Wimsatt and robustness
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Of late, I've become interested (AKA "mildly obsessed") in/with William
Wimsatt's work. (hmmm, U of Chicago, aren't some folks recently in the news from there?) Always liked the notion of processes selecting for accessibility (to maybe see what I'm talking about, study the Hasegawa dyptich at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ma_(negative_space) for a few minutes/hours). Not to mention the whole Occam's Razor show at the SF Complex continues to reverberate with the local Taiko folk and Wimsatt's paper has some insights there in the first several pages. So anyhow, "interested", so here, have a pod... From N-Category Cafe, originally - http://golem.ph.utexas.edu/category/2008/11/mathematical_robustness.html Thence to the eminently devourable paper: http://www.institutnicod.org/Reduction/7.OntComplSys.pdf (pictures are worth several hundred words). and then to the interviews at: http://chronicle.uchicago.edu/071004/limited-beings.shtml (Nicely assembled, short, pithy.) which refer to his book: http://tinyurl.com/66zxgp which I will order soon from my meager resources if no one stops me. C. ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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Here's what Wimsatt says about how to decide what's real (from the Ontology of Complex Systems paper, page 2).
Before I say what there is in this complex world, I should give my criteria for regarding something as real or trustworthy. ... I want criteria for what is real which are decidedly local--which are the kinds of criteria used by working scientists in deciding whether results are "real" or artifactual, trustworthy or untrustworthy, "objective" or "subjective" (in contexts where the latter is legitimately criticized--which is not everywhere). When this criterion is used, eliminative reductionism is seen as generally unsound, and entities at a variety of levels--as well as the levels themselves--can be recognized for the real objects they are ... Following Levins (1966), I call this criterion robustness. ... Things are robust if they are accessible (detectable, measureable, derivable, defineable, produceable, or the like) in a variety of independent ways. [emphasis in the original] It seems to me that most branches of modern science (particle physics, astronomy, neuro-anatomy, ...) rely on tools to see what's real, and those tools do not provide a variety of independent ways to access them. It feels initially intuitively comforting to say that one wants a variety of independent way to perceive something before deciding that it is real. But I don't think that's how science works. Also, the point is not reproducibility. Wimsett refers to the old distinction between primary and secondary properties to illustrate his point.The secondary properties are accessible through only one sense, e.g., sight (for color), taste (for taste), etc. But they are certainly reproducible. Everyone will agree that salt tastes salty. Yet taste is considered a secondary property. That's as far as I've gotten in the paper so far. But I thought it was worth raising this issue. -- Russ Abbott _____________________________________________ Professor, Computer Science California State University, Los Angeles o Check out my blog at http://russabbott.blogspot.com/ On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 8:46 PM, Carl Tollander <[hidden email]> wrote: Of late, I've become interested (AKA "mildly obsessed") in/with William Wimsatt's work. (hmmm, U of Chicago, aren't some folks recently in the news from there?) Always liked the notion of processes selecting for accessibility (to maybe see what I'm talking about, study the Hasegawa dyptich at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ma_(negative_space) for a few minutes/hours). Not to mention the whole Occam's Razor show at the SF Complex continues to reverberate with the local Taiko folk and Wimsatt's paper has some insights there in the first several pages. So anyhow, "interested", so here, have a pod... ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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Fair point if he was talking about science and how its done. But it
seems to me this was about ontology. (Yeah, he's got some chops in science and engineering, and yeah, the referral was from Corfield who worries a lot about how math communities work, but this is maybe not about science per se, but only by way of illustration of a more philosophical point). The footnote on the mesosome re instrumentalities example might be of interest. I do like the robustness definition. I did not see where secondary properties were accessible only through 'one sense' (in any case, there are a lot of taste buds and the brain areas they're connected to overlap - yeah, salt tastes salty, but what is necessary and sufficient (re Okham's safety razor) for that? Access 'points' (I want another word but its late) here are not necessarily people or even agents). best, C. Russ Abbott wrote: > Here's what Wimsatt says about how to decide what's real (from the > Ontology of Complex Systems > <http://www.institutnicod.org/Reduction/7.OntComplSys.pdf> paper, page > 2). > > Before I say what there is in this complex world, I should give my > criteria for regarding something as real or trustworthy. ... I want > criteria for what is real which are decidedly local--which are the > kinds of criteria used by working scientists in deciding whether > results are "real" or artifactual, trustworthy or untrustworthy, > "objective" or "subjective" (in contexts where the latter is > legitimately criticized--which is not everywhere). When this criterion > is used, eliminative reductionism is seen as generally unsound, and > entities at a variety of levels--as well as the levels themselves--can > be recognized for the real objects they are ... > > Following Levins (1966), I call this criterion robustness. ... > /*Things are robust if they are accessible (detectable, measureable, > derivable, defineable, produceable, or the like) in a variety of > independent ways.*/ [emphasis in the original] > > It seems to me that most branches of modern science (particle physics, > astronomy, neuro-anatomy, ...) rely on tools to see what's real, and > those tools do not provide a variety of independent ways to access > them. It feels initially intuitively comforting to say that one wants > a variety of independent way to perceive something before deciding > that it is real. But I don't think that's how science works. > > Also, the point is not reproducibility. Wimsett refers to the old > distinction between primary and secondary properties to illustrate his > point.The secondary properties are accessible through only one sense, > e.g., sight (for color), taste (for taste), etc. But they are > certainly reproducible. Everyone will agree that salt tastes salty. > Yet taste is considered a secondary property. > > That's as far as I've gotten in the paper so far. But I thought it was > worth raising this issue. > > -- Russ Abbott > _____________________________________________ > Professor, Computer Science > California State University, Los Angeles > o Check out my blog at http://russabbott.blogspot.com/ > > > On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 8:46 PM, Carl Tollander <[hidden email] > <mailto:[hidden email]>> wrote: > > Of late, I've become interested (AKA "mildly obsessed") in/with > William Wimsatt's work. (hmmm, U of Chicago, aren't some folks > recently in the news from there?) Always liked the notion of > processes selecting for accessibility (to maybe see what I'm > talking about, study the Hasegawa dyptich at > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ma_(negative_space) > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ma_%28negative_space%29> for a few > minutes/hours). Not to mention the whole Occam's Razor show at > the SF Complex continues to reverberate with the local Taiko folk > and Wimsatt's paper has some insights there in the first several > pages. So anyhow, "interested", so here, have a pod... > > >From N-Category Cafe, originally - > http://golem.ph.utexas.edu/category/2008/11/mathematical_robustness.html > > Thence to the eminently devourable paper: > http://www.institutnicod.org/Reduction/7.OntComplSys.pdf > (pictures are worth several hundred words). > > and then to the interviews at: > http://chronicle.uchicago.edu/071004/limited-beings.shtml (Nicely > assembled, short, pithy.) > > which refer to his book: http://tinyurl.com/66zxgp > which I will order soon from my meager resources if no one stops me. > > C. > > > > ============================================================ > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College > lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org > > ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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In reply to this post by Russ Abbott
Thus spake Russ Abbott circa 11/30/2008 09:31 PM:
> It seems to me that most branches of modern science (particle physics, > astronomy, neuro-anatomy, ...) rely on tools to see what's real, and those > tools do not provide a variety of independent ways to access them. It feels > initially intuitively comforting to say that one wants a variety of > independent way to perceive something before deciding that it is real. But I > don't think that's how science works. Speaking from ignorance, as I usually do, it strikes me that the concepts "robustness" and "consistency" are related. It sounds like that definition of robustness biases it toward the concept of consistency. I would accept "things are (relatively) consistent if they are accessible (detectable, ...) in a variety of independent ways." Formally, a stronger sense would be "things are consistent if they obtain regardless of the way they're accessed." There's part of the concept of robustness that is left out of that definition (which biases it toward consistency). I think that might be something more like "vigor" or emphasis -- the capability of surviving onslaught. And that sort of concept lends itself nicely to the type of technophilic scientific discoveries you refer to above. Even if there's only a single path to a result, if that result has intense meaning, emphasis, or "vigor" as a concept, then it is robust. E.g. a long sought after datum validating some old, accepted, but not yet validated theory. The problem is that this latter sense of robustness includes false memes that take hold and persist despite being proved false or overly simplistic. So a vigorously robust belief (like flying spaghetti monsters or gravitons) need not be true. -- glen e. p. ropella, 971-222-9095, http://tempusdictum.com ============================================================ FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org |
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