Kenneth Lloyd

I'm reading "The Book of Nothing" by John D. Barrow which begins with a history of the concepts of zero, nothing, 0 (the place holder) and the void and moves smoothly on through sets and on to quantum physics. The book raises lots of questions for me and Ken's post struck a chord. On page 235:

"Yet, despite the symmetry of the laws of Nature, we observe the outcomes of those symmetrical laws to be asymmetrical states and structures. Each of us is a complicated asymmetrical outcome of the laws of electromagnetism and gravity. ... One of Nature's deep secrets is the fact that the outcomes of the laws of Nature do not have to possess the same symmetries as the laws themselves.... it is possible to have a Universe governed by a very small number of simple symmetrical laws (perhaps just a single law) yet manifesting a stupendous array of complex, asymmetrical states and structures that might even be able to think about themselves."

If physicists find the perhaps one law (the Grand Unified Theory?) isn't that the ultimate in reductionism? Everything else is just playing in the resulting stardust.

So is the study of complexity just another way of looking at the asymmetries?

Apparently too Descartes denied that a vacuum could exist (ibid p119), let alone 0, but now physicists ideas of what a vacuum is seem to make it something other than a complete void, possessing zero-point energy. So may be D had a point?

Robert C

Kenneth Lloyd wrote:

Steve,

Good job on the defense of a reductionist position. I utilize a five phase approach to the study of complex systems.

Definition - Analysis - Normalization - Synthesis - Realization (DANSR)

Reductionism has its place in the analytical phase at equilibrium. Analysis is normally a study of integrable, often linear systems, but it can be accomplished on non-linear, feed-forward systems as well. The synthesis phase puts information re: complex behavior and emergence back into the integrated mix and may be "analyzed" in non-linear, recurrent networks. This is actually a probabilistic inversion of analysis as described in Inverse Theory.

Bayesian refinement cycles (forward <-> inverse) are applied to new information as one progresses through the DANSR cycle. This refines the effect of new information on prior information - which I hope folks see is not simply additive - and which may be entirely disruptive (see evolution of science itself) .

The fact this seems to work for complex systems is philosophically uninteresting, and may ignored - so the discussion can continue.

Final point: Descartes ultimately rejected the concept of zero because of historical religious orthodoxy - so he personally never applied it to the continuum extension of negative numbers. All his original Cartesian coordinates started with 1 on a finite bottom, left-hand boundary - according to Zero, The Biography of a Dangerous Idea, by Charles Seife.

Ken

From: [hidden email] [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Steve Smith
Sent: Sunday, September 07, 2008 6:42 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Cc: Aku
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Reductionism - was: Young but distant gallaxies

Orlando-

You can find good references in Wikipedia on this topic, including the Descartes references.

Reductionism
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Descartes held that non-human animals could be reductively explained as automata — De homines 1662.

Reductionism can either mean (a) an approach to understanding the nature of complex things by reducing them to the interactions of their parts, or to simpler or more fundamental things or (b) a philosophical position that a complex system is nothing but the sum of its parts, and that an account of it can be reduced to accounts of individual constituents.[1] This can be said of objects, phenomena, explanations, theories, and meanings.

All -

IMO,
Reductionism(a) is a highly utilitarian approach to understanding complex problems, but in some important cases insufficient. It applies well to easily observable systems of distinct elements with obvious relations operating within the regime they were designed, evolved, or selected for. It applies even better to engineered systems which were designed, built and tested using reductionist principles.   I'm not sure how useful or apt it is beyond that. Some might argue, that this covers so much, who cares about what is left over?... and this might distinguish the rest of us from hard-core reductionists... we are interested in the phenomena, systems, and regimes where such does not apply. This is perhaps what defines Complexity Scientists and Practitioners.

Reductionism(b) is a philosophical extension of (a) which has a nice feel to it for those who operate in the regime where (a) holds well. To the extent that most of the (non-social) problems we encounter in our man-made world tend to lie (by design) in this regime, this is not a bad approach. To the extent that much of science is done in the service of some kind of engineering (ultimately to yield a better material, process or product), it also works well.

Reductionism(b) might be directly confronted by the "Halting Problem" in computability theory.   Reductionism in it's strongest form would suggest that the behaviour of any given system could ultimately be predicted by studying the behaviour of it's parts.   There are certainly large numbers of examples where this is at least approximately true (and useful), otherwise we wouldn't have unit-testing in our software systems, we wouldn't have interchangeable parts, we wouldn't be able to make any useful predictions whatsoever about anything. But if it were fully and literally true, it could be applied to programs in Turing-Complete systems.   My own argument here leads me to ponder what (if any) range of interesting problems lie in the regime between the embarrassingly reduceable and the (non)-halting program.

But to suggest (insist) that *all* systems and *all* phenomenology can be understood (and predicted) simply by reductionism seems to have been dismissed by most serious scientists some while ago.   Complexity Science and those who study Emergent Phenomena implicitly leave Reductionism behind once they get into "truly" complex systems and emergent phenomena.

I, myself, prefer (simple) reductionistic simplifications over (complex) handwaving ones (see Occam's Razor) most of the time, but when the going gets tough (or the systems get complex), reductionism *becomes* nothing more than handwaving in my experience.

- Steve
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Kenneth Lloyd

Re: Reductionism - was: Young but distant gallaxies

Robert,

Are you referring to the Casamir effect in a vacuum? I suppose it all depends on how you conceptualize a void.

I would certainly agree that inequality and irreversibility are forms of asymmetry. Asymmetry is what happens in reflection and dispersion in recurrent networks. There are temporal forms of asymmetry too, which was part of the original discussion about distant galaxies, the speed of light, and what inference we can make about distant objects from light that's possibly billions of years old that is just now reaching us.

Read: The Ransom of Red Shift - no don't, I got confused. That was Ransom of Red Chief. Never mind.

Ken

From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Robert Cordingley
Sent: Monday, September 08, 2008 9:30 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Reductionism - was: Young but distant gallaxies

I'm reading "The Book of Nothing" by John D. Barrow which begins with a history of the concepts of zero, nothing, 0 (the place holder) and the void and moves smoothly on through sets and on to quantum physics. The book raises lots of questions for me and Ken's post struck a chord. On page 235:

"Yet, despite the symmetry of the laws of Nature, we observe the outcomes of those symmetrical laws to be asymmetrical states and structures. Each of us is a complicated asymmetrical outcome of the laws of electromagnetism and gravity. ... One of Nature's deep secrets is the fact that the outcomes of the laws of Nature do not have to possess the same symmetries as the laws themselves.... it is possible to have a Universe governed by a very small number of simple symmetrical laws (perhaps just a single law) yet manifesting a stupendous array of complex, asymmetrical states and structures that might even be able to think about themselves."

If physicists find the perhaps one law (the Grand Unified Theory?) isn't that the ultimate in reductionism? Everything else is just playing in the resulting stardust.

So is the study of complexity just another way of looking at the asymmetries?

Apparently too Descartes denied that a vacuum could exist (ibid p119), let alone 0, but now physicists ideas of what a vacuum is seem to make it something other than a complete void, possessing zero-point energy. So may be D had a point?

Robert C

Kenneth Lloyd wrote:
Steve,

Good job on the defense of a reductionist position. I utilize a five phase approach to the study of complex systems.

Definition - Analysis - Normalization - Synthesis - Realization (DANSR)

Reductionism has its place in the analytical phase at equilibrium. Analysis is normally a study of integrable, often linear systems, but it can be accomplished on non-linear, feed-forward systems as well. The synthesis phase puts information re: complex behavior and emergence back into the integrated mix and may be "analyzed" in non-linear, recurrent networks. This is actually a probabilistic inversion of analysis as described in Inverse Theory.

Bayesian refinement cycles (forward <-> inverse) are applied to new information as one progresses through the DANSR cycle. This refines the effect of new information on prior information - which I hope folks see is not simply additive - and which may be entirely disruptive (see evolution of science itself) .

The fact this seems to work for complex systems is philosophically uninteresting, and may ignored - so the discussion can continue.

Final point: Descartes ultimately rejected the concept of zero because of historical religious orthodoxy - so he personally never applied it to the continuum extension of negative numbers. All his original Cartesian coordinates started with 1 on a finite bottom, left-hand boundary - according to Zero, The Biography of a Dangerous Idea, by Charles Seife.

Ken

From: [hidden email] [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Steve Smith
Sent: Sunday, September 07, 2008 6:42 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Cc: Aku
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Reductionism - was: Young but distant gallaxies

Orlando-

You can find good references in Wikipedia on this topic, including the Descartes references.

Reductionism
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Descartes held that non-human animals could be reductively explained as automata — De homines 1662.

Reductionism can either mean (a) an approach to understanding the nature of complex things by reducing them to the interactions of their parts, or to simpler or more fundamental things or (b) a philosophical position that a complex system is nothing but the sum of its parts, and that an account of it can be reduced to accounts of individual constituents.[1] This can be said of objects, phenomena, explanations, theories, and meanings.

All -

IMO,
Reductionism(a) is a highly utilitarian approach to understanding complex problems, but in some important cases insufficient. It applies well to easily observable systems of distinct elements with obvious relations operating within the regime they were designed, evolved, or selected for. It applies even better to engineered systems which were designed, built and tested using reductionist principles.   I'm not sure how useful or apt it is beyond that. Some might argue, that this covers so much, who cares about what is left over?... and this might distinguish the rest of us from hard-core reductionists... we are interested in the phenomena, systems, and regimes where such does not apply. This is perhaps what defines Complexity Scientists and Practitioners.

Reductionism(b) is a philosophical extension of (a) which has a nice feel to it for those who operate in the regime where (a) holds well. To the extent that most of the (non-social) problems we encounter in our man-made world tend to lie (by design) in this regime, this is not a bad approach. To the extent that much of science is done in the service of some kind of engineering (ultimately to yield a better material, process or product), it also works well.

Reductionism(b) might be directly confronted by the "Halting Problem" in computability theory.   Reductionism in it's strongest form would suggest that the behaviour of any given system could ultimately be predicted by studying the behaviour of it's parts.   There are certainly large numbers of examples where this is at least approximately true (and useful), otherwise we wouldn't have unit-testing in our software systems, we wouldn't have interchangeable parts, we wouldn't be able to make any useful predictions whatsoever about anything. But if it were fully and literally true, it could be applied to programs in Turing-Complete systems.   My own argument here leads me to ponder what (if any) range of interesting problems lie in the regime between the embarrassingly reduceable and the (non)-halting program.

But to suggest (insist) that *all* systems and *all* phenomenology can be understood (and predicted) simply by reductionism seems to have been dismissed by most serious scientists some while ago.   Complexity Science and those who study Emergent Phenomena implicitly leave Reductionism behind once they get into "truly" complex systems and emergent phenomena.

I, myself, prefer (simple) reductionistic simplifications over (complex) handwaving ones (see Occam's Razor) most of the time, but when the going gets tough (or the systems get complex), reductionism *becomes* nothing more than handwaving in my experience.

- Steve
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Jack Leibowitz

Re: Reductionism - was: Young but distant gallaxies

In reply to this post by Robert J. Cordingley

HI Robert,

I hate to get back in the swim with you guys on the subjects of reductionism and emergence and so on, because you all seem to have it well expressed. So let's agree I'm out of that loop.

But I was intrigued by your comments on Barrow's book, which I hadn't heard about. To summarize what Robert reports on Barrows' book, the physical laws, satisfy symmetry, but real physical processes break symmetry. The physical laws necessarily satisfy symmetry, meaning that there are no preferred observers. (Emmy Noether; continuous symmetries and conservation laws; symmetrical.)

For more, see my recent book , Hidden Harmony: The Connected Worlds of Physics and Art (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), J. R. Leibowitz. Incidentally, those interested in art, like Orlando, may find the discussions on formal analysis in art interesting. (Orlando already is familiar with the book's discussion on formal analysis in art).

Jack.

----- Original Message -----

From: [hidden email]

To: [hidden email]

Sent: Monday, September 08, 2008 9:29 AM

Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Reductionism - was: Young but distant gallaxies

I'm reading "The Book of Nothing" by John D. Barrow which begins with a history of the concepts of zero, nothing, 0 (the place holder) and the void and moves smoothly on through sets and on to quantum physics. The book raises lots of questions for me and Ken's post struck a chord. On page 235:

"Yet, despite the symmetry of the laws of Nature, we observe the outcomes of those symmetrical laws to be asymmetrical states and structures. Each of us is a complicated asymmetrical outcome of the laws of electromagnetism and gravity. ... One of Nature's deep secrets is the fact that the outcomes of the laws of Nature do not have to possess the same symmetries as the laws themselves.... it is possible to have a Universe governed by a very small number of simple symmetrical laws (perhaps just a single law) yet manifesting a stupendous array of complex, asymmetrical states and structures that might even be able to think about themselves."

If physicists find the perhaps one law (the Grand Unified Theory?) isn't that the ultimate in reductionism? Everything else is just playing in the resulting stardust.

So is the study of complexity just another way of looking at the asymmetries?

Apparently too Descartes denied that a vacuum could exist (ibid p119), let alone 0, but now physicists ideas of what a vacuum is seem to make it something other than a complete void, possessing zero-point energy. So may be D had a point?

Robert C

Kenneth Lloyd wrote:
Steve,

Good job on the defense of a reductionist position. I utilize a five phase approach to the study of complex systems.

Definition - Analysis - Normalization - Synthesis - Realization (DANSR)

Reductionism has its place in the analytical phase at equilibrium. Analysis is normally a study of integrable, often linear systems, but it can be accomplished on non-linear, feed-forward systems as well. The synthesis phase puts information re: complex behavior and emergence back into the integrated mix and may be "analyzed" in non-linear, recurrent networks. This is actually a probabilistic inversion of analysis as described in Inverse Theory.

Bayesian refinement cycles (forward <-> inverse) are applied to new information as one progresses through the DANSR cycle. This refines the effect of new information on prior information - which I hope folks see is not simply additive - and which may be entirely disruptive (see evolution of science itself) .

The fact this seems to work for complex systems is philosophically uninteresting, and may ignored - so the discussion can continue.

Final point: Descartes ultimately rejected the concept of zero because of historical religious orthodoxy - so he personally never applied it to the continuum extension of negative numbers. All his original Cartesian coordinates started with 1 on a finite bottom, left-hand boundary - according to Zero, The Biography of a Dangerous Idea, by Charles Seife.

Ken

From: [hidden email] [[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Steve Smith
Sent: Sunday, September 07, 2008 6:42 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Cc: Aku
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Reductionism - was: Young but distant gallaxies

Orlando-

You can find good references in Wikipedia on this topic, including the Descartes references.

Reductionism
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Descartes held that non-human animals could be reductively explained as automata De homines 1662.

Reductionism can either mean (a) an approach to understanding the nature of complex things by reducing them to the interactions of their parts, or to simpler or more fundamental things or (b) a philosophical position that a complex system is nothing but the sum of its parts, and that an account of it can be reduced to accounts of individual constituents.[1] This can be said of objects, phenomena, explanations, theories, and meanings.

All -

IMO,
Reductionism(a) is a highly utilitarian approach to understanding complex problems, but in some important cases insufficient. It applies well to easily observable systems of distinct elements with obvious relations operating within the regime they were designed, evolved, or selected for. It applies even better to engineered systems which were designed, built and tested using reductionist principles.   I'm not sure how useful or apt it is beyond that. Some might argue, that this covers so much, who cares about what is left over?... and this might distinguish the rest of us from hard-core reductionists... we are interested in the phenomena, systems, and regimes where such does not apply. This is perhaps what defines Complexity Scientists and Practitioners.

Reductionism(b) is a philosophical extension of (a) which has a nice feel to it for those who operate in the regime where (a) holds well. To the extent that most of the (non-social) problems we encounter in our man-made world tend to lie (by design) in this regime, this is not a bad approach. To the extent that much of science is done in the service of some kind of engineering (ultimately to yield a better material, process or product), it also works well.

Reductionism(b) might be directly confronted by the "Halting Problem" in computability theory.   Reductionism in it's strongest form would suggest that the behaviour of any given system could ultimately be predicted by studying the behaviour of it's parts.   There are certainly large numbers of examples where this is at least approximately true (and useful), otherwise we wouldn't have unit-testing in our software systems, we wouldn't have interchangeable parts, we wouldn't be able to make any useful predictions whatsoever about anything. But if it were fully and literally true, it could be applied to programs in Turing-Complete systems.   My own argument here leads me to ponder what (if any) range of interesting problems lie in the regime between the embarrassingly reduceable and the (non)-halting program.

But to suggest (insist) that *all* systems and *all* phenomenology can be understood (and predicted) simply by reductionism seems to have been dismissed by most serious scientists some while ago.   Complexity Science and those who study Emergent Phenomena implicitly leave Reductionism behind once they get into "truly" complex systems and emergent phenomena.

I, myself, prefer (simple) reductionistic simplifications over (complex) handwaving ones (see Occam's Razor) most of the time, but when the going gets tough (or the systems get complex), reductionism *becomes* nothing more than handwaving in my experience.

- Steve
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Kenneth Lloyd

Re: Reductionism - was: Young but distant gallaxies

In reply to this post by Steve Smith

Steve,

"The fact this seems to work ..." that whole line was a touch of sarcasm. It appears experimentally verified in my work, but people still like to argue with me about it. Is it possible to argue a phenomenon out of existence?

Of course, I can be wrong, but someone will have to prove it by experimental counter-example - not just words. That doesn't seem to stop people from trying.

Re: the question about application to non-probabilistic models - good question! I'd need to run an example. Got one?

By all means check out Inverse theory (Tarantola, Mosegaard, Scales). Powerful stuff. Scales, ea. has a very accessible book on the web "Introduction to Geophysical Inverse Theory"

http://acoustics.mines.edu/~jscales/gp605/snapshot.pdf

Ken

From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Steve Smith
Sent: Monday, September 08, 2008 9:17 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Reductionism - was: Young but distant gallaxies

Ken -

Reductionism has its place in the analytical phase at equilibrium. Analysis is normally a study of integrable, often linear systems, but it can be accomplished on non-linear, feed-forward systems as well.
Well said...

The synthesis phase puts information re: complex behavior and emergence back into the integrated mix and may be "analyzed" in non-linear, recurrent networks.
It is the synthesis/analysis duality that always (often) gets lost in arguments about Reductionism. There are very many useful things (e.g. linear and near-equilibrium systems) to be studied analytically, but there are many *more* interesting and often useful things (non linear, far-from-equilibrium, complex systems with emergent behaviour) which also beg for synthesis.

This is actually a probabilistic inversion of analysis as described in Inverse Theory.
I'll have to look this up.

Bayesian refinement cycles (forward <-> inverse) are applied to new information as one progresses through the DANSR cycle. This refines the effect of new information on prior information - which I hope folks see is not simply additive - and which may be entirely disruptive (see evolution of science itself) .
Do find this applies as well in non-probabalistic models?

The fact this seems to work for complex systems is philosophically uninteresting, and may ignored - so the discussion can continue.
"seems to work" sends up red flags, as does "philosophically uninteresting". I could use some refinement on what you mean here.

Final point: Descartes ultimately rejected the concept of zero because of historical religious orthodoxy - so he personally never applied it to the continuum extension of negative numbers. All his original Cartesian coordinates started with 1 on a finite bottom, left-hand boundary - according to Zero, The Biography of a Dangerous Idea, by Charles Seife.
And didn't Shakespeare dramatize this in his famous work "Much Ado about Nothing"? (bad literary pun, sorry).
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Phil Henshaw-2

Re: Reductionism - was: Young but distant gallaxies

In reply to this post by Steve Smith

You guys all seem to be missing the difference between the value of reducing your solution and the error of ignoring the complexities of your problem. I find it’s often going out of my way to trace the complexities of the problem to see where they lead that leads me out of my blinders and gives me the simpler solution in the end.

I mean, like if you can’t hear the radio a solution is to keep absent mindedly turning up the volume, but if the complication is someone else with another radio in the room and you’re both turning up the volume… it would be simpler to solve the problem some very different way.

Phil

From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Steve Smith
Sent: Monday, September 08, 2008 11:17 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Reductionism - was: Young but distant gallaxies

Ken -

Well said...

The synthesis phase puts information re: complex behavior and emergence back into the integrated mix and may be "analyzed" in non-linear, recurrent networks.

This is actually a probabilistic inversion of analysis as described in Inverse Theory.

I'll have to look this up.

Do find this applies as well in non-probabalistic models?

The fact this seems to work for complex systems is philosophically uninteresting, and may ignored - so the discussion can continue.

"seems to work" sends up red flags, as does "philosophically uninteresting". I could use some refinement on what you mean here.

And didn't Shakespeare dramatize this in his famous work "Much Ado about Nothing"? (bad literary pun, sorry).

============================================================

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv

Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College

lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Kenneth Lloyd

Re: Reductionism - was: Young but distant gallaxies

Phil,

I disagree re: ignoring the complexities of the system. All extant complexities are manifest in synthesis and appear in realization. Consider what actual complexities are manifest in a closed system at absolute zero or Bose-Einstein Condensate state. The only energy left is potential energy in the mass. I don't know what happens to the binding energy - gluons - but there is nothing that could perturb the particles out of their state, or am I wrong? So the energy left at thermodynamic equilibrium seems to be that of the residual strong force, which would look a lot like either gravity, or "closeness by habitually being close"

In either case - modeled as an LPS (large Poincare system) wouldn't the mesoscopic resonance (heat & motion - zitterbegwegung) approach zero except for possibly the gluon resonance - and maybe even that, too?

The simplicity of the solutions to complex problems is that it is an ensemble - a bundle of entangled solution trajectories. It doesn't matter which particular path it takes, so long as it resolves. This holds for n-body problems or shocking a heartbeat back into a sinus pattern. They are not solved analytically, one problem at a time - they are solved all at once.

Ken

From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Phil Henshaw
Sent: Monday, September 08, 2008 1:15 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Reductionism - was: Young but distant gallaxies
You guys all seem to be missing the difference between the value of reducing your solution and the error of ignoring the complexities of your problem. I find it’s often going out of my way to trace the complexities of the problem to see where they lead that leads me out of my blinders and gives me the simpler solution in the end.

I mean, like if you can’t hear the radio a solution is to keep absent mindedly turning up the volume, but if the complication is someone else with another radio in the room and you’re both turning up the volume… it would be simpler to solve the problem some very different way.

Phil
From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Steve Smith
Sent: Monday, September 08, 2008 11:17 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Reductionism - was: Young but distant gallaxies

Ken -

Reductionism has its place in the analytical phase at equilibrium. Analysis is normally a study of integrable, often linear systems, but it can be accomplished on non-linear, feed-forward systems as well.

Well said...

The synthesis phase puts information re: complex behavior and emergence back into the integrated mix and may be "analyzed" in non-linear, recurrent networks.

It is the synthesis/analysis duality that always (often) gets lost in arguments about Reductionism. There are very many useful things (e.g. linear and near-equilibrium systems) to be studied analytically, but there are many *more* interesting and often useful things (non linear, far-from-equilibrium, complex systems with emergent behaviour) which also beg for synthesis.

This is actually a probabilistic inversion of analysis as described in Inverse Theory.

I'll have to look this up.

Bayesian refinement cycles (forward <-> inverse) are applied to new information as one progresses through the DANSR cycle. This refines the effect of new information on prior information - which I hope folks see is not simply additive - and which may be entirely disruptive (see evolution of science itself) .

Do find this applies as well in non-probabalistic models?

The fact this seems to work for complex systems is philosophically uninteresting, and may ignored - so the discussion can continue.

"seems to work" sends up red flags, as does "philosophically uninteresting". I could use some refinement on what you mean here.

Final point: Descartes ultimately rejected the concept of zero because of historical religious orthodoxy - so he personally never applied it to the continuum extension of negative numbers. All his original Cartesian coordinates started with 1 on a finite bottom, left-hand boundary - according to Zero, The Biography of a Dangerous Idea, by Charles Seife.

And didn't Shakespeare dramatize this in his famous work "Much Ado about Nothing"? (bad literary pun, sorry).
 
 
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Günther Greindl

Re: Young but distant gallaxies

In reply to this post by Douglas Roberts-2

Doug,

> I have not read "On the Origin of Objects"; I may browse it if I ever
> have some free time.

I think you would find it quite to your liking - the author himself
would say that he is _not_ a reductionist.

I have read all the comments in this thread, and I think we have been
talking a bit past each other.

The main interest here on the list seems to be in explanation and
prediction - epistemology.

My concerns with reductionism are purely ontological - as a philsopher,
I am concerned with the ultimate nature of reality. Science of course
can be done in lots of manners, and in the wake of logical positivism is
often done in an instrumental way (I think that is quite detrimental,
but that is another topic for another day...)

So I think we were actually talking past each other: you were talking
about levels of description (exclusively), and I was talking about
ontology (albeit a new form of ontology, see the Cantwell-Smith book,
which deviates very much from tratitional philosophical considerations
on this topic).

> Don't get me wrong: I do not totally reject reductionism. Well,
> actually, I do, as regards to finding any utility in it for myself. But
> other people seem to swear by it, and I am truly happy for them.

Agreed :-) Science profits from an abundance of ideas. I have never
understood why in science everybody is bashing at each other. More
harmony could be expected, after all, we all have the common goal of
understanding the world.

Cheers,
Günther

--
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
[hidden email]

Blog: http://www.complexitystudies.org/
Thesis: http://www.complexitystudies.org/proposal/

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Douglas Roberts-2

Re: Young but distant gallaxies

Thanks for closing the loop, Günther.

I guess it doesn't surprise me much that a philosopher and an engineer found themselves talking past each other...

;-}

--Doug

On Mon, Sep 8, 2008 at 2:14 PM,Gü nther Greindl <[hidden email]> wrote:

Doug,

> I have not read "On the Origin of Objects"; I may browse it if I ever
> have some free time.

I think you would find it quite to your liking - the author himself
would say that he is _not_ a reductionist.

I have read all the comments in this thread, and I think we have been
talking a bit past each other.

The main interest here on the list seems to be in explanation and
prediction - epistemology.

My concerns with reductionism are purely ontological - as a philsopher,
I am concerned with the ultimate nature of reality. Science of course
can be done in lots of manners, and in the wake of logical positivism is
often done in an instrumental way (I think that is quite detrimental,
but that is another topic for another day...)

So I think we were actually talking past each other: you were talking
about levels of description (exclusively), and I was talking about
ontology (albeit a new form of ontology, see the Cantwell-Smith book,
which deviates very much from tratitional philosophical considerations
on this topic).

> Don't get me wrong: I do not totally reject reductionism. Well,
> actually, I do, as regards to finding any utility in it for myself. But
> other people seem to swear by it, and I am truly happy for them.

Agreed :-) Science profits from an abundance of ideas. I have never
understood why in science everybody is bashing at each other. More
harmony could be expected, after all, we all have the common goal of
understanding the world.

Cheers,
Günther

--
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
[hidden email]

Blog: http://www.complexitystudies.org/
Thesis: http://www.complexitystudies.org/proposal/

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Phil Henshaw-2

Re: Reductionism - was: Young but distant gallaxies

In reply to this post by Kenneth Lloyd

Ken,

Phil,

I disagree re: ignoring the complexities of the system. All extant complexities are manifest in synthesis and appear in realization.

[ph] what, you hypothesize that because nature somehow takes care of every individual thing by her exceedingly complicated and unobserved way, that somehow any impression we have will incorporate everything about it? I some how sense a little ‘reaching’ in that..

Consider what actual complexities are manifest in a closed system at absolute zero or Bose-Einstein Condensate state.

The only energy left is potential energy in the mass. I don't know what happens to the binding energy - gluons - but there is nothing that could perturb the particles out of their state, or am I wrong? So the energy left at thermodynamic equilibrium seems to be that of the residual strong force, which would look a lot like either gravity, or "closeness by habitually being close"

[ph] well, simpler case, what about what’s going on in the back of your own fridge? What perturbs it ‘out of state’ always seems to be a surprise at the time when I discover it, and it’s not from my not knowing the formula.

[ph] If you’re imagining that theories are their own environments, so they fit perfectly in their worlds and never develop interactions that alter their own design in fundamental ways bye themselves, then you have a self-consistent model. Environments aren’t self-consistent though. They overflow with processes that reinvent the discards of one thing into key ingredients for others. What the math says about that is hard to tease out of it, as Robert Rosen who spent much of his effort attempting to do that found out. The trick is math has no environment, so it’s hard to make it say anything about what happens in environments. I made a nice clean revision of my attempt to do so, restating my principle of continuity & divergence, nick naming it a theory of “little bangs”. http://www.synapse9.com/drafts/ContPrinciple08_09.09.pdf

[ph] Yes, So long as the whole problem is inside the formula then there’s no problem. As soon as you put a formula inside an environment, though, there’s a curious formal gap of disconnection all around it, it seems to me.

phil

Ken

From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Phil Henshaw
Sent: Monday, September 08, 2008 1:15 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Reductionism - was: Young but distant gallaxies

You guys all seem to be missing the difference between the value of reducing your solution and the error of ignoring the complexities of your problem. I find it’s often going out of my way to trace the complexities of the problem to see where they lead that leads me out of my blinders and gives me the simpler solution in the end.

I mean, like if you can’t hear the radio a solution is to keep absent mindedly turning up the volume, but if the complication is someone else with another radio in the room and you’re both turning up the volume… it would be simpler to solve the problem some very different way.

Phil
From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On Behalf Of Steve Smith
Sent: Monday, September 08, 2008 11:17 AM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Reductionism - was: Young but distant gallaxies

Ken -

Reductionism has its place in the analytical phase at equilibrium. Analysis is normally a study of integrable, often linear systems, but it can be accomplished on non-linear, feed-forward systems as well.

Well said...

The synthesis phase puts information re: complex behavior and emergence back into the integrated mix and may be "analyzed" in non-linear, recurrent networks.

It is the synthesis/analysis duality that always (often) gets lost in arguments about Reductionism. There are very many useful things (e.g. linear and near-equilibrium systems) to be studied analytically, but there are many *more* interesting and often useful things (non linear, far-from-equilibrium, complex systems with emergent behaviour) which also beg for synthesis.

This is actually a probabilistic inversion of analysis as described in Inverse Theory.

I'll have to look this up.

Bayesian refinement cycles (forward <-> inverse) are applied to new information as one progresses through the DANSR cycle. This refines the effect of new information on prior information - which I hope folks see is not simply additive - and which may be entirely disruptive (see evolution of science itself) .

Do find this applies as well in non-probabalistic models?

The fact this seems to work for complex systems is philosophically uninteresting, and may ignored - so the discussion can continue.

"seems to work" sends up red flags, as does "philosophically uninteresting". I could use some refinement on what you mean here.

Final point: Descartes ultimately rejected the concept of zero because of historical religious orthodoxy - so he personally never applied it to the continuum extension of negative numbers. All his original Cartesian coordinates started with 1 on a finite bottom, left-hand boundary - according to Zero, The Biography of a Dangerous Idea, by Charles Seife.

And didn't Shakespeare dramatize this in his famous work "Much Ado about Nothing"? (bad literary pun, sorry).
 
 
 
 
 
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

Phil Henshaw-2

Re: Young but distant gallaxies

In reply to this post by Günther Greindl

Gunther,

I'd welcome some clarification too. I think there's a dilemma in that many
people don't share a way to distinguish between ontology and information.
It seems to have been the standard position of modern theoretical science
for 80 years that the two are one and the same, theoretically, i.e. making a
hopeless mess of it IMHO. I think our best information is that information
is usually incomplete, and the common 'holes' in the apparent ontology of
phenomena and whether they're real or not, is interesting to study.

Phil

> -----Original Message-----
> From: [hidden email] [mailto:[hidden email]] On
> Behalf Of Günther Greindl
> Sent: Monday, September 08, 2008 4:14 PM
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Young but distant gallaxies
>
> Doug,
>
> > I have not read "On the Origin of Objects"; I may browse it if I ever
> > have some free time.
>
> I think you would find it quite to your liking - the author himself
> would say that he is _not_ a reductionist.
>
> I have read all the comments in this thread, and I think we have been
> talking a bit past each other.
>
> The main interest here on the list seems to be in explanation and
> prediction - epistemology.
>
> My concerns with reductionism are purely ontological - as a philsopher,
> I am concerned with the ultimate nature of reality. Science of course
> can be done in lots of manners, and in the wake of logical positivism
> is
> often done in an instrumental way (I think that is quite detrimental,
> but that is another topic for another day...)
>
> So I think we were actually talking past each other: you were talking
> about levels of description (exclusively), and I was talking about
> ontology (albeit a new form of ontology, see the Cantwell-Smith book,
> which deviates very much from tratitional philosophical considerations
> on this topic).
>
> > Don't get me wrong: I do not totally reject reductionism. Well,
> > actually, I do, as regards to finding any utility in it for myself.
> But
> > other people seem to swear by it, and I am truly happy for them.
>
> Agreed :-) Science profits from an abundance of ideas. I have never
> understood why in science everybody is bashing at each other. More
> harmony could be expected, after all, we all have the common goal of
> understanding the world.
>
> Cheers,
> Günther
>
>
> --
> Günther Greindl
> Department of Philosophy of Science
> University of Vienna
> [hidden email]
>
> Blog: http://www.complexitystudies.org/
> Thesis: http://www.complexitystudies.org/proposal/
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org

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