Theories of behavior

[John Kennison]

Russ,

I agree that the question of what it means to say a person "acts as of deeply hurt" is not easy to answer. For example, some people would become non-communicative while others would communicate aggressively, so how do I come up with a third-person description of acting as if deeply hurt?. I would have to rely on an elaborate theory that would determine, from a person's history of past behavior and a large sample of current behavior that the person is, for example, depressed.  (I'm not certain if current psychological theory is stated that way.)

This suggests a question for Nick
Suppose that in analyzing behavior, we found that the rules (or probabilistic rules) governing behavior were greatly simplified if we assumed that the person could be in various states that resembled what we usually think of as psychological states, such as depression, fear, elation, etc.  Would this count as evidence for inner states?
---John
________________________________________
From: Russ Abbott [[hidden email]]
Sent: Friday, June 19, 2009 10:57 AM
To: John Kennison
Cc: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group; [hidden email]; [hidden email]
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Nick and dishonest behavior

As I wrote to Nick directly, I think Nick is gracious and kind and a man of great integrity.

But this doesn't make sense to me: "We don't have to believe in inner minds to say that a person accused of dishonesty behaves as if deeply hurt." What could it possibly mean to say that a person is deeply hurt if there is no such thing as first person experience?  And if there is no such thing as being deeply hurt in a first person way, what could it possibly mean to say that someone is behaving as if deeply hurt?

This suggests that it is very dangerous to claim that there is no first person experience and that observable behavior is all there is. It would encourage "treating people as objects" because that's exactly the position it takes. An attitude of this sort would seem to discard millennia of progress in our understanding and acceptance of what ethical human-to-human interaction consists of.

-- Russ



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[Nick Thompson]

 Comments below

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology,
Clark University ([hidden email])
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

> [Original Message]
> From: John Kennison <[hidden email]>
> To: [hidden email] <[hidden email]>
> Cc: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[hidden email]>; [hidden email] <[hidden email]>; [hidden email] <[hidden email]>
> Date: 6/20/2009 6:05:58 AM
> Subject: Theories of behavior
>
>
> Russ,
>
> I agree that the question of what it means to say a person "acts as of deeply hurt" is not easy to answer. For example, some people would become non-communicative while others would communicate aggressively, so how do I come up with a third-person description of acting as if deeply hurt?. I would have to rely on an elaborate theory that would determine, from a person's history of past behavior and a large sample of current behavior that the person is, for example, depressed.

nst --> Here is where I argue for a holistic behaviorism.  Many of the terms that we use involve category errors ... they appear to refer to one kind of thing, rather than to another quite different kind of thing.  They display "misplaced concreteness".  "Being angry" is a small piece of a much larger pattern of emotionality that we have to be in contact with before we can recognise any of its pieces.  To experience the anger of another person you have to have experienced their other stuff.  We often talk as if is possible to recognise anger in the instant case in oneself and others, but actually perception of any  particular anger-related act or event requires a much larger history with the person to which the emotion is attributed. 

 

The problem is similar to the problem of recognizing adaptation in nature.  We talk as if a particular creature is adapted to a particular environment, yet the primary experience that makes that attribution possible is an array of creatures in relation to an array of environments. That is why evolution was advanced so rapidly when people started climbing on boats and wandering around the world collecting stuff.   

 

(I'm not certain if current psychological theory is stated that way.)

>
> This suggests a question for Nick
> Suppose that in analyzing behavior, we found that the rules (or probabilistic rules) governing behavior were greatly simplified if we assumed that the person could be in various states that resembled what we usually think of as psychological states, such as depression, fear, elation, etc.  Would this count as evidence for inner states?

 

nst --> This is exactly Dennett's position in the "intentional stance", no??? Perhaps he remains agnostic on your last step.  But I am ducking your question.

 

Theories can have two virtues:  likeliness and loveliness.  You are saying, if "inner life" theory could be shown to be likely, would I love it?  And the answer is, No.  It also has to be lovely.  I.E., it has to be deployed in a manner that is internally consistent and grammatical. 

 

 

 

> ---John
> ________________________________________
> From: Russ Abbott [[hidden email]]
> Sent: Friday, June 19, 2009 10:57 AM
> To: John Kennison
> Cc: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group; [hidden email]; [hidden email]
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Nick and dishonest behavior
>
> As I wrote to Nick directly, I think Nick is gracious and kind and a man of great integrity.
>
> But this doesn't make sense to me: "We don't have to believe in inner minds to say that a person accused of dishonesty behaves as if deeply hurt." What could it possibly mean to say that a person is deeply hurt if there is no such thing as first person experience?  And if there is no such thing as being deeply hurt in a first person way, what could it possibly mean to say that someone is behaving as if deeply hurt?
>
> This suggests that it is very dangerous to claim that there is no first person experience and that observable behavior is all there is. It would encourage "treating people as objects" because that's exactly the position it takes. An attitude of this sort would seem to discard millennia of progress in our understanding and acceptance of what ethical human-to-human interaction consists of.
>
> -- Russ
>

============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
lectures, archives, unsubscribe, maps at http://www.friam.org