Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve
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Re: Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve
 
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Dammit, Nick. I can and frequently do spend hours planning, remembering, composing emails, fantasizing about my next car, etc without exhibiting any remarkable behavior beyond eyeblinking, touching my face (don't!), crossing and uncrossing my legs. We've been through this before but what is my latest plan about what to do when my auto lease is up? No one knows but me despite your claim that I don't have private access to these kinds of things. On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 1:36 PM <[hidden email]> wrote: Hi,Glen, -- Frank Wimberly
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Re: Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve
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Oh, you SAY you do. Someday we’ll get Neuralink hardware on you and then WE WILL SEE.
From: Friam <[hidden email]> on behalf of Frank Wimberly <[hidden email]> Dammit, Nick. I can and frequently do spend hours planning, remembering, composing emails, fantasizing about my next car, etc without exhibiting any remarkable behavior beyond eyeblinking, touching my face (don't!), crossing and uncrossing
my legs. We've been through this before but what is my latest plan about what to do when my auto lease is up? No one knows but me despite your claim that I don't have private access to these kinds of things. On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 1:36 PM <[hidden email]> wrote:
Frank Wimberly .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ... FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
Re: Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve
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In reply to this post by gepr
Glen said: "Were I to try to formulate the school I'm in, it would be that we are a dynamic system and the locus that we call "mind" moves around, sometimes more or less in one place/time, sometimes spread very thin. And that dynamism would be critical." So, there are a few varieties of that right now, that are trying to get along well together. Emobidied Cognition, Enactivism, Ecological Psychlogy, Extended Cognition, etc. As a starting point for that work, especially for the more mathematically inclined, I recommend "Radical Embodied Cognitive Science" by Tony Chemero, for the more philosophically inclined, I recommend "Radicalizing Enactivism" by Dan Hutto, and for the more general thinker interested in an overview of cool ideas I recommend "Beyond the Brain" by Louise Barrett. ----------- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist American University - Adjunct Instructor On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 4:46 PM uǝlƃ ☣ <[hidden email]> wrote: I'm not sure what school I'm in. But neither of those positions seems right to me. I tend to believe in (quasi)cycles and flows. E.g. when I'm dreaming, my mind is inside me. When I'm engrossed in some activity, my mind is spread over both inside and outside ... as if the skin between me and the world is gone. Were I to try to formulate the school I'm in, it would be that we are a dynamic system and the locus that we call "mind" moves around, sometimes more or less in one place/time, sometimes spread very thin. And that dynamism would be critical. .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ... FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
Re: Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve
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In reply to this post by Marcus G. Daniels
On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 5:08 PM Marcus Daniels <[hidden email]> wrote:
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Re: Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve
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That’s hilarious. From: Friam <[hidden email]> on behalf of Roger Critchlow <[hidden email]> On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 5:08 PM Marcus Daniels <[hidden email]> wrote:
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In reply to this post by Eric Charles-2
Thanks. I've read the Chemero one. And I've read something by Hutto, but I don't think it was that. Regardless, my (maybe testable) hypothesis is what I'm interested in:
If a black box demonstrates behavior that can't be captured by any (known) algorithm, then that would be an indication that something (unmodelable) was happening inside the black box. And that unmodelable thing might be called "thinking". We can extend that, I think, to "surprising behavior", which I think gets at what we usually mean by "thinking". If a black box demonstrates a long memory with not-quite-but-almost predictable behavior, then we might accuse it of thinking. Both would be counter-examples to Dave's assertion. On 5/5/20 2:55 PM, Eric Charles wrote: > So, there are a few varieties of that right now, that are trying to get along well together. Emobidied Cognition, Enactivism, Ecological Psychlogy, Extended Cognition, etc. As a starting point for that work, especially for the more mathematically inclined, I recommend "Radical Embodied Cognitive Science" by Tony Chemero <http://psychsciencenotes.blogspot.com/2011/02/new-reading-group-chemero-2009-radical.html>, for the more philosophically inclined, I recommend "Radicalizing Enactivism" by Dan Hutto <https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/radicalizing-enactivism>, and for the more general thinker interested in an overview of cool ideas I recommend "Beyond the Brain" by Louise Barrett <http://fixingpsychology.blogspot.com/2012/01/beyond-brain-review-out.html>. -- ☣ uǝlƃ .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ... FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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Re: Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve
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In reply to this post by Frank Wimberly-2
On 5/5/20 3:04 PM, Frank Wimberly
wrote:
And following (weakly I am sure) Glen's reference to
"holographically", I believe that if we record/observe *all* of
your behaviour down to the minutest detail, we can learn a LOT
about that inner state. If we had that data from the *last*
time you approached buying a new car (maybe years out) we might
recognize the specific patterns of leg-crossing and eye-blinking
and chair-leaning that go with fantasizing about that muscle-car
inspired anti-proton powered 6 wheel-drive hub-motor flying car
you have been jonesing on! I'm somewhat with Glen (as I understand him in this conversation) on the ideation that inner and outer is somewhat mutable. Sometimes the 6-rotor flying drone-car I fantasize (and blame on Frank) flitting around in is *part of* *me* and other times it is what I interface *to* and *it* interfaces (mostly) to the air (and sometimes to the water, the ground, and unfortunately a tall tree here and there). When I am composing a message *to* this august body named FriAM, I often think of youse alls as "external" to me, but if I'm talking to one of the philistines in my life who do NOT spend all their time talking/thinking about these kinds of things (whatever these kinds are), I sometimes think of myself as being *of* "the FriAM" rather than "in the FriAM" (or is that FriAM pan?).
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Re: Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve
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"We record/observe *all* your behavior down to the minutest level... " is impossible. --- Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, Santa Fe, NM 87505 505 670-9918 Santa Fe, NM On Tue, May 5, 2020, 4:13 PM Steven A Smith <[hidden email]> wrote:
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Re: Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve
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In reply to this post by thompnickson2
I think the phenomenologists would claim that until you have realized that all worlds are only “inner worlds”, you haven’t properly interpreted the informal use of the word “world” into a philosophically serious frame.
Of course they are Continental Philosophers. So one has the option to simply refuse to use any of the patterns or forms that they try to use consistently, and replace anything they say _in the way they say it_ with something else that oneself says _in some different way_, and then claim that when said in the different way, the point they were trying to make cannot be sensible, by construction. I have on many occasions wondered what is the balance between rephrasing to get more angles on a question, versus rephrasing to insist on a scheme in which the question is unexpressible. The former is an essential act of reason and discourse; the latter is a refusal to cooperate and a gambit to win a contest. For any given statement, are we sure that it can be assigned to one and not the other? Eric > On May 6, 2020, at 4:35 AM, [hidden email] wrote: > > Hi,Glen, > > Careful. Isn't the formulation "inner world" entirely contradictory? > > N > > Nicholas Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology > Clark University > [hidden email] > https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of u?l? ? > Sent: Tuesday, May 5, 2020 12:50 PM > To: FriAM <[hidden email]> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve > > However, I think we can come up with a (maybe someday) testable hypothesis based on hidden states. In principle, if EricC's principle is taken seriously, the inner world of a black box device will be *completely* represented on its surface (ala the holographic principle). Any information not exhibited by a black box's *behavior* will be lost/random. > > This implies something about the compressibility and information content of the black box's behavior, right? > > On 5/5/20 10:38 AM, Prof David West wrote: >> This does not advance an argument against the possibility of a computer thinking — merely an assertion that "behavior" is not a valid basis upon which to argue that they do. > > > -- > ☣ uǝlƃ > > .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ... > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > > > .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ... > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ... FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
Re: Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve
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In reply to this post by Frank Wimberly-2
On 5/5/20 4:38 PM, Frank Wimberly
wrote:
Some of my work (not so much these days) has been in light-field
capture as well as holography... so my metaphorical target domain
comes from a fairly specific technical perspective. Of course "recording/observing *all* of your behaviour" is as
impossible as it is impossible to "record all impinging
interfering light waves as silver halide crystals on a
photographic plate", so even a high-quality hologram is just a
"fuzzy facsimile"... the point isn't fidelity as much as it is
that a lot more *qualities* of information are available to BE
recorded than we normally record (e.g. focusing nominally parallel
light rays reflected off an object through a lens onto a similar
photographic plate). The hologram doesn't necessarily contain
more data (limited by the grain size of the silver-halide film and
the quality of the optical elements moving the light around as
well as the wavelength of the light) than a conventional
photograph, it is just *qualitatively* more interesting/complex
than the impingement of a planar wave onto a plane (or the
integrated fusing of hundreds of such captures from hundreds of
lenses or pinholes) (think phased array radar in the optical
spectra). I defer to your broader/deeper experience and awareness of conventional psychology, but I suppose what I was alluding to is the difference between a "gestalt" and a "diagnosis"? A good intuitive therapist, NLP practitioner, car-salesman, "psychic", etc. (I contend) can "read" a LOT more than a bureaucrat screening for a particular purpose. I'm simply borrowing Glen's reference to "holographically" to elaborate the nature of that. Meanwhile, I agree strongly with you that a great deal of your internal state (second by second) is operationally opaque to me and everyone else who might try to observe, including Marcus when he wires you up with Neuralink hardware or locks you into an fMRI while you fantasize about your next car or reminisce about a favorite meal/libation you enjoyed 37 years ago while apprehending the Aurora Borealis at winter solstice in a northern Finland resort that overlooks the Russian Landscape across the border. I also know from my own musings and reminiscings that *my* memories can vary from time to time (and from an objective observation like a microphone or camera capturing those aspects of a situation).
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Re: Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve
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...or reminisce about a favorite meal/libation you enjoyed 37 years ago while apprehending the Aurora Borealis at winter solstice in a northern Finland resort that overlooks the Russian Landscape across the border... How did you know?!!! Joke. --- Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, Santa Fe, NM 87505 505 670-9918 Santa Fe, NM On Tue, May 5, 2020, 5:27 PM Steven A Smith <[hidden email]> wrote:
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In reply to this post by Steve Smith
So, in state space reconstruction, it seems, we're attempting to infer a structure that is *as* expressive as the data we feed it, similar I guess to deep learning or genetic programming. All the sci-fi movies focus on the brain (or maybe even the CNS). But what I'd like to see is something like FPGA where the dynamically programmable "sleeve" (as in Altered Carbon) is hooked to one end of a harness and the "original" is hooked to the other end ... like a motion capture suit but with way more pathways. Then the "sleeve" is re-configured/programmed over some relatively short period. Like the original has to wear the suit for a 24 hour period ... paying bills, making coffee, having sex, etc. Then, at the end of the process, the sleeve is configured to be as expressive as the original ... at least in so far as the data taken during that period.
We couldn't use such things for long-term duplication. But it would be great for, say, giving speeches. We could take a Donald Trump sleeve, *program* it with Barack Obama, and abracadabra we have a real president who can get through a 30 minute speech without screwing it up. On 5/5/20 4:26 PM, Steven A Smith wrote: > Meanwhile, I agree strongly with you that a great deal of your internal state (second by second) is operationally opaque to me and everyone else who might try to observe, including Marcus when he wires you up with Neuralink hardware or locks you into an fMRI while you fantasize about your next car or reminisce about a favorite meal/libation you enjoyed 37 years ago while apprehending the Aurora Borealis at winter solstice in a northern Finland resort that overlooks the Russian Landscape across the border. I also know from my own musings and reminiscings that *my* memories can vary from time to time (and from an objective observation like a microphone or camera capturing those aspects of a situation). -- ☣ uǝlƃ .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ... FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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Re: Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve
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In reply to this post by David Eric Smith
Hi, Eric (Smith),
I think you have made your decision. Forced to make a choice between "...engaging in an essential act of reason and discourse engaging in "a gambit to win a contest", I know where I would come down, and I assume you would come down in the same place. But I think that's a wrong way to characterize the choice situation we are in. I would characterize it as the difference between holding many ideas lightly and exploratorily or pursuing an idea in a relentless manner to see where it leads (and where it fails). I value both in the pursuit of knowledge, although, in the FRIAM context I probably do more of the latter than the former. I do question the heuristic value of the idea of the impenetrable interior, but if somebody wants explore it as a scientific approach, even a pragmatist should be willing to explore its empirical implications. What are the scientific implications of believing that you have an inner life that is, in principle, impenetrable to observation by others? Let's explore those. By all means. I think at least Frank and Bruce are temped by that possibility. Or is the objection of another form: Do we have to be doing science all the time? Can't we just have fun SOME of the time? Nick Nicholas Thompson Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology Clark University [hidden email] https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ -----Original Message----- From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of David Eric Smith Sent: Tuesday, May 5, 2020 4:54 PM To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve I think the phenomenologists would claim that until you have realized that all worlds are only “inner worlds”, you haven’t properly interpreted the informal use of the word “world” into a philosophically serious frame. Of course they are Continental Philosophers. So one has the option to simply refuse to use any of the patterns or forms that they try to use consistently, and replace anything they say _in the way they say it_ with something else that oneself says _in some different way_, and then claim that when said in the different way, the point they were trying to make cannot be sensible, by construction. I have on many occasions wondered what is the balance between rephrasing to get more angles on a question, versus rephrasing to insist on a scheme in which the question is unexpressible. The former is an essential act of reason and discourse; the latter is a refusal to cooperate and a gambit to win a contest. For any given statement, are we sure that it can be assigned to one and not the other? Eric > On May 6, 2020, at 4:35 AM, [hidden email] wrote: > > Hi,Glen, > > Careful. Isn't the formulation "inner world" entirely contradictory? > > N > > Nicholas Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology Clark University > [hidden email] https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of u?l? ? > Sent: Tuesday, May 5, 2020 12:50 PM > To: FriAM <[hidden email]> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve > > However, I think we can come up with a (maybe someday) testable hypothesis based on hidden states. In principle, if EricC's principle is taken seriously, the inner world of a black box device will be *completely* represented on its surface (ala the holographic principle). Any information not exhibited by a black box's *behavior* will be lost/random. > > This implies something about the compressibility and information content of the black box's behavior, right? > > On 5/5/20 10:38 AM, Prof David West wrote: >> This does not advance an argument against the possibility of a computer thinking — merely an assertion that "behavior" is not a valid basis upon which to argue that they do. > > > -- > ☣ uǝlƃ > > .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ... > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > > > .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ... > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ... 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Re: Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve
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In reply to this post by gepr
On 5/5/20 5:40 PM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote:
So, in state space reconstruction, it seems, we're attempting to infer a structure that is *as* expressive as the data we feed it, similar I guess to deep learning or genetic programming. All the sci-fi movies focus on the brain (or maybe even the CNS). But what I'd like to see is something like FPGA where the dynamically programmable "sleeve" (as in Altered Carbon) is hooked to one end of a harness and the "original" is hooked to the other end ... like a motion capture suit but with way more pathways. Then the "sleeve" is re-configured/programmed over some relatively short period. Like the original has to wear the suit for a 24 hour period ... paying bills, making coffee, having sex, etc. Then, at the end of the process, the sleeve is configured to be as expressive as the original ... at least in so far as the data taken during that period. We couldn't use such things for long-term duplication. But it would be great for, say, giving speeches. We could take a Donald Trump sleeve, *program* it with Barack Obama, and abracadabra we have a real president who can get through a 30 minute speech without screwing it up. Yeh... but what about his long-form Birth Certificate, huh?
<crude-reference trigger-alert> And I won't even go into
what Melania would get out of the deal! Even Stormy might give
the money back and ask for "do-overs"? </crude references> <anecdotal self-aggrandizing technical discursion> My last major failed project was an "omnistereoscopic" camera I was (making plans/designs) to fit FPGAs between all 52 cameras (200%+ coverage over the 4Pi steradians) to do realtime lens-correction/stitching with the intention of being able to *resample* the implied sampled lightfield for myriad purposes, military, industrial and entertainment. The FPGA inter-camera fabric was the most efficient for the purpose for lots for lots of reasons, but was also quite a bit more processing power than was needed. Not only could it have included an array (even denser?) of microphones but there would have been leftover power to do semantic segmenting up to some level. Another layer of "deep learning" behind the semantic segmentation and viola! Petavision! The Patent holder Micoy I was working with got
bought by Digital Domain leaving my accounts receiveable
unsurprisingly in line behind the friends-and-family investors,
partly because i wasn't willing to sign on to their non-competes
and was fixated for my own reasons on going forward with open
SW/HW solutions like the elphel 393 which NOW comes
with a dual-core ARM and FPGA integrated on each camera board and
GigE for intercamera comms... I can't tell what DD has done
with the patents but they do have a big *claim*
in the VR space, including (visual) streaming/capture. so... "Assume a spherical sensory sleeve"
meets
just need to add temperature, chemical (smell/taste), and pressure sensors to the surface and viola, glen's "sleeve"! </nonsense what if's> - Steve
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Re: Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve
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OMG, Cornavirus did escape from a lab, and it was Steve’s!
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Re: Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve
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Marcus noted: I always referred to it as a "Harbor Mine". This BTW is not my preferred camera layout... just the one the
patent-holder believed was optimal (back when computer cycles were
expensive circa 1995). Meridianal rather than geodesic. Your reference lead me to look into what the COVID19 morphology
actually is... the canonical images we all see seem to be computer
renderings with a lot more symmetry (and roughly one single size)
than the few electron micrographs I see suggest.... But the
"nominal" reference "diagram" has a very similar number of
peplomers to our "cameras" on the prototype. Does anyone have a
better handle on the range of scales of COVID19 in the wild?
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Re: Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve
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In reply to this post by thompnickson2
So, all to the good.
> I do question the heuristic value of the idea of the impenetrable interior, but if somebody wants explore it as a scientific approach, even a pragmatist should be willing to explore its empirical implications. What are the scientific implications of believing that you have an inner life that is, in principle, impenetrable to observation by others? Let's explore those. By all means. I think at least Frank and Bruce are temped by that possibility. > > Or is the objection of another form: Do we have to be doing science all the time? Can't we just have fun SOME of the time? I think not the latter. I wrote out some horrible pages-long attempt to say something, and it was so awful I hope it will shame me into doing the work I should be doing for the rest of the day, instead of posting to lists. But I think what I was after is that the way one says things can sometimes preempt what one is able to say. There can be information content in formulaic agreements that certain communities settle on, about what they think they have to say, and one can’t just toss out the formula and replace it with constructions in which their claims are inexpressible, without at least admitting that they are being rejected out of hand. When I listen to the phenomenologists, whom I can’t understand but can parrot, I think they are saying they can refer to a big field of “experience”, and within that field, there is a difference in ways of experiencing — different kinds of “how” — particularly between experience-of-objects and experience-as-a-subject. This “how” dimension is not of the same kind, they would say, as the distinction between experience-of one object and experience-of another. So the fact that this whole thread has been framed in terms of different experiences-of seems to me like it rules out of discussion the main thing they claim they have to say. i.e., experience-of another person’s state of mind versus experience-of some simply operationalized behavior; that kind of framing. (And I know this thread didn’t claim to be about phenomenology; I will circle back to why I brought it in here.) The challenge with all this is that the distinction dwells in the prepositions. As Ray Jackendoff reminds us, prepositions are the worst things to translate and the least stable elements, because they cobble together the groupings we don’t really have systems for. Certainly I dislike much of what I see from Hard Problem people, because they seem to want to express an objection that can’t be answered, by construction, which seems to me like preening. But if I had to take responsibility for arguing their position, I would say that they too are arguing there is a different dimension of “how” one experiences, between experience-of-objects and experience-as-subjects. The reason I talk about how one says things is that, when they say “What is it like to be a bat”, they are using something that is not explanatory in itself as an English construction (clearly so), but has been accepted by a certain community as a conventional form, which I think intends to point to the same “how”-distinction as the phenomenologists’ experience-of versus experience-as. If you simply reject that there is any information content in their choice to settle on that distinction — which they merely signal in formulaic speech — and say “Look how awkward that locution is. What they should have said, what they _mean_, is `What is a bat like’, and then go off on a neo-Skinnerian deconstruction showing that they can only mean what your framing allows them to mean, then the point at which you rejected their premise was not in the answer, but in the refusal to suppose there was any basis for their way of putting the question. When I asked (in the earlier post) the question about when it is seeking an angle to tell the finger from the moon, and when it is a gambit to win a contest, and CRUCIALLY: whether those two are even distinguishable in some cases, I mean it as such. We always change the terms of framing, because that is how we parallax on whatever is on the other side of the language. But when the commitments inherent in the question are not in the “productive” part of the language and instead are somehow in its formulaic aspects, one can be refusing to engage de facto, while seeming to retain the terms de jure. For me, when I see these conversations that seem to have tangled themselves into an impasse, or when they seem now far from what I thought I understood as the topic, my impulse is to go back to the common-language that seemed to me the start of it all. The challenge is that common-language formulations present themselves as descriptions of reality, or of experience, or whatever, and certainly I do not take them as such at all. They are part of a signaling system _within_ the larger coordinated socio-cognitive “us”. So it is not surprising that often the common-language locations are unusable as formal description. But if they think they point to a distinction, which is encoded all cryptically in who-knows-what aspects of the discourse, how are we to best respond to that claim? In the Rota lectures that I linked a while ago, he has a line in there that irritates me in all the usual ways. Referring to exactly this distinction, he says “Of course we can’t talk about [what we are talking about]; we can only babble around it.” (This has to do with what phenomenologists call the Hermeneutic circle, and probably many others before them.). DaveW wrote nearly the same thing in a post maybe a month ago (or three?). This is standard stock, as far as I can tell, in what I am told by every Eastern-traditions person I have ever met. Jack Nicholson just needs to write on the chalkboard 100 times “The Dao that can be told is not the Dao”. (Of course it is actually much worse than the Hard Problem when one gets to either the phenomenologists or the Eastern-traditions people: they would both say that experience-of and experience-as, both objects and subjects, are constructions within some larger field — I think the keyword is “the transcendental subject” — so however obscure the hard-problem people already believed it is, the meditation-oriented philosophers want to claim it is much more obscure than that, in the sense of being resistant to linguistic rendering. But let me put all that to the side other than acknowledging that it is there.) So, again, what are we to do? Suppose that they actually aren’t saying _anything_? For the religious people talking about God as an empirical part of nature, I’m fine with that resolution. But if there is anything that getting slapped by complex subjects has made me believe, it is that there is far less that we can formalize than the richness that we think we can catch out of the corner of our eyes, and informal language may signal a lot of it. It can take considerable empathy to notice the bizarre ways informal language can carry information; any syntactician will be sensitive to that challenge. So, to get to the point before this spirals into another nightmare, I had always taken a less cutesy formulation of the hard problem to be something along the lines of: Does the prepositional dichotomy between experiece-of and experience-as reflect anything real in what one wants to mean by “experience” at all? Is it a difference of kind from all the differences we do formalize between experiences-of different objects? If so, how do we capture in a satisfying way that difference in kind, and what the experience-as-subject then refers to as the “other” part of the dichotomy? I think this is not so far from implying other things that have been said in this thread: one of the features I attach to experience-as is that it is part of what is meant by “me”, so if I knew what either term referred to, I should still be able to conclude that “me” is the only one whom I can “experience-as-subject”. We now have two undefined terms rather than one, but at least there is a constraint between them that we would like to believe will hold. But it has never seemed to me that modeling-the-other-as-object was at the center of what Hard Problem people want to be after; it seems like a corollary. Yuck. This is what happens when I can’t drag an answer out of the silly easy things I am supposed to know; I fritter away time writing about things I don’t know anything about. Eric > > Nick > > Nicholas Thompson > Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology > Clark University > [hidden email] > https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of David Eric Smith > Sent: Tuesday, May 5, 2020 4:54 PM > To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]> > Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve > > I think the phenomenologists would claim that until you have realized that all worlds are only “inner worlds”, you haven’t properly interpreted the informal use of the word “world” into a philosophically serious frame. > > Of course they are Continental Philosophers. So one has the option to simply refuse to use any of the patterns or forms that they try to use consistently, and replace anything they say _in the way they say it_ with something else that oneself says _in some different way_, and then claim that when said in the different way, the point they were trying to make cannot be sensible, by construction. > > I have on many occasions wondered what is the balance between rephrasing to get more angles on a question, versus rephrasing to insist on a scheme in which the question is unexpressible. The former is an essential act of reason and discourse; the latter is a refusal to cooperate and a gambit to win a contest. For any given statement, are we sure that it can be assigned to one and not the other? > > Eric > > > >> On May 6, 2020, at 4:35 AM, [hidden email] wrote: >> >> Hi,Glen, >> >> Careful. Isn't the formulation "inner world" entirely contradictory? >> >> N >> >> Nicholas Thompson >> Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology Clark University >> [hidden email] https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/ >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Friam <[hidden email]> On Behalf Of u?l? ? >> Sent: Tuesday, May 5, 2020 12:50 PM >> To: FriAM <[hidden email]> >> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve >> >> However, I think we can come up with a (maybe someday) testable hypothesis based on hidden states. In principle, if EricC's principle is taken seriously, the inner world of a black box device will be *completely* represented on its surface (ala the holographic principle). Any information not exhibited by a black box's *behavior* will be lost/random. >> >> This implies something about the compressibility and information content of the black box's behavior, right? >> >> On 5/5/20 10:38 AM, Prof David West wrote: >>> This does not advance an argument against the possibility of a computer thinking — merely an assertion that "behavior" is not a valid basis upon which to argue that they do. >> >> >> -- >> ☣ uǝlƃ >> >> .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ... >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ >> >> >> .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ... >> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv >> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam >> unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com >> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ >> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > > > .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ... > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > > > .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ... > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ... 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Re: Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve
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In reply to this post by gepr
An observation that might lead to a testable hypothesis of embodied mind:
High school students spent the morning, in a classroom, learning comparative fractions, taking tests that proved they could solve this kind of problem. In the afternoon the went across the street to the supermarket and asked to decide which was the better buy: 12 ounces at $2 or 18 ounces at $4. Individuals who score 100% in the classroom, were able to solve the problem in the grocery story less than 50% of the time. Tailors in Morocco spend their days laying out patterns on bolts of cloth and are sufficiently skilled at this tiling problem their wastage is less than 2%. Removed from the bazaar, installed in a classroom, and given scaled paper cutouts and paper bolt of cloth, they could not do better than 15% wastage. I remember reading about similar situations involving car mechanics and reading comprehension (ebook versus paper). The material is in the anthropology literature - Jean Lave comes to mind as possible author, Ettiene Wegner - but not at all sure I am remembering correctly. The authors suggested that "knowledge" was somehow stored in "context" with context quite literally being the physical environment in which the person was learning. How to design a controlled experiment??? davew On Tue, May 5, 2020, at 4:04 PM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote: > Thanks. I've read the Chemero one. And I've read something by Hutto, > but I don't think it was that. Regardless, my (maybe testable) > hypothesis is what I'm interested in: > > If a black box demonstrates behavior that can't be captured by any > (known) algorithm, then that would be an indication that something > (unmodelable) was happening inside the black box. And that unmodelable > thing might be called "thinking". > > We can extend that, I think, to "surprising behavior", which I think > gets at what we usually mean by "thinking". If a black box demonstrates > a long memory with not-quite-but-almost predictable behavior, then we > might accuse it of thinking. > > Both would be counter-examples to Dave's assertion. > > On 5/5/20 2:55 PM, Eric Charles wrote: > > So, there are a few varieties of that right now, that are trying to get along well together. Emobidied Cognition, Enactivism, Ecological Psychlogy, Extended Cognition, etc. As a starting point for that work, especially for the more mathematically inclined, I recommend "Radical Embodied Cognitive Science" by Tony Chemero <http://psychsciencenotes.blogspot.com/2011/02/new-reading-group-chemero-2009-radical.html>, for the more philosophically inclined, I recommend "Radicalizing Enactivism" by Dan Hutto <https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/radicalizing-enactivism>, and for the more general thinker interested in an overview of cool ideas I recommend "Beyond the Brain" by Louise Barrett <http://fixingpsychology.blogspot.com/2012/01/beyond-brain-review-out.html>. > > -- > ☣ uǝlƃ > > .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- > ... .... . ... > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ... FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ |
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Excellent examples! For controlled experiments, though, I'd prefer to avoid testing subjects most people already think of as having an inside context ("inner world", experience-as, "what it's like to be a", etc. for anyone who might be triggered by the word "context" >8^). So, I wouldn't want to experiment on humans. Animals would be better. (My mom still doesn't believe animals have souls.) Bacteria would be good. Viruses might even be the best, given our current context.
Surely the "zero intelligence" literature has some suggestions for good experimental subjects. People often talk of the social insects as if they don't have minds. But maybe that's too far the other way? My inclination would be to use something for which we have a somewhat decent computational analog. C. elegans <http://openworm.org/> might be a pretty good choice. There's a paper by Shalizi or Crutchfield, maybe, that talks about tradeoffs between space and time in computation that I'm pretty sure was posted on this list at some point. That type of evaluation criteria applied to both the computational model of C. elegans and the actual worm would, I think, come close to testing this "holographic" principle expressed by EricC. I'll try to find that tradeoff paper. On 5/6/20 6:06 AM, Prof David West wrote: > An observation that might lead to a testable hypothesis of embodied mind: > > High school students spent the morning, in a classroom, learning comparative fractions, taking tests that proved they could solve this kind of problem. In the afternoon the went across the street to the supermarket and asked to decide which was the better buy: 12 ounces at $2 or 18 ounces at $4. Individuals who score 100% in the classroom, were able to solve the problem in the grocery story less than 50% of the time. > > Tailors in Morocco spend their days laying out patterns on bolts of cloth and are sufficiently skilled at this tiling problem their wastage is less than 2%. Removed from the bazaar, installed in a classroom, and given scaled paper cutouts and paper bolt of cloth, they could not do better than 15% wastage. > > I remember reading about similar situations involving car mechanics and reading comprehension (ebook versus paper). > > The material is in the anthropology literature - Jean Lave comes to mind as possible author, Ettiene Wegner - but not at all sure I am remembering correctly. > > The authors suggested that "knowledge" was somehow stored in "context" with context quite literally being the physical environment in which the person was learning. > > How to design a controlled experiment??? -- ☣ uǝlƃ .-. .- -. -.. --- -- -..-. -.. --- - ... -..-. .- -. -.. -..-. -.. .- ... .... . ... FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
uǝʃƃ ⊥ glen
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Re: Warring Darwinians for Glen, Steve
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In reply to this post by David Eric Smith
EricS The language "experience as" versus "experience of" will be very useful in one-on-one conversations with Nick if he will tolerate them. But also in conversations with various people about differents modalities of psychotherapy. Thank you very much. Frank On Wed, May 6, 2020 at 12:07 AM David Eric Smith <[hidden email]> wrote: So, all to the good. Frank Wimberly
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