> From: Owen Densmore <
[hidden email]>
> Date: December 18, 2003 10:20:05 AM MST
> To: The Friday Morning Complexity Coffee Group <
[hidden email]>
> Subject: Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
>
> During the last Friam, we got talking about voting and Arrow's
> Impossibility Theorem came up. It basically discusses anomalies in
> voting when there are more than two choices being voted upon.
>
> The result depends strongly on how the votes are tallied. So for
> example, in our last election, due to having three candidates, we
> entered the Arrow regime. But "spoilers" like Ralph are not the only
> weirdness.
>
> The html references below have interesting examples, and the pdf
> reference is a paper by SFI's John Geanakoplos who gave a public
> lecture last year.
>
> "Fair voting" schemes are getting some air-time now a-days. There are
> several forms, but the most popular I think is that you basically rank
> your candidates in order of preference, the "top-most" being your
> current vote. There are several run-offs which eliminate the poorest
> performer and let you vote again, now with the highest of your ranks
> still available. This insures you always have a vote if you want one.
> This would have won the election here for Gore, for example,
> presuming the Nader votes would favor Gore.
>
> Various web pages with examples:
>
http://www.udel.edu/johnmack/frec444/444voting.html>
http://econ.gsia.cmu.edu/Freshman_Seminar/notes_on_arrow.htm>
>
http://www.personal.psu.edu/staff/m/j/mjd1/
> arrowimpossibilitytheorem.htm
>
http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/arrow.htm> Three proofs by John Geanakoplos
>
http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d11a/d1123-r.pdf>
> Owen Densmore 908 Camino Santander Santa Fe, NM 87505
>
[hidden email] Cell: 505-570-0168 Home: 505-988-3787
> AIM:owendensmore
http://complexityworkshop.com http://backspaces.net>
>
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