Woo Peddlers, Visionaries and Cranks!

[Steve Smith]

In researching another project I tripped over this:

http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/2011/12/11/in-physics-telling-cranks-from-experts-aint-easy/

http://theiff.org/exhibits/physicsonthefringe.html

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[scaganoff]

Just this weekend in the Science Show there was a story on "Outsider Science".

http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/scienceshow/why-listen-to-weird-ideas3f/4666056

In listening to the description of the behaviour of these "cranks" I was struck by how many real physicists I had encountered with similar behaviours.

Regards,
Saul

On 5 May 2013 04:27, Steve Smith <[hidden email]> wrote:

In researching another project I tripped over this:

http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/2011/12/11/in-physics-telling-cranks-from-experts-aint-easy/

http://theiff.org/exhibits/physicsonthefringe.html

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--
Saul Caganoff
Enterprise IT Architect
Mobile: [phone]
LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/in/scaganoff

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[glen ep ropella]

Saul Caganoff wrote at 05/05/2013 09:58 PM:
> http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/scienceshow/why-listen-to-weird-ideas3f/4666056

I like her comment that mainstream science (or did she say physics?)
consists of _collective_ theory.  It re-raises our question of the
importance of consensus to science.

I also enjoyed that she lumped Wolfram in with the "cranks" ... [ahem]
... "outsiders".

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-255-2847, http://tempusdictum.com
What luck for rulers that men do not think. -- Adolf Hitler


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[Steve Smith]

On 5/6/13 2:16 PM, glen e. p. ropella wrote:

Saul Caganoff wrote at 05/05/2013 09:58 PM:

http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/scienceshow/why-listen-to-weird-ideas3f/4666056

I like her comment that mainstream science (or did she say physics?)
consists of _collective_ theory.  It re-raises our question of the
importance of consensus to science.

It is an interesting paradox to compare "what things are" and "what things aspire to be".   I do agree that Science(tm) *is* a collective/consensus model with some self-limiting features that help it to be relatively coherent.   But it *aspires* to be a little more objective/universal than that (yet the methodology acknowledges the need for and therefore dependence on fallible humans).

I also enjoyed that she lumped Wolfram in with the "cranks" ... [ahem]
... "outsiders".

I have met Wolfram twice.  Once at the 1983? Cellular Automata Conference at LANL when he exposed his classification scheme for (1D) CA (I think it was Doyne who demonstrated the equivalence of CA of any higher dimension or topography to a 1D equivalent with sufficiently complex neighborhood/rules).   The second time was when he rolled out his New Kind of Science.   Oddly he as no more strange nor arrogant 20 years later, he just had a slightly bigger portfolio to justify it  at 22ish he already had nascent Mathematica and the CA classification work under his belt).  I would say he is a (self-established) outsider though not a crank.  He has a lot of features of a crank, however.  

I also met my favorite "self-declared" Crank at the CA conference in the person of Ed Fredkin who was putting forward his own "Digital Information Mechanics" alongside "Reversible Computation" (with Tomasso Tofolli).   Fredkin is now something of a "high priest" of "Digital Philosophy".  Fredkin's affect was not dissimilar to Feynmans but Fredkin is nearly an *entirely* self-made man.   College dropout (Caltech 19).  USAF Fighter Pilot.   MIT/Caltech/BU/CMU professor (sans formal degree?!).  Founder of III (early film recorder manufacturer).  Inventer of the Fredkin Gate (reversible computation) and the "Trie".    He owns his own (125 acre) island as well.  He has presented himself *as* a Crank, I suppose to steal the thunder of those who might try to use the term to whip him with.   Fredkin is the kind of crank we should all aspire to be (IMO).

- Steve

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[glen ep ropella]

Steve Smith wrote at 05/06/2013 02:06 PM:
> It is an interesting paradox to compare "what things are" and "what
> things aspire to be".   I do agree that Science(tm) *is* a
> collective/consensus model with some self-limiting features that help it
> to be relatively coherent.   But it *aspires* to be a little more
> objective/universal than that (yet the methodology acknowledges the need
> for and therefore dependence on fallible humans).

Hm. I don't think science _aspires_ to be anything.  And I'm not just
making a cheap rhetorical jab, either. ;-)  Science isn't really a
thing, at all, much less an entity that can aspire.  It's an amalgam of
behaviors that we cherry-pick and call "science".  In order to impute
science with the ability to aspire, we'd have to go back to our
discussion of Rosen's "anticipatory systems" or perhaps Kauffman's
attempt to place Final Cause in our lexicon.  Until we do that, science
is a collection of behaviors we identify through the rearview mirror.
E.g. Jim Carter ("circlons") is not a scientist, whereas Lord Kelvin
was.  Etc.

But my point was more the contrast between a collectively defined thing
versus a consensus thing.  And that distinction leads us back to the
discussion John Kennison started about whether there can be science
without language.  Behaviors (like using a stick to catch ants, or
learning to be afraid of snakes) can be learned without the super
structure of what we call language.  (I maintain that it still requires
the substructure for language, namely empathy and the ability to point.)
 Perhaps there exist collectively defined things (like science) that
don't really depend on consensus so much as a shared physiological or
anatomical structure?

Of course, one might argue that consensus doesn't _have_ to come about
through language.  Perhaps consensus isn't necessarily about "thought
agreement" so much as it is "behavior agreement".  If that's the case,
then one could argue that consensus and collective are synonymous.  But
I think that would seem strange to most people, at least until you
co-learned enough, interactively behaved together enough to agree that
they were the same. ;-)

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-255-2847, http://tempusdictum.com
The assertion that our ego consists of protein molecules seems to me one
of the most ridiculous ever made. -- Kurt Gödel.


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[Steve Smith]

Glen -
> Hm. I don't think science _aspires_ to be anything.  And I'm not just
> making a cheap rhetorical jab, either. ;-)  Science isn't really a
> thing, at all, much less an entity that can aspire.
I understood that when I wrote it of course... but...
>    It's an amalgam of
> behaviors that we cherry-pick and call "science".  In order to impute
> science with the ability to aspire, we'd have to go back to our
> discussion of Rosen's "anticipatory systems" or perhaps Kauffman's
> attempt to place Final Cause in our lexicon.  Until we do that, science
> is a collection of behaviors we identify through the rearview mirror.
> E.g. Jim Carter ("circlons") is not a scientist, whereas Lord Kelvin
> was.  Etc.
I still think it makes sense (though it is highly figurative) to say
that "science aspires".   What I am saying when I say that is that there
is some "collective" who *want* science to mean what I am suggesting,
even if they may fail to do their part consistently in making it that
way.   I think there is a collective (but not fully consensual)
aspiration among people who identify *as* science (scientists) and/or
proper science groupies (people who do not *practice* science as such
but who *do* consume it (consciously and introspectively).

> But my point was more the contrast between a collectively defined thing
> versus a consensus thing.  And that distinction leads us back to the
> discussion John Kennison started about whether there can be science
> without language.  Behaviors (like using a stick to catch ants, or
> learning to be afraid of snakes) can be learned without the super
> structure of what we call language.  (I maintain that it still requires
> the substructure for language, namely empathy and the ability to point.)
>   Perhaps there exist collectively defined things (like science) that
> don't really depend on consensus so much as a shared physiological or
> anatomical structure?

I wonder if there is an important distinction between "co-munication"
and "language"?   I think that *language* can be used *for*
communication but they are not identical.   Language is useful for
manipulating ideas (thinking) independent of sharing with others.  This
symbolic abstraction might have been *created* as an extension of
"pointing with empathy"  but I believe that it is more than that.

I'm not sure what it would mean to "co-municate" the details of any
significantly complicated bit of science without language.  I'd be more
comfortable claiming that this "proto-language" (pointing with empathy)
at best supports a "proto-science".   At this level of the game, one
individual can observe another individual doing something and through
emulation reproduce the "experiment".   One crow watching another crow
use a twig to dislodge a grub from a crevice in some bark  might,
through the benefit of empathic awareness try the same thing and find
that she likes the results very much.   Such a behaviour might spread by
example.   Is this communication?  Is this language?   What if the
observing crow abstracts this to demonstrating the action of prizing a
grub out, but without the grub?  Is this language?  Coining a "term" in
the proto language of "to prize a morsel"?  Perhaps if there is already
a posture or vocalization to be associated with "a tasty morsel" or "I
seek/desire a tasty morsel"?

Nick (if he is not on the road to MA) in his corvid/bird studies might
have an opinion, as might Doug-of-the-Parrots if he were not taking
separate vacations.   This is, of course, not about birds... I used
birds (corvids in particular) as an example because they are
simultaneously familiar yet distant from us.
> Of course, one might argue that consensus doesn't _have_ to come about
> through language.  Perhaps consensus isn't necessarily about "thought
> agreement" so much as it is "behavior agreement".  If that's the case,
> then one could argue that consensus and collective are synonymous.  But
> I think that would seem strange to most people, at least until you
> co-learned enough, interactively behaved together enough to agree that
> they were the same. ;-)
I continue to be interested in (both puzzled and intrigued) by your
distinction between behavior and thought and language.  While I believe
our consciousness is rooted in direct experience, I also think our
language generates a qualitatively different nature in our
consciousness.   The simplest level of language (pointing at/naming
things) has it's charms and uses, but I think something else happens
when we actually start to use predicates.   I am wondering if you feel
that empathy provides access to a "proto-predicate" in the same way that
"pointing at" might provide proto-subject/objects?

The key to the way I think of "language" and the way you discuss it
seems to be that I'm assuming that sentient beings (or at least humans,
or at least me) build simulations *in* language and execute them *in*
logic.

Of course, we have the stories of folks like UberGeek Nikolai Tesla who
claimed to build models of devices in his mind and then "execute" them
in his sleep, waking later knowing the performance/flaws of his
simulated devices.

- Steve
>


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[glen ep ropella]

Steve Smith wrote at 05/07/2013 09:09 AM:
> I understood that when I wrote it of course... but...

I know.  But language coerces thought.  So, it's important (to me) to
avoid metaphor when possible.  And it's important to my (puzzling)
distinction between thought and behavior, cf below.

> I still think it makes sense (though it is highly figurative) to say
> that "science aspires".   What I am saying when I say that is that there
> is some "collective" who *want* science to mean what I am suggesting,
> even if they may fail to do their part consistently in making it that
> way.   I think there is a collective (but not fully consensual)
> aspiration among people who identify *as* science (scientists) and/or
> proper science groupies (people who do not *practice* science as such
> but who *do* consume it (consciously and introspectively).

Hm.  You're piling on changes in the meanings of words faster than I can
handle.  ;-)  By "collective thing", I intended to talk about the
product, the artifact, not the "collective" that produced the artifact.
 So, by saying that mainstream science is a collective thing (as I think
Wertheim said in the interview) is not necessarily equivalent to saying
it is a consensus thing _or_ equivalent to saying that a collective
produced the thing.

Perhaps she (and everyone) would agree with the leaps you've made from
collective thing, to consensus, to the collective that created the
thing.  But in my never-ending perversity, I don't. 8^)

A collective thing is quite distinct from a consensus thing.  And a
collective thing is distinct from "collectives that produce things".

> What if the
> observing crow abstracts this to demonstrating the action of prizing a
> grub out, but without the grub?  Is this language?  Coining a "term" in
> the proto language of "to prize a morsel"?  Perhaps if there is already
> a posture or vocalization to be associated with "a tasty morsel" or "I
> seek/desire a tasty morsel"?

Now you're talking! (Ha!  Sorry.)  Yes, this is on the right path, I
think.  If it's possible for a crow to demonstrate the technique without
a grub being there, then I would suggest a crow might be capable of
science.  If it's possible for _another_ crow to learn to use the
technique without a grub present, then later use it when grubs are
present, then I'd say that validates the idea that crows might be
capable of science.

And we can have that discussion without hemming and hawing over the
definition of language.

> I continue to be interested in (both puzzled and intrigued) by your
> distinction between behavior and thought and language.  While I believe
> our consciousness is rooted in direct experience, I also think our
> language generates a qualitatively different nature in our
> consciousness.   The simplest level of language (pointing at/naming
> things) has it's charms and uses, but I think something else happens
> when we actually start to use predicates.   I am wondering if you feel
> that empathy provides access to a "proto-predicate" in the same way that
> "pointing at" might provide proto-subject/objects?

The way I use "empathy" is as a hook into the deeper concepts of
concretization and abstraction, as well as anthropomorphism.  For
example, when I see one of those TV commercials trying to get me to
donate to feed starving children in Africa, I posit that particular
neurological (and other physiological) processes are activated in my
body.  The same physical processes are activated when I see an ASPCA
commercial.  And when I watch some schmuck get hit in the testicles on
"Jackass: the movie" or whatever.

I go a step further and claim that those _same_ processes are activated
when I watch a cooking show, or watch one of our dorks operate a 3D
printer.

Now, so far, all these involve animals that look like me, have faces, or
eyeballs, or paws, or whatever.  A crow is one step further away.  But I
can still do it quite easily.  In fact, I can even do it with machines.
 I can watch, say, a BEAM robot trying to move around an obstacle and I
can _feel_ its frustration when it fails.  I can watch the little
spinning hourglass or whatever on my computer and _feel_ the polling
client process' frustration at the delay, or infinite loop, or whatever
that's making the server process nonresponsive.

This is what I mean when I say "empathy".  Now, if you choose to think
about this as a "class of things enough like me", then sure, it's a
predicate (or proto-predicate).  But in making such a leap (from messy
biological wet stuff to hyper-clean Platonic logic stuff), we have a
problem with "definiteness", dynamism, ambiguity, etc.  Predicates are
ideal(ized).  What I'm doing when I smash a poor fly and feel bad about
it is NOT a clean, ideal.  It's real.  I'm _there_... inside the sh!t
with the fly.  And I can don and doff lots of predicates faster than you
can say "predicate", as well as wearing more than one at a time.  I can
do that because my body is real, but my thoughts are not.

If that distinction puzzles you, then I have no idea what words I could
type, here, to make it less puzzling.

> The key to the way I think of "language" and the way you discuss it
> seems to be that I'm assuming that sentient beings (or at least humans,
> or at least me) build simulations *in* language and execute them *in*
> logic.
>
> Of course, we have the stories of folks like UberGeek Nikolai Tesla who
> claimed to build models of devices in his mind and then "execute" them
> in his sleep, waking later knowing the performance/flaws of his
> simulated devices.

I believe it's true, that most (if not all) people do something akin to
building and running simulations in their head.  However, where we
_might_ disagree is that I believe the components of those simulations
are NOT software, NOT thoughts, NOT ideas, not logic.  They are wet,
messy, globs of neurons, astrocytes, epithelials cells, free radicals,
well-bound molecules, etc.  Those are the building blocks of the
simulations we build and execute in our heads.  What you call "logic" is
actually wet-n-messy biology ... or dirty-nasty physics, depending on
your preference.  Pretending you can extract an idealized logic from
it's wet-n-messy machine is pure pretense, to me ... like denying your
origins or some form of self-loathing.

It is from that context that I talk of science being a real,
dirty-nasty, objectively true thing, independent of, in spite of, the
fantasies we engage in with our thoughts.  And therein lies it's success
over even more fantastically imaginary things like religion or Platonic
mathematics.  The reason science works and the rest fails is _because_
it's dirtier, nastier, wetter, messier, than whatever we might think ...
which is why the methods section is the important part of a journal
article. ;-)

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-255-2847, http://tempusdictum.com
The urge to save humanity is almost always a false front for the urge to
rule. -- H. L. Mencken


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[Steve Smith]

Glen -

As we attempt to untangle I fear we are tangling yet more? 

Maybe taking a fresh run will be better?

Q. Can Science be done without language?
A(smith).  Some, almost for sure.

Q. Can Science be done more easily/effectively with language?
A(smith).  It seems as if this is the case.

Q. Is Science a "collective thing"
A(smith).  Some uses of the term Science are specifically a collective thing.  To wit, the collection of all artifacts of a specific methodology including the hypotheses (tested or not), the methods and apparatus for testing them, the resulting data gathered during the testing, the logic and mathematics used to analyze the data, and most familiarly, the conclusions drawn (scientific theories).

Q. Is Science created *by a collective*
A(smith).   Individual elements in the collective thing we call Science can be created by very small collectives.  When an individual generates hypotheses, contrives experiments, executes them, gathers data and draws conclusions, this is an important *part* of science and will be included in the collective artifact.   Without independent verification (and nobody seems to agree on just how much independence and how much verification is sufficient), the artifacts are not yet fully vetted and I suppose not "quite" science.   In this sense, Science requires a collective.

Now back to untangling the tangle...

You wax further on empathy:

Now, so far, all these involve animals that look like me, have faces, or
eyeballs, or paws, or whatever.  A crow is one step further away.  But I
can still do it quite easily.  In fact, I can even do it with machines.
 I can watch, say, a BEAM robot trying to move around an obstacle and I
can _feel_ its frustration when it fails.  I can watch the little
spinning hourglass or whatever on my computer and _feel_ the polling
client process' frustration at the delay, or infinite loop, or whatever
that's making the server process nonresponsive.

This is what I mean when I say "empathy".  Now, if you choose to think
about this as a "class of things enough like me", then sure, it's a
predicate (or proto-predicate).

And I think you will agree that anthropomorphism is a form of figurative thinking as much as the use of metaphor.  In fact it seems like a special kind of metaphor (where the metaphorical source domain is humanity which is ultimately sourced from one's sense of one's self)?  I also understand that it is very instinctual and may be what allows (domesticated?) animals to learn from us (and to teach us) by example.

This is what I mean when I say "empathy".  Now, if you choose to think
about this as a "class of things enough like me", then sure, it's a
predicate (or proto-predicate).  But in making such a leap (from messy
biological wet stuff to hyper-clean Platonic logic stuff), we have a
problem with "definiteness", dynamism, ambiguity, etc.  Predicates are
ideal(ized).  What I'm doing when I smash a poor fly and feel bad about
it is NOT a clean, ideal.  It's real.  I'm _there_... inside the sh!t
with the fly.  And I can don and doff lots of predicates faster than you
can say "predicate", as well as wearing more than one at a time.  I can
do that because my body is real, but my thoughts are not.

I'm not sure that I can say that my "thoughts are not real".   I can agree for the sake of arguement that they are *different* than my immediate sensations, but then my immediate sensations (go experience one of many perceptual illusions) are not *real* either.  We fit our *raw* perceptions (whatever that means) onto some series of layers of models.   I would contend that at some point those models are entirely linguistic/abstract/symbolic (for humans) and that wherever that divide lies might be an important one.

I believe it's true, that most (if not all) people do something akin to
building and running simulations in their head.  However, where we
_might_ disagree is that I believe the components of those simulations
are NOT software, NOT thoughts, NOT ideas, not logic.  They are wet,
messy, globs of neurons, astrocytes, epithelials cells, free radicals,
well-bound molecules, etc.  Those are the building blocks of the
simulations we build and execute in our heads.  What you call "logic" is
actually wet-n-messy biology ... or dirty-nasty physics, depending on
your preference.  Pretending you can extract an idealized logic from
it's wet-n-messy machine is pure pretense, to me ... like denying your
origins or some form of self-loathing.

If I calculate something using a slipstick (aka slide rule) you could say that I am merely (surely?) manipulating physical objects (the slide in the rule) which is made up of atoms (wood, celluloid, aluminum, etc.).  But I would claim that what I am doing (whilst manipulating said objects) is manipulating abstractions... in particular, I am using the (relatively accurate) physical conservation of length in these objects/materials to "add" and then using the *abstraction* of exponential notations and arithmetic to then *multiply* and/or to simply *look up* other functions (e.g. trigonometric) using the device of marks on a movable pair of objects with an (also) moveable reticule.

When I do "simple" arithmetic in my head, I use a combination of conventional symbols (0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9) and rules (decimal positional numbers) and more rules (addition, multiplication, division, etc) to achieve these answers.  I happen *also* to have a strong intuition about much arithmetic/mathematics which I not as obviously symbolic.   But I would claim this intuitive calculation is more like a sloppy version of the slide rule described above.   I may do long division in my head using some short-cuts, but it is entirely symbolic, and I may check my answer using various intuitive tricks (including visualizing the number as a rectangular area and the divisor and result as the length of the sides).  I might take a square root of a large number by gathering together that number (counting) of physical objects and arraying them in successively larger squares until I run out, then count one edge of the (completed square) subset and then do the same with the remainder, etc. until I get tired... Or I can use any one of several methods which are *more* abstract and less geometric/physical.    A square root seems to have meaning that transcends it's humble origins in geometry and while it may be *possible* to calculate square roots (or do division) using geometric (physical?) methods, it is not the "best" or only way.  I think my own long-division in my head (or on paper) is likely more similar (because it is a symbolic manipulation) to the bit-shifting and 2's complementing and XORing of registers in a computer than to the physical arrangements of objects in a geometric array?

When I do mechanical/constructiony things, I (myself) tend toward the intuitive "cut and try" with various tools and techniques to avoid or shortcut the use of precise symbology and computation/logic.  Where someone else might whip out a tape measure and read off a number, write it down, then go cut to that same length, I am more likely to grab a bit of string, a straight(ish) stick or similar, lay it next to the hole to be filled, mark it with my fingernail (or just hold it) then move to the piece to be cut, line it up, and mark *it* with a fingernail (or recognize a mark or defect in the target bit of wood to be cut) and then cut...  biasing slightly toward "long or short" depending on whether I want a tight fit or if I can't afford to make a mistake (last piece of that stock).   I usually get really close... close enough to force-fit into place or to slip-fit it in without more gap than is suitable for the use.   

But that doesn't mean I *never* use complex computations based on abstractions.  When I designed (and layed out and built) my sunroom, I built it facing south with a faceted (at the scale of the windows I was putting in) elliptical cross-section.  I might have achieved the same thing *without* a conceptual abstraction we agree to call an ellipse and for this purpose I think it was not important that such ellipses can be idealized by a plane cutting a cone, but it was important (convenient) for layout/construction that the definition of an ellipse was that it be the figure inscribed by the conserved distance from two loci.    I had a pair of nails driven into my foundation and the same piece of string throughout the construction.  

It is from that context that I talk of science being a real,
dirty-nasty, objectively true thing, independent of, in spite of, the
fantasies we engage in with our thoughts.  And therein lies it's success
over even more fantastically imaginary things like religion or Platonic
mathematics.  The reason science works and the rest fails is _because_
it's dirtier, nastier, wetter, messier, than whatever we might think ...
which is why the methods section is the important part of a journal
article. ;-)

Ok... I think I agree that Science (as opposed to mathematics) requires an embedding in the (real, messy, wet, etc.) world.   What I'm not clear on is whether the abstractions we have developed (linguistic in general and mathematical in particular) are not neccesary (or at least very useful?).

When first studying the History and Philosophy of mathematics I was told that the Sumerians had huge stores of clay tablets with all problems of algebra solved up through quadratics but done by elaborate (and ultimately redundant if you ignore the abstraction of a variable with a unit) story problems.   This would seem to be an example of your "pointing" (using langauge to describe the identity of things) and empathy (to invoke in the imagination the experience of cutting a block of stone or pacing off a plot of land).  If a person (or culture) had the stamina/capacity to store all such examples and index them effectively, I suppose the abstractions of algebra would be irrelevant or unneccesary and maybe even considered a "cheap trick" by those who had the capacity to hold these problems in their heads?  

It seems also that the step from the "method of infinitesmals" to modern Calculus might have a similar leap in it?  The former being amenable to "point and empathize" and the latter maybe not so much? 

hmmm...
  - Steve

PostScript:

 when I see one of those TV commercials trying to get me to
donate to feed starving children in Africa, I posit that particular
neurological (and other physiological) processes are activated in my
body.  The same physical processes are activated when I see an ASPCA
commercial.  And when I watch some schmuck get hit in the testicles on
"Jackass: the movie" or whatever.

THIS is why I shot my TV!  I also stay away from Youtube except for instructional videos for tearing down, repairing (and most importantly) re-assembling my complex devices (pieces of my Digital as well as my Analog ecology (aka Swamp)).

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[glen ep ropella]

It's unclear to me whether you want dialogue with the Q:A thing, or just
to compare unadulterated answers (or not even that).  But what I did was
try to couch my answers so that they generated the parts of your answers
I agree with and contradict the parts of your answers with which I disagree.

Steve Smith wrote at 05/07/2013 12:42 PM:
> Maybe taking a fresh run will be better?
>
>    Q. Can Science be done without language?
>    A(smith).  Some, almost for sure.

A(gepr): No, probably not.  Language is an denser/compressed replacement
for other behaviors (e.g. grooming) and serves to bring about behavioral
coherence in a group.  Behavioral coherence is necessary for science.
(Thought coherence is irrelevant to science except when/where it
facilitates behavioral coherence.)

>    Q. Can Science be done more easily/effectively with language?
>    A(smith).  It seems as if this is the case.

A(gepr): Yes, which seems like a natural consequence of my answer to the
first question.

>    Q. Is Science a "collective thing"
>    A(smith).  Some uses of the term Science are specifically a
>    collective thing.  To wit, the collection of all artifacts of a
>    specific methodology including the hypotheses (tested or not), the
>    methods and apparatus for testing them, the resulting data gathered
>    during the testing, the logic and mathematics used to analyze the
>    data, and most familiarly, the conclusions drawn (scientific theories).

A(gepr): By definition, science consists of testable conjecture.  In
order to be tested, the conjecture has to be reified, embedded into a
context collectively constructed by a population (even if that
population is 1 human and 100,000 rodents).  Hence, testing requires the
artifact be part of, fit in with, a collectively co-evolved context.
There is no instantaneous or infinitesimal science, i.e. all science has
spatial and temporal extent.  If the conjecture cannot be reified,
instantiated into the external world, then it is not science.

>    Q. Is Science created *by a collective*
>    A(smith).   Individual elements in the collective thing we call
>    Science can be created by very small collectives.  When an
>    individual generates hypotheses, contrives experiments, executes
>    them, gathers data and draws conclusions, this is an important
>    *part* of science and will be included in the collective artifact.
>    Without independent verification (and nobody seems to agree on just
>    how much independence and how much verification is sufficient), the
>    artifacts are not yet fully vetted and I suppose not "quite"
>    science.   In this sense, Science requires a collective.

A(gepr): Yes. By definition, science consists of testable conjecture.
Testability implies multiple individuals willing to share enough
similarity to engage in the testing.  So, that's a slam dunk.  Shared
conjecture requires sharing in one (or both) of two forms: 1) shared
anatomical or physiological structure or 2) shared mental constructs.
Hence, complete orthogonality (or autonomy) would prevent the production
of science.  However, the existence of collectives does not necessarily
imply their produce is science.  Collectives are necessary but not
sufficient.

> And I think you will agree that anthropomorphism is a form of figurative
> thinking as much as the use of metaphor.  In fact it seems like a
> special kind of metaphor (where the metaphorical source domain is
> humanity which is ultimately sourced from one's sense of one's self)?

I just can't get beyond this.  I try, but I can't.  Anthropomorphing
(-izing?) is not figurative or metaphor.  I may be mincing words, here.
 But I believe these physiological processes are NOT representative.
They aren't symbolic.  When I refer to a robot (or a tree sapling or my
cat) as _he_ or _him_, I'm not thinking of the robot as a _symbol_ for
anything.  I'm imputing that robot (or sapling or cat) with its own
first class presence.  It's an "end in itself" a "person", as it were,
with as high an ontological reality as my self.

To think of them figuratively or metaphorically would be an entirely
different thing.  In fact, if I were to think of, say, my cat as merely
a _symbol_, I'd be more psychopathic than I already am. ;-)

Now, I admit that when I use the tagline "putting oneself in the other's
shoes", that has an element of the figurative or metaphorical, in the
sense that it requires an abstracted "replacement".  The idea requires a
sense of being able to pluck one's self out of its context, pluck the
other out of its context, and do a switcheroo.

I admit that.  But it's a failing of language and not indicative of real
figurative thinking.  When I empathize with my robot, I don't really
replace the robot with my self.  Instead, I promote the robot to
personhood status.  And that's not using the robot as a symbol at all.
It's a completely different way of thinking about the world.

So, anthropomorphism is _not_ figurative or metaphor, it's an
ontological commitment (or delusion).

> I'm not sure that I can say that my "thoughts are not real".   I can
> agree for the sake of arguement that they are *different* than my
> immediate sensations, but then my immediate sensations (go experience
> one of many perceptual illusions) are not *real* either.  We fit our
> *raw* perceptions (whatever that means) onto some series of layers of
> models.   I would contend that at some point those models are entirely
> linguistic/abstract/symbolic (for humans) and that wherever that divide
> lies might be an important one.

OK.  Maybe I'm just not saying this correctly.  I disagree and
counter-contend that at NO point are our models entirely
linguistic/abstract/symbolic.  There is no divide.  Everything in our
heads _is_ biochemical.

What I mean by "thoughts are not real" is that our word "thought" is
short-hand for the wildly complex and feedback rich biochemical
processes inside us.  It's fantasy to think that thoughts are somehow
separate or separable from the wet stuff inside us.

> But I would claim that what I am doing (whilst manipulating said
> objects) is manipulating abstractions... in particular, I am using the
> (relatively accurate) physical conservation of length in these
> objects/materials to "add" and then using the *abstraction* of
> exponential notations and arithmetic to then *multiply* and/or to simply
> *look up* other functions (e.g. trigonometric) using the device of marks
> on a movable pair of objects with an (also) moveable reticule.
>
> When I do "simple" arithmetic in my head, I use a combination of
> conventional symbols (0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9) and rules (decimal positional
> numbers) and more rules (addition, multiplication, division, etc) to
> achieve these answers.  I happen *also* to have a strong intuition about
> much arithmetic/mathematics which I not as obviously symbolic.   But I
> would claim this intuitive calculation is more like a sloppy version of
> the slide rule described above.   I may do long division in my head
> using some short-cuts, but it is entirely symbolic, and I may check my
> answer using various intuitive tricks (including visualizing the number
> as a rectangular area and the divisor and result as the length of the
> sides).

Sorry about the willy-nilly snipping.  But I get irritated when others
quote too much.  So I may quote too little (though I'll never be as
zealous as Marcus at snipping down the quote ;-).

I recall an accusation leveled at list participants awhile back when we
were talking about the definition of math and what mathematicians do.
It went something like: "those who talk a lot about math don't tend to
be very good at math" or something like that.

The point, I think, is that _doing_ math is what makes one comfortable
with it, whether one is an engineer, an artisan, or a pure
mathematician, the only thing that can make one good at it is to do it.
 Now, that says nothing about what those symbols mean while you're doing
it.  But the consensus seems to be that most people who are good at math
tend toward a Platonic understanding of math.  The "symbols" are more
than just symbols, whose meaning can be applied, unapplied, and
re-applied willy nilly.  To people who are good at math, the "symbols"
are less symbolic than they might be to those of us who are only
adequate at math.  Good mathematicians aren't just manipulating symbols,
they're discovering reality.

This means, I think, that we animals are less capable of abstraction
than I think you assert.  When you do that "higher" more abstract math,
you're doing the _exact_ same thing as manipulating the slide rule, or
matching the length of your string to marks on a board ... exactly, not
nearly, not figuratively.

> Ok... I think I agree that Science (as opposed to mathematics) requires
> an embedding in the (real, messy, wet, etc.) world. What I'm not clear
> on is whether the abstractions we have developed (linguistic in general
> and mathematical in particular) are not neccesary (or at least very
> useful?).
>
> [...] If a person (or culture) had
> the stamina/capacity to store all such examples and index them
> effectively, I suppose the abstractions of algebra would be irrelevant
> or unneccesary and maybe even considered a "cheap trick" by those who
> had the capacity to hold these problems in their heads?

If you don't regard the conceptual/linguistic objects as abstractions,
but instead regard them as compressions, then we can agree that they are
necessary.  Whether the compressions are lossy or lossless depends, I
think on the biochemical structures involved.  For example, the
autonomic wiggling of our eyes or fingers when we look at or manipulate
an object filters out some concrete detail so that the compressed
version of it in our heads has less detail than the uncompressed version
impinging on our outer senses.  Similarly, we can be tricked (by a
prestidigitator) into faulty compressions.  (I.e. when we decompress it,
it looks nothing like the original.)

But the skill being developed by compressing and decompressing a LOT is
not an abstracted thinking-in-isolation skill.  It's a filtering skill,
determining signal from noise, what to include in the compression and
what to leave out.  That's the key skill, not manipulating the
abstractions/compressions inside our heads.  The key to being a good
scientist, doing science, lies in the embedding into or out of the
environment, not the thinking/manipulating abstractions in one's head.

Preserving the applicability or embeddability of what's in your head is
the most important part, no matter how you manipulate thing in your head.

> PostScript:
>
> THIS is why I shot my TV!  I also stay away from Youtube except for
> instructional videos for tearing down, repairing (and most importantly)
> re-assembling my complex devices (pieces of my Digital as well as my
> Analog ecology (aka Swamp)).

And it's precisely why I will never willingly get rid of my TV, any more
than I'd get rid of my scissors ... or my books ... or my belt, shoes,
pencils, hammer, etc.  It amazes me when people purposefully handicap
themselves by refusing to use a tool. We have lots of self-described TV
murderers here in Portland.  I do turn off the TV just as often as I
turn it on, though ... more, actually, since Renee' tends to leave it
on.  All tools need on-off buttons. ;-)  I also reserve the right to
pray to my imaginary friends and change my mind on a regular basis.

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-255-2847, http://tempusdictum.com
Power never takes a back step - only in the face of more power. -- Malcolm X


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[Steve Smith]

Glen -


Yes, looking to compare answers..
>
>     Q. Can Science be done without language?
>     A(smith).  Some, almost for sure.
> A(gepr): No, probably not.  Language is an denser/compressed replacement
> for other behaviors (e.g. grooming) and serves to bring about behavioral
> coherence in a group.  Behavioral coherence is necessary for science.
> (Thought coherence is irrelevant to science except when/where it
> facilitates behavioral coherence.)
So you are saying that it is *practically* not possible because of lack
of group coherence, though in principle (which I think was Kennison's
original question?) language is not possible *for* doing science, it is
merely neccessary (valuable/efficient) for gaining coherence?   Is it
not possible then that a tribe of primates who obtain behavioral
coherence through lots of nit-picking (like we are doing here?) could
then have enough behavioral coherence to start doing science?
>>     Q. Can Science be done more easily/effectively with language?
>>     A(smith).  It seems as if this is the case.
> A(gepr): Yes, which seems like a natural consequence of my answer to the
> first question.
Ok... so I think your answer to the first question was really an answer
to the second.

>>     Q. Is Science a "collective thing"
>>     A(smith).  Some uses of the term Science are specifically a
>>     collective thing.  To wit, the collection of all artifacts of a
>>     specific methodology including the hypotheses (tested or not), the
>>     methods and apparatus for testing them, the resulting data gathered
>>     during the testing, the logic and mathematics used to analyze the
>>     data, and most familiarly, the conclusions drawn (scientific theories).
> A(gepr): By definition, science consists of testable conjecture.  In
> order to be tested, the conjecture has to be reified, embedded into a
> context collectively constructed by a population (even if that
> population is 1 human and 100,000 rodents).

But what is a "conjecture" without language?  And if there is such a
thing, it is already reified (or more to the point needs no
reification/cannot-be-reified)?
>    Hence, testing requires the
> artifact be part of, fit in with, a collectively co-evolved context.
yes, I think this is an important aspect we are teasing out of this
conversation, such as it is.
> There is no instantaneous or infinitesimal science, i.e. all science has
> spatial and temporal extent.  If the conjecture cannot be reified,
> instantiated into the external world, then it is not science.
And back to (my corollary to) Kennison's original question... can
(any/all?) conjectures be created/encoded without language?

>>     Q. Is Science created *by a collective*
>>     A(smith).   Individual elements in the collective thing we call
>>     Science can be created by very small collectives.  When an
>>     individual generates hypotheses, contrives experiments, executes
>>     them, gathers data and draws conclusions, this is an important
>>     *part* of science and will be included in the collective artifact.
>>     Without independent verification (and nobody seems to agree on just
>>     how much independence and how much verification is sufficient), the
>>     artifacts are not yet fully vetted and I suppose not "quite"
>>     science.   In this sense, Science requires a collective.
> A(gepr): Yes. By definition, science consists of testable conjecture.
> Testability implies multiple individuals willing to share enough
> similarity to engage in the testing.  So, that's a slam dunk.

agreed.
> Shared
> conjecture requires sharing in one (or both) of two forms: 1) shared
> anatomical or physiological structure
still nit picking... I'm not clear on what a conjecture based in
anatomical/physiological structure is?   The crow who's beak doesn't get
deep enough into a crevice to get the grub who therefore uses a twig and
the other crow whose shared structure provides the same
problem/challenge?  Or just to spin off a bit... the woodpecker who does
it without the twig because the beak is narrow, vs the crow who needs a
twig (which resembles the woodpecker beak)?   I'm fishing here.
>   or 2) shared mental constructs.
> Hence, complete orthogonality (or autonomy) would prevent the production
> of science.  However, the existence of collectives does not necessarily
> imply their produce is science.  Collectives are necessary but not
> sufficient.
Ok... we've agreed that it is built into the definition that more than
one (more than a few, more than several?) is required to "do Science"
(reproduceability) and that the act of "doing Science" requires both
spatial and temporal extent.   For (more than?) several to "do Science"
together, we must have some coherence (you say behavioral is enough and
I think all there is, I still hold onto the thought that thoughts are
real and may also be required to be coherent).

>> And I think you will agree that anthropomorphism is a form of figurative
>> thinking as much as the use of metaphor.  In fact it seems like a
>> special kind of metaphor (where the metaphorical source domain is
>> humanity which is ultimately sourced from one's sense of one's self)?
> I just can't get beyond this.  I try, but I can't.  Anthropomorphing
> (-izing?) is not figurative or metaphor.  I may be mincing words, here.
>   But I believe these physiological processes are NOT representative.
> They aren't symbolic.  When I refer to a robot (or a tree sapling or my
> cat) as _he_ or _him_, I'm not thinking of the robot as a _symbol_ for
> anything.  I'm imputing that robot (or sapling or cat) with its own
> first class presence.  It's an "end in itself" a "person", as it were,
> with as high an ontological reality as my self.
>
> To think of them figuratively or metaphorically would be an entirely
> different thing.  In fact, if I were to think of, say, my cat as merely
> a _symbol_, I'd be more psychopathic than I already am. ;-)
>
> Now, I admit that when I use the tagline "putting oneself in the other's
> shoes", that has an element of the figurative or metaphorical, in the
> sense that it requires an abstracted "replacement".  The idea requires a
> sense of being able to pluck one's self out of its context, pluck the
> other out of its context, and do a switcheroo.
>
> I admit that.  But it's a failing of language and not indicative of real
> figurative thinking.  When I empathize with my robot, I don't really
> replace the robot with my self.  Instead, I promote the robot to
> personhood status.  And that's not using the robot as a symbol at all.
> It's a completely different way of thinking about the world.
>
> So, anthropomorphism is _not_ figurative or metaphor, it's an
> ontological commitment (or delusion).

I'm stuck on (the other side) on this myself.   What you describe, I
would call "Identification" and/or "empathy".   It only becomes
"Anthropomorphism" (for me) when we add the abstractions of "this is
human-like" and "human-like is me-like".   But I accept that you you
don't grant "thinking" it's own reality, so I I'm not sure you accept
these abstractions?

>> I'm not sure that I can say that my "thoughts are not real".   I can
>> agree for the sake of arguement that they are *different* than my
>> immediate sensations, but then my immediate sensations (go experience
>> one of many perceptual illusions) are not *real* either.  We fit our
>> *raw* perceptions (whatever that means) onto some series of layers of
>> models.   I would contend that at some point those models are entirely
>> linguistic/abstract/symbolic (for humans) and that wherever that divide
>> lies might be an important one.
> OK.  Maybe I'm just not saying this correctly.  I disagree and
> counter-contend that at NO point are our models entirely
> linguistic/abstract/symbolic.  There is no divide.  Everything in our
> heads _is_ biochemical.

Referring (and deferring) back to Lakoff and Nunez (Where Mathematics
Comes from: How the Embodied Mind brings Mathematics into Existence), I
accept that our models are *only* as abstract/symbolic as the rigorous
mathematics we describe them in.

I think you are making the argument of the materialists that mind does
not exist, only brain, and that mind (even to the extent that it is an
illusion) could not exist independently of brain.  I think this one is a
bit over my pay grade, in the sense that I don't expect to demonstrate a
mind outside of a brain anytime soon, but I'm also not ready to say it
is impossible anymore than I think that multiple instances of the same
code running on multiple instances of the same machine, or better yet,
on a combination of various virtual machines running on a combination of
various physical machines/designs is impossible.   There is a question
of complexity and initial boundary conditions provided by the human
body/perceptions.
>
> What I mean by "thoughts are not real" is that our word "thought" is
> short-hand for the wildly complex and feedback rich biochemical
> processes inside us.  It's fantasy to think that thoughts are somehow
> separate or separable from the wet stuff inside us.
And yet, when I write down a complex thought (or better yet, someone
more capable than I) and someone else reads it (maybe you, maybe someone
more capable than you ;) ) then a "thought" or at least an "idea" has
been serialized, disembodied, and reembodied?

>> But I would claim that what I am doing (whilst manipulating said
>> objects) is manipulating abstractions... in particular, I am using the
>> (relatively accurate) physical conservation of length in these
>> objects/materials to "add" and then using the *abstraction* of
>> exponential notations and arithmetic to then *multiply* and/or to simply
>> *look up* other functions (e.g. trigonometric) using the device of marks
>> on a movable pair of objects with an (also) moveable reticule.
>>
>> When I do "simple" arithmetic in my head, I use a combination of
>> conventional symbols (0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9) and rules (decimal positional
>> numbers) and more rules (addition, multiplication, division, etc) to
>> achieve these answers.  I happen *also* to have a strong intuition about
>> much arithmetic/mathematics which I not as obviously symbolic.   But I
>> would claim this intuitive calculation is more like a sloppy version of
>> the slide rule described above.   I may do long division in my head
>> using some short-cuts, but it is entirely symbolic, and I may check my
>> answer using various intuitive tricks (including visualizing the number
>> as a rectangular area and the divisor and result as the length of the
>> sides).
> Sorry about the willy-nilly snipping.  But I get irritated when others
> quote too much.  So I may quote too little (though I'll never be as
> zealous as Marcus at snipping down the quote ;-).

I admire those who can trim down to the essentials ("as simple as
possible, but no simpler" A.E.) and myself prefer to wade through extra
rather than try to guess what the response is referring to without a
specific quote at hand.
> I recall an accusation leveled at list participants awhile back when we
> were talking about the definition of math and what mathematicians do.
> It went something like: "those who talk a lot about math don't tend to
> be very good at math" or something like that.
>
> The point, I think, is that _doing_ math is what makes one comfortable
> with it, whether one is an engineer, an artisan, or a pure
> mathematician, the only thing that can make one good at it is to do it.
So the correlation is that people who are good at things, got good by
doing it, don't *need* to discuss it, and in fact recognize that
discussing is futile in the face of doing?
>   Now, that says nothing about what those symbols mean while you're doing
> it.  But the consensus seems to be that most people who are good at math
> tend toward a Platonic understanding of math.  The "symbols" are more
> than just symbols, whose meaning can be applied, unapplied, and
> re-applied willy nilly.  To people who are good at math, the "symbols"
> are less symbolic than they might be to those of us who are only
> adequate at math.  Good mathematicians aren't just manipulating symbols,
> they're discovering reality.
Hmmm... they are discovering the reality of certain relations between
symbolic statements?
> This means, I think, that we animals are less capable of abstraction
> than I think you assert.  When you do that "higher" more abstract math,
> you're doing the _exact_ same thing as manipulating the slide rule, or
> matching the length of your string to marks on a board ... exactly, not
> nearly, not figuratively.
I am beginning to understand the level of your commitment to this
position but am not necessarily becoming more committed to it myself.  
I'm seeking a toehold in this realm, or maybe more to the point, trying
to find obtain an intuitive understanding of what it would mean to
dispense with "language", "abstraction", "figuration", "metaphor",
"analogy", etc.

>> Ok... I think I agree that Science (as opposed to mathematics) requires
>> an embedding in the (real, messy, wet, etc.) world. What I'm not clear
>> on is whether the abstractions we have developed (linguistic in general
>> and mathematical in particular) are not neccesary (or at least very
>> useful?).
>>
>> [...] If a person (or culture) had
>> the stamina/capacity to store all such examples and index them
>> effectively, I suppose the abstractions of algebra would be irrelevant
>> or unneccesary and maybe even considered a "cheap trick" by those who
>> had the capacity to hold these problems in their heads?
> If you don't regard the conceptual/linguistic objects as abstractions,
> but instead regard them as compressions, then we can agree that they are
> necessary.

I think you are in territory that I have encountered elsewhere and been
stymied (well, temporarily stuck actually).   I do think they can be
regarded as compressions, but I  think even *as* compressions, they also
serve as abstractions?  I'm left assuming that you might believe in
abstractions at all?  That they do not exist, that they are meaningless?
>    Whether the compressions are lossy or lossless depends, I
> think on the biochemical structures involved.  For example, the
> autonomic wiggling of our eyes or fingers when we look at or manipulate
> an object filters out some concrete detail so that the compressed
> version of it in our heads has less detail than the uncompressed version
> impinging on our outer senses.  Similarly, we can be tricked (by a
> prestidigitator) into faulty compressions.  (I.e. when we decompress it,
> it looks nothing like the original.)
I do believe there is a *lot* of compression going on (and much being
quite lossy) in perception and in communication (as evidenced by our
difficulty in converging on a shared lexicon here?).  I do think that
language used for communication often suffers from a faulty
compression/decompression pairing... supporting your notion that
communication is (often?) an illusion.
> But the skill being developed by compressing and decompressing a LOT is
> not an abstracted thinking-in-isolation skill.  It's a filtering skill,
> determining signal from noise, what to include in the compression and
> what to leave out.  That's the key skill, not manipulating the
> abstractions/compressions inside our heads.  The key to being a good
> scientist, doing science, lies in the embedding into or out of the
> environment, not the thinking/manipulating abstractions in one's head.
Ignoring how "good" the thinking or science is, I contend that this IS
what thinking is...

We "compress" as you say.  We fit data to models.   Then we manipulate
these instances of the models (informed by the data) until we find a
supposedly useful or interesting instanced-model-state (some might say
output-from) which we then "decompress" (in this case I think I mean
re-apply semantics to...).  We measure the position of something which
we percieve to be "a thing".   We impute thingness (rigid bodyness+???)
to this imagined "thing" and we use some model which we received or
discovered (by conjecture, testing,etc.) in the form perhaps of a set of
differential equations.   With values attached to the differential
equations, we manipulate said equations according to the rules of
calculus and algebra (independent of the compressed out qualities of the
"thing") until we, for example, derive a simpler form, such as the
"thing"'s position and velocity at some time (t).   When we decompress,
we apply the semantics of the "thing" (red billiard ball bouncing and
rolling down an inclined plane?) . We definitely "filtered" when we
decided that the "compression" (if I'm using your term correctly) of the
features of the "thing" we measured was useful...  We took it's
position, mass, velocity, etc. at time t0, fit it to a model of "rigid
bodies in motion in a gravitational field" and *ignored* it's redness,
it's human-ascribed utility as a "billiard ball" etc.
> Preserving the applicability or embeddability of what's in your head is
> the most important part, no matter how you manipulate thing in your head.
Ok...  I think that is what I just said above?  Making sure that the
lossiness is really just separability... holding onto the "redness" and
the "billiardballness" to re-apply at decompression?

- Steve

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[Steve Smith]

Glen -

Obviously you find your Television useful and feel you can thoughtfully
mitigate any negative side-effects having it in your life might
present.  I was mostly making fun of your (deliberately idiosyncratic?)
choices of programming as described.  You are not alone, and I recognize
that at least half the (relatively small number of) people who share my
own response to TV are bigger cranks than I am.

It is the constant stream of pop-culture and push-advertising (not just
commercial, but all kinds of social and political agendas embedded
everywhere) that I respond so negatively to.   I am not desensitized as
are people who watch/listen to it regularly.  I get edgy when in a big
city bustling with advertisements, loud cars, pushy people, beggars and
streetwalkers.  Having a TV on is a bit like that to me.

Not being desensitized, when I am exposed, I immediately notice the
worst elements.... whether it is the infomercials, the regular
commercials, the inane game shows, the yammering (not just talking)
news-heads, the Jerry Springer-style talk shows, the soap operas, or the
"reality" shows.   We *do* (now) watch made for TV movies and series
when they catch our interest through the magic of Netflix and iTunes.  
But rather than having to operate the *off* button when crap starts
spewing out of the screen, we simply operate the *on* button, choosing
*what* to watch rather than *what not to* watch.

I was not socialized to TV.   I grew up in places where there was no
reception to speak of, and my parents had little interest in it when we
did.   I (once again) live somewhere where there is no reception
(neither pre-digital nor post).   My wife came to me with a TV which she
used very little (mostly with a VHS player).   We read a lot.

Once we had alternative methods for watching video tapes (then DVDs),
the TV set went into the shed.   On 9/11/2012 my wife pulled it out,
dusted it off, plugged it in and made me order up a satellite dish.  A
week later she took it back to the shed.  I tried to cancel the
Satellite service (ha! one year contract!).  It was giving her nothing
(that she wanted) that she couldn't get by A) reading a daily paper, B)
listening to a modicum of radio when driving into town (every day or
two), C) searching on the internet (dialup at the time!), D) talking to
friends who were more plugged in.   We found the TV news stations to be
highly repetitious, redundant and often inane.    We found the rest to
be ... mostly just sad.  Neither of us follow sports.  We read a lot.

I watch maybe 10-30 minutes of TV a week with the sound turned down and
subtitles (sometimes) turned on.  It may be while standing in line
waiting where one is on, at the barber, the mechanic or in a bar, etc.  
I am often intrigued by the flashing lights, the semi-attractive talking
heads (speaking quite authoritatively about something, but I suspect
more likely nothing) and the level of hyperbole being emitted in a
constant stream.  This is usually *more* than enough for me.

TV is to me like leaded paint or leaded gasoline, or maybe at best like
white sugar and white flour.   The former has been outlawed and I think
few people pine for "the good ole days of leaded gas/paint"...   it is
recognized as an anachronism... the lead served an important function,
but the risks were eventually recognized and alternatives found.   I
don't need to keep a gallon of each around to remind me of "the good ole
days".   I *do* keep white sugar and white flour in my cabinet and even
use the sugar often in my coffee. I use the flour occasionally to make
up some biscuits and/or some gravy.   Some people use white sugar and
white flour as the core of their nutrition as others use Television as
the core of their entertainment/distraction/news.

When we stay in a motel, I hide the remote to the TV and my wife makes
me (sometimes involving physical violence) produce it and we proceed to
binge on hours of the stuff that gushes out, usually with one thumb (my
wife's) on the remote flipping through channels in morbid
fascination...  then we fall into a fitful slumber filled with
advertising jingles, flashy logos, and talking heads (remember Max
Headroom?).

The internet has become as bad (or worse really) as commercial TV in
many ways, except that is for the most part still not a push medium.   I
obviously spend way too much time on my computer/internet.   I should
read more.  Or get out in the sunshine. Or both.

>> PostScript:
>>
>> THIS is why I shot my TV!  I also stay away from Youtube except for
>> instructional videos for tearing down, repairing (and most importantly)
>> re-assembling my complex devices (pieces of my Digital as well as my
>> Analog ecology (aka Swamp)).
> And it's precisely why I will never willingly get rid of my TV, any more
> than I'd get rid of my scissors ... or my books ... or my belt, shoes,
> pencils, hammer, etc.  It amazes me when people purposefully handicap
> themselves by refusing to use a tool. We have lots of self-described TV
> murderers here in Portland.  I do turn off the TV just as often as I
> turn it on, though ... more, actually, since Renee' tends to leave it
> on.  All tools need on-off buttons. ;-)  I also reserve the right to
> pray to my imaginary friends and change my mind on a regular basis.
>

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[glen ep ropella]

Steve Smith wrote at 05/07/2013 04:01 PM:

>>     Q. Can Science be done without language?
>>     A(smith).  Some, almost for sure.
>> A(gepr): No, probably not.  Language is an denser/compressed replacement
>> for other behaviors (e.g. grooming) and serves to bring about behavioral
>> coherence in a group.  Behavioral coherence is necessary for science.
>> (Thought coherence is irrelevant to science except when/where it
>> facilitates behavioral coherence.)
> So you are saying that it is *practically* not possible because of lack
> of group coherence, though in principle (which I think was Kennison's
> original question?) language is not possible *for* doing science, it is
> merely neccessary (valuable/efficient) for gaining coherence?   Is it
> not possible then that a tribe of primates who obtain behavioral
> coherence through lots of nit-picking (like we are doing here?) could
> then have enough behavioral coherence to start doing science?
>>>     Q. Can Science be done more easily/effectively with language?
>>>     A(smith).  It seems as if this is the case.
>> A(gepr): Yes, which seems like a natural consequence of my answer to the
>> first question.
> Ok... so I think your answer to the first question was really an answer
> to the second.

In don't think so.  My answer to the first is that all science requires
language.  Can science be done without language?  No.  Not in principle,
nor in practice.

This is because language is a denser replacement for more drawn out
behaviors.  E.g. I could draw a solar system in the sand with a stick
and "explain" heliocentrism with dynamic diagramming.  But it's much
FASTER to do that with words.  Science requires this _acceleration_,
this compacting.

Note that I'm NOT claiming science requires symbolism/semiotics.  I'm
claiming that it requires compression, dense concepts that can or must
be unpacked.

> But what is a "conjecture" without language?  And if there is such a
> thing, it is already reified (or more to the point needs no
> reification/cannot-be-reified)?

Perhaps if we use the sand diagrams of the solar system?  One mute draws
the solar system in the sand and points at it.  Another mute rubs out
the sun and replaces it with a flower-shaped thingamabob ... or a
unicorn, or whatever.  This amounts to the conjecture that the planets
revolve around thingamabob instead of the sun.

Note that this isn't pure syntax, symbol manipulation.  The parts of the
diagram decompress into the actual objects to which they refer.

> And back to (my corollary to) Kennison's original question... can
> (any/all?) conjectures be created/encoded without language?

Perhaps.  But some of those conjectures would take just as long as the
real thing to reify.  I.e. a simulation that runs just as fast, no
slower, no faster than the thing it simulates _and_ takes just as much
physical material to construct as the thing it simulates is _not_ a
simulation at all.  The model cannot be the territory.

Language is required because it is a compression for material and
process.  I can tell you what I would do, if I wanted to do it, without
actually doing it.

> still nit picking... I'm not clear on what a conjecture based in
> anatomical/physiological structure is?

It is a rearrangement of biochemical, neuroelectrical patterns.  For
example, if one mute redraws the solar system diagram with a unicorn in
the center, then your brain mixes the firing patterns for solar system
and unicorn.

The point being that it's not some logical or ideological abstraction
you're mixing.  It's biochemical processes you're mixing.

> I still hold onto the thought that thoughts are
> real and may also be required to be coherent).

If by "thoughts", you mean biochemical processes, then I agree.  But
it's deceptive to talk of "thoughts" without also talking about what you
ate for breakfast, how much exercise you get, or whether or not you have
syphilis. The answers to questions like that _matter_ to every thought
in your mind.

> I'm stuck on (the other side) on this myself.   What you describe, I
> would call "Identification" and/or "empathy".   It only becomes
> "Anthropomorphism" (for me) when we add the abstractions of "this is
> human-like" and "human-like is me-like".   But I accept that you you
> don't grant "thinking" it's own reality, so I I'm not sure you accept
> these abstractions?

I accept that you (and I) are often deluded into thinking they are
abstractions, abstracted from the detail in the original source
material.  But when I'm lucid, i.e. living in the moment ... in the Tao,
they are not abstractions at all.  I really do _feel_ the frustration of
the robot, or the satisfaction when a cron job completes, etc.

> I think you are making the argument of the materialists that mind does
> not exist, only brain, and that mind (even to the extent that it is an
> illusion) could not exist independently of brain.

Maybe.  I accept that mind exists.  But "mind" is another way of
thinking about brain.  They are the same thing, mind = brain.  But brain
is outside looking in.  Mind is inside looking out.  It's not so much an
illusion as it is myopic or partly false ... biased.

> I don't expect to demonstrate a
> mind outside of a brain anytime soon, but I'm also not ready to say it
> is impossible

That's fine.  You're agnostic.  I'm not trying to change your mind.  I'm
just trying to lay out some (alternative) positions in the quest for
whether or not science makes sense without language.

> And yet, when I write down a complex thought (or better yet, someone
> more capable than I) and someone else reads it (maybe you, maybe someone
> more capable than you ;) ) then a "thought" or at least an "idea" has
> been serialized, disembodied, and reembodied?

Yes!  However, the output may be totally different than the input.  I.e.
your source material may look nothing like the reembodiment I make after
hearing your words.  That's why the thoughts/ideas are irrelevant and
what matters are the two embodiments.

> So the correlation is that people who are good at things, got good by
> doing it, don't *need* to discuss it, and in fact recognize that
> discussing is futile in the face of doing?

Well, that wasn't my point.  My point was that getting good at something
seems to correlate with _less_ symbolism, not more.

> Hmmm... they are discovering the reality of certain relations between
> symbolic statements?

No.  They're discovering reality, itself, perhaps even in its _purest_
form. That's what (I think) Platonic means.  Mathematical constructs
aren't symbols, they are real.  The point being that good mathematicians
think this way ... this Platonic literalism, whereas [in]adequate
mathematicians like myself treat the constructs as symbols that can be
applied wherever I choose.

> I am beginning to understand the level of your commitment to this
> position but am not necessarily becoming more committed to it myself.
> I'm seeking a toehold in this realm, or maybe more to the point, trying
> to find obtain an intuitive understanding of what it would mean to
> dispense with "language", "abstraction", "figuration", "metaphor",
> "analogy", etc.

Well, we don't have to dispense with them, just unpack them differently,
strip them of their ontological status.  What goes on in our mind is
dirty, messy, and correlates with how much seratonin's floating around.
 I.e. the way I think about circles or unicorns or the Copenhagen
interpretation depends, in a fundamental way, on what I ate for breakfast.

> I think you are in territory that I have encountered elsewhere and been
> stymied (well, temporarily stuck actually).   I do think they can be
> regarded as compressions, but I  think even *as* compressions, they also
> serve as abstractions?  I'm left assuming that you might believe in
> abstractions at all?  That they do not exist, that they are meaningless?

They do exist, but they are erroneous, fatally flawed compressions.
They are too lossy to be useful.  How about this?  A good abstraction
can be decompressed and give a relatively accurate reembodiment of the
source material.  A bad abstraction, when decompressed, gives an
inaccurate reembodiment of the source material.  Is that better?

If so, sure abstractions exist.  But they're useless without some caveat
saying how good or bad they are, according to some
concretization/decompression process.

The difference between the word "abstraction" (meaning "without detail")
and "compression" is the former says nothing about the detail that was
sluffed off.  The latter, at least _implies_ that there's more to the
story and you can't just symbol manipulate around willy nilly.
Compression implies baggage. Compression is bound in some way to the
details that were filtered out. Abstraction is free to be total useless
nonsense.

> We "compress" as you say.  We fit data to models.   Then we manipulate
> these instances of the models (informed by the data) until we find a
> supposedly useful or interesting instanced-model-state (some might say
> output-from) which we then "decompress" (in this case I think I mean
> re-apply semantics to...).

Grrr.  I agreed with you completely until you said "re-apply semantics
to". ;-)  My point in using "compress" is to preserve at least some
shred of the semantics... to be _less_ syntactic ... to be _more_ like
the good mathematician who, while doing math, thinks they're discovering
reality.

I do NOT think we humans, with brains/minds, strip our symbols of all
meaning then push them around like a typical computer, then re-apply
meaning when we're done computing.  Rather, some shadow of the meaning
haunts _every_ biochemical process in our heads as we churn and mix and
match them.

If/when a decompression results in nonsense, like when we dream we're
flying and swimming at the same time or somesuch, then it shows that the
semantics stayed with the mix and matched processes, until we wake up
and our ties to the outside world sync up more tightly.

> We measure the position of something which
> we percieve to be "a thing".   We impute thingness (rigid bodyness+???)
> to this imagined "thing" and we use some model which we received or
> discovered (by conjecture, testing,etc.) in the form perhaps of a set of
> differential equations.   With values attached to the differential
> equations, we manipulate said equations according to the rules of
> calculus and algebra (independent of the compressed out qualities of the
> "thing") until we, for example, derive a simpler form, such as the
> "thing"'s position and velocity at some time (t).   When we decompress,
> we apply the semantics of the "thing" (red billiard ball bouncing and
> rolling down an inclined plane?) . We definitely "filtered" when we
> decided that the "compression" (if I'm using your term correctly) of the
> features of the "thing" we measured was useful...  We took it's
> position, mass, velocity, etc. at time t0, fit it to a model of "rigid
> bodies in motion in a gravitational field" and *ignored* it's redness,
> it's human-ascribed utility as a "billiard ball" etc.
>> Preserving the applicability or embeddability of what's in your head is
>> the most important part, no matter how you manipulate thing in your head.
> Ok...  I think that is what I just said above?  Making sure that the
> lossiness is really just separability... holding onto the "redness" and
> the "billiardballness" to re-apply at decompression?

No, it sounds to me like you totally slice off the semantics, store it
in a separate place, then re-apply it after your pure syntax computation
is finished.  I'm NOT saying that.  I'm claiming that this slicing off
of the semantics does not happen, ever.  We simply do not slice off the
semantics, at all, ever.  The compression preserves some vestige of
every detail, _as_ we're mixing and matching things in our heads.  The
constructs are never really _symbols_.  They are, in some strong sense,
the same thing we experienced before, the same patterns that were
activated when we experienced the source material.  Those patterns
persist _through_ the thinking, through the evolution of the brain.
Some vestige of the "redness" and "billiardballness" stay with the the
thought the whole time.

--
glen e. p. ropella, 971-255-2847, http://tempusdictum.com
The United States is a nation of laws: badly written and randomly
enforced. -- Frank Zappa


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[glen ropella]

I share your lament about the homogenization of culture.  As I get
older, I pine for those early days of requesting files through ftpmail
and e-mail addresses with lots of ! in them.  Back then, the internet
was fun and cool.  Now it's a cesspool of TL;DR people like me yapping
about stuff nobody cares about or people uploading pictures of their
food in centralized databases used by corporations to deny them employment.

But, analogous to TV, there's a certain beauty lurking deep in the
horror.  Personally, I'm grateful to be a part-time inhabitant of the
cesspool and I am constantly amazed by the sanctimonious who hold
themselves above the cesspool.  I probably wouldn't be so amazed if I
were totally immersed in it.  Using your analogy, my tendency to
"tunnel" from one deme to another gives me the added perspective that
comes from being able to partly immerse myself in the cesspool, but
still escape sporadically and immerse myself in other pools.  I stand in
awe of the evolution of culture, just as I do with the evolution of the
universe.  But I don't let my awe prevent me from getting a little
"cess" on me on a regular basis.

It's difficult for me to imagine _wanting_ to isolate myself any more
than I'm already isolated.  But to each his own, I suppose.


On 05/07/2013 04:30 PM, Steve Smith wrote:

> Glen -
>
> Obviously you find your Television useful and feel you can thoughtfully
> mitigate any negative side-effects having it in your life might
> present.  I was mostly making fun of your (deliberately idiosyncratic?)
> choices of programming as described.  You are not alone, and I recognize
> that at least half the (relatively small number of) people who share my
> own response to TV are bigger cranks than I am.
>
> It is the constant stream of pop-culture and push-advertising (not just
> commercial, but all kinds of social and political agendas embedded
> everywhere) that I respond so negatively to.   I am not desensitized as
> are people who watch/listen to it regularly.  I get edgy when in a big
> city bustling with advertisements, loud cars, pushy people, beggars and
> streetwalkers.  Having a TV on is a bit like that to me.
>
> Not being desensitized, when I am exposed, I immediately notice the
> worst elements.... whether it is the infomercials, the regular
> commercials, the inane game shows, the yammering (not just talking)
> news-heads, the Jerry Springer-style talk shows, the soap operas, or the
> "reality" shows.   We *do* (now) watch made for TV movies and series
> when they catch our interest through the magic of Netflix and iTunes.  
> But rather than having to operate the *off* button when crap starts
> spewing out of the screen, we simply operate the *on* button, choosing
> *what* to watch rather than *what not to* watch.
>
> I was not socialized to TV.   I grew up in places where there was no
> reception to speak of, and my parents had little interest in it when we
> did.   I (once again) live somewhere where there is no reception
> (neither pre-digital nor post).   My wife came to me with a TV which she
> used very little (mostly with a VHS player).   We read a lot.
>
> Once we had alternative methods for watching video tapes (then DVDs),
> the TV set went into the shed.   On 9/11/2012 my wife pulled it out,
> dusted it off, plugged it in and made me order up a satellite dish.  A
> week later she took it back to the shed.  I tried to cancel the
> Satellite service (ha! one year contract!).  It was giving her nothing
> (that she wanted) that she couldn't get by A) reading a daily paper, B)
> listening to a modicum of radio when driving into town (every day or
> two), C) searching on the internet (dialup at the time!), D) talking to
> friends who were more plugged in.   We found the TV news stations to be
> highly repetitious, redundant and often inane.    We found the rest to
> be ... mostly just sad.  Neither of us follow sports.  We read a lot.
>
> I watch maybe 10-30 minutes of TV a week with the sound turned down and
> subtitles (sometimes) turned on.  It may be while standing in line
> waiting where one is on, at the barber, the mechanic or in a bar, etc.  
> I am often intrigued by the flashing lights, the semi-attractive talking
> heads (speaking quite authoritatively about something, but I suspect
> more likely nothing) and the level of hyperbole being emitted in a
> constant stream.  This is usually *more* than enough for me.
>
> TV is to me like leaded paint or leaded gasoline, or maybe at best like
> white sugar and white flour.   The former has been outlawed and I think
> few people pine for "the good ole days of leaded gas/paint"...   it is
> recognized as an anachronism... the lead served an important function,
> but the risks were eventually recognized and alternatives found.   I
> don't need to keep a gallon of each around to remind me of "the good ole
> days".   I *do* keep white sugar and white flour in my cabinet and even
> use the sugar often in my coffee. I use the flour occasionally to make
> up some biscuits and/or some gravy.   Some people use white sugar and
> white flour as the core of their nutrition as others use Television as
> the core of their entertainment/distraction/news.
>
> When we stay in a motel, I hide the remote to the TV and my wife makes
> me (sometimes involving physical violence) produce it and we proceed to
> binge on hours of the stuff that gushes out, usually with one thumb (my
> wife's) on the remote flipping through channels in morbid
> fascination...  then we fall into a fitful slumber filled with
> advertising jingles, flashy logos, and talking heads (remember Max
> Headroom?).
>
> The internet has become as bad (or worse really) as commercial TV in
> many ways, except that is for the most part still not a push medium.   I
> obviously spend way too much time on my computer/internet.   I should
> read more.  Or get out in the sunshine. Or both.

--
glen  =><= Hail Eris!

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[Steve Smith]

Glen -

Thanks for the perspective.  You may remember I insisted on referring to
my own version of Owen's "Digital Ecology" as a "Digital Swamp".  My
point to that, which I hope parallels your perspective, is that no
matter how much we want it all to be a nice, orderly, well understood
environment, it is a complex, seething mass with unexpected/unintended
consequences.

I'm afraid I'm a compulsive dead-horse beater.

I also understand your reaction to those of us who might sanctimoniously
try to "hold ourselves above".   I don't necessarily have any judgement
against those who are able to frolic in the cesspool (your word) of pop
culture and thrive in it's fecundity.  I use the term "pop" dismissively
and have to acknowledge that in some sense all culture is "pop".  I'm
not speaking from an elitist position that suggests Wagnerian Opera is
better than Sing Along with Homer Simpson, as Television Characters go I
kinda like Homer and don't care so much for Opera.  One may be more
rarified or expensive than the other but in some sense it is all part of
a collective experience that both reflects who we are and perhaps
establishes who we become.  You may not believe the paradigm of "bread
and circuses", I tend to.

What I think I'm reporting is that having grown up (childhood and
adulthood) somewhat *naturally* separated from the more obvious sources
of popular culture (television, urban centers and suburban consumer
culture) I am not inclined to seek it out in large doses (excepting
those all night motel binges with the remote now and then).   I'm also
reporting that I think the "push" nature of TV in particular is
insidious.   Yes, the TV has an "off" button, but it is easy to forget
to use it.   If I'm reading a newspaper (online or in print) and I get a
little disturbed by what I'm reading my failsafe position is to put it
down and read/do something else.   I guess I feel that TV is an
"attractive nuisance".

Having watched most of my television as an adult (in passing) in the
mute state, I feel that I have a unique perspective on it.  I think TV
"reads" differently without sound, especially if it is a rarity rather
than a constant companion.  And TV sound "reads" differently than Radio
sound.  Having been a DJ in a border town in the 70's I listened to my
share of Mexican Radio.  Though I understood Spanish well enough and was
not unfamiliar with Mexican culture, I was always taken aback by all the
*selling by yelling*.  TV sounds a lot like that to me, whether it is
news or advertisements.

And I share your concern (for myself in this case) about isolating
myself any more than I already am.   But somehow I don't think my lack
of TV is what isolates me.   Though there may be a correlation.

- Steve

> I share your lament about the homogenization of culture.  As I get
> older, I pine for those early days of requesting files through ftpmail
> and e-mail addresses with lots of ! in them.  Back then, the internet
> was fun and cool.  Now it's a cesspool of TL;DR people like me yapping
> about stuff nobody cares about or people uploading pictures of their
> food in centralized databases used by corporations to deny them employment.
>
> But, analogous to TV, there's a certain beauty lurking deep in the
> horror.  Personally, I'm grateful to be a part-time inhabitant of the
> cesspool and I am constantly amazed by the sanctimonious who hold
> themselves above the cesspool.  I probably wouldn't be so amazed if I
> were totally immersed in it.  Using your analogy, my tendency to
> "tunnel" from one deme to another gives me the added perspective that
> comes from being able to partly immerse myself in the cesspool, but
> still escape sporadically and immerse myself in other pools.  I stand in
> awe of the evolution of culture, just as I do with the evolution of the
> universe.  But I don't let my awe prevent me from getting a little
> "cess" on me on a regular basis.
>
> It's difficult for me to imagine _wanting_ to isolate myself any more
> than I'm already isolated.  But to each his own, I suppose.
>
>
> On 05/07/2013 04:30 PM, Steve Smith wrote:
>> Glen -
>>
>> Obviously you find your Television useful and feel you can thoughtfully
>> mitigate any negative side-effects having it in your life might
>> present.  I was mostly making fun of your (deliberately idiosyncratic?)
>> choices of programming as described.  You are not alone, and I recognize
>> that at least half the (relatively small number of) people who share my
>> own response to TV are bigger cranks than I am.
>>
>> It is the constant stream of pop-culture and push-advertising (not just
>> commercial, but all kinds of social and political agendas embedded
>> everywhere) that I respond so negatively to.   I am not desensitized as
>> are people who watch/listen to it regularly.  I get edgy when in a big
>> city bustling with advertisements, loud cars, pushy people, beggars and
>> streetwalkers.  Having a TV on is a bit like that to me.
>>
>> Not being desensitized, when I am exposed, I immediately notice the
>> worst elements.... whether it is the infomercials, the regular
>> commercials, the inane game shows, the yammering (not just talking)
>> news-heads, the Jerry Springer-style talk shows, the soap operas, or the
>> "reality" shows.   We *do* (now) watch made for TV movies and series
>> when they catch our interest through the magic of Netflix and iTunes.
>> But rather than having to operate the *off* button when crap starts
>> spewing out of the screen, we simply operate the *on* button, choosing
>> *what* to watch rather than *what not to* watch.
>>
>> I was not socialized to TV.   I grew up in places where there was no
>> reception to speak of, and my parents had little interest in it when we
>> did.   I (once again) live somewhere where there is no reception
>> (neither pre-digital nor post).   My wife came to me with a TV which she
>> used very little (mostly with a VHS player).   We read a lot.
>>
>> Once we had alternative methods for watching video tapes (then DVDs),
>> the TV set went into the shed.   On 9/11/2012 my wife pulled it out,
>> dusted it off, plugged it in and made me order up a satellite dish.  A
>> week later she took it back to the shed.  I tried to cancel the
>> Satellite service (ha! one year contract!).  It was giving her nothing
>> (that she wanted) that she couldn't get by A) reading a daily paper, B)
>> listening to a modicum of radio when driving into town (every day or
>> two), C) searching on the internet (dialup at the time!), D) talking to
>> friends who were more plugged in.   We found the TV news stations to be
>> highly repetitious, redundant and often inane.    We found the rest to
>> be ... mostly just sad.  Neither of us follow sports.  We read a lot.
>>
>> I watch maybe 10-30 minutes of TV a week with the sound turned down and
>> subtitles (sometimes) turned on.  It may be while standing in line
>> waiting where one is on, at the barber, the mechanic or in a bar, etc.
>> I am often intrigued by the flashing lights, the semi-attractive talking
>> heads (speaking quite authoritatively about something, but I suspect
>> more likely nothing) and the level of hyperbole being emitted in a
>> constant stream.  This is usually *more* than enough for me.
>>
>> TV is to me like leaded paint or leaded gasoline, or maybe at best like
>> white sugar and white flour.   The former has been outlawed and I think
>> few people pine for "the good ole days of leaded gas/paint"...   it is
>> recognized as an anachronism... the lead served an important function,
>> but the risks were eventually recognized and alternatives found.   I
>> don't need to keep a gallon of each around to remind me of "the good ole
>> days".   I *do* keep white sugar and white flour in my cabinet and even
>> use the sugar often in my coffee. I use the flour occasionally to make
>> up some biscuits and/or some gravy.   Some people use white sugar and
>> white flour as the core of their nutrition as others use Television as
>> the core of their entertainment/distraction/news.
>>
>> When we stay in a motel, I hide the remote to the TV and my wife makes
>> me (sometimes involving physical violence) produce it and we proceed to
>> binge on hours of the stuff that gushes out, usually with one thumb (my
>> wife's) on the remote flipping through channels in morbid
>> fascination...  then we fall into a fitful slumber filled with
>> advertising jingles, flashy logos, and talking heads (remember Max
>> Headroom?).
>>
>> The internet has become as bad (or worse really) as commercial TV in
>> many ways, except that is for the most part still not a push medium.   I
>> obviously spend way too much time on my computer/internet.   I should
>> read more.  Or get out in the sunshine. Or both.
>

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[Marcus G. Daniels]

On 5/8/13 9:06 AM, glen ropella wrote:
> I share your lament about the homogenization of culture.
What is a counter example of non-homogenization of culture?   It seems
to suggest that culture is a thing that leads individuals, rather than
individuals leading it.   I've always thought of culture like
education.   The people that know, try to tell the people that don't
know so that they don't make a mess of things.   (In so doing, they may
well make a mess of things themselves.   Which is a possible claim about
television.)

I think the efficiencies we witness, whether it is the content on
television or the billions served at McDonalds or juggernauts like
Costco, are just a reflection of the vast redundancy inherent in a large
population.  Most of that population is not in the tails, it is in the
center of the distribution.   Culture and education won't change that.

If anything, the problem in the U.S. is that people think their problems
are unique and that their clan is special.   So, we fail to factor out
the common bits of everyday life into shared systems like mass
transport, affordable housing, health care, etc.

There's something to be said for put up or shut up.  Prove you're
special.  Oh, so you're not, here's a nice television for you to watch.

Marcus

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[glen ropella]

I think we agree on most of these points.  Another reason I like TVs is
because I'm mostly a wall flower at parties.  Smalltalk irritates me and
I only talk to people after a given party passes through that phase
transition where it ratchets down a bit and allows more intimate
conversations amongst small groups.  Until that happens, I need ways to
entertain myself.  It's for that reason I like to play old movies or
"mix videos" on the TV during parties, usually with the sound muted.
Nosferatu and Fearless Vampire Killers are favorites.  But I also have a
good set of videos from Spot Draves:

   http://scottdraves.com/

This is especially useful because I like death, speed, and heavy metal
music.  And I usually like to turn that up loud enough to prevent
conversation.  So, the TV is an integral part of any parties I throw ...
not for broadcast stations.  That means that we have an ambiguity or
equivocation in the term "TV". I used to use a LCD projector for some of
this stuff.  But with the cheap LED-LCD TVs, the picture is so much
better and the access to various TV "apps" on network enabled TVs makes
me think no digital swamp is complete without a big screen TV.

On 05/08/2013 09:36 AM, Steve Smith wrote:

> Thanks for the perspective.  You may remember I insisted on referring to
> my own version of Owen's "Digital Ecology" as a "Digital Swamp".  My
> point to that, which I hope parallels your perspective, is that no
> matter how much we want it all to be a nice, orderly, well understood
> environment, it is a complex, seething mass with unexpected/unintended
> consequences.
>
> I'm afraid I'm a compulsive dead-horse beater.
>
> I also understand your reaction to those of us who might sanctimoniously
> try to "hold ourselves above".   I don't necessarily have any judgement
> against those who are able to frolic in the cesspool (your word) of pop
> culture and thrive in it's fecundity.  I use the term "pop" dismissively
> and have to acknowledge that in some sense all culture is "pop".  I'm
> not speaking from an elitist position that suggests Wagnerian Opera is
> better than Sing Along with Homer Simpson, as Television Characters go I
> kinda like Homer and don't care so much for Opera.  One may be more
> rarified or expensive than the other but in some sense it is all part of
> a collective experience that both reflects who we are and perhaps
> establishes who we become.  You may not believe the paradigm of "bread
> and circuses", I tend to.
>
> What I think I'm reporting is that having grown up (childhood and
> adulthood) somewhat *naturally* separated from the more obvious sources
> of popular culture (television, urban centers and suburban consumer
> culture) I am not inclined to seek it out in large doses (excepting
> those all night motel binges with the remote now and then).   I'm also
> reporting that I think the "push" nature of TV in particular is
> insidious.   Yes, the TV has an "off" button, but it is easy to forget
> to use it.   If I'm reading a newspaper (online or in print) and I get a
> little disturbed by what I'm reading my failsafe position is to put it
> down and read/do something else.   I guess I feel that TV is an
> "attractive nuisance".
>
> Having watched most of my television as an adult (in passing) in the
> mute state, I feel that I have a unique perspective on it.  I think TV
> "reads" differently without sound, especially if it is a rarity rather
> than a constant companion.  And TV sound "reads" differently than Radio
> sound.  Having been a DJ in a border town in the 70's I listened to my
> share of Mexican Radio.  Though I understood Spanish well enough and was
> not unfamiliar with Mexican culture, I was always taken aback by all the
> *selling by yelling*.  TV sounds a lot like that to me, whether it is
> news or advertisements.
>
> And I share your concern (for myself in this case) about isolating
> myself any more than I already am.   But somehow I don't think my lack
> of TV is what isolates me.   Though there may be a correlation.

--
glen  =><= Hail Eris!

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[glen ropella]

On 05/08/2013 10:31 AM, Marcus G. Daniels wrote:
> What is a counter example of non-homogenization of culture?

I think homogenization of (or homogenized state of) culture can take
different forms. Were it normal, it could be fatter or skinnier.  If
it's skewed/biased (which is most likely) it can be skewed more or less.
 These "parameters" for whatever distribution exist would (were we to
measure samples) provide counter examples.  Higher sigma and fatter
tails would indicate "less homogenous".

> It seems
> to suggest that culture is a thing that leads individuals, rather than
> individuals leading it.

If we consider the whole, high dimensional space, I posit that the
reality contains multiple feedback loops.  I.e. culture leads
individuals and vice versa.  Whether the causal flows happen more in one
or the other direction probably depends on which variable is being
examined.  For example, it seems to me that I see 2 opposing causal
flows in music.  One is that in pop music, culture leads individuals.
But in folk or jazz or any live-music oriented domain, it strikes me
that individuals (or individual bands) lead culture.

> If anything, the problem in the U.S. is that people think their problems
> are unique and that their clan is special.   So, we fail to factor out
> the common bits of everyday life into shared systems like mass
> transport, affordable housing, health care, etc.
>
> There's something to be said for put up or shut up.  Prove you're
> special.  Oh, so you're not, here's a nice television for you to watch.

This pressure is good, despite the risks of narcissism or sanctimony to
any particular individual.  It's difficult for me to imagine an
individual performing at their maximum if they spend all their time in
the middle of the biggest cluster of individuals.  But I still reject
the idea that any particular individual is somehow _not_ special.  I
remember a distinction made at one of the computing and philosophy
conferences i attended referring to the difference between the "special"
sciences and the "general" sciences.  That is one of the reasons I think
biology is interesting.  I think it sits right on the line.  It's a
special science, but seems to be poised to reveal some more generic
"laws" any decade now.

--
glen  =><= Hail Eris!

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[Marcus G. Daniels]

On 5/8/13 12:20 PM, glen ropella wrote:
> For example, it seems to me that I see 2 opposing causal flows in
> music. One is that in pop music, culture leads individuals. But in
> folk or jazz or any live-music oriented domain, it strikes me that
> individuals (or individual bands) lead culture.
It depends what you mean by `lead'.   I'd distinguish between influence
and innovate.  I'd claim that culture does not innovate, it can only put
down a road and encourage people to take it, and thereby set the stage
for innovators.   That can be useful, if the taking the path, e.g.
watching the T.V. show or buying the iPhone, results in resources being
reallocated to those that do innovate, e.g. writers or communication
satellite engineers.  A danger is that in providing a path, it decreases
entropy instead of increasing it. The television screenwriter realizes
there is no market for anything but CSI-type dramas, and stops working
on her craft.  But I think at the end of the day it matters more that
she can be a professional writer at all, than that she has a market that
demands novelty and sophistication.

Marcus


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[glen ropella]

On 05/08/2013 11:44 AM, Marcus G. Daniels wrote:
> It depends what you mean by `lead'.   I'd distinguish between influence
> and innovate.  I'd claim that culture does not innovate, it can only put
> down a road and encourage people to take it, and thereby set the stage
> for innovators.

That's a good point.  If we run with the analogy, we could also say that
both the culture and the innovator "lay down roads", the innovator
blazing new trails and the culture coming behind and paving the most oft
used of those trails.  The result becomes a large network of roads and
trails that provide the opportunity for any newcomer to walk in novel
ways ... a little bit on a seldom used trail, a little way on a super
highway, a little way on some well used, but still unpaved paths, etc.

In this sense, culture may not, itself, innovate.  But it comes very
close.  Any drill down into the meaning of "innovate" will turn into a
nit-picky rat hole.  So it's safe to say that culture does (or
practically does) innovate by optimizing the landscape for innovation...
so easy a caveman could do it. ;-)

--
glen  =><= Hail Eris!

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[Steve Smith]

“If you don't read the newspaper, you're uninformed. If you read the newspaper, you're mis-informed.”

― Mark Twain

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